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
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THE BAPTIST QUARTERLY.

THE EDUCATION THAT WE NEED.

The Culture Demanded by Modern Life; A Series of Addresses and Arguments on the Claims of Scientific Education; with an Introduction on Mental Discipline in Education. By E. L. YOUNG. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867.

Essays on a Liberal Education. Edited by Rev. F. W. FARRAR, M. A., F. R. S., Assistant Master at Harrow, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Hon. Fellow of King's College, London. London: Macmillan & Co. 1867.

Liberal Education in England. Edinburgh Review, January, 1868.

Bible Teachings in Nature. By Rev. HUGH McMILLAN, Author of *First Forms of Vegetation*. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867.

College Education. An Address delivered before the Literary Societies of the Eclectic Institute, at Hiram, Ohio, June 14, 1867. By Hon. JAMES A. GARFIELD, M. C.

Reports and Documents Relating to Cornell University.

Faraday as a Discoverer. By JOHN TYNDALL. London. 1868.

THE reformers of Great Britain say to the Established Church: "We do not propose to rob you of your rights. We would not debar any who desire it, from worshipping God according to the Anglican forms, nor tax your members for the support of any other sect. But we cannot longer consent that you shall enjoy your own liberties and other people's beside. We propose to put you upon your rights, and to give to you, as to all the sects, perfect equality before the law."

Somewhat similar, it appears to us, should be the position held by the intelligent friends of education, in reference to the various branches of learning which claim a share of the time allotted to human life. To none of you," it may be said, "will we do any injustice. We will know neither favoritism, nor prejudice. To each, to

all, the opportunity is afforded to array your arguments, and to plead your cause, before the intelligence of the nineteenth century, and to receive all to which you can establish your claim."

And this, if we understand them correctly, is the position of the writers whose works on education are named above.

Professor Youmans has gathered the opinions of many eminent men of our times, upon the subject indicated by the title of his volume. These testimonies have been given in a variety of forms and on different occasions. From this circumstance has almost invariably resulted a want of entire unity. For example, the several authors, who are cited, use the word "science" with a varying signification, some regarding the term as including only natural science, while others attach to it the widest possible interpretation, and treat it as embracing all branches of human knowledge which have been reduced to a system. Yet had the several authors written in concert, it is doubtful if the work would have been as interesting, or, on the whole, as impressive. There might have been an appearance of an intention to make out a case; some discredit would perhaps have been cast upon the unanimity with which these authors, speaking at different times and representing different nationalities, express the conviction that the study of the ancient languages, as now pursued, is entirely inadequate to meet the educational wants of the age; that we must adapt our system of instruction to the nature of the human mind, and must more fully recognize the claims of natural, political and mental science.

Professor Youmans has rendered a valuable service to the cause of education by putting these papers into a permanent form, and rendering them accessible to the general public, and has produced a volume worthy the careful study of every one who is engaged in forming the minds of others, or, indeed, in forming his own mind.

Although in the work just mentioned, the testimony of President Barnard, of Dr. Whewell, and of Lord Macaulay, is in marked accordance with that of Tyndall and Faraday, yet in a majority of cases the citations are from men who have made natural science a specialty, and who have never enjoyed the advantages of any of the seats of classical learning.

Not unfrequently the arguments of such men are met by the remark, "You but undervalue a learning which you do not possess. It is your ignorance of the classical culture which leads you to depreciate it." To this amiable and courteous reply, two rejoinders, as it seems to us, are available. Is it not possible, it might be said, that you too, who exalt classical learning at the expense of the scientific

culture, are ignorant of the studies which you decry? Dr. Paget remarks ("The Culture Demanded," p. 418).

An author of great distinction and undoubted learning, whose writings have been rewarded with the applause of the educated world, and with some of the highest dignities in the gift of the Crown, states as a "well-attested fact that a man's body is lighter when he is awake than sleeping; a fact [he says] which every nurse who has carried a child would be able to attest;" and concludes from these *well attested facts* that "the human consciousness, as an inner centre, works as an opposing force to the attraction of the earth." I quote from a seventh edition, *revised*.

We venture to add, from our own limited experience, that we not long since met a graduate of the oldest college in America, a classical instructor and an ardent champion of classical studies, who stontly maintained that ice, or snow, could not possibly fall below 32° Fahrenheit. We learned recently that one of our most eminent colleges was sending out its graduates without having given them a single lesson in geology. We lately heard a graduate, a young man, expressing to a really able and (as things go,) well-informed person, (one of the most strenuous advocates of the classics that we ever saw,) his regret that when in college he had spent but a portion of a short term of eight weeks in the study of geology. Our classical friend replied, with perfect seriousness, "Well, I presume that in that time you learned all that is to be known about geology!"

And the most remarkable fact in the premises is that the education which has these results is advocated as being a *symmetrical* education. The classicists never cease to say: "we must have men of large, rounded minds—we must not have a one-sided development." And by way of imparting a symmetrical culture, they demand that two or three years of preparatory study, and perhaps 66 per cent of the college course, shall be given to Latin and Greek, while one term is given to chemistry, possibly a term to physiology (though not always even as much as that), and a similar period to ethics and political economy. The result is that the graduate, with whatever knowledge of the minutiae of Latin and Greek grammar, is often unable to give a correct account of the circulation of the blood, of the philosophy of the stereoscope, of the principles of banking, or the laws of national wealth, is as ignorant of botany and palæontology as the most eminent scientist can possibly be of the minute points of Greek or Latin inflection or prosody. And all this is urged and advocated as, *par excellence*, the symmetrical training.

Or, again, it might be rejoined, "Is it alone the men destitute

of classical learning who are disposed to doubt the educational power of the classical studies, or it is not true rather that the strongest protests against the manner and the extent of our classical study have proceeded from men who have fully tested the system which they condemn?"

To this inquiry an answer is afforded in the "Essays on a Liberal Education." Of this work, the *Edinburgh Review* says:

By far the most copious and valuable contribution yet offered to the cause of educational reform is contained in the remarkable volume of "Essays on a Liberal Education." What gives peculiar weight to the opinions so boldly expressed and so ably advocated in this book, is the fact that all the contributors to it are men who have themselves passed with peculiar credit and distinction through the entire process of the system [of classical education, as pursued at the English universities.] . . . Four of these essayists have been Senior Classics at Cambridge, one of them Senior Wrangler. All, without exception, have taken high class degrees and are fellows of their colleges at one or the other of the great English universities. Two of them have been university examiners, and there is not a single university prize, classical or literary, which has not been gained by one or another of their number.

Several of the essayists have long been and still are teachers at some of the most celebrated public schools of England.

And what, we naturally ask, is the testimony which these nine most credible and competent witnesses bear, in regard to the system of instruction pursued at Oxford and Cambridge, and imperfectly imitated in America? They condemn it in the most decisive and unequivocal terms. Their language, though in the same direction, is far stronger than that used by the eminent men of science cited by Professor Youmans. The latter, though speaking from strong conviction, have yet no private or personal grievance against the classics; but the authors of the essays write, not only under the inspiration of a general conviction, but with a deep and painful sense that they have been robbed of many of the best years of their lives; while some of them have the added remembrance of having in their turn unintentionally repeated, in the case of others, the wrongs formerly done to themselves. Nothing but experience could enable any one to speak with the profound feeling expressed by Mr. Farrar in his essay on "Greek and Latin Verse Composition."

When we consider how little, at the end, our schoolboys know, and how vast are the regions of science with which they are wholly unacquainted; how valueless is much of their little knowledge, how dangerous is the nature of their ignorance; and above all, how rich in fruit

might have been those many barren hours which have been lavished on the impotent effort to acquire a merely elegant accomplishment,—then I confess that my regret deepens into sorrow, indignation, and shame. Is it pleasant to know that the first thing of which an old pupil may think, when he meets us in after life, is the little intellectual cause he has for gratitude towards men who occupied his boyhood by teaching him that which he has not only long forgotten, but to reach which he would not now take the trouble to raise his little finger? [p. 217.]

And again,

If in any part of this essay I appear to use strong language, let me frankly ask pardon for it beforehand, as having sprung from the pent-up bitterness of twelve years' experience. Those who know what leisure is, and who can afford to while it away in writing Latin Verse, are apt in the beauty of the exotic to forget its costliness. They forget that they are admiring the flowers—and after all they are but fruitless flowers!—of the one productive seed which has here and there survived its countless abortive brethren. The aspect of Latin Verse to the classical scholar who recurs to it as the light amusement of his manhood, is very different from that which it wears to the weary teacher, who has wasted so many of his own and his pupils' precious hours in the hopeless task of attempting to make poets of the many. [p. 211.]

It may indeed be urged that these remarks do not apply to our colleges, for they have never gone to the extreme of folly reached by the universities of England. It is indeed true that our colleges have not been able to be insensible to the all present, all pervading influence of the American spirit, to the genius of our democratic institutions. Yet it cannot be denied that it was not without justice that Professor Atkinson, (himself a classical instructor of many years' experience,) on the title page of his "Address on Classical Education in the Public Schools of England," inscribed the motto *Mutato nomine, de te fabula narratur*. 2/

As the volume is not probably accessible to the great body of American readers, we subjoin a list of the subjects and the authors of the essays:

ESSAY I.—*On the History of Classical Education*. By CHARLES STUART PARKER, M. A., Fellow of University College, Oxford.

ESSAY II.—*The Theory of Classical Education*. By HENRY SIDGWICK, M. A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.

ESSAY III.—*Liberal Education in Universities*. By JOHN SEELEY, M. A., Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge, and Professor of Latin in University College, London.

ESSAY IV.—*On Teaching by Means of Grammar*. By E. E. BOWEN,

M. A., Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Assistant Master at Harrow.

ESSAY V.—*On Greek and Latin Verse Composition as a General Branch of Education.* By the Rev. F. W. FARRAR, M. A., F. R. S.

ESSAY VI.—*On Teaching Natural Science in Schools.* By J. M. WILSON, M. A., F. G. S., F. R. A. S., Assistant Master in Rugby School, and Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge.

ESSAY VII.—*The Teaching of English.* By J. W. HALES, M. A., Late Fellow and Assistant Tutor of Christ's College, Cambridge.

ESSAY VIII.—*On the Education of the Reasoning Faculties.* By W. JOHNSON, M. A., Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, and Assistant Master at Eton.

ESSAY IX.—*On the Present Social Results of Classical Education.* By LORD HOUGHTON, M. A., Trinity College, Cambridge, and Hon. D. C. L., Oxford.

† Without doing the eminent essayists the injustice of attempting to give a skeleton of the views presented by them, merely expressing the hope that some one among our publishers will have the enterprise to reproduce the volume, may we venture to express in brief our own view of "The Education that we Need."

We have before intimated our belief that the question of the comparative value of various studies, and of the differing modes of prosecuting them, is to be settled by appeal to fact, to experience, to argument. It will, perhaps, effect an economy of time, if we spend a moment in stating what (in our opinion), are *not* arguments in the premises.

And *first*, it is not argument to urge that a particular study, or mode of study, has been in use from immemorial time, that it was the child and favorite of the ages most properly called dark. It may certainly be understood that the nineteenth century, with its weight of experience, is as competent to provide for itself, as was the sixteenth century to provide for it. Professor Youmans justly remarks in his valuable introductory essay on "Mental Discipline in Education," "All educational inquiries assume that man is individually improvable, and therefore collectively progressive." If we are to go on the basis of antiquity and long-established usage, surely nothing human is more venerable than sin.

Again, we may count out of the list of valid arguments that which we may venture, for want of a better name, to call the argument *de non existentibus*. If a certain thing does not exist, it is idle to base a process of reasoning, or a course of action, upon its existence. If a result does not follow, it is idle to argue from its sequence. If the current course of classical study does not produce on the part of the

pupil any acquaintance with the classical literature, or any love for it, it seems idle to argue for the pursuit of the classics from the richness of this literature and its value to the student. Probably both experience and observation would lead the great body of classically educated persons to feel that Mr. Sidgwick, in his invaluable essay, speaks with great moderation, and in words even more applicable to America than to England, when he says,

It will not be denied that in the English, French and German languages (I only omit Italian because it is rarely taught at schools, and I am not prepared to recommend that it should be more generally taught), there is a sufficiency of good literature to fill the leisure of a person engaged in any active calling, a sufficiency of works calculated to give a high kind of enjoyment, and to cultivate, very adequately, the literary taste. And if such a person was ever visited by a painful hankering after the time-honored volumes that were sealed to him, he might console himself by taking note how often his contemporaries who had enjoyed a complete classical education, were in the habit of taking down these master-pieces from their shelves. For I cannot help thinking that classical literature, in spite of its enormous prestige, has very little attraction for the mass even of cultivated persons at the present day. I wish statistics could be obtained of the amount of Latin and Greek read in any year (except for professional purposes), even by those who have gone through a complete classical curriculum. From the information that I have been able privately to obtain, I incline to think that such statistics, when compared with the fervent admiration with which we all still speak of the classics, upon every opportunity, would be found rather startling. [p. 106.]

That this should be the case is scarcely matter for wonder. Mr. Clark (an eminent classical advocate), remarks (in the *Cambridge Essays*, as quoted by Mr. Sidgwick), "It is a strong recommendation to any subject to affirm that it is dry and distasteful." And the educational re-actionists never cease iterating that a man's dislike to any particular study affords a strong reason why he should be compelled to give to this study the largest share of his time and attention.

We cannot but think that the conservatives are less original in this view than might appear. Have they sufficiently acknowledged their indebtedness, for their golden rule in education, to Mr. Bumble, the beadle, immortalized in *Oliver Twist*?

"Don't you think out-of-door relief a very bad thing any way, Mr. Bumble," said Mrs. Corney. "You are a gentleman of experience and ought to know. Come." "Mrs. Corney," said the beadle, smiling as men smile when they are conscious of superior information, "out-of-door relief, properly managed,—properly managed, ma'am,—is the parochial safe-guard. The great principle of out-of-door relief is to give the

paupers exactly what they don't want, and then they get tired of coming."

The principle announced by Mr. Clark and the champions of the classics may be very just (though we believe it to be the wildest folly), but the advocate of classical culture, after imposing studies, on the express ground of their being repulsive to the student, is surely concluded from the privilege of being surprised, at the pupil's abandonment of these studies, as soon as he is free to choose for himself.

Once more: that is not quite a valid argument which is drawn from a view of the *absolute* value of any study, without a comparison being instituted between it and the other competing branches of knowledge. When Lord Clive, after the battle of Plassey, was ushered into the treasury of Bengal, where he "walked between heaps of gold, and silver, crowned with rubies and diamonds, and was at liberty to help himself," if he had filled his hands with silver only, no doubt he would have been wiser and better off than if he had come away empty handed. But the inevitable question would be, why not have chosen gold, or jewels, when they were equally at his disposal? It is not between the classics and entire ignorance that the comparison lies, for of course any thing is better than mental stagnation. The real question is, "Shall the very limited time allotted to education be given to one study or to another?"

Again, it is not quite a valid process of argumentation to urge that because the acquirement of one of the classical languages confers a given amount of benefit, therefore the acquisition of both the classic tongues will confer a double amount of good. When we have learned one foreign language, and have compared it with our own, we have exhausted a very large proportion of the *disciplinary* value found in linguistic study. To imagine that the acquisition of another tongue will confer a corresponding benefit is as unfounded as to imagine that because a wife is a gift of unspeakable value therefore two wives would duplicate the blessing.

Again, it does not seem argument to claim for certain studies a place in a *liberal* and *non-professional* education, while urging this claim on grounds that apply only to a *technical* and *special* education. When the advocate of science asks that a thorough course (*e. g.* of geology) may have a place in the college curriculum, he is told, "This is all technical and special. Our aim is, not to make mining engineers, or analysts, but to make men of enlarged and liberal culture." But when it is asked in turn, "Why do Latin and Greek demand and receive so large a share of consideration in the preparatory and college course?" it is answered, "without a knowledge of Greek, the

clergyman cannot read his New Testament in the original tongue; without a knowledge of Latin the lawyer cannot read the Institutes of Justinian." All very true, and unanswerable as an argument for making these a part of a *special* education, but to urge, *on these grounds*, that the classics should form a compulsory part of a *liberal* education does not seem quite according to Aristotle.

Lastly, we feel compelled to add, abuse is not argument; calling names is not argument; neither is violent and unproved assertion; or taking the thing to be proved as a part of the proof. We beg pardon for saying all this, which probably we should not have done, but for meeting recently with the following passage in the *New Englander*, occurring in an article by an ardent and, no doubt, able advocate of the classics. We take the liberty to italicise a few of the clauses, as in an eminent degree illustrating the felicities of speech, which we have enumerated as not constituting arguments.

It is our settled conviction that a liberal education is to be distinguished from all forms of special or technical education, whatever value may belong to these in their place. And the fundamental parts of a liberal education it is not left to fancy or choice to determine. The *constitution of things*, and the *course of history*, as well as the structure of the human mind, define what these shall be. The study of the classical languages and literature is a *leading, essential, indispensable part of such a scheme of education*. The clamor which we are now hearing about "heathen learning" and "dead languages" is the *outcry*, to a great extent, of *ignorance and superficiality*. The proper study of mankind is man; and man is to be known through the study of history and literature. The foundation in this study, as well as the necessary key to large attainments in it, lies in the knowledge of the Latin and Greek. The *disciplinary and humanizing* influence of classical studies is something of *inestimable* value, and which nothing else can provide. The modern languages and the physical sciences will not do the work that is *done by Latin and Greek*, and that appears even when the ancient tongues are deficiently taught. Mr. Lowe, a member of Parliament, has lately amused an Edinburgh audience by a lively piece of declamation against the accepted system of university training. . . . Mr. Lowe *could never have made* a speech having the rhetorical merits that belong to his late address had he been educated in the method which he recommends; and whatever brilliancy pertains to his harangue, he owes chiefly to the drill he has had in the branches which he decries. As for his *argument*, it is a *tissue of sparkling fallacies*.

May we beg leave to direct the attention of the *New Englander* to the words of Mr. Sidgwick.

I am not in a position to institute a close comparison of the efficacy of

the two kinds of study in educating those faculties of the mind which both in common call into exercise. It is much to be wished that some competent person, equally acquainted with languages and science, and with equal experience in teaching the rudiments of both, would carefully make such a comparison. At present the best exponents of the effect of either study generally speak of the other with comparative ignorance. *It is, perhaps, an indirect testimony to the advantage of scientific education that this ignorance is more frequently combined with contemptuous dogmatism in the case of the classical advocate.*

We do not, of course, imagine that this author will have any weight with the writer in the *New Englander*. Of course it is to be taken for granted that Mr. Sidgwick, in common with the remaining authors of the *Essays*, in common too with Tyndall, Huxley, Faraday, Spencer, Whewell, and President Barnard, are floating on the surface of "superficiality," or wallowing in the depths of "ignorance."

We cannot omit to observe that a marked contrast to the tone just animadverted on is presented by an article in the January number of *THE BAPTIST QUARTERLY*, from the pen of one who stands in the first rank of American philologists. The spirit and temper of the article are in themselves a high illustration of the culture which the author urges, while the arguments adduced present the classical side of the question in its strongest light. We may not indeed be able fully to agree with the writer in his conclusions, and some of his testimonies seem to us counterbalanced by equal authority on the opposite side. But all this in no degree lessens our sense of the value of the article as a contribution to the literature of the subject, nor can it render us forgetful of the obligations under which we personally, in common with hundreds of pupils, must ever remain to the distinguished scholar, who after a quarter of a century of eminent professional labor at Brown University and at the University of Michigan, has lately transferred his fame and his matured powers to the institution of Christian learning which at once owes and imparts renown to the metropolis of the northwest.

As we have intimated what are *not* arguments in the premises, it is perhaps fair that we should briefly indicate what *are* some of the grounds on which the question should be settled. In deciding upon the value of a particular study, or method of study, it seems to us that four questions may very properly be asked.

1st. What is its effect in enabling the pupil to earn a living for himself? If, by perfecting himself in a certain branch, the student is able to render himself of such value to the world as to command an ample support, while high attainments in another study will enable

him to secure a remuneration that scarcely suffices for his physical wants, surely the presumption lies with the former; and on the latter rests the burden of demonstrating that it possesses an overwhelming superiority upon other grounds, which more than balances this disadvantage, and which entitles it to claim the leading place in education. A livelihood, though not indeed the most momentous consideration, is certainly the first condition of success; it is the *ποῦ στῶ*, without which the wisest of men cannot move the world. To live well, usefully, honorably, one must, first of all, *live*.

A thorough classical education will enable its possessor to earn at his graduation, perhaps, \$500. From this point, under favorable circumstances, one out of a hundred graduates may rise to a classical professorship, at \$2,000 or \$2,500. We do not say that the salary of our classically educated men never exceeds this. Many of them, as clergymen, as authors, as instructors, as professional men, enjoy much larger incomes. It is not however to their classical training that they are indebted for these incomes, but rather to popular address, to aptitude in speech or in teaching, or to a variety of causes frequently very remote from their classical studies. A man who is thoroughly versed in any of the natural sciences, or who is master of the English language, can command his own terms.

II. A second criterion of the value of any study may be found by asking, What is its effect upon the powers of the human mind? Here, it appears to us, three points may properly be considered. First, What is the effect of any pursuit upon what we may call the personal elements of character, perseverance, industry, enthusiasm, endurance, the habit of success? Here we apprehend that more has been claimed for the classics than can be made good. It has been held that these studies, by reason of their difficulty, and in proportion to their difficulty, increase the energy and resolution of the student. There is here a semblance of truth, but (in our opinion) only a semblance. It is not alone by meeting difficulties, but by *meeting* and *conquering* them, that we cultivate the executive powers. The torrid zone deprives man of energy, because labor is not needed for human sustenance. But the frigid zone scarcely less effectually paralyses him, because labor is environed by insuperable hardships and attended by scanty rewards. It is beneath the temperate skies, where labor is neither needless nor fruitless, where obstacles indeed present themselves, but obstacles which are not beyond the human powers and which proffer a perpetual reward to him who overcomes them, it is here that the characters are born which regenerate and ennoble mankind. The powers of the lad will not be strengthened by the primer,

or by fairy tales, and almost as little by the *Mechanique Celeste* or *Longinus*. What is needed is a study that shall constantly inflame the curiosity, and stimulate the mind to new exertions, (to add, in their turn, fresh vigor to the powers), that shall train the student to the habit of success, and that shall reward him perpetually by the delicious sensation of victory, and of ever increasing knowledge.

Can any thing be more calculated to cut the sinews of the mind than the ceaseless encounter of obstacles which the student cannot master, over which he constantly spends time and energy, with no result save to habituate himself to failure; or which, after they have been mastered, are attended by no result of evident and unmistakable value? With great justice, Mr. Sidgwick remarks,

The advocates of classical education, while they rightly insist that educational studies should be capable of disciplining the mind forget that it is equally desirable that they should be capable of stimulating it. The extreme ascetics among them even deny this. . . . No doubt both mind and body must be kept a sufficient time in strong tension in order to grow to their full strength; but we find in the development of the body that this tension can be longest and most healthily maintained by means of exercises that are sought with avidity. . . . It will not be denied that the study of the external world does, on the whole, excite the youthful curiosity much more than the study of languages. The intellectual advantage of this ought to be set against whatever disciplinary superiority we may attribute to the latter instrument. On the moral advantage of substituting, as far as possible, the love of knowledge, as a nobler and purer motive, for emulation and the fear of punishment, I have not space to dilate; but it seems difficult to exaggerate the importance, though we may easily over-estimate the possibility of developing this sentiment.

Second; it is proper to consider the comparative effect of the competing studies upon the powers of generalization, of reasoning, of imagination, of expression. We do not, however, propose to enter into this absolutely limitless field. We will merely quote a few sentences, vastly more valuable and authoritative than any utterances of our own. Says Mr. Sidgwick,

Physical science is now so bound up with all the interests of mankind, from the lowest and most material to the loftiest and most profound: it is so engrossing in its infinite detail, so exciting in its progress and promise, so fascinating in the varied beauty of its revelations: that it draws to itself an ever-increasing amount of intellectual energy; so that the intellectual man who has been trained without it must feel at every turn his inability to comprehend thoroughly the present phase of the progress of humanity, and his limited sympathy with the thoughts and feelings, labors and aspirations, of his fellow-men.

Says the Edinburgh Review:

If we look to what should be the grand object of all study, namely the formation of the mind and character, we shall assuredly be compelled to admit that there is no kind of study so conducive to its attainment as that of science. For there is hardly any mental or moral faculty which science does not exercise, discipline, and develop better than any thing else which a man can set himself to learn.

Of the intellectual character formed upon the basis of scientific study, an example is presented in the life, lately closed, of Michael Faraday. The delightful, but too brief memoir, from the hand of his friend and co-laborer Professor Tyndall, exhibits a character calm, patient, comprehensive, self-poised, adventurous in hypothesis, yet ever loyal to truth and reverently acknowledging the authority of fact, a character whose intellectual and moral lineaments impart new lustre to the sciences of which he was so largely at once the creator and the product.

The following words of Professor Tyndall ("Glaciers of the Alps") seem to us apposite at this point.

No man knows, when he commences the examination of a physical problem, into what new and complicated mental alliances it may lead him. No fragment of nature can be studied alone: each part is related to every other part; and hence it is that following up the links of law which connect phenomena, the physical investigator often finds himself led far beyond the scope of his original intentions, the danger in this respect augmenting in direct proportion to the wish of the inquirer to render his knowledge solid and complete.

In reference to the effect upon the mind, of the practice of writing Latin prose, Mr. Johnson remarks, "In any case the Latin language must be a hindrance to the full culture of the reason. With all its merits, it is not a proper vehicle for philosophy."

Upon the comparative adaptation of different studies to cultivate the power of expression, Mr. Farrar remarks,

If then it be desirable to educate boys—not indeed in style, but in a power of expressing themselves in their own language—then, instead of encouraging verbal imitations, and cramming their memory with classic tags, let us adopt the incomparably truer and better method of requiring a careful description of natural phenomena and scientific experiments,—a process which, while it teaches them a terse and lucid use of their own language, will, at the same time, fire their imagination with some of the grandest and noblest objects of human thought. If taste and style be a fine appreciation, and a masterly power of producing beauty of form in the expression of thought, will it best be created by making boys write

in languages which they do not know, about things for which they do not care, or by making them express carefully in their own language their natural observations and their genuine experience? With the examples before our eyes of scientific men who write as Sir Humphrey Davy and Dr. Whewell wrote, or as Mr. Darwin and Professor Owen are writing now; and with men who speak with the power and eloquence of Professor Tyndall and Professor Huxley, we need have little fear that our boys will lose in "taste" or "style," by substituting a more solid and scientific training for the time which they are now wasting, or worse than wasting, over Greek and Latin verse. [p. 228.]

Nor can we omit at this point the views of Mr. Hales, upon the prevalent theory that one must learn Latin in order to understand English.

As to the desirability that Englishmen should know something of their own language, there can be little controversy. The most ardent disbelievers in the advisability or possibility of making English a school-subject, do not doubt this. If we are to understand at all what we read, and not rest content with feeble glimmerings of its sense, then some knowledge of our language must be acquired. The question then is how this knowledge is to be acquired. The favorite answer is, by learning Latin. What a singular method! When it is remembered what the prime origin of English is, and of what kind the connection of English with Latin has been, one can only marvel at this answer, and shrewdly suspect that it is but meant to allay the distress of an uneasy conscience—a conscience murmuring at the utter neglect of the vernacular language, at the total devotion to an alien one. It may be urged that an acquaintance with Latin literature is invaluable for an understanding of English literature. This may be true. But it is surely most obvious that an acquaintance with English is simply indispensable for an understanding of English literature. But whatever *a priori* verdict one might give on this method, how does it work? Does the smattering of Latin which the vast majority of schoolboys get, or the superior knowledge of it which is gained by the few exceptions, really perform this alleged service? I think it rather obstructs it. It lights up many English words no doubt; but on the whole, it leaves the language in its previous darkness, or even in a deeper gloom, by throwing films of misconstruction between it and the eyes of the student. Practically, what knowledge of English the ordinary Englishman has, is "picked up." It is of a desultory, irregular, incoherent kind. [pp. 299, 300.]

Still another question relates to the *duration* of the culture, and of the mental stimulus imparted by various studies. Certainly in view of the fact that, with each successive year of his life, a man's powers widen and the field of cultivation afforded by his mind enlarges, it would seem evident that a study extending in its influence over the

whole of life is vastly to be preferred to a study (however fruitful apparently its immediate results), whose influence soon passes away.

Sir William Hamilton cites the remark of Plato, "No study that is forced in the school is ever voluntarily cultivated in life." Take our students who really stand well in the classics during their preparatory and college studies. How many of them carry forward the culture, whatever it be, which the classics confer? The factitious circumstances, which awakened in the student a semblance of enthusiasm, or at least which ensured his faithful attention to these studies, have passed away. Nothing in the actual world encourages or exercises his classical attainments. He does not advance. He recedes.

The culture imparted by *science*—when, save with life, does it end? Fascinating to the great body of pupils, its own attractions ensure it from neglect. And the whole outward world is an open book, on whose broad page the pupil may continually review and continue his studies. He takes up his newspaper; every column contains some allusion that exercises his recollection of the principles he has learned, and invites him to follow them into new applications. He travels. The rail over which he is flying is perhaps made of steel, and his mind is led to Bessemer's process. The coal, which transports his body, also carries his mind back to the era when it was part of the primeval forest. Every cutting, through which the train is whirled, calls up his knowledge of geology. Each field, which he passes, affords a lesson on the classification of plants. As his children gather about him at night, they will not often say to him: "Dear father, pray explain to us all about the *num ephelousticon*, and the acrostic infinite," but very often will their eager lips ask: "How does the cow chew her cud; and what makes the snow; and how does the cricket chirp?" If he is a public speaker, he finds that his most effective illustrations are drawn from physical science or from some one of the ever varying aspects of nature. And whatever his calling, he will find that the most charming and useful recreation open to him, lies in cultivating an acquaintance with the woods, the fields, and their denizens.¹

III. A third test, which may properly be applied to the various studies, relates to their comparative influence on the moral and religious condition of the pupil. We scarcely think it needful to enlarge on this point of the discussion, momentous as we deem it; for we cannot doubt that the readers of this QUARTERLY are competent to apply the test for themselves, to the classics, to the sciences, and to the various branches of study.

A single word, however, may be permitted upon the assertion sometimes made that among the advocates of scientific study are many persons who do not accept the truths of religion as held by the great body of Christians. That the pursuit of science does not tend neces-

¹ In the above paragraphs the writer has quoted from an address before the Michigan State Teachers' Association, on "The Authority of the Past in the Matter of Education."

sarily and universally to produce skepticism seems susceptible of proof. To us it appears difficult to find words more replete with the highest wisdom than the following, from Faraday's Lecture on the Exercise of the Judgment.

Before entering upon the subject, I must make one distinction which, however it may appear to others, is to me of the utmost importance. High as man is placed above the creatures around him, there is a higher and far more exalted position within his view; and the ways are infinite in which he occupies his thoughts about the fears, or hopes, or expectations of a future life. I believe that the truth of that future cannot be brought to his knowledge by any exertion of his mental powers, however exalted they may be; that it is made known to him by other teaching than his own, and is received through simple belief of the testimony given. Let no one suppose for a moment that the self-education I am about to commend in respect of the things of this life, extends to any considerations of the hope set before us, as if man by reasoning could find out God. It would be improper here to enter upon this subject further than to claim an absolute distinction between religious and ordinary belief. I shall be reproached with the weakness of refusing to apply those mental operations which I think good in respect of high things to the very highest. I am content to bear the reproach. Yet, even in earthly matters, I believe that the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; and I have never seen any thing incompatible between those things of man which can be known by the spirit of man which is within him, and those higher things concerning his future which he cannot know by that spirit.

Until it can be shown that there is a necessary tendency in the pursuit of physical science to lead to infidelity, it is as unfair to charge upon scientific studies the accidental unbelief of some of its disciples, as it would be to charge upon classical studies the semipopery that has sprung up at the seat of English classical learning. Many students of the Bible have been skeptics. So far as we are able to judge, it would appear that Theodore Parker's study of the Scriptures was close and critical. It is not the kind of study, it is the spirit in which the study is pursued, that makes skeptics.

A quotation from Mr. Wilson seems apposite at this point.

It is impossible not to feel that with the spread of scientific modes of thought, are bound up all the highest interests of philosophy and religion. Much of modern logic, and philosophy, and thought is incomprehensible except to men trained in science. To any one tolerably conversant with the distressful state of mind of thoughtful men on some religious questions, most welcome will be any progress which may help to free our successors from the same partition of soul, the same divided allegiance, from

which the present generation suffers. It cannot long be possible for us to consent to turn out men into the world, totally unprepared to meet the problems which will necessarily force themselves on their notice; to turn out men, professedly of the highest education, totally unfurnished with true scientific method and knowledge, totally unable to meet the shallowest arguments from a false philosophy of nature brought on the side of materialism or atheism; who will talk glibly of the supernatural, and yet be ignorant of the natural. Does it seem strange to hail as a friend to religion that scientific spirit so often denounced as hostile? Yet how can it be otherwise? "Are God and nature then at strife" indeed? At present there is secret, if not avowed, hostility between religion and science, or at any rate a distrustful toleration; nothing but active coöperation will permanently reconcile them. To endeavor not to see the results and tendencies of modern science is folly in the highest degree. The study and knowledge of the seen is sure to react on the study of the unseen; and he will entertain these studies in perfect harmony, and he only, in whom the scientific and religious ideas are allowed to grow up, not in antagonism, but fearlessly and freely, side by side, coöperating in the formation of a reverent, active, and independent mind, and well-balanced judgment. To think otherwise is to think that half the world is God's and the other half the devil's.

It will not be denied that the knowledge of the Scriptures is one great means of moral advancement. We incline to the opinion that the value of scientific study as an aid to the study of the Bible, has not been rightly estimated. If the book of nature and the book of revelation are from the same hand, it is reasonable to expect that the more full and accurate our knowledge of the one, the greater our preparation for an acquaintance with the other. The volume of Mr. McMillan, "Bible Teachings in Nature," affords a striking illustration of the richness and vividness which is imparted to the preacher's style, by a close observation and a wide knowledge of the outward world.

And is not the process of mind involved in exegesis and Scriptural theology very analogous to that which obtains in the study of physical science. The student of nature remarks the phenomena of the material world; he takes them just as they are; does not warp them to suit any theory, and after a patient observation of them, he deduces a law, a truth of nature. Is it not just in this way that the wise student of the Bible proceeds, reverently observing all the facts of revelation, and by a process strictly Baconian, framing from them a general statement of doctrine?

We cannot pass from the point now under review, the moral influence of different studies, without a remark suggested by a recent article in one of our most valued religious journals (*The Examiner and*

Chronicle). The writer is lamenting the immoral influence of the modern stage, and specifies among the dramas that are peculiarly obnoxious, the "Black Crook" and "La Belle Helene." And what is "La Belle Helene"? It is a scenic representation of the leading events in the life of Helen, and in the history of which she is the central figure. In a word, it is the *Iliad* of Homer, modernized, rendered into the vernacular, and made living to the eye and ear. Does it not seem strange that the guardian of the public morals finds it needful to warn the young against the immoral influence of these scenes, while we are trying to bring all of our young men into the closest possible sympathy with them. The only answer that can be returned is that Homer, as read by our classes, is a task, so unattractive, so little understood, that the pupil escapes with slight moral contamination, or with none at all.

IV. Lastly. Another test is found in the answer to the question, What is the bearing of this study upon the welfare of mankind at large? Undoubtedly there was a time when all the free and inspiring thought of the human race was lodged in the Greek and Latin languages, when even the Bible was not known in the vernacular. In these circumstances, the study of the classical tongues was the chief means of the enfranchisement of the human mind and the advancement of the human race. But a change has taken place, the magnitude of which we in vain endeavor to express. New sciences have sprung into being, and the old have been re-created. Not only does the vast body of human knowledge now lie without, rather than within, the classics, but even the literature, to which once classical attainments were the only key, may now, in the opinion of competent judges, be better reached through other means than through the ancient languages. Says the *Edinburgh Review*:

Mr. Sidgwick remarks that many persons "would perhaps be ashamed to confess how shallow an appreciation they had of Greek art, till they read Goethe and Schiller, Lessing and Schlegel?" To us it seems highly probable that an Englishman, ignorant of Greek and Latin, but thoroughly acquainted with German, and therefore able to ransack all the German literature of classical criticism and research, would be better able to obtain a speedy and accurate insight into the life of the Greeks and Romans, than one who, knowing Latin and Greek, but not German, should be only able to consult the literature of the Greeks and Romans themselves.

Nor ought we to forget that at a former day the languages were studied, not as an *end*, but as a *means*, as the necessary condition of an acquaintance with the literature of Greece and Rome, and with the various knowledge locked up in the ancient tongues. The design of

the study governed, of course, the method of its prosecution. The grammar was a subordinate matter and was pursued only so far as was needed to understand the author.

Now all has changed. The language is treated as an end in itself. The grammar has become the leading object of attention ; and Thucydides and Horace are studied as a means of understanding the grammar.

Mr. Bowen remarks,

It is quite certain, indeed, that the object which is now intended in the teaching of Latin and Greek must be different from what it was in the days of Queen Elizabeth. At that time, schools and universities made boys learn those languages in order that they might have some acquaintance with the authors who wrote in them. No sane man can assert that the same object is pursued at present, unless he is prepared to allow that it is sought at the avowed cost of sacrificing the many to the few. [p. 181.]

Surely it is not quite philosophical to assert that because Latin and Greek produced a certain result upon the human race, ages ago, under a certain set of circumstances, when studied in a particular way and for a particular object, *therefore* they will produce the same effect now, under a totally different set of circumstances, and pursued in a totally different way and for a different object.

In regard to the general question, it appears to us undeniable that, (leaving out of view supernatural agencies,) physical science in its various branches is the great means of the advancement of the human race. Not only has it directly enhanced the material enjoyment of man ; it has indirectly, and, in ten thousand ways, stimulated his intellectual progress, elevated his moral aspirations and given the supremacy to Christian nations and Christian ideas. To take but a single example, it was physical science which carried us through the late war, and gave to humanity, liberty and religion, the victory over barbarism. But we need not now pronounce the eulogy of physical science. It has been uttered by Macaulay, in his matchless passage delineating the triumphs of the "new philosophy."

We cannot but quote here from Dr. Sidgwick.

No cultivated man can fail to feel the interest and charm of philology, or would wish to say a word in its disparagement. Its materials are abundant, its processes productive, the aid it affords to history and anthropology most valuable. Still it must be classed among the sciences that are studied from "pure curiosity"¹ alone; and, however noble an im-

¹ I use the word in the more elevated signification which the corresponding term in French bears.

pulse we feel this to be, however true it is that any great increase of its force marks a step in human progress, yet such studies must be ranked, in importance to society, below sciences like physics, chemistry, astronomy, animal and vegetable physiology, which (besides the gratification they afford to curiosity) have had, and promise still to have, the greatest influence on the material welfare of the human race. [p. 94.]

Such seem to us (most inadequately presented), to be some of the tests which may properly be applied to the studies that compete for the attention of the student.

And here we might properly close, and should thus establish at least one claim upon the gratitude of our readers. Yet we shall venture on their forbearance while we try to express briefly, in conclusion, our views upon one or two additional aspects of our topic: "The Education that we need."

The question, if we understand it aright, is this: How shall the young men of America, in the nineteenth century, be so educated as to fit them, not merely for one calling, or another, but for the special pursuit of *any* calling, and above all for the high duties and boundless possibilities of citizenship, of parentage, in a word, of life.

Can we hope to lengthen the time allotted to non-professional education? It appears idle to urge or discuss this point. If we secure six years, two for the preparatory and four for collegiate study, (and for these we should prefer the years from seventeen to twenty-three,) we shall do all that we may hope to achieve.

But how shall the years be spent? Shall we make the effort, in these six years, to carry the student through, (or over) every department of human knowledge? The result will be that he will but enter upon the rudiments of each study, and will purchase universal superficiality, at the expense of endless drudgery. "I hold," says Mr. Wilson, "that a boy is best educated by learning something of many things and much of something; and that a man of the highest education ought to know something of everything and everything of something." Granting that a system such as that just alluded to will give a scholar some knowledge of many things, it certainly will not teach him "everything of something."

Shall we give the first and chief place in the system of education to classical studies? This we suppose to be the demand of the classical advocates. "It is admitted," says a writer quoted by Mr. Sidgwick "that education must be literary, and that of literary education, classical learning must be the backbone." And Prof. Boise, in the article before referred to, expresses the opinion "that the course of

classical education in this country, instead of being abridged, ought to be, and will be, gradually extended."

It needs little argument to show that if the time allotted to education be a quantity not susceptible of increase, and if, of this time, the great preponderance be given to the classics, it must be by the exclusion or the neglect of other branches. Which, then, of the studies shall be curtailed or omitted that the classics may be heir to the time thus disengaged? Shall political economy be omitted, and *that* at a time when the nation is staggering under burdens, heavy enough at the best, but aggravated by the densest ignorance of the science of public wealth, and when the wildest fallacies are put forward in high places and find no one to refute them? Or shall we abandon, or abridge, the study of ethics, of modern history, of metaphysics, of the art of reasoning, of natural science, or the study (already disgracefully scanty,) of the structure and use of the English language? Surely to ask these questions is to answer them.

There remains, as it seems to us, but a single course; a course simple, natural, comprehensible, and eminently in accordance with the whole genius of our American institutions. Why should not every student (within, perhaps, certain limits, and under the advice of instructors), give the leading place to the studies to which he is led by his natural inclination, by his aptitude, and by the probable demands of his course in life. It will not be understood that he is to restrict himself to a single set of studies, but that while seeking to learn "something of many things" he shall determine to know all of something, to be the master of one branch of knowledge. If he propose to be an exegete, a comparative philologist, a student of ancient history, a naturalist, a publicist, whatever it be, why should he not recognize this fact in his collegiate education?

Says Mr. Wilson:

The curriculum must be made to some extent elastic: it is perfectly easy to make it so in any school; to make some studies compulsory and some optional, throughout the whole course; to make others compulsory at one period and alternative at another. And where this is done with judgment, no fear of disorganizing this school and causing idleness need be entertained. [p. 259.]

And the *North British Review*, while giving a qualified assent to many of the positions of the Essays, and while differing widely from the views of Mr. Lowe, seems to agree heartily in the sentiment just quoted.

It is urged that the student is not competent to choose his studies.

But it is surely strange if a young man of twenty-one, (as are multitudes of our students), competent to elect a President of the United States; competent to choose his calling in life; competent to select his form of religious belief; competent to make the most weighty decisions affecting all his future, is not competent to choose whether he will study Greek or chemistry. And if he lack two or three years of twenty-one, the case is hardly less strong.

There is surely much force in the words of Mr. Seeley :

Students at the university are no longer boys. They differ from boys principally in this, that they are old enough to form an opinion of the value of their studies. And that they should form such an opinion is most desirable; it is, in fact, one of the principal things they have to do. The student should be always considering what subjects it is most important for him to study, what knowledges and acquirements his after-life is likely to demand, what his own intellectual powers and defects are, and in what way he may best develop the one and correct the other. His mind should be intent upon his future life, his ambitions should anticipate his mature manhood.

And it is doing injustice to our American young men to affirm that they are less competent to exercise their judgment than are their contemporaries in Great Britain. Indeed we have always boasted it as one of the choicest fruits of our free government that it throws the young man on his own responsibility and takes the surest means of securing a wise exercise of his judgment, by compelling him to bear the consequences of his own decisions. Why should not this, the American idea, *par excellence*, be applied in the education of the young man who has attained years of discretion and responsibility?

But he may make a mistake, he may choose wrongly, and thus peril his intellectual well-being. Yes; and he may choose wrongly in his political action, and may peril his own and the public welfare. He may choose wrongly in his religious belief and thus ruin himself for ever. But still it is his to choose, and his to bear the results of his election. And no less in the matter of his choice among the several studies set before him. Surely if there be such a thing as the much vaunted Republic of Letters, it would seem that this would be one of the first articles of its constitution.

The extent to which we have already carried this discussion prevents us from doing more than allude to the address of Gen. Garfield. We cannot, however, but derive additional confidence in the justness of the views we have expressed as we find them sustained by the opinion of one of our ablest and most enlightened public men. We are also compelled to omit any consideration of the documents rela-

ting to Cornell University, further than to remark that in common with every intelligent friend of education we look with hopeful solicitude to the future of this young but already mighty institution, which, untrammelled by precedent or tradition, avails itself of all former experience in order to avoid the errors of the past. If its present promise shall be fulfilled, the date of its origin will be reckoned as an era in the history of education. It is certainly not a little remarkable that, after all the discussion that has taken place relative to university education, it has been reserved to Mr. Cornell to utter (as it seems to us,) the clearest, most comprehensive definition yet given of the character of a *university*. "I will found," he says, in words not less memorable than was the deed of munificence by which they were accompanied, "I will found *an institution where any person can find instruction in any study.*"

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DIFFICULTIES OF INFANT BAPTISM.

IT IS well-known that infant baptism, both as a doctrine and a practice, has been, for the last fifty years, steadily losing ground among evangelical Christians. To those who believe it to be a part of primitive Christianity, and to have the testimony of Scripture in its favor, this growing neglect of it is of course a cause of grief, and they very consistently do what they can to counteract this tendency of the times, and to recommend the more general observance of the practice. To us, as Baptists, the neglect of a usage which we regard as a corruption of primitive Christianity, is a cause of joy, and an omen of good for the church of God. We cannot but regard this change as a sign that the Scriptures are coming to be better understood, and their supreme authority to be more fully recognized. And we feel bound to do what we can, in fairness and courtesy, to accelerate a reform which seems to us so beneficial in its effects, and so cheering in its promise.

It is the design of the present article to set forth the more prominent objections to infant baptism under one particular aspect. What are the chief *difficulties* which the defender of infant baptism has to meet? What are the considerations which make his task a very arduous one? Our discussion will be conducted with special reference to the position of Protestant and evangelical pedobaptists. If we

shall be able to place in a just light the formidable nature of the objections to the practice, we shall in so far account for the increasing neglect of it, and at the same time contribute something to the establishment of the truth. We trust that no word of sectarian bitterness will escape us, and no feeling of mere sectarian triumph be indulged or excited. When any of our Christian brethren become convinced of their errors, and abandon them, they, and not we, are the chief gainers; and both we and they should rejoice together with a common and unselfish joy.

The most formidable of the difficulties that pertain to this subject, unfortunately for the Protestant defenders of infant baptism, are connected with the *scriptural* argument.

There is a serious *negative* difficulty in the utter silence of Scripture, as to the baptism of infants. The references to baptism are frequent in the New Testament, especially in the Acts of the Apostles. The subjects of baptism are always described as men and women, never as children. Several of the men are mentioned by name, and one of the women; but no infant child is anywhere mentioned among the baptized. The sacred historian, in recording the success of Philip's preaching in Samaria, takes pains to tell us explicitly that both men and women were baptized (Acts viii. 12); but infant children are never mentioned in any such connection.

But is not the baptism of infant children *implied* in those passages which mention the baptism of households?

There are but three cases of this sort mentioned in the New Testament,—those of Lydia, the Philippian jailor, and Stephanas of Corinth. In only one of these cases is it expressly said that *all* the members of the family were baptized; and in that one case it is equally said of all that the gospel was preached to them, and that they believed and rejoiced in God. (Acts xvi. 32–34.) In each of the other two cases there are specific reasons for believing that the household was composed of adult persons;—in the case of Lydia, the nature of her occupation, as a merchant-woman, travelling at a distance from her home (Acts xvi. 14), and the mention of her household afterwards as brethren (v. 40); and in the case of Stephanas, the way in which his family is spoken of in I Corinthians xvi. 15, 16. Now when it is remembered that in the majority of households there are no infant children, that only one household is mentioned in which it is expressly affirmed that *all* were baptized, and that in all the three cases of baptized households there are specific reasons against the supposition that they were composed of infants,—the claim that infants are included by implication in these cases must plainly be

abandoned. As to the alleged implication in what our Lord said concerning the little children that were brought to him, and in what the apostle Paul says of the *federal holiness* of children in I Corinthians vii. 14, we shall examine in another place the bearing of these passages upon our subject. Children, and even little children, are repeatedly addressed in the epistles of Paul and John;¹ but the latter tells us what sort of children these were. They were of God; they had known the Father; they were in Christ; their sins were forgiven, and they had overcome the world. (iii. 12, 13; iv. 4.) No one can rightly object to the baptism of such children, however little they may be.

Nor can this difficulty from the silence of Scripture be fairly evaded by claiming that the *presumption* is in favor of the baptism of children with their parents, and that therefore this silence is a difficulty to be met and explained by those who reject infant baptism, rather than by those who receive it; for every ground on which such a presumption can be alleged is fallacious. The Abrahamic covenant will not answer the purpose; for the apostle Paul tells us that only believers in Christ are, in the evangelical sense, children of Abraham, and heirs according to the promise. (Galatians iii. 7, 29.) It is true that children were reckoned with their parents under the old covenant, and received its sign; but the new covenant is expressly distinguished from the old in this particular, among others, that all who are embraced in it know the Lord, from the *least* even unto the greatest. (Hebrews viii. 7-12.)² The proselyte baptism of the Jews cannot be relied on to establish such a presumption; for there is no proof that any such custom existed until centuries after Christian baptism was instituted. Still less can John's baptism be referred to as constituting a precedent, or creating a presumption in favor of infant baptism; for there is no shadow of evidence that children had any part in that baptism of repentance which he preached and practised. And the bearing of this precedent on the question, whether the *a priori*

¹ Ephesians vi. 1; Colossians iv. 4; I John ii. 1, 12, 13, 18, 28; iii. 7, 18; iv. 4; v. 21.

² The evangelical defenders of household baptism seem to be little aware of the precipice on the brink of which they stand, when they speak of household baptism, on the faith of the head of the family, after the analogy of the law of circumcision. Dr. Kendrick, in his review of Wolff on Baptism (*Christian Review*, April, 1863), has described the practical result of carrying out that theory in language that cannot be improved: "That a wife fresh from a sacrifice to Juno; that daughters who had just been rendering their vows to Venus; that sons whose hands were reeking with offerings to Mars; that servants who daily invoked Mercury, the patron god of thieves; that all these, on the strength of the faith of one or two genuine converts to Christianity, might pour a fresh tide of unrepented heathenism into the bosom of the infant church, has seemed so revolting, that we confess we have not supposed that one in a thousand of the professed believers in primitive household baptism really believed it."

presumption is in favor or against the inclusion of infants in the Christian rite is very significant. If it be conceded, that John's baptism did not embrace infants,—and this concession cannot on any reasonable ground be withheld,—then it follows, that the apostles were familiar with a baptism that was limited to adults, and that they would therefore naturally practice according to the same rule, when they received from Christ the permanent commission to baptize, unless they were expressly instructed to do otherwise. If then we find no such contrary instruction in the formal and final commission, we must regard the alleged presumption in favor of infant baptism as altogether reversed. The burden of proof will then rest wholly on those who defend the practice. What is the fact, in regard to the commission from which baptism, as a permanent ordinance in the Christian church, derives all its authority? Certainly it contains no word favorable to the extension of the rite to infants; but quite the contrary. As recorded in Mark xvi. 16, it implies that none but those who believe have any part in baptism. As given by Matthew (xxviii. 19), it makes instruction precedent to baptism. The Lord there directs the apostles to go and make disciples in all nations, baptizing such as are made disciples. The word "them" can have no other antecedent than the disciples implied in the previous verb; and the word disciple always implies instruction, and an intelligent learner. Thus every ground fails, on which any presumption in favor of infant baptism could be argued; and the silence of Scripture on this subject is a serious difficulty for its advocates to explain.

But this negative difficulty is only a small part of the trouble which its advocates have to encounter in dealing with the scriptural argument. There is much indirect positive testimony of Scripture, which bears very unfavorably upon the practice. As we have already seen, the commission by which baptism, as a permanent divine rite, was originally sanctioned, not only omits all reference to infants, but virtually excludes them, by prescribing qualifications for the rite which they do not possess. According to Matthew only disciples, according to Mark only believers, are to be baptized. But infants are neither disciples nor believers; they are excluded, therefore, not merely by not being mentioned, but by not having the qualifications which are mentioned.

There is a class of texts which speak of baptism in intimate connection with the things that accompany salvation, as pardon, regeneration, and sanctification. The words of our Lord himself in Mark xvi. 16 and John iii. 5, may be taken as representative of these passages. "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved." "Except

a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." Other passages of the same nature are found in Acts xxii. 16; Romans vi. 2-6; Galatians iii. 27; Ephesians v. 26; Colossians ii. 12, 13; Titus iii. 5; I Peter iii. 21. All these passages distinctly imply, in varied forms of expression, that baptized persons are in the way of salvation,—in a state of grace, as the older divines used to say. Now to all those who believe in the regenerating efficacy of the rite, these texts are so far from making any difficulty that they are perpetually quoted by them as the strongest supports of infant baptism, and proofs of its necessity. But to evangelical pedobaptists, who reject this doctrine of a regenerating virtue in the rite itself, all these passages are so many difficulties to be explained. The Greek, the Roman Catholic, and the High Anglican,—all who defend infant baptism on the old historic ground,—find a pertinent sense in these passages (though we think it an erroneous one), a sense in harmony with their belief and practice. But the comparatively small minority, who undertake to find a place for infant baptism in a reformed and evangelical theology, find these passages hard to reconcile with their system. This class of texts seems to attribute altogether too much importance to baptism. The Baptist explanation of them is the only one that can stand or be maintained in opposition to the plausible interpretation of the believers in effectual sacramental grace, supported as that interpretation is by the sanction of all antiquity. If regeneration comes *through baptism*, "*ex opere operato*," this explains the passages in question, without doing violence to their language. If baptism comes *after regeneration*, following closely upon it, as its appointed sign and formal testimonial, this too explains the passages equally well, and without any violence. But there is no middle ground on which they can be explained without wresting the language from its natural sense. They are a serious embarrassment to evangelical pedobaptists.

Besides this important class of passages, there are many other particular incidents, principles, and expressions of Scripture, which are hard to reconcile with any theory of infant baptism. Prominent among these is the case of the infants brought to Christ. (Matthew xix. 13-15; Mark x. 13-16; Luke xviii. 15-17.) When the defenders of the practice trust to these texts for support, they lean upon a broken reed which pierces their own hand. For while a single expression used by our Lord in this connection might seem to suggest an inference favorable to the practice, the narrative as a whole plainly assumes that no such practice was then known to the apostles. The very mistake into which they fell, in supposing that the bringing of these children

would not be acceptable to their Master, is a proof that this was something *new* in their experience. Such a mistake could not have occurred, if the disciples had been pedobaptists. They had themselves baptized large numbers of adults, on a personal profession of repentance (John iv. 1, 2); but they had never baptized any infants on a vicarious profession of faith; and consequently they did not know how to behave when little children were brought to Christ for his blessing. They were not to blame for not having had any experience to teach them what to do in this unprecedented case; but they need not have been so hasty in assuming that Jesus would not be pleased with the act of these Jewish parents, in seeking his blessing upon their infant offspring. But we may be the wiser for their blunder; for it shows conclusively that their minds were utterly vacant of all the ideas that are now associated with infant baptism. And it is important to note, that this incident occurred very late in our Lord's ministry; it was while he was on the way up to Jerusalem for the last time before his crucifixion, and only a few weeks, at farthest, before he gave them their commission to baptize disciples in all nations. They certainly knew nothing of any other baptism than that of adults at this time; they certainly learned nothing of any other from the terms of the commission; and there is not the slightest evidence that they had any instruction on the subject in the short interval between the two. Of course then they would do, what the whole subsequent history testifies that they did, namely, administer baptism only to the penitent and believing. We are entirely at a loss to understand how this narrative can be consistently explained by any believer in infant baptism as a primitive usage. The words of the Lord, "of such is the kingdom of heaven," weigh very little in favor of the practice, in comparison with the weight of the narrative as a whole in the opposite scale. Indeed these words are sufficiently explained by our Lord himself, in the same connection, when he says, "Verily I say unto you, whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child shall in no wise enter therein." (Mark x. 15; Luke xviii. 17.)

The apostle Paul's admonition to ministers of the gospel in I Corinthians iii. 9-17 (see especially the last clause of v. 10), presents, if we do not misapprehend its meaning, another serious difficulty to the believers in infant baptism. This passage has been very generally misapplied. The gold, silver, and precious stones have been taken to represent the true doctrines of the gospel, and the wood, hay, and stubble to denote heresies and false doctrines. But the apostle is speaking of the *materials* out of which the church is built; and these

are not *doctrines*, but *persons*. Such expressions as the building of God, the house of God, the temple of God, are never used to designate a system of abstract doctrines, but always to designate a concrete person or a company of such persons. It is unnecessary to make specific references in proof of this statement. We simply appeal to the concordance. The usage of the New Testament in this respect is uniform. Indeed the apostle seems to have taken special pains, in this particular passage, to make the application of his figurative language plain. "*Ye are God's building.*" (v. 9.) "*Which temple are ye.*" (v. 17.) We regard this passage, then, as a solemn admonition to ministers of the gospel, not to incorporate into the church, of which they are the builders under him who builds all things (Hebrews iii. 4), any materials but such as will abide the fire of God's judgment; in other words, not to baptize any but such as give evidence of being among the saved. (Acts ii. 47.) And if this be the true interpretation, as the uniform usage of Scripture, and the repeated explanation of the apostle in the context testify that it is, then it makes a serious difficulty for all who advocate the incorporation of infant children into the church by baptism.

Another passage of a like nature is found in I Corinthians vii. 12-14. This passage, like the passages narrating the bringing of the little ones to Christ, has commonly been cited as a warrant for the baptism of children, at least of such children as have one believing parent. But a careful examination of the apostle's words shows that their bearing is just the contrary. He ascribes no other "federal holiness" to the children, than that which he ascribes to the unbelieving parent. If the children are "holy," so is the unbelieving parent "sanctified." Indeed the holiness of the children is expressly *inferred* from the sanctification of the unbelieving parent: "*else were your children unclean; but now are they holy.*" Why? because "the unbelieving husband has been sanctified in the wife, and the unbelieving wife has been sanctified in the husband." Clearly, the same effect which the faith of the believing parent produces in the children, it also produces in the unbelieving parent. Clearly, the children in this case are classed with the unbelieving partner, rather than with the believing. If this passage warrants the baptism of children who have a believing father or mother, it at least equally warrants the baptism of every husband who has a believing wife, of every wife who has a believing husband. If it proves any thing in relation to baptism, it proves a great deal too much: and so it is fairly transferred from the place of an argument in favor of infant baptism to the opposite position of a grave difficulty to be encountered and explained by the defenders of the practice.

All the passages which speak of the baptized as constituting *one body* are so many difficulties for the evangelical pedobaptist in explaining the Scriptures. For his theory and practice make *two* bodies of baptized persons, differing by a much greater difference than that which, according to his theory, divides the baptized from the unbaptized,—by all the difference between the regenerate and the unregenerate, between union with Christ and alienation from him. The scriptural doctrine is, that “by one Spirit we are all baptized into one body.” (I Corinthians xii. 13.) And the baptized are everywhere in Scripture presumed to be regenerate and holy persons, and addressed as such. “As many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ.” (Galatians iii. 27.) This passage is a fair representative of the tenor of Scripture upon this subject. That there were some unregenerate and unholy persons—some hypocrites and some self-deceivers—among the baptized, even in primitive times, cannot be questioned. Such persons are plainly recognized in the apostolic writings;—but *how* recognized? as “false brethren *unawares* brought in.” (Galatians ii. 4.) But infant baptism brings in such persons not unawares, but knowingly and systematically; not as exceptions, but as the rule; not in single instances, but by wholesale. It substitutes two sorts of baptism for the “one baptism” of Scripture. (Ephesians iv. 5.) For the baptism of an infant on the faith of its parent, and the baptism of a believer professing his own faith, do not constitute “one baptism.” The two things are essentially different. The former tends to supplant and abolish the latter. At first it only makes the latter occasional and exceptional; but when carried out consistently it confines believers’ baptism to the infancy and the margin of the church. What it steadily and rapidly tends to is this: to make that baptism to which alone the language of Scripture is fairly applicable an infrequent and abnormal baptism.

These are some of the principal difficulties connected with the interpretation of Scripture, which it is necessary to overcome in order to make out a case in favor of infant baptism. But there are also grave *historical* difficulties. Just as the silence of Scripture is a serious negative difficulty, so also the silence of the earliest ecclesiastical writers is an additional difficulty, corresponding to and emphasizing the former. The writings of the so called Apostolical Fathers say not a word about the baptism of infants. Justin Martyr not only gives no testimony in favor of such a practice, but he uses language in regard to the rite which implies that he knew of no other baptism than that of instructed, repentant, believing, and voluntary candidates. Clement of Alexandria is equally silent. In regard to Irenæus, Tertullian, and

Origen, if the dispute is not yet settled, this at least is certain, that their testimony is now regarded, by the ablest and most impartial scholars, as much less favorable to infant baptism than it was thought to be half a century ago. The Apostolic Constitutions make no mention of the practice in the earlier books, and only the briefest mention in the later. It cannot be said with certainty to be mentioned by any ecclesiastical writer, till after the middle of the third century. Cyprian is the first who distinctly and indisputably testifies in favor of the practice; and he does so in a way which implies that it was an unsettled practice. Nothing in his letter to Fidus on the subject implies that children were baptized, or that, in his judgment they ought to be, in any case except where they were believed to be in imminent danger of death. And this early testimony to the practice, in this specific case, is limited to the North African church. No other writer of this early date makes any mention of it. A century later it finds express defenders in other parts. But such witnesses as Gregory Nazianzen, and Chrysostom, and Augustine, in the end of the fourth century and beginning of the fifth, are more embarrassing than helpful to its modern evangelical defenders. For the grounds on which they advocate it militate against its divine origin, and the practical inconsistency of their position as its advocates argues its recent introduction. They do not advocate it as a primitive usage, but distinctly on the ground of its necessity to salvation, just as they advocate infant communion for the same reason. Their testimony confirms one assurance that the practice was the offspring of an anti-evangelical theology—a theology which connected saving grace with the reception of the sacramental rites, irrespective of the faith of the recipient. And then there is this practical inconsistency in the case. The very writers who recommend infant baptism as necessary were not themselves baptized in infancy, though born of Christian parents. So their very advocacy marks them as *innovators* in the church, urging the general adoption of a practice which was not generally adopted in the preceding generation. How is it, we may reasonably ask the evangelical pedobaptist, that among all the Greek and Latin fathers of the first four centuries, there is not one concerning whom we have any testimony that he was baptized in infancy, while in regard to nearly all of them we have explicit and unquestioned testimony that they were baptized in adult years, after they were converted? It is often said that exceptions confirm the rule; but it goes hard with the rule, when *all* the cases known are exceptions. Ambrose, Jerome and Augustine, in the west, and Chrysostom, Gregory and Basil, in the east, were all baptized after they came to

years of manhood, although several of them are expressly declared to have been dedicated to God from their birth by their pious parents. And there are numerous like cases of persons less distinguished. These are the men who insist on the necessity of giving baptism to infants. What does this mean? Plainly it means just this: that they lived at the time when infant baptism was *gaining ground*,—coming to be, what it had not heretofore been, the *general custom*. This accounts for their recommending to others what was not practised in their own case, when they were children. But here is a serious difficulty for the pedobaptist. If infant baptism was instituted and practised at the beginning, how came it to fall into such general disuse in the first three centuries? How came a *divine rite* to be so neglected, at the very time when the tendency to exaggerate the importance and increase the number of external religious rites was confessedly rife? Thus while the Baptist has to meet the single difficulty of explaining the use of infant baptism—a difficulty which, since the researches of modern scholars into the history of the subject has ceased to be formidable,—the pedobaptist has to meet the *double* difficulty of accounting both for the early disuse and the subsequent revival of the practice; and all the researches of modern scholarship tend only to make this double difficulty more formidable.

The defenders of infant baptism have appealed to the inscriptions found in the catacombs of Rome, as proving that the practice prevailed in the early centuries. But they have only encumbered their cause with a new difficulty by calling attention to these interesting monuments of antiquity. It is true, that very young children—even infants under three years of age—are mentioned as baptized, in a few of the inscriptions on these monumental tablets. But there is no proof that these inscriptions belong, as Dr. Bushnell and others have assumed, to the first two or three centuries. Most of them are without any means of determining their date. The date of some, however, is determined by the names of the Roman consuls recorded in them. Of those of which the date can be determined, there are none that commemorate baptized children earlier than about the middle of the fourth century, and only three within the limits of that century. These three are dated respectively A. D. 348, A. D. 371, and A. D. 374. In the first of these cases, the baptized child was six years and above eight months old; and in the other two cases eight years or more: and all the three are expressly spoken of as *newly* baptized,—that is, evidently baptized at this early age only on account of the apparent approach of death. There are inscriptions as early as the end of the first, and the beginning of the second century; but for

about two and a half centuries from this earliest date there is no record of a baptized child. Among about one hundred epitaphs of children there is only one before the year 350 that speaks of the child as baptized,—and that one only two years before this date; and there are only two others which fall within the limits of the fourth century. Evidently infant baptism had made but slow progress during the hundred years since Cyprian began to advocate it in North Africa, in cases of necessity. The facts established by a careful examination of the monumental inscriptions in the catacombs are just these: In a very few cases, in the latter part of the fourth century, baptism was administered to children of six or eight years of age, at the point of death. Even this child baptism, in extreme cases, can be traced no farther back than that. Not a single case of strictly *infant* baptism can be fairly made out from these tablets till after the year 400. And if it could, it would not go to prove the *prevalence* of infant baptism at the date of the record, but only the existence of the superstitious practice of baptizing infants that were apparently near to death. The fact that these young children are so generally designated as *newly* baptized, when there is any mention at all of baptism, is very significant. We see from this in what sense they were baptized on the faith of their parents. They were not baptized because and when their parents believed in Christ; but they were baptized because their parents believed baptism indispensable to salvation, and only when their parents believed they were about to die. The supporters of infant baptism must be hard pressed for historical arguments in its favor, or they would not have recourse to so damaging an expedient as an appeal to the epitaphs collected from the catacombs.¹

The more ecclesiastical history is studied, the more the difficulties of infant baptism are multiplied. Less than a century ago there was a general disposition to concede, that in the field of post-apostolic history the pedobaptists had altogether the best of the argument. Now it is coming to be generally understood, that the verdict of early church history is decidedly against the divine origin of the practice. It is hard to say which of the many difficulties which it has to encounter in this field of inquiry is the greatest,—the silence of the earliest writers, the inconsistency of the later ones, the opposition which the practice had to overcome, the unscriptural grounds on which its earliest advocates recommend it, the treacherous nature of the evidences adduced to prove it, or the lateness of its general acceptance.

¹ For a full and critical discussion of the bearing of these inscriptions on the question of infant baptism, see an article by the late Dr. Iraha Chase, in the *Christian Review* for October, 1868, pp. 550-560.

Besides these exegetical and historical difficulties of the subject, there are others of a doctrinal, ecclesiastical, and miscellaneous nature. To these we must refer briefly, as the fuller development of them would swell this article beyond the limits suitable to the pages of this periodical.

Infant baptism tends to obscure and corrupt some of the most important doctrines of the gospel. Among these is the doctrine of personal regeneration by the Holy Spirit. Throughout the greater part of Christendom, the baptism of infant children has long since usurped the place and the name of regeneration, and undermined and abolished all right views of that great spiritual change. And among those who still hold evangelical views of regeneration, it tends to weaken their conception of the magnitude and necessity of that inward renewal. For wherever it is held with any tenacity, it must be practically conceived of as something which puts the subjects of it in some new relation to God, brings them somewhat nearer to him, puts them in a condition more favorable to salvation. If it is not regarded as effecting something of this kind, it comes to be nothing more than a family festivity at the naming of a child, which is all that it is in some parts of the old world, or a humanly devised form of dedicating the child to God, as it is among many evangelical pedobaptists in this country. The infant dedication is right and acceptable to God; but they have no right to employ for this purpose a divine ordinance which God appointed to express a different meaning. In fact, so far as the rite is regarded as making any *real distinction* between the children that have received it and the children that have not, it must tend to modify the view of regeneration as needed by the former. And history bears witness to this tendency of the practice. To a believer in the unadulterated Scripture doctrine of regeneration, it is difficult to answer the question, What is the precise benefit conferred by infant baptism?

This practice also makes a difficulty in relation to the place which divine truth occupies in Christ's kingdom. According to his own declaration to Pilate, he is King in the realm of Truth, and the subjects of his kingdom are those who know, believe, love, speak, act, defend, and propagate the truth. "To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness to the truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice." (John xviii. 37.) The connection of the passage shows that he said this as an explanation of that kingly office which he claimed, and of the nature of that spiritual kingdom which he had just before declared not to be of this world. (v. 36.) These principles are received by all evangelical

Christians. But, according to these principles, what part or place can those have in His kingdom, who are naturally incapable of any intelligent apprehension of religious truth? Here is a difficulty for the evangelical pedobaptist.

According to the belief of all evangelical Christians, the efficacy of all religious acts, in respect both to their acceptance with God and to their profitableness to men, depends on the moral disposition, the faith, of those who perform them, or are the subjects of them. The ordinances which God has appointed are means of grace only to the believing. These principles are dear to evangelical pedobaptists; but how can they reconcile these principles with any theory which attributes any sacredness or importance to infant baptism? The clear, unqualified statement of them is tantamount to a condemnation of infant baptism. Take, as an illustration, a few sentences from that excellent and evangelical work of Dr. Hodge, "The Way of Life."

They (the Scriptures) teach that the sacraments are thus efficacious, not to every recipient, but to the believer; to those who already have the grace which these ordinances represent. [p. 267.] . . . In like manner we are said to be saved by baptism, because baptism implies faith. If this faith be wanting, baptism can do us no more good than a heartless confession. [p. 274.] . . . When an unbeliever receives these ordinances, he no more obtains a title to the blessings which they represent, than a man obtains a title to an estate by falsely assuming the name of the person for whom it is intended. . . . The sacraments have no inherent efficacy of their own, but become efficacious means of grace to those who believe. [p. 276.]

Similar expressions might be quoted from Jonathan Edwards and many other evangelical divines. They cannot be thoroughly evangelical on this subject of faith, in connection with the ordinances, without being for the moment anti-pedobaptists. Yet they sincerely believe in infant baptism; but they hold it under a serious difficulty, and the more evangelical they are, the greater the difficulty.

The sufficiency and sole authority of Scripture is another fundamental principle of evangelical Protestant theology. But infant baptism very much needs more decisive support than it can find in Scripture; and hence its advocacy is always a temptation to ascribe undue weight to tradition, to post-apostolical usage and uninspired testimony. It is true that not much is gained by this course in the long run. History, when critically examined, confirms Scripture and condemns infant baptism. But then the historical argument is more effective than the scriptural with many, because they are not so well acquainted with early Christian history as they are with the Scriptures,

and, therefore cannot so readily detect a sophism or a fallacy here. There is in fact here a double difficulty for the evangelical pedobaptist, a Scylla and a Charybdis, between which there is no safe navigation. On the one hand, the deficiency of scriptural evidence is constantly tempting him to have recourse, contrary to his Protestant principles, to post-apostolical authority, and to concede tacitly at least, the dangerous principle of gradual, post-apostolical development of Christian doctrine; and on the other hand he gets at last more hurt than help from this expedient. For, as we have already seen, it is coming to be generally admitted by the ablest church historians and antiquarians, that the existence of infant baptism in the first two Christian centuries cannot be proved.

It belongs to the nature of the evangelical system, that all acts of obedience and all rites of worship should be intelligent, free, and voluntary. Christ asks no blind, compulsory, or involuntary service. He asks the service of the mind that understands, the heart that loves, the will that chooses. No coercion can compel a man to be a Christian—nothing but his own intelligent and free choice can rightfully make him *profess* himself a Christian. Let us hear Dr. Hodge once more: "If, however, the sacraments are seals on the part of God, the reception of them implies a voluntary engagement on the part of the Christian to devote himself to the service of Christ." [Way of Life, p. 263.] The consistent application of this principle would put an end to infant baptism. The reception of the rite, in the case of infants, is neither intelligent, free, nor voluntary. Indeed the protest of the candidate is sometimes vigorous, persistent, and troublesome. How can the prayer, which the Episcopal service prescribes, be consistently offered after such a baptism,—that the child "may lead the rest of his life according to this beginning"? Is it well to pray that the child may go through life making a hollow and false profession of being a Christian? Is it well that such an involuntary baptism should be interposed as an obstacle in the way of his future intelligent and free reception of the rite? Every infringement of this important principle of intelligent choice in our religious acts tends to lower the value of a Christian profession, to undermine Christian freedom, to perplex the moral sense. Baptismal vows made under such circumstances cannot be felt to be binding by an unsophisticated conscience; and every attempt to enforce their fulfilment is an outrage against soul-liberty, a spiritual tyranny not to be endured. Christianity is a spiritual religion, and protests against all such involuntary and enforced vows, as the inroad of a worldly power and policy into her unworldly kingdom, as tending to justify the coercion

of consciences, and all the enormities of spiritual tyranny. But for this abandonment of the voluntary principle in religion, there would have been no invoking of the civil power to punish heresies, no alliance of church and state, no persecution for conscience' sake. The unquestionable tendency of infant baptism to favor these doctrinal and practical abuses is a difficulty which its defenders have to meet.

The difficulties which it introduces into *ecclesiastical* questions are not imaginary nor inconsiderable. What is the relation of baptized children to the church? Are they members, or are they not? There is a notable want of agreement on this point among the upholders of the practice. Their written standards, we believe, generally answer the question in the affirmative, in accordance with ancient belief and practice; and the present drift of opinion, among those who are most zealous for the perpetuation of the custom, seems to be in the same direction, to the manifest peril of doctrinal soundness and ecclesiastical purity. Yet if they are not members of the church, by virtue of their baptism, some new way of making them so must be invented, for which there is neither precept nor precedent in the New Testament.

The difficulty which infant baptism introduces into the relations of the two ordinances is another serious burden to its defenders. It disturbs, and indeed abolishes, their scriptural relation and sequence. There is no Scripture for requiring higher spiritual qualifications for the Lord's Supper than are required for baptism. There is no Scripture, and no precedent in Christian antiquity, for denying the Lord's Supper to any of the baptized not under discipline. There is no more Scripture for regarding the Lord's Supper as a sign of Christian character, or as an expression of the unity of all Christ's people, than there is for regarding baptism as a sign of regeneration and an expression of unity. If the faith of the parent avails to entitle the child to baptism, why does it not equally avail to entitle the baptized child to the communion? No satisfactory answer has ever been given to this question. None can be given. The Greek Church is consistently wrong, in adhering to the practice of antiquity, and giving the communion to baptized infants. The evangelical Protestant churches are inconsistently right in withholding it from them till they are converted.

Nor even in respect to baptism itself do evangelical pedobaptists carry out their principles consistently, in relation to other bodies of professed Christians. They receive as valid the baptism of Greeks and Roman Catholics, of Armenians and Nestorians, to say nothing of some Protestant state churches in Europe, that are nearly as desti-


tute of spiritual life as the former. Yet they do not regard the members of these churches as baptized on any recognized faith of their parents. On what ground then is their baptism valid? How can the recognition of it be justified on their own principles?

One more difficulty, which presses heavily upon infant baptism, is the inconsistency and antagonism between the different grounds on which it is defended. Not only do some of its defenders uphold it on grounds irreconcilable with those on which it is advocated by others, but the same persons often bring forward different arguments which overthrow each other. If Christ's words, "of such is the kingdom of heaven," are the warrant for baptizing infants, then the arguments from circumcision and from I Corinthians vii. 14, are of no force. If they are baptized on the ground of what they are in themselves, then neither the Abrahamic covenant, nor their federal holiness have any thing to do with their title to baptism. If the defenders of the practice could only agree upon one line of defence, or upon two or more that did not cross each other, they would be able to do the cause much more effectual service. But so long as they are at variance among themselves, as to the substantial grounds of the practice,—whether the baptism of infants is justified and demanded by their natural innocence, their inherited depravity, or their federal holiness,—whether their title to the rite is founded on their own character, their parent's piety, or the church's faith,—whether they are baptized because they are already heirs of salvation, or in order to make them so, their work will be very difficult, and they must not expect to be very successful in their efforts to extend, or even to maintain, the practice.

Having these many and varied difficulties to contend with, scriptural and historical, doctrinal and ecclesiastical, it is no wonder that infant baptism is declining more and more in our day, and declining most rapidly among the most intelligent and evangelical. The drift of modern scholarship is plainly against its divine institution. The current of modern evangelical thought is opposed to its continuance, and is gradually but surely undermining it. It will not cease to be practiced in our day, even among evangelical Christians; but its defence, on grounds compatible with evangelical Protestant theology, is growing continually more and more difficult, and its doom was pronounced by Him who said, "every plant which my heavenly Father hath not planted shall be rooted up."

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HAMILTON, N. Y.



DEACONS AND THE DIACONATE.

NOTHING is trivial which pertains to the life, growth, and structure of the Christian church; for it is the chosen temple in which the Holy Spirit dwells among men. It has Christ for its architect and builder, and is the sacred depository in which the symbols of eternal mysteries are preserved to be interpreted to the successive generations of men. All life in this world is deposited in living caskets which we call organisms. An organism differs from a mechanism, in that it has unity, life and growth by assimilation. Local churches are the visible outcroppings of the one invisible and spiritual church. There may be organizations called churches which are pure mechanisms, made up of dissimilar elements; but true Christian churches are not built; they grow by a Divine process of assimilation. Visible churches are the organic structures in which Christianity has its social development in the world. They are worthy of careful study because a lack of scriptural symmetry is a decisive indication of suppressed life.

Structural deformity in a church is incompatible with a healthy, functional vigor. Local churches are the chief estates of that realm on earth which is denominated in Scripture "the kingdom of God," which no man can see except he be born of the Spirit, and which no man can enter except he be also born of water.

Our present inquiry relates entirely to the Diaconate. In regard to this point there is the greatest divergence of views which suggests the possibility of the widest aberration from the truth. What we present, however, may be looked upon as hypothetical and tentative, rather than as oracular and final. We intend to make an investigation,—not to pronounce a verdict. We beg the indulgence of critics for occasional circumlocutions and explanations which are intended for another class of readers. We wish in the first place to get a clear conception of the character and duties of those persons who were called *διδάσχοι* by the Greeks. We do not wish to have our conception colored by the opinions of former writers. We will shun the turbid waters of ecclesiastical controversy by going to the head of the stream. We propose to investigate the historic meaning and usage of the Greek word *διδάσχος*. Our aim is to obtain pure truth, unalloyed by hereditary corruptions. In every language there is a large class of words whose force can be appreciated only by comprehending the structure of society in which they had their origin. Natural objects and natural relations are substantially the same in all ages. The words which denote them are generally easily understood, because they find their equivalent in the conceptions of men of all countries and ages. The terms father, son, brother, sister, mother, denote ideas which are essentially the same, whether society be primitive or mature, whether men be barbarous or refined. But as society ripens, artificial distinctions and classifications of men spring up, which have no exact parallel in any other land or age. The plastic symbols of language take their physiognomy from prevailing customs; hence there arises a class of words as unique in signification as the form of social life which prevails is peculiar and anomalous.

Hence an inside view of the social habits of the people whose language we would interpret is indispensable to a correct apprehension of its meaning. Though there are not wanting tolerable analogies in other languages which would give us a general conception of the Greek *διδάσχος*, still the original die in which the word was cast must be sought in Grecian ideas and customs.

The distinction of sex constitutes the basis of the broadest classification into which human society is divided. According to Grecian manners the domestic servitor might be either male or female. To illustrate the gender of the word and its general classical use to English readers, the following passage from Xenophon's treatise on the Management of a Household is translated; here remarking once for all that wherever *διδάσχος* occurs in the Greek we have adopted the English word *servitor* as a uniform equivalent. For reasons which

we have not space to state we prefer the French derivative to the Latin *minister*, although the latter has become better seasoned by more common English use.

Iscomachus said that it was good exercise for a wife to wet and knead bread and to shake and arrange garments and beds. By exercising in this way she would have a better appetite, be healthier, and show a better complexion in truth; and then when her appearance comes into comparison with that of a *servitor* (*διακόνος*) her superiority is manifest in her becoming neatness, her attractive dress, and especially in her spontaneous readiness to please, instead of a constrained obedience.¹

Social Condition.

From the time that captives began to be taken in war, slavery prevailed with differing degrees of rigor throughout nearly the whole of Greece. Hence, according to Hellenic conception, society was composed of bondmen and freemen. Even the poorer citizens used to have a slave to take care of their domestic concerns. The low prices at which slaves were bought and sold indicates the abundance of the supply. Ordinary house slaves, whether male or female, could be purchased at Athens, in the time of Demosthenes, for one hundred and fifty drachmas apiece, a little over \$25 of our money in gold; and he considers $2\frac{1}{2}$ minæ (about \$44) a very large price. Upon Boeckh's estimate, the slaves in Attica whose civilization may be looked upon as exponential in this respect, numbered on an average four to one of the free native population; they performed all sorts of service in doors and out; they represented all trades and occupations; they wrought in the mines and in the workshops; they labored on shipboard and on shore; they tilled the soil, kept accounts, wrote as amanuenses, tended flocks as shepherds, and officiated as waiters in the temples of the gods.¹ Aristotle conceived no household to be organically complete without a slave, whom he denominated "an animate organ" (*ἔμψυχον ὄργανον*), for the performance of menial labor. When wealth and ambition had ripened into showy extravagance, retinues of slaves were kept, not altogether for the service which they rendered, but sometimes for dignity and display. Hence the baleful shadow of slavery darkened all of that classic land and shed a sickly hue over all social relations. Even the illustrious Plato was freed from slavery by Anniceris for twenty or thirty minæ; and Diogenes also, when he was put upon the block to be sold as a slave, bawled out, "Whoever among you wants a master, let him buy me."²

¹ Oec. X. 12.

² Servitors were generally slaves.

Silenus who had been delivered into captivity by Tyrrhenian pirates calls himself, in a piteous lament, the *servitor* of a godless Cyclop.¹ Athenæus quotes Clitarchus in whose words *servitors* are enumerated as a class of slaves.² Socrates declares a slave who is destitute of self-control to be unfit to be a servitor.³ The instances which are to be found in Greek writers, where domestic servitors were not slaves, are rare and generally foreign. They seem to be mentioned as something unusual and exceptional.⁴

Our conclusion is that as a servitor, viewed in reference to what is essential to his character, might be either male or female, so he might be either bond or free, but in fact was undoubtedly, with rare exceptions, a slave.⁵

Sphere of Service.

We come now to inquire into the sphere which a *servitor* was accustomed to fill. There is nothing in the etymology of the word which throws any satisfactory light upon this point.⁶ It does not however seem to be a very ancient word. It is not to be found, I think, in Homer nor in Hesiod. Society in those early times was crude and undeveloped. The minute and systematic division of labor, which a riper civilization introduced, does not appear chronicled in the words of the period. Nevertheless the wave-lines of human thought which subsequently indurated into national customs are clearly discernible. The Homeric picture of "queenly Hebe," in the golden hall at Olympus, where she appears as the servitor of the gods, and passes round the nectar at their banquet, is perhaps the mythological archetype which helped to form the ideal of social gentility which prevailed wherever the gods that dwelt in Olympus were revered. The court of Zeus, as delineated by the poets, was the emporium of cosmopolitan etiquette throughout the pagan world. The custom of reclining at meals, which does not seem to have prevailed universally in the earliest times, may have originated in the conception of the poets, but was probably imported from the east.⁷ Whatever be its origin, it is manifest that its prevalence created a special demand for a class of attendants whose service was the natural complement of that luxurious custom. The Greeks had no drawing-rooms. Hence at a feast, after the guests were seated, the tables were brought in by servitors, and when the several courses were finished the tables were removed.⁸ The Greeks at their meals

¹ Eurip. Cyc. 31.

² Deipnosophistas.

³ Xen. Memb. IV. 2.

⁴ Herod. IV. 71 and 72; Xen. Anab. IV. 33.

⁵ Xen. Cyc. II. 3, 7, and VIII. 3, 7.

⁶ Buttmann's Lexilog. § 40, p. 230; Gaisford Etymolog. Mag.

⁷ St. John's Hellenica.

⁸ Polyb., vol. IV., bk. XXI. 4, 5, p. 499.

made no use of knives and forks nor of the Chinese substitute chopsticks. They ate with their fingers. Hence it was customary to present to every guest at table an ewer of water that he might wash his hands, both at the beginning of the repast and at the end of the several courses. After each lavation the hands were wiped and sometimes scented with delicate perfumery like rose-water. Where the festivities were luxuriously complete, after supper the guests were served with a great variety of odoriferous unguents and essences. The servitor therefore became an indispensable attendant at all meals which made any pretensions to genteel formality. Among those whom simplicity of taste or want of means made frugal, servitors, who took their name from their most invariable and essential duty, performed more or less of collateral service. It is on this account that Herodotus mentions "bakers and cooks" in the Persian army, to indicate the luxurious completeness of its culinary department, while the abstemious Lacedemonian generals only had servitors.¹

In proportion as genteel usage rendered domestic serving indispensable, it rose to the dignity of a separate and honorable profession. To serve was an accomplishment which was magnified in several ways. It was made honorable. As in feudal times the great baron of England used to follow the king, kneel down when he was addressed by him, and perform such menial duties as to bear the ewer in which his sovereign washed his hands, so in early times among the Greeks, serving was performed by persons of princely dignity and noble blood. Subsequently as the rank of those who officiated in this capacity declined and slavery supplanted primitive simplicity, the dignity of the servitor was preserved and perpetuated by the special training which was given him in order that the duties of his vocation might be performed tastefully and agreeably. As domestic servitors sustained a relation of delicate proximity to their superiors, they were always selected, like cup-bearers, with a due regard to their youth and beauty. The cup-bearer who poured the wine belonged to the general class of persons who are called servitors.² His duties however were more specific, and his presence a more decisive indication of royal festivity.

Hence the presence of the servitor was indispensable on all dignified social occasions. His sphere and duties though belonging to the class useful were nevertheless like those of a cup-bearer, somewhat ornamental. His presence was a badge of social distinction. He is never to be found in the lower grades of society. He is indigenous to festivity, competence and high position. He flourished among those

¹ Herodotus, IX. 82, m

² Xen. Oec., VIII. 10 and 14.

whom wealth, or birth, or office, or royalty, had made great. The poor had *slaves*, but *servitors* were the appendages of dignified station. The accomplished mistress of a high bred family had *servitors*. The pilot of a ship was dignified with a *servitor*.¹ Officers in the army had one or two *servitors*.² The Theban Polemarchs are described by Xenophon as attended by *servitors*.³ Pausanias, the governor of Sparta, had his *servitors*. Euripides⁴ decorates Polyphemus with a *servitor* to depict the degradation of Silenas in his subjection to so despicable a dignitary. In Sophocles⁵ the forlorn Philoctetes ironises his destitute condition by calling the chance visitors through whom he sent in vain for relief, the estate of his *servitors*. "In regard to the *estate of my servitors* (*τὰ τῶν διαδόνων*) they, as is likely, I think, making little of my lot, hastened their voyage homewards." His poverty presented no inducement to them to form his retinue and go on his errands. Æschylus⁶ delineates the god-like estate of Jupiter with a no less personage than Mercury for his *servitor*, whom Prometheus stigmatizes as an *underling of the gods*. (*θεῶν ὑπηρέτου*.) Thus we find that the attendance of *servitors* was an emblem of social dignity; their position was honorable, because it came in contact only with the upper classes. The royal dignity of king Ahasuerus⁷ was embellished by the attendance upon him of seven eunuchs, who are called in the Septuagint strictly according to the Hellenic conception, *servitors*. Thus everywhere, besides the purpose of luxurious utility which *servitors* were intended to fulfil, they stand also as indices on the social scale to mark the grade to which the personages to whom they are attached belong, whether in the family, the state, or among the gods. We regard the term *διάκονος* as very specific. It always implies perfect subordination to its chief, and as uniformly denotes the FIRST GRADE OF SUBORDINATION, and not like *ὑπηρέτης*, the second or the third.⁸ In the domestic sphere no other servant stands between the *servitor* and his master. In the state only the supreme authority holds the right of direction. The *servitor* of the gods is subject to no mortal dictation. The *servitor*, however, has no glory of his own: all his dignity and splendor depends on the sphere in which he shines

Aristides,⁹ in his eulogy in behalf of the four Grecian statesmen, not only asserts that it is essentially honorable to serve, but that Milti-

¹ Xen. *Helenica*, V. 4, 6.

² Xen. *Hiero*, IV. 2.

³ *Cyroped.*, VIII. 3, 7.

⁴ Eurip. *Cy.*, 31.

⁵ Soph. *Philock.*, 497.

⁶ Æsch. *Prom.*, 940.

⁷ *Esth.*, I. 10 and II. 2; VI. 3.

⁸ *Athn.* VII. 37, a; *Stalb. Plato's Republic*, 370, E; 370, D; 371, A; 373, C; *Gorg.*, 513, C; *Legg.*, VI. 782, B.

⁹ *Arist.*, XLVI. 199.

ades and Themistocles attained to unparalleled preëminence by becoming the servitors of the gods.¹

The tractable subserviency which the term implies may be seen by consulting the following passages. Plato, *Leges*, 831, E; Plutarch's *Moralia*, 63, B; Aristotle's *Ethics*, VIII. 6, 7.

Aristides² argument assumes that servitor implies unqualified subordination. He proceeds to show that the subordination of Athenian statesmen was not however like that of a cook to a mistress, nor like that of a caterer to a customer, nor like that of a politician to the people; but was a voluntary and intelligent submission to the gods. With an evident attempt to claim all of prerogative for his favorites which the term would allow, the whole oration indirectly proves that it essentially implies absolute subordination to its chief as Plato claims.

Correlation of Servitors.

Human society is joined together by reciprocal adjustments. Each part has its counterpart. Hence words which describe social relations have their correlatives. The correlative of child is parent; that of slave is master. The characteristic bond which unites the former together is affection; the coupling between the latter is authority. As a *δίδωνος* was generally a slave, its correlative is sometimes *δεδούτης*; but as a servitor was something more than a slave, its appropriate correlative is *κύριος*. The tie of affiliation between a lord and his servitor was something besides arbitrary authority. It was softened by endearment and confidence. When a slave became his master's servitor he felt himself ennobled; he passed from the shady side over to the sunny side of his master's character. He attained to somewhat of the dignity of a subordinate companion. In early times, before Hellenic social life was debased by making merchandize of men, the Greeks described this inferior companion by the more generic term *θεράπων*. Thus Patroclus was the companion of Achilles, Meriones of Idomeneus, Eteonus of Menelaus. All of the Grecian heroes are delineated with a social shadow which is cast in an inferior attendant. Boswell sustained a similar social relation to Dr. Johnson; so Bentinck to William the Prince of Orange; and the cruel Alva to bloody Philip of Spain. In the passage which has already been cited from Herodotus the *δίδωνοι* are manifestly included in the more generic term *θεράπωνων*. In Xenophon's *Hiero*,³ *δίδωνοι* are enumerated as a species of *θεράποντες*. Mutual confidence is the

¹ Arist., 152, 187, 193, 199.

² Arist. 221, 223.

³ Xen. *Hiero*, IV. 1.

moral coupling which unites congenial companions. Hence it is said in king Hiero, "What companion (*θεράπων*) would be agreeable if distrusted?" In a subordinate degree the element of social faith was essential to the normal relation between a servitor and his lord. Hence tyrants whose natures become deranged by the crimes which they commit, are tormented with wretched suspicions, because they distrust those who bring them their food and drink. Even of these things before they make a thank-offering to the gods they command their servitors (*τοὺς διαδόχους*) to taste on account of their distrust lest even in these things they should eat or drink some poison." That the relation between a servitor and his lord was one of confidential subserviency is asserted in the following fragment from Euristheus.¹ "It is necessary therefore for the servitor (*τὸν διάδοχον*) to be faithful, both to be such and to conceal the affairs of their masters." In the Prometheus² of Æschylus, Mercury, who is described in the context as "a confidential messenger of father Jupiter," is called his servitor. Thus, "In a short time, too long, alas! he will not rule among the gods! but enough! for I behold this footman of Jupiter, the servitor, (*διάδοχον*) of the young tyrant." Thucydides narrates a story which shows that the normal relation between a servitor and his lord mingled confidence with authority. Pausanias, the Governor of Sparta, wrote to Xerxes that if it seemed as desirable to him as to himself the plan was ripening in his mind to marry his daughter and bring Sparta and the rest of Greece under the Persian sceptre. Xerxes was pleased with the letter and appointed Artabazus to a satrapy on the coast where he could forward communications between the negotiating parties. An Argilian who was once a special favorite of the satrap and was much *trusted* by Pausanias was selected by him to carry his last letter for the king to Artabazus. The chosen messenger became suspicious because no one of those who had served as messengers before him ever came back; he opened the letter and found his suspicions confirmed in that his name was enrolled for death. He took the letter to the Spartan authorities who devised plans for the sure conviction of the treacherous governor. The man betook himself to Tainara as a suppliant, built a hut with a secret apartment in which the magistrates were concealed in order to overhear Pausanias when he came to ask the reason of his supplication and consequent delay in carrying the letter. He alleged as the cause the things written concerning himself and showed in regard to former affairs, each by each, that he had never endangered Pausanias through the knowledge which he had of the *services* (*διαχοναίαις*) per-

¹ Euristh. IV. 1.² Æsch. Prom.; 941.

formed by preceding messengers towards the king; but equally with the multitude of his servitors (*διακόνων*) he had been deemed worthy to die. In this case the relation between the servitor and his lord was subverted by mutual distrust.¹ Let us examine the usage of *διάκονος* and its cognates in the New Testament.

The verb *διακονέω*, which is translated in the common English version "use the office of a deacon," in I Timothy iii. 10, 13, occurs in all thirty-seven times in the New Testament.

1. It is used in its primary literal sense to describe domestic waiting service sixteen times, as follows: That which Martha performed on two occasions at Bethany (Luke x. 40; John xii. 2); that which Peter's wife's mother performed when she arose and ministered to our Lord and his disciples (Matthew viii. 15; Mark i. 31; Luke iv. 39); that which the women performed who followed Jesus from Galilee "and ministered unto him of their substance (Matthew xxvii. 55; Mark xv. 41; Luke viii. 3); that which the angels performed to our Lord in the wilderness (Matthew iv. 11; Mark i. 13); that which waiting servants are wont to perform when they gird themselves and serve (Luke xii. 37; Luke xvii. 8; Luke xxii. 26, 27). The words "I am among you as he that serveth," verse 27, undoubtedly refer particularly to the washing of the disciples' feet. The Lord of glory by his condescension reversed the order of the scale of honor. In the kingdom of Christ the badge of dignity is not prerogative, but service. If the expression "serve tables" (Acts vi. 2), be understood literally, and not rhetorically it may be numbered in this class.

2. It is used ten times in a Christian sense, in which its original meaning glimmers but faintly. The language, "If any man serve me let him follow me, and where I am there shall my servitor be," indicates the appropriate place of a servitor always with his lord. (John xii. 26.) What is meant by the declaration "the Son of Man came not to be served, but to serve" (Matthew xx. 28; Mark x. 45), is defined by the facts of his life.

In the passage "when saw we thee an hungered, or athirst, or a stranger, or naked, or sick, or in prison, and did not minister unto thee," this verb comprehends all ministrations, temporal and perhaps spiritual, which it is possible to render to any of God's elect; for they severally and collectively personate the unrecognized Christ. Similar was the kind of service which the Hebrew Christians performed "in that they ministered to the saints" (Hebrews vi. 10), and also that which "if any man minister" he is to perform as with the ability which God bestows. (I Peter iv. 11.)

¹ *Tue.*, I. 33

3. It is used to describe the conveyance of supplies from the contributing churches to the poor saints under the direction of the apostle Paul, when he went "to Jerusalem to minister to the saints." (Romans xv. 25.) This contribution is spoken of as a "charity served out by us" (II Corinthians viii. 19), and as "an abundance served out by us" (II Corinthians viii. 20), suggesting the imagery of a servitor bearing his dish-tray. The figure is the same where each one is exhorted as he has "received a gift" to "serve it out one to another, as good stewards of the manifold grace of God." (I Peter iv. 10.) It is thus used four times.

4. By a striking figure, drawn from a special use of this Greek verb, the apostle represents the Corinthians as Christ's letter of commendation, served by himself, *i. e.*, in the writing of which he was Christ's amanuensis. (II Corinthians iii. 3.) By a similar trope it is said (I Peter i. 12) that "not unto themselves but unto us," the ancient prophets did minister the things which are now reported by the preaching of the gospel, *i. e.*, not for themselves, but for us, by revelation, they wrote as God's amanuenses the things now heralded in the gospel.

5. It is used three times to describe the service which was rendered to Paul by his personal attendants. The first is, "He sent into Macedonia two of them that ministered unto him. (Acts xix. 22.) The second is, "The Lord give mercy unto the house of Onesiphorus: for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain; but when he was in Rome, he sought me out very diligently, and found me. The Lord grant unto him that he may find mercy of the Lord in that day; and in how many things he ministered unto me at Ephesus, thou knowest very well. (II Timothy i. 16-18.) The last refers to a service which the emancipated slave Onesimus was capable of rendering. "Whom I would have retained with me, that in thy stead he might have ministered unto me in the bonds of the gospel." (Philemon 13.) The bearing of these passages on our general subject will be considered at a subsequent stage of our investigation.

The word *διακονία* occurs in all thirty-four times in the New Testament. 1. It is used to denote the service with which Martha was encumbered when she welcomed our Lord into her house. (Luke x. 40.) Also that which angels perform in ministering to the future heirs of salvation. (Hebrews i. 14.) The dispensations of the law and gospel are spoken of in contrast: one as the ministration of death and of condemnation—the other as a ministration of spirit and of righteousness. (II Corinthians iii. 7-9.) The nature of each may be seen more fully by an examination of Galatians iii. 24.

2. It is used ten times of communicating material aid for the relief of saints. Seven of these relate to the relief of the poor saints in Judea by means of charitable contributions sent by the Gentile Christians. "The sending of relief by the church of Antioch," as Baumgarten¹ remarks, "was the first stretching out of the hand by the Gentile world across the ancient gulf which separated it from Israel." This was sent to the elders of the church at Jerusalem by the hands of Barnabas and Saul. (Acts xi. 29; xii. 25.) No ecclesiastical deacon is mentioned in connection with this apostolic charity. The other contributions were sent from the churches of Macedonia, Achaia, and Galatia. (Romans xv. 31; II Corinthians viii. 4; ix. 1, 12, 13.) Titus and the brother whose praise in the gospel was throughout the churches, and the messengers of the churches who are called the glory of Christ took these moneys in charge and carried them to Jerusalem.

There is no reason to believe that the service which was rendered by Stephanas was official because his family appears more prominent in it than he himself. The family devoted themselves to the service of believers. He held no official prerogative, because the same recognition is to be accorded to "*every one* that works with us and labors," and because the language of the original implies reciprocal service. They were to be relieved as they had relieved others. What they had done was required of all, and all who became exhausted in the service were entitled to similar relief. (I Corinthians xvi. 15.)

The term *διακονία*, in Acts vi. 1, does not mean ecclesiastical deaconship because it is used in reference to a state of things which existed before deacons were thought of. We look in vain in the New Testament for deacons in charge of the temporalities of the church. It is to be feared that the prevailing views on this subject are narrow and sectarian, instead of being scriptural and catholic. The benevolent service which the church of Thyatira performed and for which it was noticed and commended by the Son of God, probably related to the care of the poor, which was one of the most striking characteristics of the early Christians. (Revelation ii. 19.)

The word *διακονία* is used fifteen times to denote the spiritual ministration of apostles and preachers in dispensing the gospel: strictly of the apostolic office, as held by the twelve, three times (Acts i. 17, 25; vi. 4); of the ministry of Paul himself, eight times (Acts xx. 24; xxi. 19; II Corinthians iv. 1; v. 18; vi. 3; xi. 8; I Timothy i. 12; Romans xi. 13); of the ministry as held by Timothy, once (II Timothy iv. 5); by Mark, once (II Timothy iv. 11); by Archippus, once (Co-

¹ Vol. II., p. 5.

lossians iv. 17); and of the ministry in general, once (Ephesians iv. 12). All but the last of these are clear and determinate. The breadth of the ministry here spoken of is to be measured by the agents by whom it is filled and the end at which it aims. The end is declared to be "the edifying of the body of Christ;" the agents by whom it is filled are apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors and teachers. (v. 11.) Hence the word which is here translated ministry is as comprehensive in its sense as the Holy Spirit is liberal in the distribution of gifts. It includes apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors and teachers. No deacons are named.

The same word is used in I Corinthians xii. 5, and is then translated "administrations." The words "gifts, administrations and operations," mutually limit each other; the ideas which they denote are all commensurate. "The work of the Spirit," says Hodge, "is presented under three different aspects: viewed in relation to the Spirit they are gifts; in relation to the Lord they are ministrations; in relation to God they are operations." The ministrations are as manifold as the gifts. The gifts are illustratively enumerated below, viz., the word of wisdom, the word of knowledge, faith, gifts of healing, working of miracles, prophecy, discerning of spirits, tongues, and the interpretation of tongues. There is here certainly no allusion to deaconship, unless deaconship be explained to mean the possession and exercise of charismatic gifts.

The nature of the ministration or service described in Romans xiii. 7, depends upon the character and sphere of those persons who are called servitors or ministers in the New Testament. In our common English version of the Scriptures *διδάσκαλος* is translated "minister" twenty times and "deacon" three times. It occurs in all just thirty times.

1. It is used in its primary classical signification twice to denote the servitors who filled the firkins and passed round the wine at the marriage in Cana of Galilee. (John xi. 5, 9.)

2. It is used four times in a slightly tropical sense to denote a servitor in the kingdom of God. Prerogative and power in the economy of this world are passports to distinction and eminence. In the kingdom of Christ a reverse principle prevails, viz.: Humiliation is the path to honor. Christ condescended not simply to become a servitor, but took the lower grade of subjection, which was denoted by *δούλος*, and therefore henceforth all greatness shall be graduated according to the scale which he sanctioned by his example. The gleam of its primeval use shines out also in the passage, "If any one serve me let him follow me, and where I am there shall also my servitor be."

3. It is used thrice to denote the deputies of civil government. The ministers of the king, who seized the intruder that had not on a wedding garment, are called servitors. (Matthew xxii. 13.) Civil rulers are called God's servitors (Romans xiii. 4), who bring good to the righteous and wrath to the wicked.

4. Twice it is applied to Christ: affirmatively where it is said, Christ became a servitor of the circumcision, *i. e.*, of the Jews;—interrogatively, where it is said, "Is Christ then the servitor of sin?"

5. It is used fourteen times to denote apostles and other preachers, twice in a bad sense, once in a doubtful sense, eleven times in a good sense.

False apostles are called the servitors of Satan. Of Judaizing teachers it is said, "are they servitors of Christ?" (II Corinthians xi. 23.) Paul twice calls himself a servitor of the gospel (Colossians i. 23; Ephesians iii. 7); once a servitor of the church, viewed as the body of Christ (Colossians i. 25). Likewise he calls himself and Apollos servitors through whom the Corinthians believed (I Corinthians iii. 5); himself and Timothy servitors of the New Covenant (II Corinthians iii. 6), and servitors of God (II Corinthians vi. 4). Timothy is called a servitor of God (I Thessalonians iii. 2), and a servitor of Jesus Christ (I Timothy iv. 6); Tychicus is twice called "a faithful servitor" in the Lord (Ephesians vi. 21; Colossians iv. 7); Epaphras is also called a faithful servitor of Christ (Colossians i. 7).

The only possible cases in which the term may be used in a special sense to denote an ecclesiastical deacon are the following: (Romans xvi. 1; I Timothy iii. 8, 12; Philemon 1). Phebe is called a servitor of the church which is at Cenchrea. Our view of the sphere which she occupied must depend upon the interpretation which is given to I Timothy iii. 11.

In our common English version of this chapter there is an unmistakable protrusion of the ears of an ecclesiastical system, nor is the version of the Bible Union free from hereditary taint. The usages of the church are incorporated into the translations. The coloring which is thrown over the general conception seems borrowed from modern ecclesiastical practices. Three points deserve attention. They all contribute to form a false impression which widely prevails. 1. The article is omitted in the translation where the original has it, and is inserted in the translation where the original has it not. The original reads, "the overseer" and "servitors;" the translation says "a bishop" and "the deacons." This is an important difference. It has a significant bearing upon the question whether the office of deaconship belongs to the organic structure of the church or not.

The article is used to describe what is definite and well known. The phrase "the deacons," in this connection, implies the existence of the diaconate. The omission of the article on the other hand would leave the existence of the diaconate an open question to be determined by what is taught in other passages. The translation of the verb *diakonéō* in verses 11 and 13 is to be regarded with suspicion. The circumlocution by which it is translated, viz: "use the office of a deacon" is broad enough to cloak the most extravagant assumptions. Like the misuse of the article which has already been pointed out, it lends countenance to an impression which is questionable and perhaps false. The phrase "use the office of a deacon" implies as much official trumpery as you are wont to associate with the office. It is time enough to introduce the trappings and livery after the office of deaconship has been instituted and its prerogatives defined. If we have a Pope the deacons must have the grade of cardinals; if bishops, deacons must be "the third order." The verb *diakonéō* as we have seen, no where else means "to use the office of a deacon." To so translate it here, therefore, is an unauthorized assumption, unless such an office can be proved to have been instituted. Christ is the model and exemplar of all Christian duty. He did not "use the office of a deacon," though what the verb which is so translated denotes is predicated of him. He came not to be served but to serve. An unusual and exceptional rendering is a precarious and doubtful charter to an office in the Christian church. This verb means simply "to serve" in thirty-five instances; we insist that the thirty-sixth and thirty-seventh instances should not be made exceptions without reason. Another item which gives a false perspective to the picture is, that the assumed diaconate is meretriciously dignified with peculiar wives. Women, indeed, are mentioned in this connection, but that they belonged to the deacons as their wives is an assumption which is very natural after they have been inducted into an imaginary office. The real idea is that women may become servitors as well as men. We present the following reasons for this interpretation:

1. The original and primary meaning of the word which is translated wives is *women* and not wives, except sometimes by obvious implications. In this instance no such implication is necessary, and is denied quite uniformly by the older commentators.

2. The pronoun "their" in our translation is wanting in the original; if the women spoken of belonged to the deacons as their wives we should expect the insertion of the pronoun or of the article, or both. We have neither. (See Ephesians v. 24, 25).

3. The women are grouped by themselves as a class as much as the male servitors mentioned above. The word *ἰσάμηναι* which is translated *likewise* in the eighth verse, is the same which is translated "even so" at the beginning of the eleventh verse. The presumption is that its meaning in both places is the same. It is used as a separating label to divide off the several classes in an exhaustive enumeration. Thus in Titus ii. 2, 3, 6 "aged men," "aged women," and "young men" are placed in separate groups by the discriminating *ἰσάμηναι* "likewise." The same usage is to be observed in I Timothy, ii. 9, where "men" and "women" are set in distinct classes by the separating "likewise." Hence we conclude that these women are not the wives of the deacons, because there is the partition of a "likewise" (*ἰσάμηναι*) between them. The term servitor does not indicate gender. The term "women" is introduced to show that servitors may be both male and female.

4. The order and parallelism of qualification, as Ellicott remarks, indicates that women occupied a similar sphere of service as the men. The first qualification, which is requisite in each, is the same and is indicated by the same word "grave." The second in both relates to the government of the tongue; the men are not to be "double-tongued;" the women not slanderous. To the qualification in the men "not given to much wine" we have for the women the term "sober," denoting not a long face and solemn gait, but temperate habits. It includes especially abstinence from wine, and probably requires circumspect habits in every respect. So interpreted it completes the parallelism, which is expressed on the male side by the additional term "not greedy of base gain."¹ To the phrase "holding the mystery of the faith and of a pure conscience" on the part of the males we have the comprehensive summary "faithful in all things" on the part of the females. The similarity of qualifications therefore seems to indicate similarity of service.

5. The fact that no domestic qualifications are mentioned renders it impossible that there is any allusion to wives. A fastidious maid might make a beautiful servitor, but a wretched housekeeper for a deacon. Domestic qualifications are not omitted on the male side; if wives were spoken of certainly some domestic quality would have been enjoined.

6. The fact that no qualifications are enumerated as prerequisite in the overseer's wife renders it improbable that any special qualifications in the wives of deacons would be required. This consideration has been felt so much that some have endeavored by a forced applica-

¹ This is not found in the MSS. Sinaiticus nor Vaticanus.

tion to make it describe the qualifications of wives, both for deacons and for the overseer. Such a plea indicates a difficulty of some magnitude to be disposed of. It is undoubtedly incumbent on all women who are so fortunate as to have husbands, to be good wives; but I can see no reason why deacons should have better wives than the rest of mankind.

7. The Christian religion needs such services as women alone can render. Says Dr. Ripley, commenting on this passage, "The substantial reasons for having such women will always remain. The care of the communion service; of baptismal garments for females; the wants of indigent females and cases of discipline enlisting the sympathy of females, render the service of judicious and pious women indispensable." How serviceable devoted women may be in taking care of the sick is forcibly illustrated in the cases of Florence Nightingale, and in the labors of those women who went forth as angels of mercy with our army in the late rebellion. Similar services are perpetually needed at home in connection with every Christian congregation. Devout women are also needed in all missionary enterprises. Were it not for this passage of scripture, and the example of Phebe, a servitor in the church of Cenchrea, there would be no divine authority for appointing women to special service in the church. The want of such service is perpetual. A divine commission anticipating and supplying that want indicates the illimitable forecast of the founder of Christianity, in that he has provided for all emergencies by specific grants in the original charter. Hence we conclude that there was a class of persons in apostolic times called servitors, who might be either male or female. Phebe is a female representative of this class. The question now arises whether there is an office in the Christian church which may be called the diaconate or deaconship. It is claimed by some that there are three grades in the ministry, and that the lowest grade is that of deacon. The existence of deaconship as a distinct and authorized office in the Christian church has been extensively admitted, even by those who deny the distinction of an intermediate grade of office between the overseer and the deacons. The argument which is adduced to prove that the servitors of the New Testament belonged to the ministry and were not simply employed in managing the temporal affairs of the church cannot be gainsayed. The term servitor is applied to those who are admitted on all hands to have been preachers more frequently than it is used in all other significations. As we have seen Christ himself is twice called a servitor. It is applied to the apostles and other preachers fourteen times. Paul, Apollos, Barnabas, Timothy, Titus, Tychicus and Epaphras were all

engaged in diaconal service. The term "service" is used fifteen times to denote the ministry as it was fulfilled by apostles and other preachers. It is, however, never used to denote the office of an ecclesiastical deacon in charge of the temporal affairs of the church.

Christ is the foundation and model of diaconal service. The sphere which it is to fill and the character of the subordination which it implies are exemplified in him. He is the key to the scriptures on this as upon every doctrinal topic. The original charter by which diaconal service is authorized is found in the example of Christ. The earliest precedent furnishes the best exemplification of the intent of the law. Jesus Christ became a *διδάσκων* or servitor of God. He took this subordination in behalf of the truth of God. The end of his mission was the complete fulfillment of the covenant of grace, which was foretold by the prophets. His service was diaconal, and is the model and warrant for the employment of diaconal service in the church. According to this primary pattern the apostles became the servitors of Jesus Christ, who is the incarnate embodiment of the truth. The end of their commission is the complete fulfillment of the covenant of grace. In all they authoritatively performed, whether providing food for themselves and their Lord, healing the sick, preaching the word, or founding churches, their service was diaconal. They acted as servitors of Christ for the fulfillment of the covenant of grace. They were the executors of his pleasure, not his advisers. While they were in the process of training, according to universal ancient custom, they ministered to their teacher; they went on his errands (Mark xi. 2), they prepared his meals (John iv. 31), gave to the poor, made purchases (John xiii. 29), and preparations in general as he directed (Luke xxii. 8). At the same time they healed the sick, cast out demons, and preached the gospel. They were his deputies. They acted in subordination to him as he to the Father. He was a servitor of the truth of God. By the outpouring of the Holy Spirit they became like him official servitors of God, and as such in rank coördinate with him, but in administrative functions, subject entirely to him (Matthew x. 40), as the infallible expounder of the covenant of grace. Thus was the personal ministry of Christ enlarged by the introduction of diaconal service, and thereby a warrant was given for a subsequent similar enlargement which would adjust itself to the growth of the church.

The outpouring of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost brought a great enlargement to the church, and created a demand for a corresponding enlargement of the ministry. There was a demand for additional helpers in order to fulfill the covenant of grace. The most important

duties of the service must not be subordinated to the lower. The church was canvassed for the highest order of talent and piety to supply the growing wants of the church for an enlarged ministry. Seven men were chosen to assist, especially in that department of the service which was most suffering from neglect. Upon these men the hands of the apostles were laid, to signify that the work of the ministry was communicated to them. They became hands and tongues for the truth, as they themselves were. In regard to the import of the imposition of hands we quote from an article by Rev. Dr. Hovey: "The hand is the proper and natural organ for giving, communicating, transferring; and we think the imposition of hands always signified the transference of something, either really or emblematically, from one person to another. The circumstances of each particular case must be consulted in order to ascertain what is represented as being thus transferred." It is manifest that it did not signify the impartation of special gifts and the Holy Spirit; for they were already "full of the Holy Spirit and of faith," and the spiritual endowments which they possessed was the chief consideration which induced their selection. It did not signify the creation of an ecclesiastical diaconate, for no such office has any warrant in the gospel or historic foot-prints, either in the Acts or in the epistles. It was the inauguration of the regular ministry upon the same plan that the apostles succeeded to the personal ministry of Jesus. Labors which had hitherto been performed personally by the apostles was transferred to deputies, who like them in rank as servitors of God became servitors of Jesus Christ. The miraculous outpouring of the Spirit superseded the necessity of any special training except what the providence of God had already given. The method of their appointment and induction into office indicates the normal process of organizing a Christian church. These helpers became, after their ordination, like the apostles, servitors of Jesus Christ and pastors of the church at Jerusalem. The impression that they were deacons is unfounded. They indeed began to assist in that department where the apostles could best be spared, and where they could help most. But two of them straightway entered upon the highest department of ministerial labor, and achieved such signal success that we must admit that their work declares what was the mind of the Spirit. There are several considerations which render it probable that the seven who received the imposition of the apostles were the elders of the church and not its deacons.

1. If they were not elders then we have no history of the organization of the first Christian church in the world. There were elders

in all the other churches, and we have a history of their appointment. There were elders in this church besides the apostles; but if the seven were not elders we have a detailed account of the appointment of deacons and sketches of the sermons they preached, but no account of their superiors in office, the elders. Such an omission is unreasonable.

2. Those who were chosen manifestly possessed, next to the apostles, the first order of ministerial qualifications in the church. They owed their elevation to the prominence which their talents and piety had already given them in the sight of the people. The best men would be needed for elders; it is reasonable to believe that this was the sphere for which they were ordained.

3. We should more naturally expect an account of the appointment of the elders of the church than an account of the appointment of deacons, if we have but one. In the subsequent history of this church the elders are prominent, but deacons are not mentioned at all. Is it credible that the names of all the deacons should be recorded and not an elder named? Is it credible that we should have a minute account of the inauguration of the deacons, who are never heard of afterwards, and no hint that the elders who figured so prominently in the council subsequently, were ordained? This is more improbable because we read of the ordination of elders in Gentile churches, but never of the ordination of deacons. Barnabas and Paul ordained elders in every church in Iconium, Lystra, and the surrounding region. There were elders at Ephesus. Titus was directed to set in order the things which were wanting in Crete, which he did by ordaining elders in every city. Deacons are never mentioned in the New Testament as a part of the organization of a Christian church; there is no enumeration of the duties which they are to perform; there is no definition of the prerogatives which they may exercise; no precept nor precedent to limit their sphere.

4. That the seven men upon whom the apostles laid their hands were the elders of the church and not deacons is shown from the service which they subsequently performed. Up to that time it is manifest that the apostles themselves had superintended the finances of the church (Acts iv. 35). A class of persons, whose official title is not given, was appointed to superintend the distribution of supplies to the poor, and thus relieve the apostles of this department of their labors. The persons whom we next find in charge of this department are called elders; for the contribution from Antioch was sent to the elders for disbursement, not to the deacons. The inference is unavoidable that the persons who were chosen to assist the apostles were elders and not deacons.

It is sometimes assumed that the care of the poor devolves upon the deacons. It was not so in the apostolic church of Jerusalem (Acts xi. 30; Galations ii. 9). It was not so in the church of Ephesus. In his charge to the elders of that church, Paul says to them, "ye ought to support the weak and to remember the words of the Lord Jesus, 'It is more blessed to give than to receive.'" No charge is ever given to deacons to look out for the poor. Jesus himself committed the care of his mother, not to a deacon, but to the beloved disciple. This act, taken in connection with words which he had previously spoken, is a precedent which embodies an authoritative principle. When Jesus said to John, "Behold thy mother," he virtually said to the Christian ministry, "Behold the faithful poor," because he has the same tender regard for every one who does the will of his Father as he showed for his bereaved mother (Matthew xii. 50). According to the teaching of the New Testament the supervision of God's poor devolves upon the elders, not upon deacons.

5. As a matter of retrospective experience we say deacons cannot be found who are capable of taking the supervision of the department of religious finance. The highest order of ministerial talent is demanded in all aggressive operations. When colleges are to be endowed, seminaries formed, asylums opened, missions established, churches built, and exhausted treasuries replenished, the best ministerial talent has to be summoned to the field. Hence all the sects employ ministers and not deacons as agents and secretaries to superintend all of their general benevolent societies.

If God has appointed deacons as financial superintendents in his church, then there is need of a world-wide reform—our practices are all wrong—our greatest men are out of place—the past is all a blunder. Paul wandered from his sphere in sending collections to the poor saints of Judea; and Titus deserved censure and not commendation for his zeal as collecting agent. It is a shame for us to have a creed which we habitually, and systematically set aside in practice. If deacons are appointed by God as religious financial overseers, then dismiss all the secretaries and agents in Bible societies, Tract societies and Mission boards, let the deacons raise and disburse the funds of Christendom. As this would be unwise now, so it was impracticable then. Hence elders were appointed at Jerusalem by the apostles to superintend this fundamental department. It may be said that the term "elders" includes both overseers and deacons. This may be conceded, if it can be proved. It is generally agreed that the terms "elders" and "overseers" are synonymous. Some of the qualifications which are enumerated in the pastoral epistles are cer-

tainly ministerial, *e. g.*, "apt to teach"—"able to convince the gain-sayers." If the term "elder" includes deacons, the term "overseer" undoubtedly includes them also, and there is no difference between a pastor and a deacon. Their grade, duties and prerogatives are the same. But it is necessary first to show that a deacon is not an ecclesiastical invention.

The great life work of both Jesus and Paul was to train up ministerial successors, but it remains to be proved that they or any of the apostles had any thing to do with deacons: for the same method of recruiting the ministry which was employed in the church of Jerusalem was carried out by Paul among the Gentiles. No new order of men was introduced. No clannish distinction was created. The unity of the ministry was not impaired by being divided into sections. Its dignity was not degraded by the introduction of persons whom God had not called and endowed. A sound Christianity produces a sound ministry; doctrinal deterioration works organic corruption in the church and ministry. The empire of Satan is a principality of diverse grades and casts. The kingdom of God is a democratic brotherhood. The term *servitor* implies no more class-distinction than our term minister of Jesus Christ. It is not used at all to denote an ecclesiastical officer of any grade. Nothing could be farther from the word than the idea of gradation in office: for it is applied to all grades of ministers, from Christ, who is the Head of the Church, to Phebe, an untitled woman, who went upon a pious errand in behalf of the church in Cenchrea. It is distinguishable from "overseer" and "elder" in that the latter are applied exclusively to ministers who were the superintendents of churches, while the term *servitor*, like our word minister, denotes a minister at large, without implying any inferiority of grade or ability; for Paul is called a *servitor* more frequently than any other person in the New Testament. Whenever it is applied to other persons it is in the language of eulogy and commendation to express exaltation and praise and never inferiority and disparagement. To call one a faithful *servitor* or minister of Jesus Christ is one of the choicest encomiums which Paul ever bestowed.

The extent to which Paul sought to enlarge the ministry is expressed by the commission which near the close of his career he gave to Timothy. *The things that thou hast heard of me among many witnesses, the same commit thou to faithful men who shall be able to teach others also.* For the interpretation of this language we must look to early apostolic practice, because we have not the subsequent history of Timothy's ministry. We may safely assume that, what Paul and the other apostles had done was what in kind he charged Timothy to do.

Look at the immense number of men whom Paul found and trained for ministerial service. It is plain that wherever he found capacity he sought to develop it and bring it into use. He constantly sought ministerial helpers. He so taught Priscilla and Aquila that they were able in turn to expound to the eloquent Apollos the way of the Lord more perfectly. The third chapter of I Timothy is to be understood as a schedule of minimum qualifications which he himself observed in introducing persons into ministerial service. All of the elders which he ordained possessed the qualifications which are required of overseers in his pastoral epistles. All of the helpers whom he employed and trained possessed the qualifications which are required of servitors. The faithful men whom Timothy was directed to select and train that they might teach others also, were such as Paul had selected and trained. If Paul sought and trained and ordained deacons, then deacons are meant; if he sought and trained young men for ministers, then ministers are meant. The first case is that of Timothy. He is described as a "disciple well reported of by the brethren that were at Lystra and Iconium." This young man, whom Paul took with him and instructed thoroughly in a knowledge of his "ways which were in Christ Jesus," is called a servitor of Jesus Christ, and was a minister after Paul's own heart. Erastus was an assistant of the same class as Timothy. (Acts xix. 22.) Who can doubt that the men who accompanied Paul into Asia, Sopater of Berea, of the Thessalonians, Aristarchus and Scundus, Gaius of Derbe, Tychicus, and Trophimus of Asia, travelled with him like Timothy for instruction? Some of them, whose subsequent history can be traced, are called by Paul "fellow workers unto the kingdom of God," who were a comfort to him. Tychicus is twice called "a faithful minister and fellow-servant in the Lord." The character of those whose history is not given in full must be inferred from that of their associates which is recorded. That Paul instructed the elders of the church at Ephesus most thoroughly, he affirms in his farewell address; that he did the same thing everywhere is a legitimate inference. Paul sought ministerial helpers; it is the qualifications of these therefore which he describes in his letters to Timothy.

In apostolic times men became accredited servitors or ministers, not by ordination, but as under government, by receiving a commission or an appointment to discharge ministerial service. Thus Silas, who was a chief man among the brethren became an accredited servitor when he was chosen to go on the deputation from Jerusalem to Antioch; Barnabas, when he was sent forth to Antioch to encourage

the Grecian converts; Paul, when he was sent from Antioch to Jerusalem with a contribution.

We conclude, therefore, that those only were called servitors or ministers who possessed spiritual gifts of such a character as brought them into notice, and made them suitable agents to be employed on special service. All who had been thus blessed by the Holy Spirit and honored by the appreciative choice of the church, were recognized as ministers of Jesus Christ, without any distinction in grade whatsoever. The servitors differed from the elders much as our own missionaries, agents, secretaries and professors differ from the pastors. In some spheres men might be employed as servitors who had not all of the qualifications requisite in overseers; but as a class the servitors of apostolic times, with Paul at their head, were not a whit in talent and rank behind the elders or overseers of churches. Hence their qualifications, selection and training are described in the pastoral epistles, rather than in the letters to the churches. This is the class of persons referred to in Philemon 1 and in I Timothy iii. 8, *seq.*, who are called in our translation deacons. This translation is given in utter violation of the usage of the word in other passages in the New Testament. It is altogether exceptional and without any analogy from its use in classical writers. An ecclesiastical system is hereby foisted upon the Scriptures which is totally unauthorized and hostile to their spirit which finds its hideous development only in the numberless orders of the Romish hierarchy and the principalities and powers of Satan's empire.

There is an apostolic succession in the ministry; it consists, however, not in priestly manipulation and sanctimonious ceremonies, but in the instruction, discipline and spirit which the ministers of one age impart to their successors in office and labors.

There are not, therefore, by Divine appointment, three orders in the Christian ministry; nor are there two ecclesiastical offices in the church, but only one. Elders are ministers who have been chosen to preside in a given church and exercise pastoral supervision. In their relation to the church they are called overseers; in respect to Christ they are at the same time servitors or ministers. Thus Timothy, while he had the supervision of the church at Ephesus was presumed still to aspire to be "a beautiful servitor of Jesus Christ" (*καλὸς δίδκονος*). Men who do not possess the qualifications which are required in overseers should never be elected to any ecclesiastical office; for eldership is the only office which has been created by Divine enactment. Service in aggressive campaigns was undoubtedly designed to furnish the maturity of age, wisdom, discipline, piety and

experience which they should possess. Thus Peter, who went forth like the other apostles as an evangelist, later in life, when he wrote his epistles, calls himself "an elder." In the enumeration of gifts which Christ gave to men when he ascended on high, this class is called "pastors and teachers." Their Jewish designation is "elders." This is the home guard of the ministry. Christ gave no deacons; they are the invention of men. Prophets, *i. e.*, preachers and and evangelists, compose the missionary wing of the ministry. In rank all are coördinate. Together they compose the ministry which was given "for the building up of the body of Christ." The appointment of committees for specific purposes is abundantly authorized by apostolic example. Such unofficial service is the practical curriculum in which candidates for the ministry are to be "proved first;" afterwards they are to serve as accredited ministers, if found irreproachable: "for those who minister beautifully purchase to themselves a good degree and great boldness in the faith." Hence the appointment of committees for special duties is scriptural; while the appointment of deacons is unauthorized. Nevertheless worthy deacons, because they hold office in the church, should be recognized and treated by pastors as their colleagues, entitled to all the honor which is due to Christian ministers.

The papacy, in all probability, grew up from an inadvertent corruption of the organic structure of the Christian church. An artificial distinction of caste was introduced into the church by the creation of the diaconate. This is the germ from which manifold ecclesiastical gradations grew. It fostered a spirit of pride and called for the assumption of those undefined prerogatives which were necessary to maintain the peace and order of the churches. Hence the episcopate shot forth to balance the diaconate. At length no prerogatives were adequate to the growing emergencies. The bishops claimed to be the vicegerents of Jesus Christ. The creation of an office in the church which Christ did not institute was the virtual exercise of a Divine prerogative. The necessary development of this false assumption required, as the logical upshot of the system, the exercise of all Divine prerogatives. Away, then, with this root of sacerdotal hierarchy from Baptist churches, if it be found indeed on further examination to belong to a plant which our Heavenly Father has not planted. Let incumbent deacons, with their pastors, consider that in the order of Divine Providence they have been placed in the eldership or presbytery of their churches, and therefore so let them minister as those who shall give account for this high trust.

The regimen and correlation of evangelical servitors demands a

more thorough discussion than can be given to the subject in the present article: for the correlation in which they are held is indicative of the type of ecclesiastical polity to which they belong. According to the episcopal system, the correlative of deacon is bishop: the deacons are subject to the direction of their overseers, the bishops. The right of final decision in questions at issue belongs to the bishops by virtue of their superior grade in office. It cannot be denied that the term *διδάσκαλος* implies absolute subordination to its chief. The examples which have been cited prove this. In this the Hellenic and the evangelical usage both agree. The argument in Plato's *Gorgias* assumes this; Aristides in his reply concedes this, and avoids the degradation which submission to the people implies in political ministers, only by denying their correlation to the people and asserting the Christian doctrine that civil magistrates are ministers of heaven. A similar temporary change of lordship is a common ecclesiastical sophistry. The New Testament diction implies that as an amanuensis is subject to the dictation of the author, so a servitor in what he does is to make an exact transcript of the will of his lord.

The theory of an ecclesiastical diaconate compels a resort to one of two alternatives. The deacons are either subject to the absolute control of their overseers, or they are not. If the supervision is absolute, the right of private judgment and independent interpretation is alienated from the deacons. The overseers become their responsible conscience-keepers. The deacons become degraded into irresponsible functionaries; the bishops become invested with popish prerogatives and with a corresponding retinue of obsequious dependents. This theory is the counterpart of political absolutism, which assumes that the king can do no wrong. It implies the infallibility of those who are highest in official standing; for it is self-evident that no man has any right to command another to do what is wrong. This theory of the diaconate is essentially popish. If, on the other hand, the supervision of overseers is not authoritative and final, the diaconate creates a liability to incessant disorder and intestine conflict in the church. If the deacons are not subject to the overseers, they are subject either, (1.) to the same regimen as the overseers, (2.) to a different regimen, or (3.) to no regimen at all. (1.) If they are subject to no regimen, their prerogatives are popish, and must necessarily come in conflict with the Christian ministry, which teaches the ways of Christ as authoritative "every where in every church." (2.) If the deacons are subject to a different regimen than are the overseers, the result must be a schism in the church; for no organization can serve two masters any more than an individual can serve two masters. The legitimate

head of the ministry is Christ. If the regimen of the diaconate be not in Christ, but in the popular will, then a factious opposition to the truth of Christ, which would have been latent and powerless for mischief without leaders, finds the means of a triumphant opposition in the organic deformity and weakness which arise from the incorporation of elements which belong to an unscriptural order of church polity.

(3.) If the deacons are subject to the same regimen as the overseers, both being subject to Christ the two offices are either independent of each other, or they are correlated. If they are correlated they must be either coördinate in prerogative, or one must be subordinate to the other. There are three hypotheses. (a.) The two offices are mutually independent, or (b.) they are coördinate, or (c.) one is subordinate to the other. (a.) If one is subordinate to the other, then the right of private judgment is alienated from one, and the right of final decision resides in the other. This polity is papal. (b.) If the two offices are coördinate, we have two executive departments in one organization, that possess equal prerogatives, which are independent of each other and are not subordinate one to the other. It is manifest that there is danger according to this theory of misunderstanding and a probability of inharmonious operation. The probability is strengthened if we consider that there is nothing in the New Testament to define the sphere, or fix the prerogatives, or to prescribe the duties which belong to ecclesiastical deacons. Such a system as a system promises nothing but schism and conflict. It contains the elements of antagonistic polities. The necessary complement of an ecclesiastical diaconate is episcopal supremacy; episcopal supremacy developed is popery. The diaconate without the primate yields nothing but conflict and disorder. It remains to consider the supposition in which independency is introduced in its plentitude.

(c) The two offices are perfectly independent of each other, both being subject exclusively to Christ. They possess the same prerogatives, because they are coördinate; for if one was subordinate to the other it would not be independent. We have then for both, the same regimen, the same prerogatives, the same independence, the same grade. There is, then, in reality but one office, though it be held by several persons. Is not this the true theory? Christ is the only true diaconal correlative. His ministers are amenable exclusively to him. There are not two orders in the ministry, but only one. They are all of the same grade, because they all stand in the same relation to him. The affairs of his kingdom are legitimately under the supervision of those only whom the Holy Spirit has made overseers in his churches.

The correlation of evangelical servitors, as fixed by the authoritative enactment of Jesus Christ, forbids the introduction of orders and grades in the ministry. The law of his kingdom is the reverse of that which governs in worldly politics. In them authority is the highest pinnacle of dignity. But said Jesus, "So shall it not be among you." Greatness consists in humility, not in prerogative. An attempt to attain greatness in any other way reverses the scale and results in a corresponding degradation; for the grade of servitors depends upon who is their lord. Hence to serve Christ by ministering to those that are his, exalts the servitor to honor; to serve any other lord degrades the servitor by bringing him into ignoble bondage. This principle extends to all departments. If a magistrate, for example, consents to become simply the minister of the people, like yielding Pilate, he becomes degraded into their slave; if he act as a minister of God to maintain right he becomes clothed with divine dignity. The introduction of grades and subordinations in the ministry contravenes this positive enactment of Jesus Christ. Be not called Rabbi; neither be ye called masters, for one is your master—Christ,—and "*all ye are brethren.*" The introduction of fictitious distinctions and offices necessitates false correlations; and false correlations degrade men into slaves. The subordination of one class of men to the authority of another by an unauthorized ecclesiastical regimen is a deliberate and systematic robbery of Christ. All authority in heaven and in earth belongs to him. His commandments include the sum of all duty. All which is not done from regard to him, is done amiss. Hence respect to authorities and dignities and offices which he has not appointed is giving to another what belongs to him. This is robbery. An ecclesiastical polity which requires deference to fictitious dignities is a systematic robbery of Christ. The members of every church are all commanded¹ to "know," "esteem," "obey" and "submit to" those leaders who speak the word of God. It is manifest that all other leadership is an usurpation and robbery of Jesus Christ. The creation of an unauthorized office in the church tends to depress the general activity of the whole church by beclouding the relations and responsibilities of its members. ² SERVING is the chief business of the whole fraternity of believers. They are called to *serve* in imitation of Christ, not to *be served*. Unless they minister to Christ's representatives who are an hungered, or athirst, or sick, or in prison, he will not own them at all in the day of Judgment. To appoint special individuals to attend officially to what is

¹ Hebrews xiii. 7, 17; Thessalonians v. 12.

² Osh p. 124; Matthew xx. 28.

inalienably incumbent on each and every one, is only spreading an ecclesiastical veil over human responsibilities. Serving is an universal duty, which is incumbent on all to the full extent of their several ability. The selection of special helpers, who are not properly official, but incipient and tentative servitors, devolves upon those who are commissioned to select and train the rising ministry.

There are Assyrian representations in bass-relief at Koyunjik of two or three persons in one chariot of war making a joint attack upon their enemies; one drives the horses, one holds a shield, while the third, with a trained hand, hurls missiles with unerring precision upon their enemies. The Christian ministry is properly such a combination of trained skill coöperating in unanimous effort for the dissemination of the faith of Jesus. There is a diversity of gifts in the ministry and a corresponding variety of work to be done. The ministry is properly a board of directors, which has the oversight of all the affairs of the church, spiritual and temporal. An aggressive Christianity invariably develops itself in this form, so far as it is able to resist the pressure of adverse creeds. A plurality of individuals characterizes the ministry of all denominations sometimes in spite of their creeds. An executive board is the characteristic of all religious societies which have attained to any degree of maturity. In all the churches which are described in the New Testament in this particular, there was a plurality of individuals in their eldership. The introduction of different orders in the ministry was the beginning of the corruption of organized Christianity; for it necessitated the introduction of a principle of subordination and diaconal correlation which is essentially papal. It is worthy to observe that wherever the distinction of orders in the ministry is admitted at all, they become, in spite of creeds, like the frogs of Egypt, innumerable and troublesome.

The view which has been presented explains all the instances in which *διδάσκειν* and its cognates *διακονία* and *διακονεῖν* occur in the New Testament. It enables us to couple together with an uniform thread of meaning, examples which on any other hypothesis are discordant and perplexing. Those who are called servitors in the New Testament, so far as they can be identified and their history traced, were perhaps, without a single exception, missionaries, or the assistants to missionaries. Paul was a missionary; so perhaps was Phebe, of Cenchrea. The churches of apostolic times were all missionary bodies. The preaching of the gospel was the Christian SERVICE. How appropriate would be the term, to distinguish those who went abroad, from the overseers of the churches, to call them, whether male or female, servitors of Jesus Christ!


The view which has been presented promises efficiency. If the ministry is true to Christ it cannot be too efficient. If it is not true to Christ the proper remedy is to set aside its unworthy incumbents and choose others. The right of choice involves the right of deposition if incorrigible abuses demand summary discipline.

This view commends itself also by presenting a healthful stimulant to favor the growth of the Christian ministry. It is an incalculable calamity that the vital process, by which the increase of the ministry would naturally keep pace with the growth of the church, should be arrested by the introduction of mechanical contrivances, which only obstruct vitality and produce weakening deformity. Men should be selected for pastoral assistants who at length "may be able to teach others also." This is the appropriate accompaniment to the prayer that "the Lord of the harvest would send forth laborers into his harvest."

This view brings all believers into a common correlation to Jesus Christ, their living head. He and he alone is worthy of the dignity and imperial exaltation which a retinue of servitors implies. He is the executive head of the Christian dispensation, and, therefore, the ministry is properly subject to his dictation. He alone has the infallibility which is essential to a consistent diaconal regimen which secures order without an abridgment of personal liberty. He is the only conscience-keeper in whom it is safe to confide. To Him alone men can become obsequious without degrading their manhood. In Him alone slavery is baptized into freedom. He who built the magnificent structure of Grecian civilization and gave it the peculiar shape which it bore in order to prepare an exact and copious nomenclature by which divine realities could receive appropriate designation, and thereby the tidings of salvation be carried to all nations and ages, is worthy to receive the direct and personal homage of an undivided retinue of servitors; for he hath on his vesture and on his thigh the name written, KING OF KINGS, and LORD OF LORDS.

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SUGGESTIONS FOR EXPOSITORY PREACHING.

ALMOST every preacher one meets, if asked whether he often makes expository discourses, will answer, "No; I have long believed there ought to be more preaching of that kind, but the attempts I formerly made in that direction were quite unsuccessful, and it seems I have no talent for it." But how few have ever fairly tried to develop such a talent. Men labor for years to acquire the power of producing a good topical sermon. All their rhetorical training, and all their practice, is directed to that end. Then they try the experiment of expository preaching, which requires a different kind of practice, and perhaps even a different method of studying the Scriptures, and wonder that their first attempts prove a comparative failure. This is as unreasonable as the course of those who, after training themselves to read sermons, make a timid and ill-prepared effort to preach without writing, and infer from the almost inevitable failure that they have no talent for extemporizing.

Now we do not propose to discuss at any length the advantages and disadvantages of expository preaching. The former are to some extent obvious and generally recognized, and they have been admirably presented by Dr. J. W. Alexander, in an article republished in his *Thoughts on Preaching*. As stated by him, they are as follows:

This method better corresponds with the very idea and design of

preaching. It is the primitive and ancient method. It insures a better knowledge of the Scriptures, on the part of preacher and hearers—and of the Scriptures in their connection. It causes sermons to contain more of pure Scripture truths, and scriptural modes of viewing things. It gives occasion for remarking on many passages of the Bible which otherwise might never enter into one's sermons; and for giving important practical hints and admonitions which might seem to some hearers offensively personal if introduced into a topical discussion, but which are here naturally suggested by the passage in hand. And it greatly diminishes the temptation to misinterpret texts by excessive allegorizing, by "accommodation," etc.; for men are often driven into such misinterpretation by the difficulty of finding for every sermon a short passage which will legitimately afford the requisite amount of material.

It might be more desirable to discuss the objections to this method, for these often appear more serious than they really are. There is, in many quarters, a popular prejudice against expository preaching, arising from the fact that it is so often badly managed, and from the notion that it is a labor-saving contrivance. On rainy Sundays, or on week-nights, the preacher who has no sermon prepared, or wishes to save his elaborate preparation for a more auspicious occasion, will frequently undertake to "read a passage of Scripture, and make a few remarks;" feeling that this enterprise is attended by no risk, because, as some quaint old preacher expressed it, if he is "persecuted in one verse, he can flee to another." Hence the people rather naturally conclude that whenever one takes a long text, it is an expedient to dispense with labor. Besides this prejudice against the method, which a judicious and laborious preacher can soon overcome, it has inherent disadvantages. Our people, it is to be regretted, seldom follow that excellent Scottish fashion, of keeping a Bible in hand during the sermon; and so they find it hard to remember the general drift and connection of the long text, as they are accustomed to do with a short one. This difficulty one must bear in mind, seeking to overcome it as far as possible. Some persons, too, in our extremely restless age, object to *continuous* exposition on the ground that it lacks variety; they grow tired of hearing the preacher, Sunday after Sunday announce the same book and perhaps the same chapter. Others really care so little about the Bible that they take no interest in explanations of it; they wish the preacher to make his text merely a point of departure, and to give them "something fresh." Others object that the expository sermon cannot present those connected arguments in which the human mind so greatly delights; but it may trace

and unfold the argument of an inspired writer, which ought to be more interesting than one constructed by the preacher himself. If it be still further objected that a discourse which is mainly or largely occupied with explanation of the text, can leave but little room for application—while, as Spurgeon says, “where the application begins, there the sermon begins”—we answer that the impressiveness of an application depends very largely upon the interest which the hearers have been previously brought to feel in the subject applied; and that a brief, and even unexpected application or appeal is often more impressive than one which gives notice, and throws men on the defensive.

Prof. Shedd takes the ground (*Homiletics*, p. 157) that “there is somewhat less call for expository preaching than there was before the establishment of Sabbath-schools and Bible classes.” He adds, however, that “it is the duty of the preacher, occasionally, to lay out his best strength in the production of an elaborate expository sermon, which shall not only do the ordinary work of a sermon, which shall not only instruct, awaken, and move, but which shall also serve as a sort of guide and model for the teacher of the Sabbath-school and the Bible class.” But it is worthy of inquiry whether the Sunday-school teaching does not actually prepare people to receive expository preaching with higher appreciation of profit. The great difficulty in the way of making it effective is not knowledge of Scripture but ignorance of it. We have sometimes fancied we could point out, after preaching to a congregation of strangers, those who are engaged in the regular study of the Bible, from the greater interest with which they listened to any explanations of Scripture which may have occurred in the sermon. Robert Hall found his regular Sunday morning expository sermon very acceptable at Cambridge; but at Liecester he lamented to a friend that the congregation, being generally less intelligent, could not be brought to fancy this method, and he was annoyed at having to change his habit, and hunt up two separate texts for every Sunday.

But our chief design is to offer practical suggestions as to the proper management of expository preaching. It is in several respects a peculiar variety of discourse, requiring peculiar treatment; and yet the treatises of homiletics, while never failing to urge that this method has great advantages, furnish the student with scarcely a single hint for his guidance in attempting it. From some experience and observation, from conversation with other ministers, and from the study of the best specimens within reach, we have gathered a few ideas on the subject which it is hoped may be somewhat useful, and which, as practical hints, ought to be presented with directness and simplicity.

An expository discourse may be defined as one which is occupied mainly, or at any rate very largely, with the exposition of Scripture. It by no means excludes argument and exhortation as to the doctrines or lessons which this exposition develops. It may be devoted to a long passage, or to a very short one, even a part of a sentence. It may be one of a series, or may stand by itself. We at once perceive that there is no broad line of division between expository preaching and the common methods, but that one may pass by almost insensible gradations from topical to textual, and from textual to expository sermons. We see, too, that men often preach expository sermons which they would not call by that name. Moreover, it is common to apply the term only to discourses upon the doctrinal, preceptive, and devotional portions of the Bible, and not to those which treat of the narrative portions. Now the methods of exposition appropriate to Scripture history are of course quite different from those applied to the other portions. But whenever the discourse is not merely a discussion of certain thoughts suggested by a Scripture story or scene, but in the first place spends much time in bringing out clearly and vividly the scene or story itself, that is really historical exposition. And this is surely a highly important class of expository discourses. A very large portion of the Bible consists of narrative, and in this as in other respects the Bible is adapted to its purpose; for narrative possesses an unfailing interest, for old and young, cultivated and ignorant, converted and unconverted. But sermons on historical passages are very apt to err, in one of two directions. In the one case the preacher makes haste to deduce from the narrative before him a subject, or certain doctrines or lessons, and proceeds to discuss these precisely as if he had drawn them from some verse in Romans or the Psalms; thus sinking the narrative, with all its charm, completely out of sight. In the other case, he indulges in a vast amount of the often ridiculous thing called "word-painting," overlaying the simple and beautiful Scripture story with his elaborate descriptions, and showing no desire, or having no time, to give us any glimpse of the lessons which the narrative teaches. There is certainly a middle course. Without consuming our time in exhibiting overwrought pictures of his own, the preacher may seek to throw light on the Bible picture, so as to make us see it plainly and vividly, and may either indicate the lessons as he advances from point to point or group them in the latter part of his discourse. What we insist on is, that there ought to be such a method of preaching upon the narrative portions of Scripture as should be distinctively appropriate to narrative, while yet it is preaching. And it must be remembered that his-

torical exposition does not depend merely upon power of description, but is often best effected by the analysis of character and motive. We have known more instances than one of very able men, who had rarely attempted historical subjects, because conscious of possessing no talent for description; but when the simple suggestion was made that they could bring to bear their analytical powers upon the character of some Scripture personage or the motives of the actors in some Scripture scene, they soon found themselves much interested in historical discourses, and found, too, that they could throw in excellent touches of description by the way.

What now is the prime requisite to the effectiveness of an expository sermon? We answer, unity. Unity in a discourse is necessary to instruction, to conviction, and to persuasion. Without it, the taste of enlightened hearers cannot be satisfied, and even the uncultivated, though they may not know why, will be far less deeply impressed. But unity in an expository discourse is by many preachers never aimed at. They conceive of it as a mere series of disjointed remarks upon the successive verses. It was to this kind of "homilies" that Schleiermacher referred, when he said that they are composed of little sermons of the common form tacked together. (See Palmer, *Homiletik*, s. 380.) But it is not at all necessary that an expository sermon should exhibit this fault. "The difficulty as to unity, presented by this kind of discourse, never amounts to impossibility. We do not at random cut from the general text of the sacred book, the particular text of a homily. The selection is not arbitrary. The limit of the text is predetermined by reference to unity, which, therefore, we shall be at no loss to discover in it." (Vinet, *Hom.*, p. 148; Comp. Shedd, *Hom.*, p. 153.) In making a single, detached expository discourse, one can easily see to it that the passage selected shall have unity. In *continuous* exposition of the same book, it may sometimes be necessary to take a passage in which this is not the case; but even then, we may gather from it such thoughts as can be framed into one plan, and pass over the remainder, or notice them very briefly. Let there be unity at whatever cost. And not only this, but structure. Thanks to the influence of the schoolmen, the modern mind greatly delights in analysis, and in the regular construction of the materials which analysis has furnished, and hence the great preference of many for topical discourses. The homilies left us by the fathers are frequently quite deficient in respect of orderly structure, and sometimes even destitute of unity. And some persons appear to imagine that we can have no "homilies" except upon the model of the fathers, and with a total disregard of modern taste and modes of

thought. But a discourse upon an extended passage of scripture, well-chosen and well-handled, may have a well-defined topic, and a distinct and orderly plan, and yet not fail to be an expository discourse, dealing largely in explanation of the text. We insist strongly that an expository sermon may have, and must have, both unity and an orderly structure, because the frequent practical neglect of these requisites is one principal cause of those failures to which allusion was made at the outset.

When an inexperienced preacher begins to think of attempting expository preaching, his mind is very apt to turn at once toward the idea of continuous exposition. He must get up a series. We have recollections, more vivid than pleasing, of a first attempt, which consisted in a series upon Colossians, and which was declared by a preacher's best adviser to have been on the whole a decided failure. But why should not the preacher first discipline himself in this kind of preaching, and accustom his congregation to it, by the exposition, every now and then, of detached passages? It will be time enough for a series when he has gained a little more practice, yea, and has made repeated and very mature study of the book to be handled. And let us entreat that first attempts shall not be made upon a psalm, as is very generally the case. With occasional exceptions, the Psalms are comparatively lacking in manifest unity, and in distinct connection and regular progress, so that it requires practice to handle them successfully. It may also sometimes be well to take an extended passage and merely make a text sermon on a long text, gathering several thoughts from it and handling them as in the ordinary text-sermon upon a short text. Or a brief text may be announced, and the sermon be occupied with a discussion of the entire paragraph in which it stands. This indeed is often done by men who have no thought that they are preaching expository sermons. By such means the people cease to imagine that expository preaching is entirely different from other methods, and become accustomed and attached to all alike. Then, whenever a series is attempted, there will be little feeling of strangeness about it, and much less difficulty in sustaining the interest.

We turn now to the case of continuous exposition. Here, as we have intimated, the first thing to be done is to make a careful study beforehand of the entire book, or other portion of Scripture to which the series is to be devoted. To view every book as a whole, to grasp its entire contents, and then trace in detail the progress of its narrative or argument, is a method of Scripture study far too little practised. It is one of the benefits of expository preaching that it

compels the preacher to study in this way. We may say in general, that no man will succeed in expository preaching unless he delights in exegetical study of the Bible, unless he loves to search out the exact meaning of its sentences, phrases, words. In order to this, a knowledge of the original languages of Scripture is of course exceedingly desirable, but it is by no means indispensable. Andrew Fuller, who dealt largely and successfully in this method of preaching, had substantially no knowledge of Hebrew and Greek, and his writings were devoted not to commentary, but to didactic and polemic theology. Yet he loved to study the very words of Scripture. In all his works it is manifest that he did not content himself with gathering the general meaning of a passage, but was exceedingly anxious to know its exact meaning. One of the most eloquent Baptist ministers of America, who died twenty years ago, was never so happy, so charming, as in expository sermons. He too was unacquainted with Greek and Hebrew, and was not liberally supplied with commentaries; but he loved, above all things, to ponder and to talk about the meaning of God's word. Unless we mistake, there has been a change in this respect which is to be lamented. We have a great multiplication of commentaries, and an immense amount of more or less real study of the Scriptures in Sunday-schools, we have many more ministers than formerly who know something of the original languages, but there is reason to fear that the close, thoughtful, lovingly patient study of the Bible is less common among our ministry now than it once was. And as to conversation about the meaning of this or that passage, such as once abounded when preachers were thrown together, it has gone out of fashion. A man who should raise such a question now among a group of ministers, sojourning together during the session of some association or convention, would be almost stared at. It will not do to say that we manage these questions better at home among our books. He who most zealously uses his books, at the same time thinking for himself as every man that is a man will do, finds the largest number of points arising, upon which the books utterly disagree or are unsatisfactory, and concerning which he would like to compare views with intelligent brethren. But not to dwell further upon this notion, especially as the actual state of things may be better than we have supposed, it is proper to insist, most respectfully and affectionately, that one great reason why many ministers find expository preaching difficult is, that they have not been sufficiently accustomed to *study* the Bible. Our rapid general reading is very useful, our devotional reading of brief portions is indispensable to personal piety, but the downright study of Scripture is

too often confined to the texts for next Sunday, and their immediate context. The first thing to do, then, after determining to give a series of expository sermons upon a book, or other portion of Scripture, is to study it all over in advance, with some of the best *explanatory* commentaries, and with especial attention to the general contents and connection. To commit the book to memory would be no bad idea, but at any rate one should get the whole train of thought or series of facts, from beginning to end, firmly fixed in his mind.

Next, it would be well to mark out a scheme of sermons covering the whole ground. Previous experience in the exposition of detached passages will enable one to do this without any great difficulty, and of course there can be alterations, if occasion for them should arise in the progress of the series. The great advantage of making out the scheme in advance is, that we can thus distribute most judiciously the several topics of the book. In Romans, for example, various subjects are alluded to in the first three chapters, which are afterwards treated at some length. It would be awkward if one should go into any general discussion of these topics at the point of their first occurrence. They ought to be briefly handled there, and reserved for more extensive remark where they are introduced again. It would very rarely be advisable, however, to promise at the outset a definite number of discourses. Indeed, it is not always best to *announce* a series at all. Let us add that one must beware of going too slowly. Let there be manifest progress, such as the restless spirit of our generation requires. But we may pause upon any specially interesting passage or phrase, even to the extent, in some cases, of devoting a whole sermon to it. Thus there will be variety as well as progress; and hearers will be gratified to perceive that the preacher marks out passages, not according to their mere external dimensions, but according to the richness of their available contents.

But now the particular discourse is to be constructed. The passage before us has unity, and we note the heads which it presents, as we should do in a textual sermon. Thus we shall have a structure, a discourse, and not a scattering talk. But one of the principal difficulties in the entire task now presents itself, the proper handling of the details. If we simply take the topic and the heads which the passage affords, and proceed to discuss them in our own way, that is not an expository sermon, but a text-sermon. The exposition of some passages, particularly in the hands of some men, will constantly tend towards this form, and often with advantage. But what we are supposed to be aiming at, is a strictly expository sermon, in which not only the leading ideas of the passage are brought out, but its details are

suitably explained, and made to furnish the chief material of the discourse. In order to manage this, we need to study the details thoroughly, so as to master them, instead of being oppressed by them. We thus, too, enter more fully into the spirit of the passage, as the musician must who makes variations on a theme. Then we must select and group. Here the inexperienced preacher often errs. Having minutely studied the details of the passage, and become interested in them, he desires to remark upon a greater number of points than the limits of his discourse will allow. Thus it becomes so crowded that the hearer follows with annoying difficulty, and none of the numerous points presented have time to impress themselves upon his mind. It is indispensable to select. Of course one will aim to choose such details as especially require explanation, and such as will at the same time yield important or interesting matter. Often points of no great intrinsic importance, slight traits in the narrative, or minor links in the argument, will add greatly to the vivacity and vigor of the discourse. Every one knows that in oratorical description we must seek the kind of excellence which is seen in certain descriptions by Tacitus, or in Retzsch's Outlines—a few lines and touches, but those few eminently suggestive and stimulating to the imagination. Is there not something similar in the oratorical exposition of an argument? Must we not labor, besides exhibiting the outlines, the prominent thoughts of our passage, to choose out those details which will cause the whole argument to stand forth in its completeness? Remember, we are not preparing a commentary, nor a dogmatic treatise, but an *expository sermon*, and the whole treatment must be, in the good sense of that word, oratorical. In this respect, as in everything else pertaining to the art of discourse, practical effort, controlled by just principles, will not fail to bring skill.

A mistake sometimes made consists in the unduly multiplied and extended quotation of parallel passages. Thus the details of the text, too numerous themselves, perhaps for oratorical purposes, are each surrounded by a mass of other passages, and the discourse is so loaded down as to be past endurance. The Lectures of M'Ghee on Ephesians, which are in some respects good, err in this direction very sadly. It is a fault sometimes observed in other than expository sermons, though in these the temptation to it is particularly great. It is so easy for a preacher to persuade himself that he is putting honor upon Scripture, by quoting thus largely, when sometimes he is only putting honor upon his own indolence. The practice is well satirized by Coquerel (*Observations sur la Prédication*, p. 69.) Of course, *judicious* quotation from other parts of Scripture is highly appropriate

and often exceedingly valuable, and we need not sympathize with the fastidiousness of Foster, any more than with the opposite extreme.

There is also danger of error as to the treatment of difficult passages occurring in the text. The preacher will, of course, study these with great care, for he cannot afford, as regards his personal habits, to slide over difficulties. But having thus become much interested in this difficult portion of his text, having become familiar with the different views which have been suggested, and the arguments for one view and against another, he very naturally feels disposed to use the matter so laboriously wrought out, to discuss the question which appears so interesting. In this way many an expository sermon has been ruined. True, wherever the preacher is really able to clear up the difficulty, and to do this by a comparatively brief and evidently satisfactory explanation, people will be glad to hear it. If he can show that the passage, as thus explained, presents some interesting and valuable truth, they will be delighted. If it is a passage which has been made prominent in religious controversies, or has on any account attracted extraordinary attention, they might even like to hear something of the process by which this satisfactory explanation has been reached. But such cases are comparatively rare; and in general, men grow weary of a long discussion of some *quaestio vexatissima* or *locus difficillimus*. If the preacher, by long study and a brief statement of the results, can throw any light on such a passage, very well; but the long study is his affair, not theirs. This is only one of many directions in which preachers are apt to err, in thinking the people will be interested by everything that interests them. And then, where the result of his researches is not satisfactory, where he does not feel that he can make the matter plain, let the preacher merely notice that there is a difficulty here, and pass on to speak of truths which the passage certainly does teach, to handle what he is confident he understands. A celebrated Professor of Greek in one of our American universities had a youthful assistant, who was one day unexpectedly called on to meet a class, without having read over the lesson. When asked afterwards how he had got through, he said, "I just talked about what I understood, and let alone what I didn't." "Pretty good plan," said the old gentlemen, "I suspect you had better continue to do that, as long as you live." It is a complaint often made against the commentaries, that they say much about the easy places, and little about the hard ones. Now where the book is designed, not so much for explanation as for comment, in the strict sense of that term—and this is the case with most of the older works—it is obviously proper for the writer to spend his time in develop-

ing and applying the teachings of those passages which he understands. He has no right to develop and apply what he is not confident is the true meaning. Quite similar is the case of the expository preacher. To state at great length several different views as to the meaning of a passage, without being able to show cause why any one of them should be accepted or preferred, and then leave the matter in that unsatisfactory position, is tiresome in a book, and in a sermon intolerable.

In the progress of an expository discourse, it is often desirable to keep the connection of the text before the minds of the audience, by somewhat frequently glancing back, as we proceed, upon the ground already traversed. Chrysostom sets us the example of managing this with skill. He also frequently throws in some lively question as to what comes next, calculated to arouse the hearers, and make them notice it when stated. Our audiences, like his, do not commonly have the sacred text before them, and we must strive to supply the deficiency. By making the leading thoughts of the text quite distinct, by skilfully selecting and grouping the details, and by glancing backward and pointing forward as we proceed, this serious practical difficulty can be to a great extent overcome.

Much pains should be taken to point out and apply the lessons which the text may afford. The people need, and desire, to have these distinctly stated, unless the application is exceedingly obvious. Of course such lessons must, in general, be briefly indicated, as so much time is needed for exposition. But where there is a subject of special practical importance, it may be discussed and urged at length, even if some portions of the text have to be left unexplained. And if current events, or the religious condition of the congregation, should make it particularly desirable to discuss some practical topic which the text does not naturally suggest, it may be introduced in the way of inference, or of remote application of some general truth or duty. Here again, Chrysostom presents us an example. Much as he delighted in explaining Scripture, he yet felt that, in preaching, the practical interest is paramount; and he not only points out many lessons by the way, but is almost sure to find some practical subject for the conclusion, and this is not unfrequently treated at great length. Nor does he trouble himself much as to the association of ideas by which he shall reach any such important practical matter, but often uses a freedom which critics with strict notions of what we call "sermonizing" would be likely to condemn. In his sermon on the Transfiguration, for example, he wants to bear down on the money-lenders then at Antioch, and reaches them as follows: The three

disciples were happy in seeing Christ's glory on the mount—we may hope to behold him in a more splendid glory—but if we wish to do so we must take heed what manner of lives we are leading—we must not do this and that, must not oppress the poor—and so he comes to the matter of charging enormous interest, which is then discussed for some time, with vehement denunciation and entreaty. By a still more roundabout process he passes from the feeding of the five thousand to an earnest attack upon the elaborately embroidered and curiously fashioned sandals which were then the rage. And he can frequently return to the same subject, if it seems to require renewed censure or exhortation, managing to bring it in somehow. In one long series of discourses he rarely fails to inveigh against profanity; and his favorite topic of alms-giving may be expected to recur almost anywhere, upon the slightest provocation. Now in all this his example is not faultless, certainly, but it is extremely instructive. We have insisted that there is to be desired a much greater unity, and much more of orderly structure and regular progress than is exhibited in Chrysostom's homilies. But the strictest notions in this direction must not prevent us from frequently and freely introducing matters of practical interest. In this way the people will be led to listen much more attentively to our explanations, being constantly on the look out for some practical application to themselves; and they will also be constantly reminded of what men are so prone to forget, the intimate relation between Scripture truth and daily life. Pastors sometimes shrink from undertaking a series of expository discourses, from the fear that they will not be able to adapt themselves to the precise condition and wants, week after week, of their people; but if the suggestions just made be acted upon, there will in this respect be no difficulty. Besides, where one preaches twice every Sunday, according to the common if not commendable fashion of the present day, he may of course have one sermon free for as much variety of specific adaptation as he pleases.

Allusion may be here made to the matter of expository remarks in the public reading of Scripture. This has never ceased to be the practice of many preachers in Great Britain, particularly in Scotland, and of some in this country; and there is perhaps reason to think that it is at present becoming more common. Spurgeon is said to make such remarks regularly, and to manage them with singular skill and success, giving them usually the devotional turn which is obviously desirable. This habit on his part is probably a principal reason why he has not undertaken expository sermons. It is greatly to be regretted that he has not done so, for with due self-training he

might have given us expository discourses which would have been, in several respects, models of excellence; and at the same time the practice would have re-acted favorably on himself, tending to restrain that excessive "spiritualizing" and unwarranted "accommodation" of Scripture, which disfigure too many of his noble sermons. If remarks in reading are unacceptable to some congregations, it is probably because they have heard them made without preparation, at wearisome length, or with too little of the devotional. We think that with the present usages as to public worship in this country, such expository touches ought to be a mere addition to the reading. The idea should be, not that the preacher expounds a passage of Scripture in the early part of the services, but that in reading a passage he makes an occasional remark. If properly managed, this could not fail to make the congregation attend more closely to the public reading of the Bible than they usually do. The remarks made ought to be clear, pointed, brief, varied, informal, devout. The careful previous examination of the passage to be read which is necessary for this purpose, will also prepare the preacher to *read* it more impressively. Every one notices how rare, and every one knows how desirable is really good reading of the Bible in public worship; and however great may be the importance of a good voice and of careful practice, the chief requisite to effective reading is a thorough knowledge of what we read, and a full and warm sympathy with its sentiment.

One who wishes to cultivate himself as an expository preacher, will of course be disposed to search the literature of the pulpit for good examples of that species of sermons. It may therefore be worth while to mention some specimens which we think it would be instructive to study, selecting such as are easily accessible.

First, a few good expository sermons on detached passages. Monod on the "Women of Canaan" (Fish's "Select Sermons from the French and German"), is good; and his sermons on the "Temptation of Christ," in the same volume, though not strictly expository, are instructive in this direction. Dr. J. Addison Alexander on Titus ii. 11-15 (Sermons, vol. I), is an admirable specimen of doctrinal and practical exposition. Dr. R. Fuller's discourses on the "Walk to Emmaus," and on the "Three Hebrews in the Furnace" (Sermons), are very fine; and we venture to express the hope that that prince among preachers may soon give us another volume, and include in it several specimens of expository discourse, both historical and doctrinal. Dr. Wayland's "Day in the Life of Jesus of Nazareth," and "Fall of Peter" (University Sermons), are of remarkable excellence. Spurgeon on the

"Blind Beggar" (Sermons, vol. VI.), is more distinctly expository than is common in his sermons.

Passing to specimens of continuous or connected exposition, we mention the following as chiefly historical. Krummacher's "Elijah the Tishbite" is hardly equalled by any of his later volumes which have come under our notice; but his "David," which we have not examined, ought to surpass it. The "Friends of Christ," by Dr. N. Adams, is a capital volume. Blunt's "Lectures on the History of our Saviour," form a good example for most of us, because they are interesting and profitable, while not exhibiting remarkable abilities. Every one is curious to see how Mr. Beecher, with his wonderful powers in some respects, will work out his series of discourses on the "Life of Christ." Monod's "Five Sermons on the Apostle Paul," ought by all means to be studied. More distinctly expository than these, and among the most instructive specimens of their class in our recent literature, are Hanna's "Last Day of our Lord's Passion," "Forty Days after our Lord's Resurrection," etc.

And the following are chiefly doctrinal or preceptive. Chalmers on Romans is eminently worthy of study, and is most instructive to those who are best acquainted with his other sermons, and his peculiar cast of mind. Leighton on I Peter is famous, and of a beautiful spirit. Luther on Galatians is highly interesting and instructive, and is perhaps the best specimen of those powerful expository sermons by which he wrought so great a work. Cumming's volumes, as on Revelation, on Daniel, on the Parables, etc., are, whatever one may think of his peculiar opinions, excellent models of easy, agreeable, and attractive popular exposition. Some of the sermons of F. W. Robertson, as well as his volume on Corinthians, are admirable specimens of a certain kind of exposition; though one cannot be too careful, in reading any of his works, to guard against his grievous errors as to inspiration and atonement. Ryle's "Expository Thoughts on the Gospels" (several volumes), contain only the substance of sermons, not written out in full, but they are very useful for our purpose. The most instructive example, however, of expository discourse, both doctrinal and historical, is the Homilies of Chrysostom. While no man of sense would think of making discourses now precisely on the model of his, it is remarkable how much may be learned from them as to the skilful, spirited and effective management of expository preaching. Those who have not access to, or cannot read his works in the original, would find it desirable to procure a translation, such as is contained in the Oxford Library of the Fathers. Profound students of his works consider the best of his Homilies to be those on the Psalms

and on Matthew. In the former there is necessarily much erroneous interpretation, since he knew no Hebrew, and had to rely on the Septuagint, which in the Psalms is full of errors. The volumes on Matthew are therefore probably the most valuable for our purpose, and these can be obtained at no great cost. One who knows how much interest Andrew Fuller and Robert Hall took in expository preaching, would expect to find profitable examples in their works. But he would be disappointed. Fuller's published expositions on Genesis and on Revelation contain the substance of sermons, and comprise much judicious interpretation and sound thinking; but they give us very little information as to the form of his discourses, and none at all as to his management of details. Still less to the purpose is the report of Hall's sermons on Philippians. The copious "Homiletical and Practical" notes in Lange's Commentaries may be found profitable in expository preaching by those who take pains to use them wisely.


Some of the works in this brief list might not be regarded as expository sermons, according to the common use of that phrase. But we have claimed for it a wider range than is common, and have insisted that this method of preaching often approximates closely to the other methods.

If the suggestions we have offered are well-founded, it will be obvious that expository preaching is a difficult task. It requires much close study of Scripture in general, and much special study of the particular passage to be treated. To make a discourse which shall be explanatory and yet truly oratorical, bearing a rich mass of details but not burdened with them, full of Scripture and abounding in practical applications, to bring even dull, uninformed and unspiritual minds into interested and profitable contact with an extended portion of the Bible,—of course this must be difficult. We do not say then, as is often said, try expository preaching first on week-nights, till you and the people become accustomed to it. We say, try it now and then for your principal sermon on Sunday, without mentioning that you are about to do any thing unusual, and lay out your best strength upon an earnest effort to make it at once instructive, interesting, and impressive. Then you and the people will gradually become accustomed to expository preaching as it should be. After repeating, more or less frequently, such occasional efforts, you will know how to prepare for an expository series. He who begins it as an easy thing, will find expository preaching surpassingly difficult; but he who manfully takes hold of it as difficult, will find it grow easier and more pleasant, with every year of his experience. Not

every man will find the expository method best suited to his mental endowments. But every one ought to acquire the power of employing it with skill and success. Then, though it be better for this or that man to preach for the most part in other ways, he may continue to introduce expository sermons now and then, and may also infuse a larger expository element into many of his textual and topical sermons. And it is our firm belief that many a one who now thinks this method of preaching unsuited to him, needs nothing but diligent study and practice, upon some such principles as we have indicated, to make his expository sermons very profitable to his hearers, and singularly delightful to himself.

JOHN A. BROADUS.

GREENVILLE, S. C.



RITUALISM IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

THE conception of Ritualism as a mere freak of clerical fancy, which would soon exhaust itself in millinery and mummery, is now happily yielding to a juster view. The slow eye of the public is gradually opening itself to the truth, that the Ritualism of to-day is only the product of deep-seated and long-cherished principles. It is an attempt to give effective expression to convictions that existed in the English church before the Reformation, and, surviving that convulsive period, have been transmitted without intermission to our day. The attempt has resulted in a movement so wide-spread and well-ordered—a movement that embraces so many of the clergy, and under the countenance or connivance of the higher functionaries of the church has grown to such dimensions, as to have attracted to itself the attention of Christendom.

A variety of circumstances conspire to give importance to the movement and to entitle it to the attention of all thoughtful men. It is regarded with interest and fostering care by many Romanists, if not indeed by the Pope himself,¹ while in return its love and reverence

¹ It has been denied that either the Pope or papists generally are pleased with the movement; but too many Romanists (Archbishop Manning being accredited as one of them) have openly avowed their satisfaction with it for any doubt longer to exist; and the heartiness with which English Ritualists go down on their knees before the Pope at his receptions, and the complacent smile with which he extends to them his hand to be kissed, leave little room for misunderstanding the feelings of his Holiness.

for the Roman church is openly avowed. It has put an effectual check upon conversions from the Anglican church to the Roman, and now demands of the British nation that its right to exist and pursue its own course shall be acknowledged, or it will direct its whole force towards the dissolution of the union of church and state. Curiously coincident with the present stage of its progress, is the manifest revival of self-confidence and aggressiveness in the spirit of Romanism in all Protestant lands, as well as that strange fondness for symbolical forms, alike in worship and church architecture, now showing itself among other sects than the Anglican. Meanwhile the confessionalist party of the Lutheran church, between which and the Anglican there exists neither fellowship nor mutual respect, labors assiduously, under the leadership of Hengstenberg, to establish its Sacramentarianism on a basis of compulsory authority. But that which more than all else gives importance for readers of these pages to the ritualistic agitation, is the active sympathy and intimate relationship subsisting between the Church of England and the Episcopal Church in this country. What Ritualism is in the Church of England, it aspires to be, and will speedily become, in the Episcopal Church of America; and whatever novelty shall become the mode in the worship of the Episcopalians of America will be sure to make itself felt on the unthinking and weakly ambitious among the other sects.

Ritualism, as is clearly enough indicated by its name, reveals itself in a special attention to the outward observances and external rites of religion. Nothing pertaining to religious service, whether it be consecration of the elements, the act of communion, the position, shape and dimensions of the altar or the altar's furniture, the dress and attitudes of the priests and choristers, or the attitudes of the laity; and nothing pertaining to church architecture, whether of its style, its orientation, or the symbolism of its ornamentation—nothing is too trivial to escape its microscopic attention. It descends to particulars with a degree of minuteness that is scarcely credible to one who has not looked into its Catechism, and Prayer Books, its Manuals of religious service for the laity, and its *Directorium*¹ for the clergy.

But to confine our attention to Ritualism as a mere system of observances would leave us as ignorant of its real nature, as would the history of a nation or period, which limiting itself to a mere narration of occurrences, should ignore the religious and political philo-

¹ *The Directorium Anglicanum* is a closely printed octavo volume of 371 pages, containing abundant notes and sub-notes, a frontispiece exhibiting elaborately dressed priests before a brilliantly lighted altar in the act of elevating the Host, and a variety of plates illustrating clerical vestments and accoutrements. It had reached its third edition in 1866.

sophies that shaped the national character, and directed the public will. Ritualism as phenomenal can be understood only by an acquaintance with the doctrines it embodies. Tested by the principles of Protestantism, it seems puerile and even absurd. Admit the truth of the principles on which it builds, and it rises at once to the dignity of being natural, philosophical and imposing. To judge intelligently, therefore, of English Ritualism, we must know something of the chief doctrines on which it rests.¹

Fundamental among these is its theory of the Sacraments and of the Priesthood. The Sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper it regards as mysteries through which, when properly celebrated by the divinely commissioned priesthood of the church, mankind are to be saved. These sacraments convey a supernatural power and accomplish supernatural effects. They are the only divinely instituted vehicles of saving grace.

The baptismal service of the Prayer-book is interpreted in the most rigidly literal sense of its words. The doctrine of baptismal regeneration is avowed with vehemence of emphasis. The Broad Church party of a former generation had interpreted baptism as being to the Church what natural birth is to this world, and that the service of the Prayer-book simply declared the child to be born by baptism into the church, and thus to be brought into relation to the "means of grace" through which it was to be saved; the Broad-Churchism of to-day asserts that the baptismal service is simply the recognition of the fact that the child *as such*, is the child of God, and not that by baptism it becomes such; Low-Churchism, or the evangelical party, explains the language of the rite as simply declarative of hope that by a fulfilment of the prescribed condition of baptism God may or will regenerate the baptized; but Ritualists affirm that the language of the baptismal service of the Prayer-book, like all its other language, can honestly be interpreted as meaning only just what it says. In this service, the officiating priest, declaring the child to have been "conceived and born in sin," prays that he may be "regenerated and born of water and the Holy Ghost," and that, "coming to holy baptism,

¹ "Ritual, like painting and architecture, is only the visible expression of Divine truth. Without dogma, without an esoteric meaning, Ritual is an illusion and a delusion, a lay figure, without life and spirit, a *vox et preterea nihil*." "Ritual is valuable only as the expression of Doctrine, and as a most important means of teaching it, especially to the uneducated and the poor." *The Church and the World; Essays on Questions of the day in 1866*; by various writers, edited by the Rev. Orby Shipley. Third edition, pp. 214 and 299.

It is because of the importance attached by Ritualists themselves to their dogmas, and the vital relation of these to their practices, that the writer, in what follows, has been at some pains to give to them the benefit of stating their doctrines, so far as his limits would allow, in their own language.

he may receive remission of his sins by spiritual regeneration;" and after baptism the priest, declaring that the child "is regenerate and grafted into the body of Christ's church," proceeds to say, "We yield thee hearty thanks, most merciful Father, that it hath pleased thee to regenerate this infant with thy Holy Spirit." Can there be any doubt, ask Ritualists, as to what this language was intended to express? "If these things," (words,) exclaim they in the language of one of their leaders, the Bishop of Oxford, "are not literally true, they are blasphemous trifling."

But it is to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper that Ritualism attaches the greatest importance. This sacrament it declares to be, not so much a commemorative act by the communicant, as it is an act of sacrifice by the priest and of worship by the whole assembly. The Lord's Supper, is a "Holy Sacrifice," a "Eucharistic Sacrifice," a "Propitiatory Sacrifice," "the Sacrifice of the Mass," and the Lord's table is an "Altar" on which the adorable propitiatory sacrifice is "offered." By consecration of the elements, Christ becomes in them "Body and Blood," actually present. The elements are not, say they, as the old Romanist theory maintained, transubstantiated, *i. e.* changed in their substance into the body and blood of Christ; nor is there, as the Lutheran theory maintains, a consubstantiation (commingling) of the supernatural body and blood with the natural and unchanged elements of bread and wine; but, by consecration, a "miracle is wrought by the Holy Ghost"—"a miracle as great as any of those recorded in Scripture"—and the whole person of Christ, in some ineffable manner, becomes supernaturally, but "truly, really and substantially present under the form of bread and wine." There is, to quote from Dr. Pusey, capitals and all, "a Real Objective Presence of Christ's Blessed Body and Blood."

Thus one essential part of the ritualistic theory of the sacrament of the Supper, is the dogma of the *Real Presence*. "The Eucharistic sacrifice derives its whole character and efficacy from the Real Presence." "For if Christ is not Present as the substance of our offering, we have nothing to present to God but the material things, 'the outward Signs,' which can no more make us acceptable than the legal victims which could never take away sin." How far this differs from the Romish doctrine of transubstantiation, our readers can judge for themselves. That Ritualists are much more disturbed by the opprobrium attaching to the word, than to the thing signified by it, is apparent from their anxiety to show that it was the Schoolmen's meaning of the word against which the English Reformers protested, and that "since the catechism of the Council of Trent" the Roman

and Anglican doctrines of the Real Presence are essentially one. Says Dr. Pusey in his *Eirenicon*,

I know not what can be included in our term "substance," which the English Church affirms to remain, which is not also included in the Roman term "accidents," which they also affirm to remain. . . . A sacramental or hyperphysical change no English churchman, who believes the Real Presence as his Church teaches, could hesitate to accept. [p. 32.]

We say then that, under the Form of Bread and Wine, Christ is Present *truly*, that is, not in figure or symbol, or by representation, as he may be said to have been in the persons of those who were Types of Him, or under the Symbol of the Lamb. He is Present *really*, not to the faith which ascends up to heaven to lay hold of Him, as some speak; but objectively in the Sacrament. He is Present *substantially*, not by any Grace or Virtue emanating from His Sacred Body, or infused into the Bread and Wine; but in the very Substance of His true Body and Blood. It is not a Presence of Power or Virtue, but of Person. The Bread and Wine are not called His Body and Blood because they are virtually, or to all intents and purposes, such to us who may receive them. Neither are they Figures or Symbols of a Person absent, having no influence upon us except to teach or to awaken thought. Under those external Forms there is the *true, real, substantial* Presence of CHRIST'S Body and Blood, animated by the Living Soul, and both pervaded by the Living DEITY—Whole CHRIST, GOD and MAN."—The Real Presence, Tract No. 5, p. 30.¹

In the *Little Prayer-Book* used at St. Alban's, London, and in other ritualistic Churches, occur the following directions for the Assembly during the celebration of the Eucharist: "At the words 'This is my Body, this is my Blood,' you must believe that the bread and wine become the real Body and Blood, with the soul and Godhead of Jesus Christ; bow down your heart and body in deepest adoration when the priest says these awful words, and worship your Saviour, then verily and indeed Present on His altar." p. 16.

Thus it will readily be seen how from the doctrine of the real presence spring certain other dogmas and practices by which Ritualism is distinguished. Of these, it must here suffice to mention the "Eucharistic Adoration," or the worship of Christ's person under the form of bread and wine; the "Propitiatory Sacrifice," or the conception of the Eucharist as "rendering God favorable to us by presenting before him the meritorious and ever-acceptable oblation of his Son;" the "Sacramental Participation," by which, through partaking of his actual body and blood, we are "united to the life-giving humanity

¹ Tracts for the day; Essays on Theological Subjects; by various authors. Edited by the Rev. Orby Shipley, M. A. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1867.

of the Son of God." These three acts, the ritualist maintains, are all included in the one complete "action" of the Eucharist. Not that every one who performs the first two acts must necessarily perform the third. Between adoration and uniting by prayers in the sacrifice, and the act of communion, is made a marked distinction.¹ All the faithful present at a celebration should always adore and join in the sacrifice, though for sufficient reasons they may not all communicate. But each of the acts derives all its significance from the Real Presence. "The adoration of Christ is not a matter of positive institution; it follows as a necessary corollary from the fact of his Real Presence;" the Eucharist is a sacrifice to propitiate God, because it "offers" before him "the sacred body and blood of the Redeemer;" and "the effects of holy communion depend entirely upon the Real Presence," since "union with Christ is absolutely unattainable by any of the sons of men, except through sacramental participation of his Body and Blood."

Eucharistic adoration though a mere corollary from the Real Presence, is nevertheless rigidly enjoined. It "is not a thing to be merely tolerated; it takes the nature and rank of a Christian duty."² Hence the importance attached to the Elevation of the Host. Immediately after consecration, the priest kneels in adoration of the Divine Presence, and then, rising, elevates the bread on the paten to be worshipped by the assembly.³ In the sharp controversy over the practice of elevation, its defenders affirm that "it symbolizes exactly the lifting up of Christ on the cross," and its omission leaves Anglican worshippers, as compared with those of the Eastern and Roman Churches "at a positive disadvantage." In the Eastern Church notice is given by the gestures of the deacon, and in the Roman by the

¹ In the Ritualist's Catechism, prepared by an authorized clerical committee, we find the following: "Q. If we are not going to communicate, ought we to go out of Church before the communion? A. No; we should stay to worship our Lord, even if we are not about to receive his body and blood, and should never leave, at any rate, till after the consecration, because the sacrifice is not offered at all until then. Q. What good will this do us? A. It is good for us to be near our Lord, like the woman who was cured by touching his garment, though she did not touch his body. Q. What is this act of worship called? A. Spiritual Communion."

² In a Prayer-book for the Young occur the following instructions: "At these words, 'This is my body,' remember that your Saviour comes down and is really present Body, Soul, and Godhead, under the sacramental veils of bread and wine (though you cannot see him) on the altar. Bow down your body and soul before him and adore him. At the words, 'This is my body,' say, I adore thee, O body of my Lord Jesus Christ, once sacrificed for me, and now daily sacrificed on thine altars."

³ In the *Directorium* we read: "After the words, 'This is my body which is given for you,' the 'Hostia' should be placed on the paten, and the celebrant with his assistants should reverently genuflect. Then rising, the celebrant should at once elevate it with the first finger and thumb of both hands for the worship of the faithful, while he is saying, 'Do this in remembrance of me.'" Similar instructions are given for the handling of the chalice.

ringing of a bell; but without elevation the Anglican worshipper who cannot read, or is too remote from the priest to follow the service correctly, knows not when his Lord has descended to the altar and he is to kneel in worship.

The idea of *Sacrifice*, we have said, is also an essential part of the Ritualist's conception of the Eucharist. Hence he insists on calling it a "mass" in the sense of "*an offering, or sacrifice sent up to God.*" The sacrifice is not a repetition of Christ's sacrifice on the cross, but a representation of it to God.¹ It is but "the counterpart of the sacrifice of our Lord's perpetual intercession in heaven." And yet "this continual offering and presentation of a sacrifice once made, is itself a sacrificial act. The act of offering or presenting a victim is a sacrifice, though that victim be not, as of old, a new one slain on each occasion, nor yet the same slain on each occasion. It is a true sacrifice though the victim be always the same."² And so effective is this sacrifice that it may be offered with an "intention," that is, for the purpose of procuring some desired end, public or private, for the benefit of the dead or the living. It is declared to be "the Church's one great means of obtaining good." It may be offered with one intention by the priest that officiates, with another by each of his assistants at the altar, and by as many more as there are persons present to unite in the service.

As an integral part of this idea of sacrifice is the theory that the celebration of the Eucharist is the principal part of Christian worship. The elevated Host, itself worshipped, becomes the propitiary vehicle of adorations and devout petitions to Almighty God. The soul and centre of all Christian worship is in the "action" of consecration and elevation. It is contended that in the early church the Eucharist, or "breaking of bread," was the "real and only characteristic Christian worship," and that the "ordinary office," that is, religious service without the communion, was only an offshoot from it, a radius, and not a substitute for it under any circumstances. And as to worship in our day, the prayers of the faithful should always form an appendage to the Holy Sacrifice of the altar. "Thus, matins and even-song are the only forms of prayer without an action, and though not subjective, (for they are common prayers to one spiritually present), they form from their Eucharistic analogy the only permissible

¹ In the Catechism before quoted it reads: "Q. How can we take part in his sacrifice? A. By celebrating the Holy Communion. Q. What is it then which we do when we celebrate the Holy Communion? A. We are doing on earth what our Lord is doing in heaven, representing and pleading his sacrifice. Q. What does representing mean? A. Re-presenting, i. e. presenting over again."

² "The Church and the World." 1866. 3d ed., p. 307.

Divine service without celebration of the Holy Communion, the only *Dry Service*,¹ so to speak which is not an unreality." Against the dry service, or daily "office" of the present day, all Ritualists are specially vehement. Such service they assert should never take place except on Good Friday, and that occurring at any other time it is simply a "sham service." Hence the urgency with which they advocate a "daily sacrifice," and the prominence with which, in the newspapers and by other methods,² they advertize a "daily communion."

Indissolubly conjoined with the notion of Sacrifice in the Supper is the conception of the efficacy of "Participation," or "oral" reception of it. The "Benefits" received by this participation are not derived from any thing independent of, and merely signified by, the bread and wine; but "there is a real and permanent conjunction between the sign and the thing signified, so that if the one be received the other must be received with it," and the "Benefits flow directly from the Body and Blood of Christ then verily present and received." Grace is conveyed, not by the elements as signs or symbols, but by the actual Flesh and Blood, of the "time and place" of whose "Presence" the visible elements simply certify us, and none must partake except while fasting. It is only by understanding this theory of sacramental efficacy that we can understand the reasons for the painfully minute directions to communicants in the Little Prayer-Book, and cautions to the clergy in the *Directorium*.³

Inseparably connected with the Ritualist's doctrine of the sacraments is his doctrine of the priesthood. The efficacy of the sacraments depends on the validity of the commission of the priest. Whether bap-

¹ According to the *Directorium* the *Missa Sicca* (Dry Service) is proper only as an "abridged office," or "the saying of the Office as far as the Offertory." But in the authorized English Prayer Book stands this direction: "Upon the Sundays and other Holy days (if there be no Communion) shall be said all that is appointed at the Communion until the end of the General Prayer, together with one or more of these Collects." The prevalent custom with English Churches (and with Episcopal Churches in this country) is, to omit the Communion except at stated intervals, but to follow implicitly this direction. The practice is reprobated in the strongest terms in the *Directorium*. In one of its notes it says, "Our 'Reformers' of the present day are continually and successfully undoing the mischief."

² One of the signs by which the Ritualistic tendencies of an English chaplain on the Continent is easily recognized, is the conspicuous notice of "daily communion" which he suspends in the hotels and on the door of his chapel. One of the curious facts in the history of these chaplains (of whom there are many) is, that Ritualists are most commonly found in the best paying positions, while Low-Churchmen are at points where they must depend chiefly for their support on the offerings of transient tourists; but this is not always the case, and in more than one instance, where a Low-Churchman had rooted himself among a resident English population, a Ritualist has been sent out to supplant him by starting a new chapel.

³ *Little Prayer-Book*.—"Kneel upright at the Altar; and when the Priest comes to you, hold the palm of your right hand open and your left hand crossed under it; be most careful to receive into your mouth all, even the smallest portion, of the most Holy Sacrament, since one crumb or drop of it is worth more than the world itself. Receive the chalice with your head

tism, to be effectual must be invariably performed by a priest, Ritualists do not positively affirm. Some Anglican clergymen deny the efficacy of any baptism not performed either by a priest or a deacon; but ecclesiastical canons have declared baptism by laymen, and even by women, to be valid; and since the Roman Church not only declares the same, but in extreme cases authorizes baptism by the mid-wife even before the completion of birth, there is reason for believing that Ritualists do not make the priestly function to be indispensable to its validity. But in the sacrament of the Eucharist the priestly function is all-important. It is the one *sine qua non*. No priest, no consecration; no consecration, no sacrifice and no participation; no sacrifice, no worship; and no participation, no union with Christ. Christ was the only true priest; his cross the only true altar. All that preceded him—altars or priests—were merely typical. All that have succeeded, are vicariously representative. The vicarious and representative priest is divinely commissioned and empowered "by the Holy Ghost especially conveyed to him in the gift of Holy Orders."

upright, and leave the Altar as soon as you have been communicated. When you get back to your place, use no words of prayer for a minute or two, but kneel with closed eyes, clasped hands, and bended head, with all your mind fixed on the thought that God and Man is within your soul and body." (p. 38.) It has been published in an English newspaper that the Rev. John Keble, author of the "Christian Year," made a dying request of his executor, Rev. T. Keble, that two lines referring to the Eucharist, in his poem on the Gunpowder Plot, which formerly read,

"Here present in the heart,
Not in the hand,"

Should be changed so as to read,

"Here present in the heart
As in the hand."

Directorium.—"If the Eucharist hath fallen to the ground, the place where it lay must be scraped, and fire kindled thereon, and the ashes reserved beside the altar."

"If by negligence any of the Blood be spilled upon a table fixed to the floor, the Priest must take up the drop with his tongue, and the place of the table must be scraped, and the shavings burnt with fire, and the ashes reserved with the relics beside the Altar, and he to whom this has befallen must do penance forty days."

"But if the chalice have dropped upon the Altar, the drop must be sucked up and the Priest must do penance three days."

"But if the drop have penetrated through the linen cloth to the second, he must do penance four days. If to the third, nine days. If the drop of Blood have penetrated to the fourth cloth, he must do penance for twenty days, and the Priest or the Deacon must wash the linen coverings, which the drop has touched, three times, over a chalice, and the ablution is to be reserved among the relics."

Then follow directions of what is to be done in case one "vomits up the Eucharist," and time of penance is graduated to the station of the offender and according as his fault is from accident or infirmity. Between six and seven pages of the *Directorium* are occupied with similar details.

The priesthood are a divinely commissioned body, duly appointed and empowered to *do religion* for the rest of mankind.

Now on these two doctrines, that of the Sacraments, (particularly the Eucharist), and that of the Priesthood, rests the whole fabric of Ritualism. Jesus Christ offered himself on the cross a sacrifice to God; worship in the Christian church, and human salvation are possible only through a priestly re-presentation of this sacrifice before God. What constitutes a proper and effectual re-presentation of this sacrifice, is with the Ritualist the one all-absorbing question; out of his answer comes his attention to the furnishings of the altar, to priestly vestments and attitudes, masses for the dead, celibacy, the confessional, absolution, floral decorations, processions, incense, in a word the whole system of rites that prevailed in the English Church before the Reformation, and prevails in the Church of Rome to-day. Not only must the church edifice be placed with due regard to the points of the compass, but it must be provided with its chancel or choir exactly constructed, within which must be placed the altar with exact western frontage. The altar must be of just such form, and provided with its fixtures, and its "fair white linen cloth" with "five crosses worked upon it, corresponding to the five crosses on the Altar-stone, in the centre and four angles, with borders of various patterns." It must have as accessories, a credence, a piscina, an aumbrye or locker, and sedillia; and, for furniture, must be provided, in addition to various cloths, with chalice, paten, flagons, burse, offertory basin, altar cross, altar candle-sticks, altar lights, incense boat or navicula, and censer or thurible.

The source of these various utensils seems to have been the Jewish temple, and the ground of their use in Christian worship is the ritualistic theory of a Eucharistic Sacrifice. They are supposed to add to the solemnity of the sacrifice, and each article is supposed to be laden with symbolic meaning. According to Bishop Cosin¹ "they were appointed for inward reverence to that work which they make outwardly solemn."

So also of the priestly vestments, attitudes, genuflections, crossings, etc., etc., the ground of their use is the idea of sacrifice. The vestments, drawn partly from Judaism and partly from the dress which Christ is supposed to have worn on the day of his crucifixion,

¹ A favorite author with Ritualists—a very high-churchman in his day—and the author, among other works, of "Notes on the Book of Common Prayer," and a "History of Transubstantiation." As Dean of Peterborough he was procured to be impeached by the Puritans, on the charge of Popish inclinations, but, finally, having taken prominent part in the last revision of the Prayer-Book in 1662, died Bishop of Durham in the time of Charles II.

are intended to give dignity and solemnity to the offering, as well as to symbolise to beholders its significance. Of the vestments, the Directorium specifies twenty-three distinct pieces. For all persons engaged in the service, including choristers, are prescribed the cassock and square cap; for celebrants, there are, in addition, the amice, the alb, the girdle, the stole, the maniple, and the chasuble; for assistant ministers, there is the dalmatic for the Gospeller, the tunic for the Epistoler; besides these, for Bishops, mitre, gloves, sandals, pastoral staff and ring; and for Archbishops, crosier and pall. At the Daily Office are prescribed surplice, cowl, tippet, amys; and, in processions or at funerals, cope and biretta.

As natural products of the idea of a Priesthood divinely empowered to offer effectual sacrifice with "intention," we have private confession and priestly absolution. Auricular Confession and Absolution are already established usages with the Ritualists. Their writings abound in open and elaborate defences of these. And as legitimate deductions from the same theory of a priesthood, we find them both approving of celibacy in their writings, and practicing it in their lives; and sisterhoods and brotherhoods, those ritualistic euphemisms for nunneries and monasteries, are already in existence among them.

But it is time that we pass to notice briefly the Origin of this remarkable movement. Its immediate beginning was, of course, in "Puseyism." It is only the Tractarian movement in an advanced stage. Dr. Pusey is to-day the chief oracle in all that pertains to the principles and practices of the party. His apartments at Christ Church, Oxford, are the headquarters of the leaders of the movement, and when he speaks, his word is authority. All the Tractarians dwelt on topics involved in Ritualism. Tract No. 90, the most famous of the series, propounded systematically its fundamental principles, and originated that method of expounding the thirty-nine articles by which Ritualism, in its attempts at self-defence, has specially distinguished itself.

And yet in a broader sense of the word origin, Ritualism is only an organized expression of old Anglican traditions—traditions that antedated, and through the high-church party have survived, the English Reformation. It embodies views which were held by many in the convocation that prepared the first reformed Prayer-book, by many that assisted in subsequent, particularly the later revisions of it, and have been maintained, ever since, by no inconsiderable portion of the clergy, whose public services, in the use of the Prayer-book, have been outwardly regulated by the usages of their times. It was amid much opposition that the reformed Prayer-book was first intro-

duced. Bucer, in a letter to Hooker in 1550, the third year of the reign of Edward VI, and a year after the adoption of the reformed Prayer-book, speaks of the discarded vestments as still worn, and of the Lord's Supper as still being celebrated by some as a mass. And according to Strype's *Memorials* (vol. II. Pt. 1., p. 372) the Communion was celebrated as a mass, the same year, at St. Paul's, in London, under the Bishopric of Ridley. "Such a secret good-will," says Strype, "did many of the priests and churchmen belonging to the Cathedral still bear to the old former usages." And whatever may have been the modification of usages since the time of Charles II, when the last revision was made in 1662, and the English Prayer-book took its present form, the High Church notions which made the Eucharist a mass in the time of Edward VI, and now make it the same in Ritualism, have always had their warm supporters. Ritualism is only English Romanism as it existed before the Reformation. It is only an attempt to rebuild the English Church on that mediæval theology on which the Roman Church split in the sixteenth century, and from which no one of the leading reformers and founders of the great Protestant Churches succeeded in disengaging either himself or his Church.

But the grounds on which Ritualism defends itself—the reasons which it offers in support of its claims to be regarded as the legitimate English Church, to the exclusion of its Protestant elements, are of more interest to us than its origin, and we will proceed to state them briefly. It claims to be supported by the amplest authority—the Holy Scriptures, the most ancient liturgies, the statutes of the realm, unrepealed rubrics, the Prayer-book as it now reads, and even by the thirty-nine articles, though the two latter are admitted to have been lamentably corrupted by the intermeddling of foreigners from Geneva.

The Scriptural argument, appealing to the Old Testament ritual, goes upon the assumption that the service of the typical priests of the Jewish temple is to be copied by the representative priests in the Christian Church; and it appeals to the Apocalypse as furnishing a picture of worship in heaven, which, modelled after the Jewish, should also be imitated by worshippers on earth. Appeal is also made to the most ancient liturgies, and the Prayer-book is interpreted in the light of these. It is affirmed, that according to the acts of Uniformity in the time of Edward VI, the Convocation which first remodelled the Prayer-book in 1549, had "as well eye and respect to the most sincere and pure Christian religion taught by the Scriptures, as to the usages of the primitive Church." And the commissioners who,

appointed by Charles II, gave that final revision to the Prayer-book in 1662, which left it as it now stands, were also directed to "compare the same with the most ancient liturgies which have been used in the Church in the primitive and present times." Thus Ritualists maintain, that in the restoration of neglected ritual, they are only fulfilling the purpose of the first and the last of the sovereigns who authorized those revisions of the Anglican Prayer-book, which have resulted in the service as it now stands, and even the purpose of the commissioners themselves by whom the revisions were made.

But the main argument relied on by Ritualists, as gathered from various sources, may be stated as follows: The English Church did not originate in the sixteenth century, but was then simply reformed. The Church of England in the nineteenth century is identical with that of the ninth. This is implied in the whole theory of her constitution, particularly in her doctrine of apostolical succession. Nothing short of a formal canon, statute, or ordinance, can be adduced as affecting, in any degree or manner, any one of her ancient ecclesiastical laws; and no custom or usage in vogue within the past three centuries can be held to repeal, or modify, or render legally obsolete, any one of her ancient usages or customs. Starting with these principles, they proceed to examine the existing Prayer-book. At its very beginning, before the order for Morning Prayer, stands the following rubric: "*And here it is to be noted that such ornaments of the Church and of the Ministers thereof, at all times of their ministration, shall be retained and be in use, as were in this Church of England by the Authority of Parliament, in the second year of the Reign of King Edward the Sixth.*" The Prayer-book, as it now stands, is the revision of 1662, in the reign of Charles II, and the rubric aforesaid refers to the year 1549, the second of the reign of Edward VI, when the first revision was made and authorized by act of Parliament.

A question in dispute, however, has been as to the interpretation of this Rubric. The Ritualists have maintained that the reference was not to the Prayer-book of 1549, but to the usages of the Church in the second year of Edward's reign, since that Prayer-book was not sanctioned by Parliament until within seven days of the close of that year, and was not in actual and general use until near the middle of the third year of his reign; and that, therefore, the reference must have been to the usages and customs which had been sanctioned by act of Parliament in the reign of Henry VIII, and which had neither ceased nor been legally annulled in the second year of Edward VI. Their opponents affirm that the language must be interpreted

as referring to the *Book of 1549*, which was actually adopted by Parliament within, though very near the close of, the second year of Edward VI. But Ritualists still insist, that even accepting this interpretation, the *Book* must yet be interpreted as approving every then existing usage and custom which it does not distinctly prohibit. And it must be admitted that they seem to have very clearly the right of the argument on their side.

Singularly enough, the Prayer-book which did prohibit what Ritualists are now so zealously seeking to restore, and which prescribed almost the identical usages and customs that for the past three centuries have prevailed in the English Church, was the *second* revision under Edward VI,¹ adopted in the *fifth* year of his reign. According to Bishop Cosin, "in that fifth year all ornaments were taken away (but a surplice only), both from bishops and priests,² and all other ministers; and nothing was left for the Church but a font, a table, and a linen cloth upon it (at the time of communion only)." But the Rubric is explicit, according to Ritualists, in saying that all ornaments of the church and ministers, at all times of their ministrations, which were in use in the second year of Edward's reign, *shall be retained* and continued in use. As good churchmen, therefore, they have no alternative but to go back to the Prayer-book of 1549, and to the usages of the second year of the reign of Edward VI. And, taking the law in the letter of it, it cannot be denied that they make out a very fair case for themselves.

To their opponents, who maintain that the first *Book of Edward* sanctions only what it enjoins, they appeal to the usages of the third and fourth years of Edward's reign, which called forth the second revision prohibiting those usages, and their appeal seems decisive. And to give weight to their argument, they refer to the Prayer-book adopted by authority in 1559, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. This *Book* was in fact the second revision (that of 1552) of the reign of Edward VI, modified, indeed, by a few though important alterations, but prefaced by that momentous Rubric which, then first enacted,³ now covers the existing Prayer-book with such a cloud of uncertainty. From this Rubric, as well as from certain other lesser signs in *Eliza-*

¹ One of the remarkable omissions in this revision was that of a rubric, which in the *first* revision had prohibited Elevation of the Host.

² The language, however, of the rubric on vestments in this *Book* was: "But being an Archbishop or a Bishop, he shall have and wear a *Rochet*" (a sort of diminutive alb, with tight sleeves, and worn under the surplice); "and being a Priest or a Deacon, he shall have and wear a surplice only."

³ Only one or two verbal alterations were made in this Rubric in the final revision in 1662, and these, strangely enough, favor the ritualistic argument.

beth's book, it is claimed to be clear that both she and her revisers were disposed to do all they could to favor the restoration of "such ornaments" as the second Book of Edward VI had discountenanced and thrown into disuse. The book in use in the reign of James I, authorized in 1604, was but a very slight alteration of that in use in the preceding reign of Elizabeth. The thirtieth canon of 1603, the year preceding the authorization of James's Book, declared the ornaments, ceremonies, and usages of the Church of England at that time to be the same as the churches abroad, except in "those particular points wherein they had fallen both from themselves in their integrity, and from the apostolic churches which were their first founders." From this canon, from the two books of Elizabeth and James, and from historical evidence, it is inferred that the vestments, lights, incense, and the mixed chalice, were retained and legally used. They show from history, that, in Queen Elizabeth's own chapel, the Holy Communion was celebrated with two lighted candles and a crucifix on the altar, and by priests habited in all those vestments which they are now so anxious to restore. Recourse is also had to the works of Bishop Andrewes,¹ a noted divine of his day, to show what kind of ornaments were used and approved by him in his chapel, and there seems to be evidence enough for believing that nothing now contended for by Ritualists would have failed to receive his approval. Thus, from all they can find in the Prayer-books, and from all they can learn of ecclesiastical usages during those reigns in which the Prayer-book was subjected to the greatest modifications, Ritualists declare it to be impossible to come to any other conclusion than "that, notwithstanding the opposition of foreign Protestants and their followers in this country, Queen Elizabeth, King James and Charles, and the most learned Bishops in their reigns, favored the preservation of the Catholic Cereimonial, though they were not able to enforce its observance."

In further corroboration of their views, they quote exultingly the admissions made in their favor by the Bishop of London in the House of Lords in 1865, and from a report on ritualistic practices by a committee in the Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury in 1866.

The Marquis of Westmeath, an Irish peer, complained in the House of Lords of the rapid progress of Ritualism in the English

¹ This Bishop Andrews was Master of Pembroke College, Cambridge; Prebend of St. Paul's; Chaplain in Ordinary to Queen Elizabeth; Dean of Westminster; Bishop of Chester; afterwards, for good and sufficient service to James I, translated by him to the bishopric of Ely; and later, to the still richer see of Winchester. He died in the second year of the reign of Charles I.

Church, to which the Bishop of London replied, admitting the matter to be very grave and serious, but referred to the before-mentioned Rubric as occasioning great uncertainty in the law, and as making it impossible for the Bishops to proceed against the offenders. His Lordship also mentioned another Rubric, which makes it the duty of any priest who has any doubts as to the interpretation of the Rubrics to appeal to the Bishop of the diocese, and, in case of an unsatisfactory decision from him, to appeal to the Archbishop of the province, whose decision shall be final; but, continued his Lordship, these gentlemen have no doubts, and do not want to refer to the Bishop, or Archbishop, or any one else. It had been thought by some that "the evils could not be put down" until a new court should be established, but the Bishop believed "it was not a new court that was required, but a revision of the law." The inevitable inference from the speech was, that the Ritualists are safe in their intrenchment behind the written law. They so interpreted his words, and exclaimed, "of the strict legality of our forms and methods of worship there can be no manner of doubt."

In 1866, a committee, of which Dean Stanley, the well-known author of Broad Church sympathies, was a member, reported on Ritualism to the Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury. This report was regarded by the advocates of restored Ritual as a great concession to their claims, as admitting in principle all that they contended for,—“as speaking, on the whole approvingly, though with great caution, of the use of vestments, lights, incense, &c., on the ground of their antiquity.” Even on points where the report affected to condemn, the exceptions taken were so trivial, and the judgment so gently pronounced, that they regarded themselves as virtually acquitted. The Report pronounced the “censing of persons and things” to be “inadmissible,” but allowed the burning of incense in a “standing vessel.” At this distinction the Ritualists made themselves merry, though, when regarding it seriously, they had no difficulty in proving the censing of both persons and things to have been practiced under the first Book of Edward VI, and so to be sanctioned by the Rubric. The Report also disapproved of the Elevation of the Host in the Eucharist. But this they easily evaded on the ground that the Report assumed an elevation *after* consecration, whereas it is *during*¹ consecration that they practice it. Admitting,

¹ The *Directorium*, however, asserts that Elevation *after* consecration was the ancient English custom, and that the rubric of Edward's first Book prohibiting it, having been omitted at all the subsequent omissions, “the prohibition altogether falls to the ground.” The Prayer-Book of 1549 forbade the elevation in the following language: “The words before

however, the insufficiency of this reply, they still maintained that the rubric, which, in both the Book of 1549 and that of 1662, regulates the method of celebrating the Eucharist, and directs that the priest shall take "into his hands" the paten and the chalice successively, is unmeaning unless elevation is to be practiced, since in mere consecration no such handling is requisite.

Such are the arguments by which Ritualists attempt to defend themselves on the authority of the Prayer Book, as interpreted in the light, partly of the various revisions through which that book has passed, partly of the usages of the church under cover of these revisions, and partly of the admissions which their opponents are obliged to make in their behalf. And it must be admitted that their defence is not a weak one. But it is clear that every step of it rests on those portions of the old Catholic Liturgy which the Romanist party succeeded in retaining through every successive revision, in spite of all the energy and skill of their Puritan opponents. When they come, however, to deal with those portions of the Liturgy into which these opponents succeeded in incorporating their Protestant views, and especially with the thirty-nine articles so clearly marked with traces of the hated "foreign Protestants" from Geneva, their weakness at once appears and we are forced to admire their ingenuity at the expense of all respect for their candor if not for their honesty. We subjoin a specimen or two of their style of argument on these points.

Thus the Prayer Book makes no provision of prayers for the dead, and the thirty-first article distinctly pronounces such prayers "blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits." But the "Altar Manual" of the Ritualists explicitly requires that the "*intention*" be directed for the dead, and the "Little Prayer Book" supplies a prayer for them. And, says the Ritualist, the authorized Prayer Book itself contains prayers for the dead, because it prays both for the "Church Militant" and the "Church Universal," each of which must include the dead. And that this must be so is clear, since all Catholic Liturgies contain prayers for the dead; the English Church is a part of Catholic Christendom, therefore the Anglican Liturgy must contain prayers for the dead, and if found nowhere else they must be included in the two petitions named. (See p. 66, *Directorium*, and pp. 518 and 520 of *Essays*, "Church and the World." 1866.)

rehearsed are to be said, turning still to the altar, without any elevation or shewing the Sacrament to the people." This, says one of the ritualist writers, "seems to imply that there was a custom of the priest to turn around and show the sacrament to the people after consecration, but it does not forbid elevation during consecration."

Again, the Prayer Book forbids a celebration of the Eucharist without the presence of a certain number of communicants. But, says the Ritualist, the celebrant is to assume that, out of those present at any given service, some by fasting are fitted for the communion, and should the people withdraw after the "Prayer for the Church," "if the oblation has been made, as of course it will have been, the service must go on. Much more should absent sick persons, who will of course communicate spiritually, be counted in." (*Directorium*, p. 88, note.) "Daily Sacrifice," on the theory that the central act of all worship is the Eucharist, must be maintained at all hazards.

A like want of candor is shown in the method of defence of daily communion against objectors. The rubric prescribes the celebration of the Eucharist on Sundays and Festivals, and is explicit in saying that "the Collect, Epistle and Gospel appointed for the Sunday shall serve all the week after, where it is not in this book otherwise ordered." Now, to unsophisticated minds it would seem very clearly to have been the intention of the framers of this rubric, that the ordinary service of the week should be the same as on Sunday, minus the Communion, or what is technically known as the *Dry Service*; but, says the Ritualist, the Collect, Epistle and Gospel which are to serve all the week after, themselves manifestly imply that central act of all worship, the sacrifice of the Eucharist. A daily sacrifice is, therefore, a necessity, except in the service of Good Friday, the only day for Dry Service in the year; and *then* the priest should be dressed in a cope, and not in the chasuble, and should "end the service with the Church Militant Prayer, Collect and Blessing."

Again, the twenty-fifth article, says, "The Sacraments were not ordained to be gazed upon"—an unquestionable interdiction of Eucharistic adoration. But this, we are told must mean that they are not to be careless and idly looked upon without reverence and without devotion.

So also Article twenty-eight says, "The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper was not by Christ's ordinance reserved, carried about, lifted up, or worshipped." This, it is said, must mean that elevation cannot be practiced on the ground of its being done "by Christ's ordinance," but it may be done on some other ground.

What may be the casuistry of men who can so defend their principles and practices, it is difficult, for minds accustomed to frank and straightforward actions, to comprehend. In a circular from a vicar-general of Jesuits to members of his order, such methods would be intelligible; but how men bred in Protestant England can resort to them is a mystery. Has sympathy with Romanism made them more

familiar with the "Moral Theology" of Escobar, than with the simple ethics of the New Testament? Is it of the nature of Ecclesiasticism, with its squint-eyed vision, whether Anglican or Roman, always to read the divine commands by halves, and to study the wisdom of the serpent to the exclusion of the harmlessness of the dove?

The avowed Aim of the managers of the ritualistic movement is to restore to the English Church her Mediæval Theories, and on the basis of these to reconstruct her whole system of doctrine, of government and of worship. They call their movement the "Catholic Revival." They openly and ostentatiously avow their purpose to catholicise the whole Anglican body. They thrown down the gauntlet to the Protestant party of the church and demand that they shall submit, quit, or be vanquished. If bishops stand in their way they treat them without ceremony.¹ The English Church, says one of their most vigorous writers, is a Catholic Church, and her clergy a "sacrificing priesthood" and not a preaching ministry; we are determined it shall be recognized as such; and if you Protestants do not like it as a Catholic Church, you have nothing to do but to leave and go to your own kind.

But it is not to be inferred that the Ritualists are unanimous in a desire to introduce a recognition of papal supremacy. A portion of them would evidently rejoice in such recognition, but another portion, holding to the theory of an independent apostolic origin of the English Church, yet infatuated with the idea of an external oneness of Christendom, are anxious to restore Mediæval usages and ceremonies, and, if possible, bring about thereby a harmonious and imposing unity of the Roman, Greek and Anglican bodies.

A great majority of the party are also intent on a dissolution of the union of the Church and State. But in this their motives are various. Some are at work to this end on the ground that the Church should ever be superior to the State, and others, chafed by the interference of the State with their plans, and troubled with apprehensions of a final interposition for their suppression by law, are anxious to secure to the Church an independent footing; yet, captivated with the grand idea of the external unity of Christendom, and believing that a real-

¹ In 1865 the Bishop of London had occasion to speak of them, and one of his clergy, the Rev. Edward Stuart, incumbent of St. Mary Magdalene, Munster Square, Regents Park, wrote as follows, over his own signature, in the *London Guardian*: "If the Bishop of London is inclined to 'run-a-muck' at Catholic faith and Catholic worship, by all means let him do so. He has as good a right to his opinion as we have to ours. If he wishes to Puritanise the church, as I believe he does, let him take all lawful means towards his object; and if we wish to Catholicise the church, as we avowedly do, let us take all lawful means towards our object too; and 'God defend the right.'"

ization of their idea will be practicable only on the overthrow of the supremacy of the State, all are anxious either to accomplish a complete dissolution, or to secure the supremacy to Synodical authority.

The methods by which they propose to accomplish their purposes, particularly that of a unity of Christendom, are both curious and instructive. Fully convinced of the efficacy of *intention* in the Eucharistic sacrifice, they have actually proposed and attempted a widely concerted offering of such sacrifices in behalf of the cherished end. They also place great reliance on the effectiveness of their imposing ceremonial and ritual. They maintain that the eye may be much more effectually addressed by histrionic¹ performances than the ear by words and tones. They draw arguments from theatres, ginpallaces, the street processions of secret and secular societies, and set off in striking contrast the bald services of Protestantism and the imposing ceremonies they advocate. Says Dr. Littledale, in an essay on "The Missionary Aspect of Ritualism: "Take two Street-Arabs, perfectly ignorant of Christianity. Read to one of them the Gospel narrative of the Passion, and comment on it as fully as may be. Shew the other a crucifix and tell him simply what it means. Question each a week afterwards and see which has the clearer notions about the history of Calvary."

And if we may judge of the effectiveness of their rites and the practicability of their aims by the present degree of their success, they are not laboring without strong encouragement. Probably no class of men at any period of the English Church were ever more terribly in earnest, or more self-denying than these Ritualists. None were ever more strikingly in contrast with those very respectable clergymen who ruled the destiny of the Anglican body during what these new "reformers" denominate the "dreary Protestantism of the Hanoverian period." No work is too humble for them to undertake; no ridicule or scorn too bitter to be borne; no population too degraded to attempt, in their style, to evangelize. Among the candidates for holy orders now at the Universities the contagion of their spirit and principles is manifesting itself in forms and to a degree that startle the older functionaries of the church, like an apocalyptic vision. They are confounded to learn that in London and neighborhood more than a hundred churches, and in the country more than a thousand, are under ritualistic guidance (more than two thousand churches have candles on their altars), and that the leaders of the movement are or-

¹ The Bishop of London gave great offence in 1850, by designating the ritualistic worship as "almost histrionic;" the bolder leaders of the movement, like Dr. Littledale, now claim special merit in their rites and ceremonies simply on the ground that they are histrionic.

ganizing all over the United Kingdom; and, with a spirit of self-sacrifice and a determination of purpose that put their opponents to the blush, are laboring to convert the English Church and the English nation to their views.

It may be true that almost none of the older and well-known men of intellect and learning are numbered in their ranks. Manning, Newman, and men of that class left for Rome before the Ritualist movement began. Pusey, almost deserted, toiled on in hope. The party, therefore, is made up chiefly of men not yet in their prime, but among them are men who are yet to become conspicuous for their learning and ability. Much more than the Broad Church section, it is a party of the future.

And as against its progress there is little to be feared by it in either of the other parties of the church. The Evangelicals, once so powerful under the leadership of Wilberforce, Legh Richmond, Newton, Cecil, Simeon, Wilson, and others, now faint in spirit, weak in intellect, jostled and cajoled by both the other parties, and with doctrines that are contradicted on almost every page of the Prayer-book, are losing heart and ground with equal pace. Snubbed on every hand, they seem, as a party, to have been cowed into almost insignificance.

The Broad Church party, on the other hand, while it regards with contempt the principles of Ritualism, is disposed to look with indifference, or even with toleration,¹ on its practices. Indeed, according to its theory, Christianity is a religion whose institutions are to be maintained, and whose rites are to be practiced, on purely prudential considerations. Questions, therefore, of ceremony, of usage and of vestments, are to be judged of purely in the light of expediency and of a politico-religious philosophy. Broad churchmen admit the force of the histrionic argument, and say to their ritualist friends, Go on with your ceremonies, and accomplish what you can by them. We have no faith in your nonsense about baptismal regeneration, real presence, eucharistic sacrifice, absolution, and whatever else, but your vestments are picturesque, your processions and banners imposing, your chorals delightful, and your incense not disagreeable; your whole service is adapted to humanize and refine the rude and uncultivated for whose benefit religion is specially designed; therefore, we bid you

¹ The chapel used for prayer by Merton College, Oxford, is also used as a parish church. The Head of the College, being a Broad-churchman, reduced the Daily Service to a minimum of amount and ornament, dispensing with choristers and whatever he legally could; the incumbent of the parish (who died some year and a half since), being a great Ritualist, indulged, when it became his turn to officiate, in all the pomp of processions, banners, chorals, incense, lights, and whatever else he could.

God speed in your benevolent work. Broad-churchism neither proselytes nor persecutes. Ritualism at present restricts itself to proselyting, but in this it engages with a zeal and a method to which its opponents have as yet discovered no adequate barrier. It may be that a superstructure built, like the English Church, on a foundation composed of materials so heterogeneous and incongruous, cannot be perpetuated; that an ecclesiastical government whose great legal authorities are so antagonistic as are the Prayer-book and the Thirty-nine Articles, cannot much longer be administered; that the Bishop of London is right when he declares that Ritualism cannot be "put down," except by an authoritative revision of the Prayer-book and its rubrics.

But whatever may be its destiny, that destiny cannot terminate in itself alone. To suppress it by authority, would give to the Anglican body a shock which no statesmanship and no prelatical skill could cure. To let it take its course, may be to enable it to do what it proposes—catholicise the English Church. In either event the Episcopal Church of America, the foster child of the Anglican, must participate in the results. Indeed, in the results of the movement at its present stage, the American Episcopal Church is already deeply participating. Its spirit and methods, its assumptions and arguments, its boast of Prayer-book authority, its contempt of Protestantism, and its reverence for everything mediæval, are all reproduced in America. St. Albans and its priest Maconichie, of London, the one notorious type and representative of "Restored Ritual" for Anglicans, is literally copied in the St. Albans and its priest Morrill of New York. The Bishop of Oxford, just now made Archbishop of York, the most noted prelatical abettor of the movement, and so fully entitled to the sobriquet of "Slippery Sam," is not without his antitype among the American bishops. The old animus of the party, once conspicuous in Tractarian days during the Onderdonk controversy, has suffered no decay, but gathering strength in silence, is reappearing and reorganizing its forces under the banner of "Restored Ritual." Bishops McIlvaine of Ohio, Johns of Virginia, Smith of Kentucky, Lee of Iowa, and others like them, may deplore and warn and preach against the new movement; Drs. Tyng, Muhlenburg, John Cotton Smith, and Canfield, and the like, may array themselves against it and (honor to them for their courage) fraternize with the "sects;" but all in vain. Ritualism is the true child of "The Church," and will never be driven from his inheritance by the sneers of the son of the bond-woman.

English Ritualism, as we have said, and we think shown, is too

firmly intrenched within the defences of ecclesiastical law to be dislodged by any ordinary tactics. But with the exception of the formidable Rubric, which alone could amply protect the lovers of ritual in England, the American Prayer-book is just as favorable to their schemes as is the English. Every sentence and phrase which is specially cited as ritualistic in requirement or implication in the English, exists in the American. It stands recorded in the preface of the American book, that "This church is far from intending to depart from the Church of England in any essential point of doctrine, discipline, or worship, or further than local circumstances require." The truth of these words is easily seen by a comparison of the books of the two churches. And a comparison reveals the additional truth that the American book is even more ritualistic in its tendencies¹ than the English. It gives greater prominence to the priestly functions of the clergy, and more distinctly emphasises the idea of a sacrifice in the Eucharist. Throughout the Anglican book there is in the rubrics a noticeable interchange of the words "minister" and "priest;" throughout the American, there is a studied use of the word "minister" in all the rubrics, except those pertaining to absolution and certain special portions of the Communion Service. Why signalize the word "priest" by restricting it to these rubrics, unless to mark absolution and celebration of the Eucharist as the special prerogatives of a consecrated priesthood? Again, in the Anglican Communion Service, the priest partakes of the elements immediately after consecration; in the American, Consecration is immediately followed by "Oblation." Such was the order of service in the first book of Edward VI. The entire absence of Oblation from the Anglican Communion Service of to-day is a sore grievance to Ritualists; its presence in the American Service is a godsend for which they will not cease to be duly grateful. If Ritualism in England can flourish on a Prayer-book more reformed than the American, and in spite of the repressing hand of the civil power, how much more vigorous will be its growth with a Prayer-book and government like those of the Episcopal Church in this country.

But why trouble ourselves with the affairs of the Episcopal Church? What concern is it of ours what her Prayer-book contains, or what her bishops and clergy believe and teach? Much every

¹ It may be known to some of our readers that a book on the "Ritualistic Tendencies of the Prayer-book," by an Episcopalian, was published some time since, and began to excite no small stir. It is said that the book has been suppressed, and that Episcopal rectors have warned their congregations against it. The present writer has sought in vain to procure a copy of it.

way. The Episcopal Church claims to be exclusively "The Church;" all other Christian denominations are schismatics and sectarians. If these are to be saved at all it must be by the uncovenanted mercies of God, of his superfluous grace. The Episcopal clergy as a body (the exceptions are few and honorable) refuse to the clergy of other denominations the commonest of clerical civilities. In most parts of our country they withhold their congregations, so far as practicable, from all organized unions for any religious purposes whatsoever. In some of our cities they are even withdrawing from the ordinary charitable associations, and, like the Roman Catholics, founding orphan and other asylums of their own. Episcopal schools, advertised as such, where drill in the use of the Prayer-book forms a special part of the daily routine, are in existence in all parts of the country. Can sectarianism go further?

In strict keeping with its sectarianism is the arrogance of the Episcopal Church. Claiming by "squatter right" of preëmption the spiritual oversight of our Military and Naval Academies, it has long sought by systematic superciliousness to drive from the navy every chaplain of every other sect.¹ Deriving its priestly unction through the English Church, it pretends, on the ground of the sheerest historical fiction, to possess an apostolic authority transmitted through other channels than that of Rome. She forgets the Papal supremacy which for centuries controlled alike the sceptre and the crosier of England, and which Henry VIII first effectually assailed;² she forgets that her priestly unction, if apostolic, must have reached her only through the smutted hands of the Leos, the Gregorys, and the Johns of the Papal line; and that if she differ at all from her Roman grandmother, it is only in consequence of her better education, her cleaner habits, her use of the vernacular, and her lucid intervals of consciousness that she is now living in the nineteenth and not in the thirteenth century of the Christian era.

The claims which are arrogantly made by the Episcopal Church, and the spirit of exclusiveness with which they are enforced, may be ridiculous in the eye of an intelligent and critical student of history, but they are telling their story in the progress of religion in our country. No sect within the past few years has increased more rapidly in proportion to its numbers than the Episcopal. The

¹ This state of things has slightly mended since the old broken-down families of Virginia have ceased to claim exclusive right to offices of the Navy.

² Says the Rev. F. G. Lee, editor of the second and third editions of the *Directorium*; "The religious changes of the sixteenth century were commenced by a monarch who had murdered his wives; carried on by a statesman who had murdered his brother; and completed by a queen who had murdered her guest."


rapidity of its increase in the wealthier and more populous portions of our land, and the nature of the materials which it is attracting to itself, constitute one of the most noticeable signs of our times. Its recruits, clerical¹ and lay, come from all the other sects. To admit that individuals become Episcopalians from honest convictions, or from preference of liturgical to extemporary prayers, and of Episcopacy to a more liberal form of church government, is of course only to admit that the law of reaction, so constantly illustrated in the religious history of periods and individuals, is still in force. But it is equally true that the law of reaction from one extreme to another is also still in force; that they who enter the Episcopal Church enter it with predisposition to High Ritual; that this class abide in the Episcopal Church, rather than proceed to the Roman, from incidental considerations; and that the Episcopal Church will retain them and add to them of the like, only by maintaining her high pretensions, and by developing the pomp of her ceremonies. The future and rapid growth of Ritualism in the Episcopal Church of America may, therefore, for many reasons, be anticipated with certainty.

By what methods is this judaising spirit to be encountered and the pure spiritual Christianity of the apostolic church to be still preserved? Is it by putting the claims of one "Church" against those of another "Church?" Can the spirit of one kind of Churchism be exorcised by the spirit of another? Have we not already, within the the past three hundred years, had enough of the "Battles of the Churches?" Is not the spirit of Sacramentarianism, consciously or unconsciously, the very life and soul of every sect that arrogates to itself the title of "Church," and is not its infant baptism the lifeblood of its Sacramentarianism? The sect may repudiate the notion of salvation by priestly manipulation; it may, as our German Reformed friends charge their fellow sects with having done, adopt the "Baptistic principle" of personal faith as prerequisite to the Communion, and yet if at once Baptistic and Sacramentarian is it not a hybrid monster born of an unnatural conjunction of Evangelicism and Romanism? To all such hybrid churchism the demon of Ritual will ever respond, "Jesus I know, and Paul I know; but who are you?"

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¹ Widely various estimates of the proportion of the Episcopal clergy, bishops included, who were educated by other denominations, have been made. If our Episcopal friends could give us authentic statistics inclusive of names, they would be useful in many ways.



THE BIBLE DOCTRINE OF THE WEEKLY SABBATH.¹

I.—THE NATURE AND OBJECT OF THE SABBATH.

1. The Sabbath provides a season of rest for both man and beast. "But the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God; in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy manservant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates."

2. It is a religious institution. "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it *holy*, that is, religiously,

3. The Sabbath is a festival memorising creation. "For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is; wherefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day, and hallowed it.

II.—THE SABBATH FROM CREATION TO THE GIVING OF THE LAW.

The first chapter of Genesis contains an account of the six days' work of creation, and the second opens thus: "Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them. And on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made; and he rested on the seventh day from all the work which he had made. And God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it; because that in it he had rested from all his work which he had made." (Genesis ii. 1-3.) Here we see the first seventh day of time consecrated as a season of rest: 1. By the action of Jehovah. 2. By his blessing it (speaking well of it) as a season of rest, for so had

¹ This article is inserted at the request of the writer, that our readers may have a statement of the peculiar views of our Seventh-Day Baptist brethren, as presented by one of themselves.

he employed it. 8. By sanctifying it, that is, setting it apart. Here we have, in these seven days, not only the first week of time, but also time arranged and organized for the use of man. The earth is now fitted up for the abode of man, and put under his control. It is impossible to conceive of properly organized and toiling humanity without a season of rest. Unceasing toil would be unendurable. Rest is a necessity. But let it be remembered, that now humanity is organized for all coming time, and its wants provided for. Let it be remembered, also, that the honor of God, as the architect of the universe, was concerned in the Sabbath, because man, his imitator, was not only to work six days, but to rest on the seventh, and rest on the seventh with direct reference to God's rest, which rest of God had reference to his previous six days of work; and hence the keeping of the Sabbath honors God as the creator. The week, with its six days for toil and the seventh for rest, is the type of the Creator's work and rest; and the Sabbath, as the head or chief day, because it declares the triumph of the wisdom and power of God over chaos, reducing it to order, is the world's jubilee, and a standing witness for God against atheism and every form of idolatry. Here, then, we take our stand in defence of the Sabbath at the birth of the world, and date it from the beginning. "For he spake in a certain place of the seventh day in this wise, And God did rest the seventh day from all his works." (Hebrews iv. 4.)

From Genesis, chapter ii. to Exodus, chapter xvi. the Sabbath is not formally mentioned; but the division of time into weeks of seven days, and the observance of that division in the arrangement of society, is mentioned. God, in arranging for the sending of the flood observes this order. "For yet seven days and I will cause it to rain on the earth." (Genesis vii. 4.) "And it came to pass after seven days, that the waters of the flood were upon the earth." (Genesis vii. 10.) It will be seen, in the eighth chapter of Genesis, that Noah, in sending forth the raven and dove, thrice observes this order of seven days. In the transaction between Laban and Jacob, recorded in Genesis xxix. 21-30, the week is distinctly mentioned, and in Judges xiv. 12, we find a nuptial week to consist of seven days. It is clear, then, that the week, as a divinely appointed arrangement of time, was providentially preserved amidst the general wreck of the times. Now is it reasonable to suppose, that the week was thus remembered and employed, and the character of its chief day, the one upon which God had especially set his seal, forgotten? But if, under the circumstances, reason decides that the peculiar character of the seventh day of the week was remembered, then we are bound so to decide, and this settles the question in favor of the continuance of the Sabbath thus far, and if thus far, then always.

We come now to great and mighty changes in the social and political condition of the world, culminating in the exode of the Hebrews from Egyptian bondage. But let it be premised, that in the midst of universal apostacy from God, when every nationality was founded in idolatry, he organized the Jewish commonwealth, to be his peculiar people. To them he gave the true religion—that religion which revealed him as

the Infinite One, the creator and sustainer of all things, the redeemer and head of his people. And now, in teaching this infant colony of emancipated ones their first lesson—that of trusting in him as the possessor of all power and possible resources—he couples the observance of the Sabbath with the miraculous supply of their daily food, in such a way as to show them that the Sabbath and their food came from a common source, and that he who in the beginning wrought six days, and rested on the seventh, now gives them manna from heaven six days, and rests now, as then, on the seventh day, and bids them also to rest, having prepared them for it by giving their supply of bread for this day in the double quantity of the sixth day. Still further: When the rulers came to Moses and inquired concerning the double quantity of manna which fell on the sixth day, he replied, "This is that which the Lord hath said, To-morrow is the rest of the holy Sabbath unto the Lord." Now, is not the connection of this most natural with the account of God's resting on the seventh day, and sanctifying it? (Genesis ii. 2, 3.)

But a little later the Israelites stood before Mount Sinai, in the presence of Jehovah, to receive from him the Ten Commandments, that matchless code of laws, in the midst of which he placed the Sabbath. This code is in two parts, the first guarding the honor of God, and the second the rights of men. The first three commandments in the first table are negative in their character, guarding the honor of God, telling us what we must not do. The fourth is affirmative, and the only one containing the worship element, and is in these words: "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labor, and do all thy work; but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God; in it thou shalt not do any work; thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates: for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day; wherefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day, and hallowed it." Let this commandment be stricken from the Decalogue, and we should not only have no Decalogue, but the instrument would be imperfect and without meaning. If the writing of the other nine upon tables of stone was prophetic of their enduring nature, was it not equally so of this? If the Sabbath was a mere Jewish rite, one of the ceremonial laws, which was to pass away at the death of Christ, and thus unlike the others of that code, why was it written with the immortal nine?

III.—THE SABBATH FROM THE GIVING OF THE LAW TO CHRIST.

That the Sabbath, during this period occupies a most important position, is known to every student of the Bible. No merely ceremonial regulation presents such a character. In no instance has the Divine One called the annual Sabbaths his holy days, and pronounced special benedictions upon those who observe them. Remissness in their observance called forth no severe maledictions, nor is sin charged upon the people for any such neglect. But that the violation of the weekly Sabbath was treated as a sin, and a grievous sin too, is a fact too notorious to need

proof. That there was something about the Sabbath making it fundamental, is seen by every reader of the Bible. And now I ask why was this honor bestowed upon the Sabbath? Why did God set upon it such a high value? *Because it was the institution, above all others, that witnessed for him and against idolatry*; and hence, as the Jews were his witnesses, it was essential to their testimony that they observe his holy day.

IV.—THE TEACHING OF CHRIST CONCERNING THE SABBATH.

Christ opens his ministry by emphatically declaring that he came not to destroy the law, and that one jot or tittle should not pass from it till all should be fulfilled. That at the death of Christ the ceremonial law had fulfilled its mission, and so passed away, is clearly taught. But had the Sabbath fulfilled its mission? It was not a type of Christ. The Sabbath existed before sin entered into the world, and therefore before a Saviour was revealed, and hence it was no part of the ceremonial law. In the twenty-second chapter of Matthew, Jesus sums up the first table of the law in one sentence, love to God; and one of the precepts of that law was the Sabbath commandment. If any one should deny this, my reply is, that with equal propriety he might deny that either of the other commandments was covered by this saying. Nothing is plainer than that Jesus here has reference to the Ten Commandments, in the phrase love to God and love to men. (See Deuteronomy vi. 5, *seq.*; Romans xiii. 9, *seq.*) But another and most significant feature of Christ's teachings concerning the Sabbath, is his constant effort to free it from the embarrassments thrown around it by the false interpretations of the Jews. They had made the Sabbath a burden instead of a blessing—*against* man instead of *for* him. Against this Christ throws the whole weight of his authority, and supports his conduct by pleading his divinity and his lordship over the Sabbath, from which I infer that he was its author. Christ never taught the abrogation of the Sabbath, but rather its perpetuity, by freeing it from Jewish errors, and so restoring its true character as an institution in the interest of humanity. The Sabbath was made *for man*. Christ as much died in the interest of the Sabbath as of either of the other precepts of the Decalogue. *Why not?*

V.—THE SABBATH IN THE BOOK OF ACTS.

This book gives us an account of the principal doings of the leaders of the church down to about the years sixty-two or sixty-three, and during this period the Sabbath is frequently mentioned, and always by its own proper name, "The Sabbath day." It evidently had not lost its authority, nor was there even a hint that it had been abrogated or superseded. On the other hand, the writer proceeds in the most artless manner, and whenever he has occasion to refer to this day, does it as if it were still the Sabbath. Thus we trace this institution for some thirty years after the death of Christ.

VI.—THE SABBATH IN THE EPISTLES.

The weekly Sabbath is not mentioned in any of the epistles, except in

Hebrews iv. 4. I am aware that Romans xiv. 5, *seq.*; Galatians iv. 10, and Colossians ii. 16, *seq.*, are quoted as referring to the Sabbath, and they will be noticed hereafter. That they refer to the annual Sabbaths, none will dispute; but that the weekly Sabbath is included with the annual Sabbaths is *assumed* not *proved*. That, however, the epistles everywhere recognize and enforce the doctrine that the law of God is the rule of conduct for believers, is accepted by all sound interpreters. Still further, that it is the mission of the gospel to work in the hearts and lives of men conformity to the spirit and letter of God's holy law, is manifest. In this way only is the sinner fitted for heaven.

VII.—THE SABBATH IN THE APOCALYPSE.

The Sabbath is possibly referred to in Revelations i. 10, and probably so whenever the commandments are mentioned.

VIII.—THE CHANGE OF THE SABBATH.

The change of the Sabbath is not mentioned in the New Testament. The keeping of any other day than the seventh is not mentioned. That the practice of neglecting the observance of the seventh day, and the observance of the first day of the week, has obtained in the Christian Church, all know. I am also aware that arguments are offered to show that the Scriptures authorize this custom. To an examination of some of these arguments, the remainder of this article will be devoted.

The proposition upon which the argument for a change of the Sabbath is based, I conclude is fairly stated thus: "The work of redemption is greater than the work of creation. The work of creation was finished upon the seventh day of the week. The work of redemption was finished by the resurrection of Christ upon the first day of the week. Now, as God appointed the seventh day to commemorate the work of creation, so has he ordained the keeping of the first day to commemorate the work of redemption."

That the seventh day was appointed as a memorial of creation, all know, for the Scriptures so declare; but they nowhere say that the work of redemption is greater than the work of creation, nor that it was finished by Christ's resurrection, nor that he rose upon the first day of the week, nor that the work of redemption is to be celebrated by keeping the day of Christ's resurrection, nor any other day, whether of the week, month, or year. That the work of redemption centers in the death and resurrection of Christ, especially in the former, is fully believed. The work of expiation was effected by the sufferings of Christ, as taught by the system of sacrifices under the law, everywhere in the New Testament, and most emphatically by Christ on the cross, when he said, "It is finished." (John xix. 30.) But the work of redemption is not left without a witness, as the ordinances of Baptism and the Lord's Supper testify. As the death and resurrection of Christ go together in redemption, so do Baptism and the Lord's Supper, as symbols both of the *facts* involved, and the *doctrines* taught. These ordinances cover the whole ground; and how beautifully they do it! Reader, can you think of a single fact stated, or doctrine taught, concerning redemption, which is not symbol-

ized by one of these ordinances? Then why add another? Why volunteer an ordinance, or institution, when the whole ground is already occupied by those divinely appointed, and well suited to the purpose? What significance is there in the keeping of a day to symbolize the fact of Christ's resurrection? None whatever.

The next step in the argument is, the statement that after Christ's resurrection he frequently met with his disciples on the first day of the week, thereby honoring this day. But how is it known that Christ designed to honor the *time* on which he met with his disciples, since the Scriptures are silent about it? But, further, why say that Christ frequently met with his disciples on this day, when, after all, only two such meetings are claimed? Does "frequently" fairly represent the number two? And with respect to the first of these meetings, which was no meeting at all, but simply the assembling of the disciples in their own room, in which they were partaking of their ordinary meal, how can it be said that they came together to honor the *time* of Christ's resurrection, when—1. His resurrection occurred twelve or more hours before; and, 2. They did not believe the fact that he had risen? (See Mark xvi. 14.) And here I raise another question, which let the Bible student answer, *Did Christ spend this day as a Sabbath?*

After eight days from this, the disciples were again within, and Thomas with them, on which occasion he was cured of his unbelief as to the fact of Christ's resurrection; but nothing is said of its being a sacred season, or that the disciples were commemorating the *time* of Christ's resurrection, or the fact itself. Nor is it by any means certain that this gathering occurred as early as the evening of the next first day, reckoning the evening which followed the day as belonging to it; for there are but seven days in a week, and the "being within" of the disciples was "after eight days." I am aware that it is said, the Jewish mode of reckoning time made this meeting occur one week later than the other; but the proof of this statement I have not seen, while I have seen the opposite of it. Matthew and Mark, in speaking of Christ's transfiguration, say, "After six days Jesus taketh with him Peter and James and John," etc.; but Luke, speaking of the same event, says, "About an eight days after, Jesus taketh with him," etc. Now, if "after six days" was about an "eight days after," how can after "eight days" be only a week? I think it is not *certain*, then, that this was the next first day evening. The next time that Jesus showed himself to his disciples was at the sea of Tiberias, and here a far more lengthy conversation is narrated than the other; but who thinks, on this account, that the time was holy? Now if the first day of the week had become the "Christian Sabbath," why were there no meetings held on it for the next thirty days and more before Christ's ascension? But that the disciples did not meet on this day in the instances referred to, because it was made sacred by the resurrection of Christ, is certain, inasmuch as the gatherings were not had because he had risen. I deny, then, that the disciples understood that the meetings of Christ with them on these occasions were designed to impress on them the idea of the sacredness of this day. I insist, that no

other thought is contained in the account than the desire of Christ to impress upon the disciples the *fact* of his resurrection. The question of the sacredness of the day of Christ's resurrection, is an after-thought, and found outside of the sacred record, not within it. It is an attempt to find a reason in the Bible for a practice unknown to it. Does the Bible teach us ordinances, rites, and ceremonies, through the law of inferences? Never. Is there an ordinance enjoined in the Scriptures, the nature of which is not described and its object stated? Reader, pray let me ask you, Can you call to mind a reason given in the Bible for observing the first day of the week? *There are plenty of human reasons given, but not one Divine reason!*

The next passage ordinarily quoted as evidence that the apostles and early Christians observed the first day of the week, is Acts xx. 7, "And upon the first day of the week, when the disciples came together to break bread, Paul preached unto them, ready to depart on the morrow, and continued his speech until midnight." But this text says nothing of the sacredness of this day, and the reason of the holding of this meeting at this time was evidently in view of the apostle's departure the next day, his company having already departed for Assos. (See v. 13.) The meeting was held in the night, not in the day time, the breaking of bread, which was stated to be the object of the gathering, taking place some time after midnight. Besides, this meeting, for ought that appears to the contrary, was held on the night following the Sabbath, in which case Paul journeyed on the first day of the week, which of course must have been lawful. But if the meeting was held the night following the first day, still the breaking of bread did not occur until after midnight; which shows that it was not essential that it should be broken upon the first day of the week. And it will be remembered, that in the case of baptism and the communion, they may be administered whenever the providence of God shall direct. "As oft as ye do eat this bread and drink this cup," etc. Besides, in no instance is the time mentioned when the Eucharist was administered, save when it was instituted, except in this instance. There is, then, no weekly celebration of the Eucharist taught. One thing is certain, that those who plead this text as authority for observing the first day of the week, and then do not administer the Lord's Supper in the evening, that being the object of the meeting, do grossly contradict themselves! Again, if we are to learn the duty under discussion from example, and not from precept, then the meeting should be held in the night, and not in the daytime. Still further, more than twenty-five years have now passed since the death of Christ, and no meeting of his disciples has occurred in the daytime on the first day of the week—at least none is mentioned. Nor is it anywhere said that we must observe this day, or commemorate the resurrection of Christ. That our *emersion* from the water in baptism symbolizes Christ's resurrection, and is prophetic of the believer's resurrection is clear; but this ends the teaching of Scripture on this subject, so far as *ordinances* are concerned.

The passage quoted from I Corinthians, "Upon the first day of the week let every one of you lay by him in store, as God hath prospered

him, that there be no gatherings when I come," is strangely pressed into this service, as there is in it no mention of a meeting, or even a coming together. The duty enjoined is that of each person's laying by himself in store a certain amount of his earnings the previous week for the poor saints at Jerusalem. The inference that this service was performed at their regular weekly meetings is not only gratuitous, but directly against the text, as each one is ordered to lay by himself. There is, then, here, no observance of the "Christian Sabbath," no "honoring of the first day of the week as the resurrection day," but simply an individual business transaction, in the interest of suffering brethren, ordered to be done at the beginning of each week, that when the apostle should come to them, in his journey to Jerusalem, their benefactions might be in readiness.

Down to the year sixty-two, then, we have no account of the observance of the first day of the week, nor have we it mentioned but once in the Acts and once in the Epistles, and in neither instance as a sacred day; nor is there any clear evidence that it is again referred to in the New Testament. I am aware that interpreters have claimed that the phrase "Lord's day" (Revelation i. 10), applies to the first day of the week; but does the Bible say so? We have found the phrase, "first day of the week," once in the Acts, and once in I Corinthians, and in both instances written simply "the first day of the week," which clearly proves that that was the name it then bore. The last of the epistles in the New Testament, except the letters of John, were written in about the year sixty-six, in neither of which is the first day of the week mentioned. John's letters were written about the year ninety, and these make no mention of the first day of the week in any form. About the year ninety-six John writes the Apocalypse, and in chapter i. verse 10, occurs the phrase "Lord's day." Now, as up to this time no New Testament writer, not even John himself, had called the first day of the week by any other name than "the first day of the week," how can any man with *certainly* affirm that "Lord's day" here means the first day of the week? Indeed, how can any one be *certain* that any particular day of the week is meant, seeing that neither the text nor the context so indicates? 1. The word *day* in Scripture is used with a wide latitude of meaning, often describing a long period of time. 2. The time of Christ's manifestation and work or reign is called his day. "Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day." (John viii. 5, 6.) Peter calls the day of judgment "the day of the Lord." (II Peter iii. 10.) 3. In this instance it is fair to infer that the day in which John was in the "Spirit" lasted until his writing was finished, because the message was peculiar, and covered all coming time, and certainly was not written out in a day of twenty-four hours. 4. But if any day of the week is meant by this phrase, the Sabbath must be that day; else the revelator spoke unintelligibly, for the reason that in the Scriptures the other days are known only as *first, second, third*, and so on, while the Sabbath is everywhere marked and known as Jehovah's honored day, and often called his. Of this day Jesus says, he is "Lord." (Mark ii. 28.) I conclude, then, that the quality of *certainly* does not inhere in the interpretation which makes this passage refer to the first

day of the week, and that such interpretation does not possess the nature of proof.

IX. The argument that first asserts that the weekly Sabbath was appointed in Eden, before sin entered into the world, and before a Saviour was promised, and then affirms that Paul, in Romans xiv. 5, Galatians iv. 10, and Colossians ii. 16, classes it with those annual Sabbaths which were adumbrative of the good things of the gospel, is too illogical, one would think, to be entertained for a moment. How could the Sabbath be a memorial of creation, and a shadow of the gospel? How could Adam, before he knew sin, keep an ordinance as a type of redemption? Those who argue thus, asserting that the *day* was *Jewish*, but the institution *general*, and then say that what Paul argued against was the keeping of the *day*, but that he reserved the *institution*, talk nonsense! I beg pardon, if need be, but can hardly refrain from the utterance. That my apparent severity may be excused, apply this argument to the whole ceremonial code, and see where it will lead you. Instead of having the code *abolished*, you would have it *changed*! If you change the weekly Sabbath from one day to another, do you not, by the same rule, change the annual Sabbaths from the days on which they were originally appointed to others? And so of all the rest. If the Sabbath *day* is abolished, the institution goes with it. The *day* is essential to the institution. God rested on the seventh day, because it followed the day on which creation was finished. He blessed and sanctified the seventh day, because that in it he had rested from all the work which he had made. Jehovah never blessed the institution of the Sabbath, but the Sabbath *day*. Indeed, there is no such thing as the Sabbatic Institution without the day. Now, all this contradiction comes from attempting an impossibility—to make the fourth commandment accept of the first day of the week instead of the seventh. Read the commandment straight through, and all is well; but attempt this change, and all is confusion.

X. A prominent argument for a change of the day is drawn from the fact that in the commandment the word *week* does not occur; and hence it is said, that Jehovah does not require the observance of the seventh day of the week, but only the seventh day after six days of labor. It is indeed true, that the word *week* is not found in the commandment; but I ask, is not the *thing* there? Is not the seventh day of the commandment in reality the seventh day of the week? Let us see: The fourth commandment is founded on several facts, which must, I think be taken into account in its interpretation. For instance, is it not decisive in the controversy concerning the meaning of the formula used in baptism, that the early Christians did *immerse*? Now, what are the facts underlying the language of the fourth commandment? 1. It is a fact that God rested on the seventh day of the week. 2. It is a fact that He blessed and sanctified the seventh day of the week. 3. It is a fact that the seventh day of the commandment is the day Jehovah blessed. 4. It is a fact that the Jews rested on the day mentioned in the commandment,

and that that was the seventh day of the week. How, then, can any one in fairness say, that the seventh day of the Sabbath law was not the seventh day of the week in *fact*, although the word *week* is not in the commandment? That our argument is sound, namely, that we are to interpret the language of the law by the facts upon which the law rests, will be admitted; for writers who object that the command does not specify the seventh day of the week, because the word *week* is not found in it, do themselves insist that Christians are not at liberty to choose to observe this day or that, as they may fancy, but the *fact* of Christ's resurrection on the first day of the week binds them to the keeping of that particular day, although the words of the commandment do not. We take it, then, that the conclusion is just, that in the light of the facts underlying the fourth commandment, it describes by the word "seventh day" the seventh day of the *week*.

XI. The attempt sometimes made to find proof in the fourth chapter of Hebrews, verse 10th, for a change of the Sabbath, is, to say the least of it, remarkable, as the sum of the apostle's reasoning is simply and only this, namely: *That Christ furnishes rest to the believer, both in this world and in that which is to come*, ESPECIALLY THE LATTER. For a sober and excellent comment on this whole question, I refer the reader to Stuart's Commentary on Hebrews, edited and revised by R. D. C. Robbins, 1865.

XII. In conclusion, I call the attention of the reader to a few simple but important points:

1. The weekly Sabbath is a Bible institution. Neither ecclesiastical nor civil law has here the appointing power. If there be not a "Thus saith the Lord" upon which it rests, it can have no power over the conscience, nor can any man be charged with sin who violates it.

2. As the Sabbath law is clearly stated in the Bible, so must any modification of the law be matter of revelation; hence, if the law in this case has been abolished, we may expect to find it so revealed; or, if the time of its observance has been changed from one day to another, the change certainly should be so revealed. It is, we know, often asserted, that the weekly Sabbath has been abolished, the proof text for the declaration being Colossians ii. 14, 17. "Blotting out the hand-writing of ordinances that was against us, which was contrary to us, and took it out of the way, nailing it to his cross. And, having spoiled principalities and powers, he made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in it. Let no man therefore judge you in meat, or drink, or in respect of an holy day, or of the new moon, or of the Sabbath days, which are a shadow of things to come; but the body is of Christ." But it will be seen, that the Sabbaths here spoken of are a part of the hand-writing of ordinances, which were against us, and were therefore the annual Sabbaths of the Mosaic dispensation, which of course are done away in Christ. That the weekly Sabbath is not mentioned here with the annual Sabbaths, is clear for two reasons. (a.) It was made for *man*, and there-

fore is not *Jewish*. (b.) It is not *against us*, but *for us*. If the Sabbath is an institution in the interest of humanity, it certainly is not done away. Do we not need the Sabbath under the Christian dispensation as much as before, and shall we not need it until the end of time? Why, to charge Christ with abrogating the Sabbath, is to accuse him of unmercifulness in its worst form! And to talk of a change of the Sabbath, is to talk of that of which the Bible makes no mention. That there is no command for observing the first day of the week, all admit. But if there is no command for it, then there is no law for it, and of course it is no sin to disregard it.

8. The phrases "Jewish Sabbath" and "Christian Sabbath" are unknown in the Bible. The Sabbath was not made for the Jews, nor for Christians, but for *MAN*. I protest against these forms of expression, because they are unscriptural and false. Neither is the word "Sabbath" applied in the Scriptures to the first day of the week, nor have we any right to so use it. When we do this, we rob Jehovah's holy day of its divinely-given name, and give that name to a day only known in the Bible by the phrase "The first day of the week." If God had chosen to give this title to the first day of the week, would he not have done so? Then the fact that he did not do so is evidence that he did not want it so done. I affirm it as my full conviction, that if we were to return to the Scripture method of naming the day of the week, not five years would pass before such a change would occur in the public mind as would open the way for the re-enthronement of the true Sabbath, and the dethronement of its rival.

4. The time is fast approaching, when the ordinary methods of argument upon this subject must be abandoned. Every where around appear evidences showing that the public mind will not much longer be satisfied with the present state of the question. One reason why civil laws, passed in the interest of the "Christian Sabbath" are so fast losing the respect of the public mind, is because of the wide-spread belief that under the Christian dispensation the Sabbath is abolished, and this opinion receives great strength from the fact that the argument for the change of the Sabbath is so unsatisfactory; and, in my judgment, this state of things will continue until we return to the simple teaching of the Bible, and accept the Sabbath as there presented to us.

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EDITORIAL NOTES.

TRANSMUTATION OF CHURCH GOVERNMENT.

The doctrine of Transubstantiation affirms that the original substance of the eucharistic elements becomes another substance, while their sensible forms and properties continue the same. Something analogous to this takes place in human organizations. It is a familiar truth that while a form of government may remain unchanged, its character and spirit may be essentially modified. Under the forms of a republic the monarchical spirit may be developed; a nominal democracy may become a real aristocracy; a monarch nominally absolute may be as really, if not as efficiently, restrained by public opinion as if that opinion had constitutional organs established for its expression.

Episcopal government properly implies that the discretion of every inferior minister in executing his office is subject to be overruled and controlled by the judgment of his superior. His obedience is defined and regulated by the canons of the church. But, besides that a written code needs interpretation, it is presumed that there will be need of direction in matters that no code can specify. The spirit of the system demands that the inferior clergy submit, heartily and cheerfully, to the expressed will of their bishops in matters pertaining to their ecclesiastical functions.

Presbyterianism, on the contrary, holds that by Divine right a church government is established in church courts. All ministers are of equal rank, but the unity of the church is in its supreme judicatory which has the power of review and final decision in all questions of doctrine or dis-

cipline, and the individual minister is subject to the whole church as thus represented.

Now, as churches are subject to the common liability of all human organizations, to interior and unperceived changes, we have no occasion for surprise if we observe something of the kind going on in the first of the churches alluded to. When a presbyter refuses to obey the directions of his bishop, except so far as he is legally compelled to, has he not virtually vested the supreme rule in a church court rather than in the bishop? The court is not indeed constituted as are Presbyterian judicatories, but it is in principle nearer to it than to the *paternal* rule of the episcopate. He has solemnly promised (as in the Anglican ordinal,) "reverently" to "obey his ordinary and other chief ministers of the church, . . . following with a glad mind their godly admonitions, and submitting to their godly judgments." It has been justly said by an eminent prelate,—“To interpret this, then, as if it meant no more than ‘I will submit to such commands as can by course of law and under penalty be enforced upon me,’ is a manifest evasion of the words, as it is of the intention of the promise.”¹ Such, however, is a very common course. Ritualist presbyters insult Protestant bishops, and evangelical presbyters treat their bishops' "admonitions" as wasted breath. And this line of conduct, in either case, cannot justify itself by saying that the episcopal admonition is *not* "godly," without still more radically contradicting the spirit of the law; for that is to say, "I will obey such commands as are godly according to my judgment,"—another way of determining to do what is right in one's own eyes. The term "godly" in fact means *spiritual*,—admonitions on spiritual matters.

Thus, little by little, Convention (Synod) becomes more mighty than bishop, and is the real ecclesiastical arbiter. In like manner it might be shown that, along with the zeal for Presbyterianism implied in movements for "reunion" and in the repudiation of "Plan of Union," the practical administration of many Presbyterian churches is as popular as that of a Congregationalist church. There are the theory and the forms of presbyterial rule, but the spirit of popular self-government.

It is no less true that a system popular in form may be administered in the spirit of a synodal or an episcopal government. This is the practical lesson that we may need to learn. And as it is proverbially difficult to see ourselves as others, see us, we have traced the process of ecclesiastical transmutation in others that the view may perchance serve as a mirror for ourselves, and impressively teach us the necessity of holding fast not merely to a Scriptural theory but to the spirit of that theory,—not only to maintain the form of sound words, but to translate it faithfully into appropriate action,—not merely to adhere to right usages but to inform those usages with life and sincerity, guarding against insidious departures from our cherished "faith and practice."

¹ Ordination Address, by the Bishop of Oxford.

NOTE TO THE ARTICLE ON "RITUALISM."

While this number has been passing through the press, intelligence has come that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the court of last resort in ecclesiastical causes, has decided prostration before the Eucharistic elements, and the use of lighted candles in the service, to be unlawful. This decision interferes to some extent with the freedom of ritualistic expression, but the disorder is beyond any remedy short of a complete Reformation—such as the Church of England should have had in the sixteenth century.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Cyclopædia of Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Literature. Prepared by the Rev. JOHN MCCLINTOCK, D. D., and JAMES STRONG, S. T. D. Vol. I., A, B.—Vol. II., C, D. New York: Harper & Brothers.

This is the most extensive work of the kind as yet undertaken in the English language. The volumes before us contain respectively 947 and 933 pages, and comprise the articles under four letters of the alphabet. Though very moderate in its dimensions, compared with the great work of Hertzog, it will be, when completed, an honorable testimonial to the literary enterprise of our country at this time.

As the title implies, the plan is comprehensive. It includes Biblical Literature, Theology, Church History, Religious Biography, and Ecclesiology. The subjects under their several heads are of course not treated with the exhaustive fulness of a special dictionary for each. Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, or Kitto's Cyclopædia, treat their topics with an amplitude of discussion and illustration not to be expected in a comprehensive dictionary of sacred Technology such as this is designed to be. Each has its advantages. The more complex work brings together matters which have a near relation and more or less imply each other. For many purposes, and for all purposes of many persons, this will prove a sufficient substitute for a number of special works. In Biblical Literature the work is very full, and in most topics leaves nothing to be desired. In Theology there is an evident purpose and effort to be impartial in statement, doing justice to the views of different schools, while the editors avow that their own point of view is the Methodist. But in treating of different denominations the aid of some member of each has been obtained to insure accuracy. Thus, the article BAPTISTS gives a fair and sufficiently full account of our distinctive doctrines and history. The article BAPTISM, while it expresses the Baptist doctrine, gives, more at large, the view of the subject which the editors hold and that which they regard as generally prevalent. So the article CALVINISM deals with the subject as we should expect from fair-minded and large-hearted Methodists, while those which treat of the several Calvinistic *denominations* are prepared by, or with the assistance of, some competent member of each.


Similar care has been taken to select impartially from the great field of religious biography. The men of each distinctive body of Christians know each other and hold in common memory their own honored dead, as they cannot know the distinguished men of other denominations. Perhaps we are all too much inclined to magnify our own; to think our geese are all swans. But if we miss names that we feel ought to have had a place here, it is but reasonable to ascribe it to inadvertence, or to the necessity of making a selection and the difficulty of deciding whom to notice and whom to pass by, rather than to impute a lack of catholic feeling in the matter. We know that there has been no want of effort. The editors state that the most important articles were prepared before the publication was commenced, thus putting the seasonable completion of it beyond any serious doubt.

Night Scenes of the Bible. By Rev. DANIEL MARCH, D. D. Philadelphia: Zeigler, McCurdy & Co.

The scenes and events here contemplated are supposed to have occurred in the night. Hence the title. It is made to comprehend some of which we have no evidence that they were not by day, and one at least which is imagined rather than described by the sacred writer. But the title and the contents of a book cannot be always expected to be commensurate. To the effective illustration of his subjects Dr. March brings adequate knowledge of the places and traits indicated by the sacred narrative, a power of clear and vivid description, insight into the moral purpose and instructive bearings of scriptural incident, and a consequent force of application to the life of to-day. Perhaps there is sometimes just a little too much of the homiletic style. The volume is got up in a handsome dress, and is embellished by twelve engravings, including some from designs by Martin, Doré, Eastlake, and other artists. It is a volume which is suited by its style of workmanship to be an acceptable gift book, and by its contents to exert a salutary influence on the reader's mind.

The Plymouth Pulpit. New York.

The sermons of Rev. Henry Ward Beecher, which have heretofore been reported to the public through certain weekly newspapers, now have a periodical to themselves. The popularity of the Plymouth pastor, we presume, will make *The Plymouth Pulpit* no doubtful venture. With his eloquence, his wit, his humane sympathies, his poetic soul, his great power in the effective presentation of some important truths of religion we could wish he combined a higher reverence for the Word of God, such as would make him more studious to set out its true meaning, and a more justly preportioned and well-filled-out conception of Christianity as a system of truth. If, *e. g.*, he preached the Deity of Christ without denying his humanity, and the benevolence of God without denying his sovereignty, and the moral power of Christ's atonement without discarding its expiatory character, we could feel a more unmixed satisfaction in contemplating the measure and the extent of his influence.



INTELLIGENCE.

FOREIGN LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

"*The Doctrine of Revelation*, by A. E. KRAUSS, 1868,"¹ is described by the author, in his subordinate title, as "A Contribution to the Philosophy of Christianity," and this description does not claim too much for the work. For it is really such a contribution, discussing the deep and difficult questions of modern thought, preliminary to the doctrine of the Inspiration of Scripture, in a very able and conclusive manner. The work is divided into four sections: in the first, a Foundation is laid for the doctrine of revelation by developing the true idea of religion, showing its reality, its objective and subjective contents—in a word, its nature; in the second, the Testimonies for revelation are considered, showing the possibility of it, examining the objections against special revelations, with the claims urged in favor of mere natural religion, and explaining the bearing of sin upon the problem; in the third, the Contents of the revelation needed by sinful men are set forth, the Law, the Gospel, and the Kingdom of God; and in the fourth, the Form of revelation, that is, by Miracles, Theophanies, the Mediator, the Prophets and the Apostles, is submitted to a thorough investigation, showing the insufficiency of the most plausible objections to this form. But such a glance at the leading topics of this work will give the reader no adequate conception of the directness of the author's style, the fulness of his learning, and the solid strength of his argument. A similar work is needed

¹ Die Lehre von der Offenbarung. Ein Beitrag zur Philosophie des Christenthums. Von Lic. Alfred Ed. Krauss, ev. Pfarrer zu Stettfurt. Gotha. 1868.

in the English language; but those who are familiar with the German will do well to read the treatise before us; for though we do not assent to all the views which it presents as correct, we have found it exceedingly instructive. No treatise with which we are acquainted discusses the same questions in so succinct and yet thorough a manner.

"*Compendium of Dogmatics*, by C. E. LUTHARDT. 3d Ed., improved and enlarged. 1868." Dr. Luthardt is one of the most prolific writers of the evangelical school in Germany. As a professor in the University of Leipsic he is associated with Tischendorf and Kahnis, both of them eminent authors; and he excels them both, if not in learning, yet in vigor of expression, warmth of feeling, tact in the arrangement of his materials, and rapidity of execution. He is thoroughly evangelical, a great admirer of Luther, and ready to do all in his power for the faith which the Reformer preached. Of the work whose title is given below, he says in the preface to the first edition: "What I here give to the public is no Dogmatik in the proper sense, and no sketch of my own dogmatic system, but only a combination of the most indispensable historical material. Yet from this historical labor, any one may learn the fundamental views which I represent and the position which I hold to the dogmatic questions of the present. . . . I have taken my outline of Lutheran dogmatics chiefly from Quenstedt and Hollaz, its two characteristic representatives." These sentences give the reader a correct idea of the writer's aim in the preparation of this work; but to one who is acquainted with the "Dogmatics" and the "Hutterus Redivivus" of Dr. Hase, the author's remark may be useful, that "in the matter of form his *Compendium* lies midway between those two works." It is certainly a very convenient book, containing a large amount of historical theology in a small space. The arrangement of topics and the selection of illustrative and confirmatory passages, must be regarded as entirely satisfactory.

"*The Biblical Theology of the New Testament*, by Dr. BERNHARD WEISS. 1868." This work will repay faithful study; for it is a most orderly and complete exhibition of the author's view of the theology of New Testament, in the several stages of its development. And the word development suggests at once an excellence and a defect of this work. For if the word is used to denote progress in Christian knowledge, or in the apprehension of Christian truth, it may doubtless be applicable in some measure to the apostles, even after the day of Pentecost. Meditation upon the words of Christ and the exigencies of their sacred calling, but especially the constant presence of the Spirit of Truth, may have led them to enter from time to time more fully into the mind of God and to see more distinctly the depth and richness and manifold ap-

¹ *Compendium der Dogmatik*. Von Dr. Chr. Ernst Luthardt, Consistorialrath, Professor der Theologie. Dritte verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. Leipsic. 1868.

² *Lehrbuch der Biblischen Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, von Dr. Bernhard Weiss, Professor der Theologie. Berlin. 1868.


plications of that truth which they had been commissioned to preach. But there is danger of allowing this thought to carry one too far. There is danger of overlooking the evidence of rapid and almost instantaneous progress, from twilight to full day, in the case of the apostles. The marvellous gift of the Spirit, which they received on the first Christian Pentecost, lifted them at once to a high plane of knowledge, and put them in many respects far in advance of the ablest uninspired teachers of the early church. There is danger, we say, when once the idea of a natural progress of knowledge is applied to the apostles, of thrusting far into the background the supernatural aid which they enjoyed, and then of questioning the correctness of either their earlier or their later teaching. And there is also danger, we think, of being led by the idea of natural development to overlook, in the case before us, the mental and spiritual peculiarities of the different apostles, ascribing that to time and progress which was due to other causes, making diversities of knowledge successive which were in fact contemporaneous. For it cannot be supposed that Peter and John and Paul were all equally interested in the same Christian truths, that they all unfolded the same truths in the same way and with equal clearness, or that they kept pace with one another exactly, at all times, in their knowledge and experience. In a certain sense the apostles complemented one another. Only Christ was perfect in knowledge and in heart, having no mental or spiritual idiosyncrasies which qualified him to present one class of truths better than another. Now we are not disposed to deny that the students of the Sacred Record were at fault in former times by not giving sufficient attention to the indications of a gradual increase of knowledge on the part of the apostles, as they went on with their work and found occasion to meet new forms of error, but we are ready at the same time to affirm that the reaction against their mistake has carried many to the opposite extreme. Among these must be numbered the author whose work we are reviewing. He finds too many distinct forms of doctrine in the New Testament, and in too many instances traces the differences which really exist to different periods of time, rather than to the peculiar endowments of different men. Thus he exhibits, in the first place, the doctrine of Jesus according to the oldest tradition, making use of the three synoptical gospels, but discriminating between the more or less original elements which he believes are contained in them. In the second place, he exhibits the original apostolic doctrine in the period before Paul, making use of several discourses recorded in the Acts, of the First Epistle of Peter, and of the Epistle of James. In the third place, he exhibits the doctrine of Paul, as taught by him in different periods of his ministry; to wit, the earliest preaching of the apostle to the heathen, the doctrinal system of his four great letters, the peculiarities of doctrine in the epistles which he wrote while in prison, and the type of doctrine in the pastoral letters. In the fourth place, he exhibits the original apostolic doctrine in the time after Paul, drawing his materials from the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Second Epistle of Peter, that of Jude, the Apocalypse of John, and the historical books, meaning by these portions of the synoptical gospels and the nar-

rative parts of the Acts. And in the fifth place, he exhibits the theology of John, as found in his three letters and the fourth gospel. A glance at this analysis of Dr. Weiss' elaborate work will illustrate the criticisms which we have offered. Yet the volume is one which deserves to be studied; and it will be found extremely interesting. There can be no doubt of its taking a high position among the works which must be used by those who aim at a thorough knowledge of the New Testament.

- “*The Jesus of the Evangelists*, by the Rev. C. A. Row. 1868.”¹ The author of this work published a few years since a volume on the Nature of Inspiration, maintaining that it was a divine influence which secured infallibility in teaching religious truth, but left the apostles and evangelists in all other respects to the action of their own unassisted powers. Hence the errors and discrepancies which appear in their writings. These errors, he thinks, are not to be denied, but they relate to unimportant circumstances, to matters of time and place, of letter and form, which do not affect the spiritual truth taught by the sacred writers. We were not able to accept the conclusions of that work, though we recognize the perfect integrity of its author and his deep reverence for the Word of God, as the great source of religious truth. The same views of inspiration reappear in the present work, but they do not greatly mar its value as an apologetic treatise. Among the large number of works on the Person of Christ, this will take rank as one of marked ability, contributing its portion to the volume of evidence which is daily becoming broader and deeper, in confirmation of our faith in the historical Christ.

A. HOVEY.

¹ *The Jesus of the Evangelists: His Historical Character Vindicated; or, An Examination of the Internal Evidence of our Lord's Divine Mission with reference to Modern Controversy.* By Rev. C. A. Row.



THE BAPTIST QUARTERLY.

DALE'S CLASSIC BAPTISM.

Classic Baptism; an Inquiry into the Meaning of Βαπτισμα, as determined by the usage of Classical Greek Writers. By JAMES W. DALE.
Philadelphia Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1868.

IT IS curious and even cheering to observe what varying forms are assumed by the uneasy and perturbed spirit of pedobaptism. For it shows that a great and evangelical religious body, professing, and in the main evincing unconditional allegiance to the Head and Legislator of the church, cannot sit down in a complacent acquiescence in an alleged and half-conscious inconsistency between its convictions and its practice. If it cannot tear itself from a usage hallowed by a venerable tradition and a thousand endearing associations, it will bend its energies to prove that that usage is at least not expressly discountenanced by the Divine Word. Hence every now and then, some fresh endeavor to meet the exigency; some fresh rearguing of the subject from the old stand-point; or the broaching of a new theory to bolster up a failing cause.

More than thirty years ago, Prof. Stuart brought his wide learning and conscientious industry to the task, but failed of satisfying the pedobaptist, and (though his article, somewhat annotated, would have made on the whole a fair Baptist tract,) the Baptist public. He fought it out on the old line, surrendering mainly, though not entirely, the philological argument, and throwing himself back chiefly on the indifference of a spiritual faith to the demands of a rigid ritualism. Dr. Edward Beecher subsequently entered the field, taking up a

new line of defence, and claiming that βαπτίζω, under the specific New Testament meaning of *purify*, threw its broad shelter over every form of administration. Much more recently the Rev. Charles Wolfe put forth a book, arguing that classic Greek baptism consisted in *drowning*, and thus seeking to sever entirely its connection with the New Testament ordinance. This is largely, though with many modifications, the position of the book before us. Classic baptism proper, if it does not shut up its subjects to absolute and inevitable drowning, yet comes so near to it as to be, in its primary import, wholly unfitted for a safe Christian immersion. Thus we have reached a new order of things to which we must adapt ourselves. *Tempora mutantur*;—the old arguments are become curiously antiquated. Once we had to resist the plea for too little water, now the demand for too much. Once we had to prove that βαπτίζω could not legitimately *sprinkle* its subjects; now we are put to our wit's end to prove that it will not necessarily *drown* them. When our brethren shall have decided on their ultimate line of defence and attack, we may know where to dispose of our own. Till then our condition is sufficiently perilous. Our strongest entrenchments of to-day may be snugly occupied by the enemy to-morrow, and our most effective batteries be spiked or adroitly turned upon ourselves. Our only safe policy meantime would seem to be "a masterly inactivity."

The works of Dr. Beecher and Mr. Wolfe, especially the latter, were received with loud demonstrations of applause, and each, we believe, before the echoes of the plaudits had fairly died away, was quietly shelved and consigned to a kindly oblivion. Mr. Dale has met a warmer welcome and louder praise than either of his predecessors. Men eminent in the pulpit and the lecture-room have been unable adequately to express their admiration of the extraordinary skill and learning which he has brought to his task, and their delight at the accession to their ranks of this new and potent ally. Unless the enthusiastic utterances of the pedobaptist press are to be taken at a large discount, the "last word" would seem to have just been, or just about to be uttered, and the troublesome Baptist ghost of immersion laid in a grave from which it will have no resurrection.

Mr. Dale must not be deceived by this multitudinous din of applause. The question will not *stay* settled, or rather, it will not stay unsettled. Mr. Dale virtually misrepresents the facts when he speaks of "discussion" having "continued for centuries." There is scarcely a question in the whole range of theological literature on which the judgments of competent men have been so nearly unanimous as on the meaning of βαπτίζω. On matters of church polity and Chris-

tian doctrine, there have been among men of equal and the highest attainments, wide and obstinate differences of opinion. But on the word prescribing the New Testament rite of baptism there has been no difference of scholarly opinion that was worth the naming. The controversy has not been between Baptists and pedobaptists. It has been between pedobaptist principle and pedobaptist practice, between pedobaptism in the study and pedobaptism in the congregation. All that Baptists have needed to do, regarding the meaning of the word, has been to array the long line of pedobaptist testimony against itself. The works of Gale, Booth, Carson, Judson, Fuller, and the recent exhaustive and overwhelming treatise of Dr. Conant, were absolutely unneeded, except as *resumés* of the argument, and manuals of practical instruction. And the pedobaptist, on the other hand, who assumes the theoretical championship of sprinkling, has one of the most ungracious of tasks. His principal controversy is with his friends. His chief foes—and they are a long and formidable array—are they of his own household. In entering the lists he finds occasion for the utmost display of courage and knightly prowess. As he approaches the barrier where stands arrayed the long and frowning line of his opponents he may well pause before the stalwart and steel-clad forms whose lances he has undertaken to shiver, and whose harness he seeks to penetrate. It is not merely a few erratic and outlawed "Baptists" whom he defies and summons to the encounter. It is the leaders and rabbies of his own religious denomination—be that denomination what it may. Whether Catholic or Protestant, Lutheran or Calvinist, Episcopalian or Presbyterian, he will find on this subject, the magnates whose names he is wont to swear by, in the camp of his opponents. If this almost unbroken body of opinion—this collective and all but unanimous testimony of the learned world, embodied in lexicons, commentaries, and church histories, and flanked by the uniform usage of the Greek Church, and, until a very recent period, the prevalent usage of the English—if all this can now be done away, so be it. Baptists, we trust, will accept the situation, and bow gracefully to the discoveries that shall discredit the testimony of fathers and reformers, of theologians and commentators, of lexicographers and church historians, of the Luthers and the Calvins, the Scaligers and the Grotiuses, the Bentleys and the Bloomfields, the Meyers and the De Wettes, the Neanders and the Stanleys of the church.

We respectfully submit to Mr. Dale that it cannot be done. It is too late in the day to reverse the settled verdict of the world regarding the force of a Greek word of so frequent recurrence

and so obvious import as βαπτίζω. No amount of philological thimble-rigging—no tricks of critical legerdemain—no dexterous, or would-be dexterous manipulation of the words βάπτω and βαπτίζω, *tingo* and *mergo*, *dip* and *immerse* can alter the facts, or vary in the slightest degree the essential aspects of the question. Of these feats of petty sleight of hand Mr. Dale's book is full. It looks like an elaborate and persistent effort to trick βαπτίζω out of its honest meaning, and extract from sophistry and special pleading a signification which refuses to come from usage and the lexicons. The attempt will prove futile. Without learning, without philosophy; and without candor, the book will follow its predecessors to that hopeless submersion to which its logic dooms every consistent adherent of βαπτίζω.

We must add that of the real nature and magnitude of his undertaking, the author himself seems utterly unconscious. He has set himself to break a lance with every lexicographer and every scholar who ever undertook to define βάπτω and βαπτίζω. The grand aim of his book is to dissociate these two words from each other, as well as their respective English exponents *dip* and *immerse*; to unchain βάπτω from the car of βαπτίζω, to which Baptist prejudice has held it attached on account "of the vital connection of the act of *dipping* with the Baptist system," and by remanding the two words to entirely distinct categories of usage, to tear from "immersion" the aid and comfort derived from a surreptitious and illogical "*dipping*," and thus drive the Baptist either out of the water, or *into* it to its legitimate "suffocation." A less important, but by no means unimportant, point is the illegitimacy of the compound "immerse" as representative of the simple verb βαπτίζω. Mr. Dale insists on "merse."

Now we say nothing at present of the truth or value of these distinctions. We simply say that in insisting on them Mr. Dale is setting himself against a usage that is absolutely universal. Mr. Dale never opened a lexicon, nor read a commentator that did not systematically ignore these distinctions; that did not define βάπτω and βαπτίζω by the same words; that did not freely interchange, *dip*, *immerse*, *plunge*, etc., as substantial equivalents, and totally disregard his pet canon regarding the rendering of a simple verb by a compound. But of this fact Mr. Dale appears as ignorant as if he lived in another planet. From the beginning of his book to the end of it we have met with only one, and that the slightest shadow of recognition that the confusion and the blunders he complains of are chargeable upon any body but Baptists. Now we submit that considering the heinousness of the offense and the gravity of its consequences, it

would be but reasonable that he should saddle their fair share of the responsibility on the shoulders of his friends, and allow the Baptists the few crumbs of extenuation and comfort allowed them by the fact that they share their unscholarly proceeding with the universal scholarship of the world! That while they are committing the unpardonable blunder of treating βάπτω and βαπτίζω, "dip" and "immerse," as essential synonyma, and of loading down the simple βαπτίζω with the weight of a superfluous and illegitimate preposition, they are merely doing what every lexicographer and every critic that ever undertook to render the two words either into Latin or English has done before and beside them!

But not such are the tactics of our author. "Immerse and dip are confounded together by Baptist writers, and interchanged at will. There is no authority for so doing." (p. 16.) "When Baptist writers say that βάπτω and βαπτίζω mean to dip, do they mean understandingly to say," etc. (p. 25.) "If Baptist writers have failed to mark this discrimination—they must not be astonished if there is questioning," etc. (p. 26.) "Have Baptist writers maturely considered these distinctions," etc. (p. 26.) "This utter confusion of these words so long persisted in by Baptist writers," etc. (p. 38.) "The best foundation on which Baptist writers can stand in their plea for dip," etc. (p. 270.) And so on *ad nauseam* and *ad finem*—from the opening of the book to its close. All the obloquy of a "confusion" that has reigned through all the centuries, and is now first dispelled by the luminous logic of Mr. Dale, heaped upon the heads of the Baptists! If Mr. Dale knows no better, his ignorance is scarcely less than disgraceful. If he *does* know better, the terms appropriate to his proceeding would be still less complimentary. To which horn of the dilemma he may prefer to attach himself it is not ours to determine. We incline to the kindlier and less discreditable hypothesis. We doubt if his book indicates a knowledge of any usage other than that of "Baptist writers."

This fact furnishes the key-note to the book; as is its general spirit so are its details. What professes to be and ought to be, a dispassionate and scholarly examination of certain Greek and English words, never for one moment rises out of the atmosphere of sectarian partizanship into that of broad scholarship, and ingenuous criticism. It is one long endeavor by nice verbal distinctions to pit "Baptist writers" against each other, and against themselves, and the result is worthy of the purpose and the means. We proceed to inform our readers of its achievements.

After an outline of his proposed course of inquiry, the author

favors us with several so-called "Baptist postulates." The first in the series is that "*βαπτίζω* throughout the entire course of Greek literature, has but one meaning, which is definite, clear, precise, and easy of translation." This proposition, sagaciously remarks Mr. Dale, "is not self-luminous with truth." Doubtless; and neither is it "self-luminous with truth," that it is a "Baptist postulate" at all. And as Mr. Dale proceeds with great vigor and effect to demolish his own assertion, and to show abundantly that "Baptist writers" have united in asserting no such absolute singleness of meaning, and facility of translating, we may spare ourselves the trouble of refuting it. Baptist writers have held no peculiar views regarding the meaning of *βαπτίζω*. While concurring substantially with all scholarly authorities in affirming one fundamental idea controlling all the usages of the word, they have varied indefinitely in their modes of statement, and the special shades of meaning to be assigned to it in particular cases. No Baptist, we presume, has ever dreamed that one word could invariably translate it, or that it was, in every instance of its numberless rhetorical uses, easy of translation. The "one single word"; for its uses in all Greek literature, is an honor that has been reserved for Mr. Dale. With his invariable barbarism of "merse" he has done what no Baptist ever dreamed of attempting.

Our author's second "Baptist postulate" is this: "*βαπτίζω* and *βάπτω* have precisely the same meaning, *dyeing* excepted: in all other respects, whether as to form, or force, or effect, they differ neither more nor less." As to the absolute identity of the two words in "form," the possession of eyes and an acquaintance with the Greek alphabet, should have saved Baptist scholars from so gross a blunder. Regarding the rest of the proposition we have already declared our judgment. There is not a shadow of ground for imputing to Baptist writers any peculiar doctrine regarding the relations of *βάπτω* and *βαπτίζω*. They have treated them as all lexicographers and scholars—from Stephens to Robinson, have concurred in treating them, as substantial equivalents, rendering them indifferently by *dip*, *immerse*, *plunge*, *submerge*, &c. That they have attached any controversial importance to the relation,—that they have held to the "dipping" of *βάπτω* to escape the threatened "drowning" of *βαπτίζω*, is a pure conceit of Mr. Dale's. We are not sure that Mr. Dale himself did not catch the suggestion from Dr. Dagg, who distinguishing the "slight and temporary immersion" of *βάπτω* from the "drowning and ship-sinking" affinities of *βαπτίζω*, "touches" to our author's excited imagination, "the nerve of truth," "so as to send a shock through all the Baptist system." The "Baptist system," it is comforting to know, was insensible to the "shock," and has survived it.

"Postulate" third runs as follows: "*Βαπτίζω* expresses an act, a definite act; mode and nothing but mode; *to dip*. *Βάπτω* (primary) expresses an act, a definite act; mode and nothing but mode, *to dip*." Of the relation of the two words and their meaning, as held by Baptists, we have already spoken. On his authority for this postulate, Mr. Dale himself shall enlighten us. On p. vi. he says: "Some hold it"—viz., the "definite act" theory—"absolutely (Carson). Some doubt (Gale). Some deny (Fuller). Some *non liquet* (Conant)." Again at p. 32: "If it shall be found that between postulates and writings there is no harmony; that between writer and writer there is as little; that the pages of the same writer, compared with each other, perpetuate this disharmony; that there has never been any attempt by any one writer, through these three hundred years, to carry these postulates through all Greek literature,"—then (we will take the liberty of following Mr. Dale's "if" to its logical conclusion) then the idea of propounding them as "Baptist postulates" is ludicrously absurd, and would imply in "Baptist writers" a stupidity only equalled by that of Mr. Dale in affirming them to be "Baptist postulates," and then proceeding to show, with Homeric fullness and vivacity, that they have been flatly disowned by every Baptist who within "these three hundred years" has written upon the question!

Nor do we believe that any Baptist scholar has *ever* maintained that these words mean *dip* in Mr. Dale's narrow sense of the term. As Prof. Stuart says "*βάπτω* and *βαπτίζω* mean *to dip, plunge, or immerse* into any thing liquid; all lexicographers and critics of any note are agreed in this;" so Baptists generally have freely interchanged the words *dip, plunge, immerse, &c.*, as allied in their fundamental import. They have not trod anxiously as near an ambuscade of synonyms. They have not trembled for fear of being submerged in a tidal wave of nice verbal distinctions. They have affirmed that "dipping is baptising, and baptising is dipping," in the sense in which they would have said "immersion is baptising, and baptising is immersion;" they have employed the liberty hitherto accorded to every translator, of varying words according to diversities of idiom, without dreaming of an assault from Crabbe and Mr. Dale.

But precisely here is our author's strong point. "He is nothing if not" verbally and intensely "critical." He does not assail us with Stephens and Scapula. It is not clear that he has (more than) the slenderest acquaintance with critics and commentators. But he has studied English synonyms. He has determined the minute shadings that mark off "*dip*," "*plunge*," and "*immerse*," (as well as "*bapt*," "*merse*," "*inn*," and "*intuspose*,") and thus completely armed, dis-

charges his volley of synonyms with fatal execution into the Baptist camp. From the point of view of the synonyms he passes in review the Baptist authors, to see how they have made good their "postulates," and, as might be expected, finds them woefully deficient. Where all was to be definite, luminous, and exact, there reigns a perfect Babel of contradictory and unintelligible testimonies. One says "dip;" another "dip, and nothing but dip," yet presently adds "or immerse,"—a "note of discord," says the inspector. Another equally discordantly adds "plunge;" another takes "sinking" and "drowning" under the shelter of βαπτίζω. Another hints at that distinction of βάπτω and βαπτίζω which sends "a shock through the whole Baptist system;" and to crown all, Dr. Conant brings up the rear with "dip, immerse, immerge, whelm, imbathe," and we know not how many more enormities, to throw our author's critical soul into utter bewilderment and perplexity. Where and what, then, is the "one definite meaning" of βαπτίζω? Is dipping plunging? Is plunging immersing? Are "sinking," "submerging," and "laying under water" identical? Does not "plunge" express "a movement characterized by rapidity and force?" and "dip, a gentle, downward movement, entering slightly into some diverse element with immediate return"? Does not "immerse" like βαπτίζω express "no definite form of act" and "intuspose its object within a fluid element without providing for its removal?" And are "Baptist writers" to be allowed to toss about indiscriminately words so radically diverse, and, postulating one meaning through all Greek literature, and that *dip*, then thus wantonly to make shipwreck of their professions and the synonyms? And can we wonder that thus summoned before his critical tribunal he brands upon them utter "failure" to meet the demands of their postulates?

We assure our readers that we have indulged in neither caricature nor hyperbole. We have given, above, the substantial import of some fifty pages of as barren verbal criticism as it was ever our misfortune to read, and, we believe, the misfortune of any sensible man to write. We venture the following specimen:—

We are told that this word "expresses putting into or putting under, immersing or submerging." Does Dr. Conant mean by this language that the word means either to put *into* or to put *under*,—but he cannot tell which? Or that sometimes it means the one, and sometimes the other; not being fixed in its meaning? Or, that it means both; there being no difference between "into" and "under"? Or, that it means, exactly, neither, but some third thing? Surely we are left quite in the dark as to any definite idea of the action expressed by this word.

"To put" gives no definite information, for it has sixty-seven variations of usage according to Webster, and sixty-seven more perhaps might be added. No valuable aid is found in "put *into*," or "put *under*," for these terms are very far from agreeing in one.

Such pitiful drivel—and the book is plethoric with it—Mr. Dale, we suppose, calls criticism. As to his general review of the usage of Baptist authors, we need only remark that they have used words in their current acceptation, with no reference to nice shades of difference, and varying their renderings according to the demands of idiom, and those slight diversities of view under which the same fundamental thought presents itself to honest and independent minds—and his phantasmagoria of contradictions vanishes like the fabric of a dream.

The "failure" he pronounces to be threefold : it embraces the "act," the "object," the "end" of the rite. How the Baptist case fails to be made out regarding the "act," we have already seen. After chasing it through its Protean trasmutations of *dip*, *plunge*, *submerge*, *immerse*, *put under water*, and failing to hold it in any "questionable shape," he turns away in despair. The Sphinx never propounded a darker enigma, and Mr. Dale is no Œdipus for its solution.

It fares no better with the "object." At first, indeed, all here seems plain sailing. "The man," "the subject," "the body," "the candidate," "the whole body,"—here is "diversity of phraseology, but unity of material object," blandly declares our master of synonyms, and delighted that our unintelligible "act," has at least an intelligible "object," we are about to bow ourselves out of the judicial presence. But stay: the law has yet another hold on us. The theory is all right, but how about the "practice?" Baptist principle requires the submerging of "the whole body" in water in the rite of baptism; but the practice nullifies the principle. According to the unfortunate concession of Dr. Ripley "the going down into the water" is no part of the baptism. It requires but half an eye to see the consequence—a consequence which scatters to the winds our pretended fidelity to the divine ordinance, and completely vitiates every alleged Baptist baptism from the days of Philip and the Eunuch until now. Does not a theoretical Baptist baptism demand, as part of the rite, the submerging of the whole body in water? And does not Baptist practice render this impossible by submerging a part of the body previously to the ceremony? Can he be totally immersed in baptism half of whose body is immersed already? Is the dipping of the "head and shoulders" the dipping of the whole body? And what refuge from

this logic, but to cease to profess immersion, or else adopt the benevolent suggestion of Mr. Dale, provide ourselves with "ropes and pulleys" and have the "body slid off the bank by a little clever management?" "Never fear," exclaims our *captator verborum*: "the thing has been done. None need hesitate through fear that 'ropes and pulleys' could not secure an orthodox Greekly baptism."

Our pen fairly tingles with shame as it records this strange compound of folly and irreverence. We will not insult the understanding of our readers by a moment's reply to such incredible puerility. Is there another living man, out of an idiots' asylum, who would maintain that the Baptists "have never in one instance, for three hundred years," consistently "obeyed the command" of immersion, because the candidate descended into the water in order to its performance? Did any body but Mr. Dale ever fancy that the fact of Philip and the Eunuch's going down into the water, not only does not prove that there was a consistent Baptist baptism, but proves irrefragably that there was not? Would any body else construe the natural act precedent and preparatory to the ceremony, into an effectual bar to its performance? And will not Mr. Dale's facetious suggestion of "ropes and pulleys," and "clever management," and "sliding the body off from the bank," be relished as a good joke by the large denomination into whose face he flings his impertinent and insulting proposal? If he can make any thing by showing up the inconsistencies of "Baptist writers," he is welcome to the gain and glory of the achievement. But let him spare his scoffings at the ordinance which nineteen twentieths of the Christian world believe to have been hallowed alike by the command and the example of the Redeemer.

But the "failure" is equally signal in regard to the "end." The professed end is *immersion*; the consistent end would be *drowning*; the actual end is *dipping*. "The idea of emersion," justly says Dr. Conant, "is not contained in the Greek word: but a living being put under the water without intending to drown him, is of course to be immediately withdrawn from it." Mr. Dale resists the humane suggestion. "True, there is nothing in the word to prevent its object from being 'immediately taken out of the water;' but it is also true that the word *never contemplates* the removal of its object from the condition in which it has placed it." "I remember but one solitary case in the classics to which the supposed case is applicable." "Baptize will put a man into the water, but it never did, and never will take him out." To enter the water, then, under its auspices is imminently perilous. It has no thought of extricating its subject, and if he emerges it is with no thanks to the hard-hearted agent that has

"mersed" him. Commend us, then, to the tender mercies of *βάπτω*. She stipulates in advance to bring her votary to the surface, and hence the death-grasp with which Baptists cling to *βάπτω* as sister and confederate of *βαπτίζω*. They stand in imperative need of both. If they go in simply for a "bapting" (in our author's classic phraseology), they fail of the divinely commanded *baptizing*. If they go in for a "baptizing," they run the hazard of that unpleasant "suffocation," which Mr. Dale tells us is so common an attendant on "drowning." Thus, if they only "baptize" they *drown*; if they only "bapt," they emerge indeed, but the "dipping," brief as it was, has been long enough to submerge their principles.

The curtain falls, then, on a scene dark enough to satisfy our bitterest enemies. The "act" inextricably confused by all that muddle of ideas implied in dipping, immersing, plunging, laying under water, putting into or under the water! The "object," theoretically, "the whole body," but practically only "the head and shoulders!" And the "end" inevitable drowning, unless averted by an act of lexicographical dishonesty, which the Furies of the murdered *βαπτίζω* stand ready to avenge with a whip of scorpions by the hands of Mr. Dale! We wait to see the curtain rise on his "repewed" and independent investigations.

These consist primarily in establishing the complete distinction of *βάπτω* and *βαπτίζω*. They belong, he maintains, to entirely separate classes of words, and never can be, and in all Greek literature never are, interchanged or confounded. *Βάπτω* expresses primarily and ordinarily a definite act, to *dip*, implying a gentle motion, a superficial entrance, and a speedy withdrawal. *Βαπτίζω* implies no "definite form of act," but a *state* of complete "intusposition," for an unlimited time, and without contemplating its termination. The distinction thus established Mr. Dale applies rigorously to the Baptists. He can no longer allow them to play fast and loose with totally diverse words; to go into the water under the conduct of *βαπτίζω*, in pretended obedience to the divine command, and just when that would send them to the bottom, raise the cowardly cry of "Help me," *βάπτω* "or I sink," and on its illegitimate shoulders scramble back to the shore with life and dishonor. He will force them to an alternative. They must choose whom they will serve. If *βαπτίζω* is their idol, let them follow it—to the drowning; if *βάπτω*, let them abandon their claim to preëminent fealty to the divine ordinance. If they choose to remain *dippers*, let them say so, and give up their unfounded, not to say hypocritical pretence of immersion. If they choose to become *baptizers* let them become so, and manfully face the consequences.

Now on this, his grand position, we beg to offer a few general remarks. And first, this utter and absolute distinction between βάπτω and βαπτίζω, he has not proved, and it is scarcely too much to say that he has not *attempted* to prove it. He has *affirmed* it over and over with an emphasis and confidence that he has doubtless mistaken for a demonstration. But there is not a paragraph in his book in which he has endeavored to maintain it by scholarly argumentation. He seems to have *constructed* it by reasoning back from the supposed distinction between "dip" and "immerse;" and, assuming the corresponding distinction in Greek, he settles every individual case by a fierce assertion of the general law. His whole argument is little else than a begging of the question, and reasoning in a circle. If he alleges the examples which he adduces in proof of the meaning of "dip," we reply that that is not in question. Nobody doubts that βάπτω may mean "to dip." The only question, and one which Mr. Dale has not taken a single honest step toward settling, is whether βάπτω and βαπτίζω are in usage separated by that broad and impassable line which he affirms, and which he thinks (no matter whether justly) he has established between "dip" and "immerse."

But, secondly, Mr. Dale's position is intrinsically improbable, and in fact erroneous. That the two words are entirely independent, and never interchanged in all Greek literature, no scholar would affirm for a moment. Closely allied in *origin*, they cannot but have had the same fundamental signification. That they should *continue* wholly identical in meaning, was, of course, improbable. Βάπτω, the more primitive word, early specialized itself, from dipping into a coloring fluid, into *dyeing*—a meaning which need not, and did not pass over to βαπτίζω. Βαπτίζω, on the other hand, partly, perhaps, from a real or supposed *causative* force in its ending, and still more, we think, from the lengthened and heavier character of its form (analogously to the heavier Imperfect forms as compared with the lighter Second Aorists), became naturally applied ordinarily to immersions of a more formal character and longer duration, while the shorter and lighter βάπτω (like the English *dip*) ordinarily denoted the lighter and more transient immersions. Thus arose the distinction suggested by Dr. Dagg, giving a partial foundation for the dogma of Mr. Dale. But in the unqualified form in which Mr. Dale states it, the doctrine is totally untrue, and his canon constructed on *a priori* grounds, with no regard to etymology, and little regard to usage, is largely false, and, so far as true, scientifically worthless. The radical identity of the two words in meaning is determined by their etymological relationship. Their substantial identity of usage is shown by the fact that lexicogra-

phers and critics uniformly render them by the common words *mergo*, *immergo*, *dip*, *immerse*, *submerge*, *plunge*, etc., indiscriminately; while their easy interchangeableness can be shown abundantly from usage. In three of Mr. Dale's examples of βάπτω the scholiast replaces it by βαπτίζω. Aratus sends the sun to his ocean bed with βάπτω, and the Orphic Argonautæ with βαπτίζω. The defiled Egyptian (Herod. ii. 44,) removes his pollution by βάπτω. Naaman the Syrian, Judith in the Bethulian encampment, the Pharisee coming home from the market, the votary of the Expiatrix (Plut. de Superst., 3), all perform their ritual cleansing by βαπτίζω, (neither of them intending to be drowned.) Hierocles (in Suidas) *dips* (ἔβαψε) the hollow of his hand in blood and sprinkles the judge; the voyager on the Nile drinks, (Achil. Tat. ii. 14) by *immersing* (βαπτισας) his hollowed hand into the river and filling it; and the dying Roman general (Plut. Parall., Gr. et. Rom. iii.) dips, immerses (βαπτίζων) his hand with blood in order to inscribe a trophy. Nebuchadnezzar took a long and thorough bathing in the dews of heaven with βάπτω, while Philip (Polyæn. iv. 2, 6) played the game of mutual dipping or immersing (with no drowning purposes,) with δια-βαπτίζομαι. We might multiply our examples indefinitely, but we will simply add that every ritual immersion of the New Testament (expressed by βαπτίζω, and with no purpose to *drown*) refutes our author's position. Two or three of the above examples are, indeed, from Scripture, which we must be permitted to adduce until the light of Mr. Dale's final volume shall dispel our darkness on Judaic and Scripture baptism. In some of the above passages, also, we have crossed the track of Mr. Dale's criticisms. Several of these we shall have occasion to notice. Such as we do not, the learned reader who will consult them (*e. g.*, pp. 271, 275, 343,) will excuse us from replying to. Like most of the book they exhibit powers of philological criticism which, diligently cultivated, will make Mr. Dale illustrious when Bentley and Hermann are forgotten. We repeat: none will deny the partial truth of Mr. Dale's distinction; but asserted without limit or qualification, it becomes a falsehood and absurdity.

But we remark, thirdly, that however clearly and absolutely the distinction were made out, it is utterly without significance in the baptismal controversy. Though βάπτω were proved a thousand times over to mean *dip*, in the rigidist sense, and never interchangeable with βαπτίζω and *immerse*, it would be to Baptists a matter of absolute indifference. It could not put the weight of the shadow of a feather into the scales of the argument. If "Baptist writers" have maintained that "dipping was baptism," it was in the times of that ignorance in which the torch of Mr. Dale's synonyms had not shed its

light upon the world, and they lay enveloped in the common darkness which practically confounded it with "immerse." We do not believe the Baptist writer ever lived who was afraid to trust himself and his cause to the "uncovenanted mercies" of βαπτίζω in its most absolute idea of submersion. Granting that βαπτίζω *always* engages to take its subject from the water (which we do not believe), and that βαπτίζω *never* does (which we readily admit), we have Mr. Dale's reluctant confession that it interposes no obstacles to his coming out. True, he claims for βαπτίζω "mersion" for "an indefinitely protracted" period. But "indefinitely" is a skillfully chosen word, and may cover any space from a second to a century. Βαπτίζω abundantly meets the Baptist exigencies. It lays its subject under the water; it does not hold him there a single moment. Its whole function is fulfilled with the act of submersion; it offers no shadow of an obstacle to his instant emergence from his watery entombment. We have the utmost confidence in the kindly purpose of βαπτίζω and of Him who has made its liquid grave the external portal to his kingdom. Neither it nor He intends to drown us. We let βαπτίζω take us into the water, and can trust to men's instinctive love of life, their common sense, their power of volition and normal muscular action, to bring them safely out. We assure Mr. Dale that the experience of centuries proves this reliance to be entirely safe. Men will not commit either homicide or suicide for a synonym. They will not either drown others, or submit to drowning themselves, simply *because they have not been commanded not to*. In a matter so precious as life they instinctively take the benefit of the *permission to live*; and Mr. Dale's elaborate argument, if his success in it had been as complete as his failure, is a pure superfluity, and a grand impertinence. He may dissociate βάπτω and dip, from βαπτίζω and immerse, as completely as he pleases; he may sink them in the Styx, or roll over them the waters of the Atlantic. The distinction is absolutely destitute of the slightest harm to the Baptist argument. The law of God in Revelation sends the Baptist down into the waters of immersion; when it is accomplished, the equally imperative law of God in nature brings him safely out.

But finally, granting the distinction perfectly established, and in fact so far as it is established, the proper word for the ordinance is not "dip" but "immerse," not βάπτω but βαπτίζω. The *exclusive* use of βαπτίζω is explicable, indeed, on the ground that the word employed in the original command would naturally become, with all the disciples, the technical designation of the rite. But as between the two, βαπτίζω is the appropriate word, partly from its greater

length, weight and dignity of form, and still more from its distinctive import. It is not a dipping that our Lord instituted, but an immersion. He did not command to *put people into the water and take them out again*, but to *put them under the water*, to *submerge* them, to *bury* them symbolically in the grave of their buried Redeemer, like him, indeed, not to remain there, but with him to arise to a newness of life. This arising, though essential to the completeness of the transaction, could not be included in the designation of the rite any more than the rising of the Redeemer could be included in the words denoting his crucifixion and his burial. In its primary idea the Christian baptism is a *burial*, a burial with Christ, and to change it into a "dipping" for the sake of a totally superfluous provision against drowning, is to divest it of its symbolical significance and moral dignity. We repeat, with emphasis, for the consideration of our Baptist brethren: Christian baptism is no mere literal and senseless "dipping," assuring the frightened candidate of a safe exit from the water: it is a symbolical immersion, in which the believer goes with sublime and solemn trust into a figurative burial, dying to sin for a life with Christ; and just as far as Mr. Dale's distinction holds good (which even thus far *he* has not established), βαπτίζω, and not βάπτω, is the only suitable designation of the baptismal ordinance. The early Israelites were baptized to Moses in the cloud and in the sea. They emerged indeed and were intended to emerge, at last. But it was in their wondrous march through that long and fearful night, with the double wall of water rolled up on either side, and the column of fiery cloud stretching its enshrouding folds above them, it was in this, and not in the closing emersion, that they were baptized into their allegiance to their great Lawgiver and Leader. Mr. Dale will ridicule this "burial-baptism," for he has done it already (p. 95); but to the apostle of the Gentiles it was solemnly significant.

We return to our author. After entertaining those who will read it with a dissertation of some twenty pages on "bury, drown, and whelm" (as words of the class of βαπτίζω), he proceeds to define βαπτίζω more fully, and then look after a "representative word," by which uniformly to designate it, and thus achieve the result of which "Baptist writers" have so signally failed. He admits it impossible to find any one word entirely adequate, but thinks it better "in controversy" to make the endeavor. Most men would think that "in" or out of "controversy" the best rendering of a word is that which in each case most nearly reproduces in idiomatic English, the precise force of the original. But Mr. Dale's tactics are peculiar. He finds an extraordinary virtue in words. He entraps the Baptists in a pit-fall of

words. He now waves his wand, and summons trooping from the vasty deep, an array of words to submit to him their respective claims to "represent" βαπτίζω through all Greek literature. The process is edifying to follow.

The first claimant (*horrescimus referentes* !) is *drown*. "To *drown* is in some respects quite a favorable representative word." Never mind the reasons: they are pretty nearly decisive, and we are on the point of being startled by a decision which will send every victim of βαπτίζω, past, present, and to come, to a watery grave, when our judge relaxes, and his humanity gets the better of his logic. With inimitable *naïveté* and a touching tenderness he remarks: "but in translating to *drown* we should assuredly be embarrassed by the greatly predominant meaning—to destroy life by suffocation under water." The kind-hearted man! From much of his book we should have supposed that so trifling a consideration would be anything but embarrassing. But he was merely playing with our fears, and reminding us, if he were only so disposed, to what a terrible fate our senseless Baptist obstinacy might consign us. He dismisses *drown*, but lets it, as it retires, fling a Parthian arrow behind it—dodge it if we can: "Nevertheless it is of importance to state that this Greek word is fairly, though inadequately represented by *drown*." In what the inadequacy consists we will not stop to speculate. We simply take issue with the author, and deny that βαπτίζω ever properly means to *drown*. "Drowning" is, in usage, only figuratively applied to inanimate things, and though βαπτίζω cannot take sentient beings out of the water, neither can it of itself push their submersion to the extent of drowning. Drowning may accompany, and, under the circumstances, be *implied* in βαπτίζω, but is not *expressed* by it. Mr. Dale's humanity has stood him in stead of knowledge. It has saved him from the blunder of adopting as its "representative" a word which not only does not ordinarily, but strictly speaking *never*, represents βαπτίζω.

"Whelm" and "steep" are examined, but do not meet the case. "Inn" is a favorite with the author, but after the dalliance of three paragraphs, is denied the post of honor. "Immerse is peremptorily excluded," because "compounded with a preposition," and for other reasons perhaps equally cogent. "Baptize" is smilingly regarded as a candidate for the secondary meaning of βαπτίζω, "as expressing controlling influence," and though dismissed at present, we can divine that it is intended to do good service in the coming times of "Judaic" and "Johannic" baptism.

Our judge finally lights down on "merse," and this word with

steady hand, and with none of the "gerrymandering" whose "full power" he urbanely remarks would "be taxed to express the ins and outs of Baptist writers in jotting down the 'one only meaning of βαπτίζω through all Greek literature,'" he carries this word, sense or nonsense, through all the usages of βαπτίζω which he cites. Certainly we are far from complaining of his choice, and on the whole concur with him in its adoption. We congratulate him on his success—on an achievement whose significance he has himself, perhaps, failed fully to appreciate. We congratulate him on having solved the problem, and adjusted the "conflict of the ages." "Merse" is a good word; we welcome it as a universal exponent of βαπτίζω. Pedobaptists, from their enthusiasm over his book, we are sure will follow their leader in this felicitous adjustment. We can almost pledge Baptists to its reception. We might, indeed, put in a modest plea for our pet *im*, just to smooth off the English, and make the "mersion" a shade more classical. But all parties must sacrifice something, and where so much is at stake, we choke down our æsthetic objections, and dropping "some natural tears," go in for the compromise. Baptists, then, will lop off the obnoxious *im*; pedobaptists shall make whatever little concessions are required, and we all meet together on the common ground, or rather in the common waters of "mersion." No more sprinkling, no more pouring, no more dipping, no more immersing, no more plunging, no more drowning—nothing but mersing! Pedobaptists shall revise King James' Bible, and we will revise the Baptist revision. "Then went out to him Judæa and Jerusalem—and were mersed by him in the Jordan." "And John was mersing in Enon near Salim, because there was much water there." "And they went down into the water, both Philip and the Eunuch, and he mersed him." A Daniel come to judgment! we thank him for teaching us this word.

We might here bid good-bye to Mr. Dale. In demonstrating the drowning propensities of βαπτίζω he has made it necessary to find for himself and friends some escape from the consequences of his own work. For this terrible word βαπτίζω lays its injunction on them as well as on us. The ark of deliverance from its submerging flood is found in a secondary meaning, viz.: that of *exerting a controlling influence*, to the expounding of which the last half of his book is devoted, and which independently, of any outward form, admits the largest variety of *modes* of exerting it, dipping always excepted. But as Baptists have no fear of βαπτίζω primary, they have no need to resort to βαπτίζω secondary. As we can come legitimately out of the literal immersion, we have not the slightest interest in resolving it into the

gaseous vagueness of a "controlling influence." It is with simple curiosity, therefore, that we follow Mr. Dale into this department of his verbal manipulations. We notice first, however, some of his preliminary illustrations of the classic usage of βάπτω. From his success in these we may forecast his achievements with βαπτίζω.

His first examples illustrate his meaning of *dip*—a meaning which none will dispute. It will be remembered that he links βάπτω, *dip*, and *tingo*, in close union, and separates them "wide as the poles asunder" from βαπτίζω, *mergo*, *immergo* (and all manner of compound verbs) and *immerse*. The first example we notice is p. 30, καὶ ναὺς γὰρ ἐβάρυνε (Eurip. Orest. 705)—"for a vessel, with her sail violently strained, dips; but stands, on the other hand (or again) if they loosen the sails. Mr. Dale mistranslates it: "if a vessel has dipped." But passing this, we listen to his comment:

Euripides speaks of the dipping of a sailing vessel; but it is not the entire vessel that is dipped, but merely the rising and falling produced by the wind. . . . The following quotation illustrates the passage: "As the squadron rounded the buoy, the wind was free and the sheets were eased off: the vessels righted at once." The dipping is not directly stated, but it is involved in the "righting." Some have translated this passage "if a vessel has sunk." There is no sanction here or elsewhere for translating βάπτω to *sink*. It is never applied to vessels or any thing else, sunk: βαπτίζω exclusively is used in connection with such facts.

Now this certainly is a very innocent dipping, "merely the rising and falling produced by the wind,"—the ship gracefully bending under strained canvas before the wind. But no such harmless dipping is suggested by the context. The passage illustrates the folly and madness of resisting, nearly single-handed, by force, instead of soothing by gentle words, the rage of an excited populace, hard "to quench as a fierce fire;" and the figure is without pertinence unless it speaks of threatened disaster and ruin. The same figure employed by Sophocles (Antig. 715) for a very similar purpose, expounds that of Euripides: "For the shipmaster who, straining the sail-rope of his vessel, gives no way, oversets her, and navigates henceforth with benches turned up-side down;"—a Greek tragedian's rather Milesian way of saying that she goes to the bottom. So much for the connection. As to the authorities, the Latin translations give "*mergitur*" and "*mergi solet*" (Anglicō "*immerse*."). One Greek scholiast explains: "she becomes *submerged* (ὑφαλός *under water*), for a violent wind striking, oversets ἀνατρέπει her." Another says "she dips, that is to say, baptizes (ἐβάπτισεν) herself"—for which an alternative

reading is ἐκβρῖσκειν *plunges into the sea*, which would be equally fatal alike to the ship, and to Mr. Dale's pet theory of βάπτω. Matthiæ for the meaning of the passage, refers to the Antigone; Passow renders: *the ship draws water, goes under*; and Pape, Rost and Palm, and Liddell and Scott, all make it expressly "the ship *sank*."

So much for Mr. Dale's "gentle motion," "superficial entrance," and innocent little "dip;" and so much for the "some" whose authority he thus summarily disposes of. We beg particularly to remind Mr. Dale that whatever βάπτω does with the vessel, whether putting her under the water, or sending her to the bottom, it puts her into a state from which *itself has no power to rescue her*. We beg to remind him that one scholiast makes it *overset* (ἀνατρέπει) and put her under the water (ὕφαλος); that another makes it *immerse* (ἐβάπτισεν) or *plunge her into the sea* (ἐκβρῖσκειν), that the Latin translators make it "merse" (*mergitur*) her, and that the chief German and English lexicographers make it *sink* her—and that the authors of these manifold enormities, including Euripides himself, are none of them "Baptist writers."

From the Schol. to Eur. Hec. 608, he gives the definition of βάπτειν, viz.: "to let something down into water;" we remind him that the language neither expresses nor implies any withdrawal.

Suidas de Hierocle is cited to prove that βάπτω means to *wet*: βάψας κοιλὴν τῇ χειρᾷ, etc.: "wetting the hollow of his hand, he sprinkles the judge (τὸν κριτὴν, not, as Mr. Dale, τῇ διαστολήν). But why "wetting?" How does he wet the hollow of his hand, and why the hollow of it rather than his fingers, in order to sprinkle; and what necessary relation between "wetting" and sprinkling? The appropriateness of the imagery is totally lost in Mr. Dale's rendering. "He dips the hollow of his hand" (literally, "his hand hollowed");—it is clearly a case of dipping, not of "wetting."

Two examples make βάπτω *moisten*. "Being pressed it moistens and colors (βάπτει καὶ ἀνθίζει) the hand." (Arist. Hist. Anim. 5, 15). But why "moisten" rather than "dye?" To avoid tautology, says Mr. Dale: "two words are not needed for dyeing, while the moistening by the juice is essential to dye, stain, or color the hand."

True, but that does not prove that βάπτω means *moisten*; and in fact βάπτει *dyes* and ἀνθίζει *colors*, are rhetorically quite different. "Dye" is the generic term, and "color" the specific. βάπτω, *dye*, states the *fact* to the mind, ἀνθίζει *color* (from ἀθος *bloom, a flower*) paints the *result* to the imagination. But "we the more readily adopt this meaning because Plutarch expressly says that the word is used in this sense." And then follows the example referred to, from Plu-

tarch (Sympos. Probl. 8, 6): "*Βάψαι* the poet has called *διῆναι moisten*." But Plutarch says no such thing. If he had, it would rather disprove Mr. Dale's assertion, than prove it, as it would show the need of explaining the use of *βάψαι* as "moisten," by a poetical figure. But "the poet" here is, by familiar Greek usage, Homer. Homer has no where employed *διῆναι moisten* as an equivalent to *βάπτω*, but he *has* so employed *μυλῶ stain* (Il. iv. 141), and beyond all doubt the true reading here is *μῆναι, stain*. These cases of *βάπτω*, then, belong to *dye*, and "moisten" disappears.

He next makes *βάπτω wash*. First we have Aratus 950; *κοταμοιο ἐβάψατο—κεφαλῆς*, of which he gives us this elegant and lucid translation, "washed head and shoulders of the river." We will not inquire after the river whose 'head and shoulders' received the washing. The author's commentary relieves the difficulty, but creates others. "Aratus speaks of a crow washing itself 'of the river.' The phraseology indicates that *dipping* is not intended." We beg to dissent. The phraseology does *not* indicate that dipping is not intended. The broad use of the Greek genitive (to which, we suppose, Mr. Dale refers) often in prose, and still oftener in the poets, will cover almost any form of special relation. True, "wash in respect of the river" would be equivalent to "wash in the river," and the barbarism "wash of the river" is no better than "dip of the river." But here nothing indicates that the crow comes to the river for a washing. From his delight in the water in certain states of the atmosphere preceding a storm, he comes to swim upon the river, and to *dip* himself into it. "The Scholiast," says the author, "omits the limitation 'head and shoulders,' and says 'washes itself—*βάπτει δὲ ἑαυτὴν*'—including the whole, while a part only is washed." But the Scholiast does *not* omit the limitation, but gives it expressly "from the head to the extremities of the shoulders," and for *βάπτω* substitutes *βαπτίζω*, in defiance both of the quotation and the canon of our author. "The importance of the form of expression," adds Mr. Dale, "is obvious in the translation of Carson—'if the crow dips his head *into* the river.' 'Into' has no existence in the text, and whatever Carson may think, others will be likely to judge that 'into the river' and 'of the river' are phrases of very different value." Mr. Dale is not mistaken. The phrases *are* "of very different value;" and the difference consists in this, that Dr. Carson's "into the river," is an entirely just rendering of the Greek into idiomatic English, while Mr. Dale's "of the river" is neither sense nor English.

The next example is from the same author (Arat. 588,) *ἀνέφαλος βάπτει πόου ἐσπερίοιο*, rendered with the same ingenious awkwardness

as the above, "Cloudless, washes of the western flood," for the poet's graceful "But if the sun should plunge (or dip himself) without clouds into the western flood." "The form of the phraseology," says our author, "is similar to the preceding, and is indicative of a similar use." True, and nothing in the "form of the phraseology" of either requires us to change the customary "dip," of βάπτω into *wash*. The sun does not go down into the ocean flood to wash himself; but he goes under, dips or plunges himself. The Scholiast replaces it by δύνῃται (*sink or go under*) which Mr. Dale tells us p. 246 "is used as an equivalent of βαπτίζω." The Latin translation of Buhle's edition, renders it by *mergitur*, and the Orphic Argonautæ for the same idea, says, "Βαπτίζετο τιτὸν the sun was immersing himself (not "had mersed himself," as Mr. Dale), into the ocean stream." The authors of these outrages on Mr. Dale's canon are neither of them "Baptist writers." We add, that although βάπτω might take the crow out of the river, it does not undertake to bring back the sun from his western 'dip'. It leaves him to find his way as well as he can around to his oriental emersion. Before leaving Aratus we cite another passage in which the constellation Cepheus (l. 651) "brushes the earth with his girdle, dipping his head, etc., 'of' the ocean," which the Scholiast explains by δέδυξε, Stephen's lexicon renders by *mergitur*, *immergitur*, and Cicero who, like Stephens and the Scholiast, was not a "Baptist writer," and, unlike Shakespeare, knew a good deal of Latin and not much less Greek, renders *demergo* in double violation of our author's principle.

The next example is from Herodotus (II. 47) who says that an Egyptian accidentally defiling himself by contact with a pig "goes to the river and dips himself together with his garments"—ἔβαψεν ἑαυτὸν, βὰς ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν; which Mr. Dale, with his usual skilful avoidance of correctness, elegance, and sense, converts into "washes, going upon the river." "Coming upon" for "happening upon" a river is idiomatic English. "Going upon the river" can properly mean nothing but "going upon the surface of the river," except possibly "going *along* it." Mr. Dale explains correctly enough, and the barbarous rendering is, like multitudes of others in his book, purely gratuitous, designed, we suppose, to fascinate us with the beauties of "classic baptism." For substituting "wash," here for "dip, bathe, immerse" there is neither authority nor reason. Carey and Rawlinson both render spiritedly and freely "plunge." If absolute exactness were demanded, it is not certain that βάπτω, while it certainly puts him into the river, brings him in with a plunge. He may *walk* in and the submersion follow.

With his accustomed insolence Mr. Dale here summons Dr. Carson to his critical tribunal. "We have here another of those broad discrepancies so often found in the translations of this writer as compared with the original. The text is 'going upon (the bank of) the river.' If, however, it be assumed as an unstated fact, that after having come upon the river he 'also went into the river,'" etc. To which we reply that it is not "an unstated fact" that he went *into* the river. The statement of Herodotus is as unequivocal as the Greek language can make it. *βάπτω* as clearly takes him *into* the river as *βάς ἐν* brings him *to* it. Dr. Carson's rendering "going into the river" is undoubtedly inexact; but the error does not vitiate in the slightest degree his interpretation of the passage as a whole. His rendering is entirely true to the facts, while Mr. Dale's is partly false and partly nonsense. With *βάπτω* right before his eyes, and with the *αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἱματίοις* with *his very garments* (without significance on his hypothesis), he coolly tells us that it is "an unstated fact" that he went into the water at all! With his "very garments" the defiled Egyptian stood on the bank and "washed"!

It is amidst such displays of taste and scholarship that Mr. Dale talks complacently about "the broad discrepancies" of Dr. Carson, and here through two or three frivolous pages, as often elsewhere, makes himself merry at his expense. Now Dr. Carson is not faultless. He is not, we readily admit, our *beau idéal* either of a scholar or a controversialist; but in neither capacity is he a man to be sneered at by such a one as Mr. Dale. "The Philosopher of Tubbermore," as Mr. Dale facetiously designates him, will have to descend a great many degrees before getting near the level of the expounder of "classic baptism."

We must discontinue our detailed criticisms though the material is still abundant. In our author's example of *βάπτω* as *stain* (Soph. Aj. 95. *ἔβαψας ἑγχος εἰς—στρατὶ* *did you nobly plunge*, etc.?) he has certainly misunderstood the structure, and probably mistranslated the verb—"Is it well that you stained," etc.? His meaning of "gild" is obtained by stripping the single passage which furnishes it of all its force and beauty. A dyer, after dyeing everything else, has "dyed poverty" and exhibits himself rich. "Gild" ruins the rhetoric. But leaving *βάπτω*, and proceeding to *βαπτίζω*, we might first comment on the task of carrying "merse" a word not English to begin with, through all usages of the Greek *βαπτίζω*, and castigating the "gerrymanderings" of "Baptist writers" for having the good sense to vary their renderings according to the various shades of usage, and the demands of English idiom. But "classic baptism" has beauties higher even than this. For

καταβαπτίζω thoroughly immerse, completely overwhelm, and *διαβαπτίζουσι* mutually immerse, immerse one another, we have repeatedly the extraordinary combinations "de-merse (de-baptize)," and "thoroughmerse" (we believe not, *thorough-baptize*.) Of the phrases "washes head and shoulders of the river," and "washes, going upon the river," a sagacious reader, we believe, might study out the meaning. But we defy his utmost divining power, when brought to bear on "de-merse" and "thoroughmerse." "De-merse," according to all English analogy, like de-naturalize, de-centralize, de-intoxicate, should reverse the action of "merse;" in no case can it, like the Greek *κατά*, intensify it. "Thoroughmerse" is still more monstrous, either totally misleading, or totally unintelligible. If Mr. Dale had manufactured "intermerse," it would have been far from a good translation, but would have avoided a hybrid, and approached the force of the preposition. Dr. Conant's rendering "they know how to play the dipping match with him," and Mr. Dale's "they know how to thoroughmerse with him," illustrate the difference between a man who has taste and scholarship, and a man who has neither. If Mr. Dale pleads the exigencies of controversy, we reply that it is a principle yet to be established, that renderings either false or unintelligible can subserve any legitimate ends of controversy.

Mr. Dale's general style of criticism, we are bound to say is in harmony with the renderings and the comments which we have cited. There is not an *indigenous* criticism in his book—(two on "Baptæ" are communicated)—that sheds any scholarly light on the passage it discusses. Eight pages are devoted to Aristotle's "Wonderful Report" concerning the tidal ebbing and flowing on the coast beyond the Pillars of Hercules. In eight pages a scholar, and even a candid man of sense, could scarcely avoid offering upon the topic some valuable suggestions. Mr. Dale has no better use for the entire space than arraying "Baptist writers," who have commented on the passage with freedom and independence, against each other, and converting their slight and natural differences into vital and ruinous contradictions. Dr. Gale regards the submerging of the land by the rising tide as indicating the *result*, rather than the *act*, of immersion. Dr. Carson finds in it no infringement of his doctrine that *βαπτίζω* carries invariably the idea of mode, and thus sees in the overwhelming of the land by the rising waters a figurative dipping or plunging of the land into them. Dr. Fuller coincides substantially with Gale; and over this slight and perfectly legitimate diversity of view, Mr. Dale makes himself merry through eight pages of as dreary and barren criticism as the tide-washed coast that has created the discussion. He does not seem to have the

faintest idea of the flexibility and subtlety of thought, and of language as its exponent, nor of the varying aspects under which the same thought may present itself to the imagination. To the sailor, now the boat recedes from the shore, and now the shore recedes from the boat. To the railway traveller, now the train flies by the landscape, and now the landscape flies by the train. As the rising floods beleaguer a mountain, now the floods seem to be whelming the mountain, now the mountain seems to be sinking into the floods. In all these cases now one object is conceived as stationary, and now the other. Either form of conception is equally true to the imagination, and therefore equally legitimate in expression, though not equally true to the fact. To the intense conception of the poet, the "coward lips do from their color fly," instead of waiting for the color to fly more prosaically from them. In the case before us it is nearly equally natural to conceive of the water rising and whelming the shore, or the shore dipping and sinking into the water. The former is more literally exact; the latter more figurative, and yet by no means violently so; and a difference like this of Drs. Gale and Carson reflects not the slightest discredit on the scholarship or good judgment of either. The whole force of his feeble ridicule recoils on the captious critic. If Mr. Dale could have risen to a philosophical conception of this free play of thought and expression—this rapid and half imperceptible gliding over of one conception into another—why then his vocation would have been gone, and "Classic Baptism" would never have shed its light upon the world.

Our nearly exhausted space compels us to deal summarily with the rest of Mr. Dale's book. It is devoted to the exposition of the various uses of "*βαπτίζω* primary" which consist in general in '*intusposing*' (qu. a compound?), and specifically, in "mersing, drowning, whelming, steeping, and innings"; and of "*βαπτίζω* secondary" which performs its work in general by "*influencing controllingly*," and specifically by mersing, whelming, steeping, innings, baptising, and intoxicating. Here baptising may be specialized into *stupefying*, *bewildering*, *polluting*, *purifying*—any thing apparently but "dipping." Any thing that can exert a "controlling influence" is competent to effect a baptism; and *βαπτίζω* thus used, may with the utmost fidelity be rendered *stupefy*, *intoxicate*, *bewilder*, etc. "One drop of Prussic acid is as thoroughly competent to effect a baptism secondary (perhaps the more common form of baptism expressed by the Greeks) as is an ocean to effect a baptism primary." But neither an "ocean" nor a puddle is required by Mr. Dale's definition for a baptism primary. If "intuspose" and "inn" are, as definitions, any thing more than

mockery, then putting a man into the sand, or into a barrel, or into a stage-coach is as legitimate a baptism primary as putting him into an ocean. Does Mr. Dale really discard the idea of a fluid from his conception of a literal baptism?

Our author makes three divisions of βαπτίζω primary; viz., "intusposition,"—1, "without influence;" 2, "with influence;" 3, "for influence." An example of the first is "Immersed (Cupid) into the wine." Why not *for* influence, as he was intending to swallow him? Of the second: "that we might lighten the 'mersed' part (τὸ βαπτισμένον) of the ship"—how immersed *with* influence, rather than *without* or *for*? Of the third: "immersing (βαπτίζων) he killed him." But how is '*for* influence,' expressed by the participle? The truth is the distinction is wholly factitious; many of the examples might perfectly well change places, and in them all, whatever of "influence" is intended or implied, (except in figurative uses) the influence is suggested by the context, not contained in the verb itself. Persons may be immersed that they may be drowned, or that they may be purified; vessels, that they may be destroyed, or may shut up a harbor; nothing in the word itself is changed by or expresses the purpose. The ass that in passing through the river, immersed the panniers, did it for a purpose, but no shadow of the purpose cleaves to βαπτίζω.

Next comes "influence with rhetorical figure" of which the "number is not large." The reason why it is "not large," is because Mr. Dale allows no rhetorical figure except where some added clause makes denial of the figure impossible. We suspect the cases of a figurative use of βαπτίζω are far more numerous than he supposes.

Then comes the "great gun" of the author next to the detaching of βάπτω from βαπτίζω. It is the "secondary use" of βαπτίζω, that, viz., of "controlling influence." This is first, "general, without mersion in fact or in figure," and second, "specific, with or without intusposition." Under each of these heads a large number of cases is cited, translated, and commented upon, after the fashion which we have indicated. The general doctrine is that βαπτίζω loses its primary meaning of literal "intusposition" or "mersion", and (just as βάπτω passes over from the primary meaning of *dip* into the secondary but equally literal one of *dye*) passes over into the simple generic idea of "controlling influence," without either any literal, or any figurative "mersion." Whether he means to be understood that it can ever be *translated* "to influence controllingly" does not appear. He never so renders it himself, although it would seem that that which is the proper meaning of the word ought to be competent for its translation. Neither

has he given the actual renderings *stupefy*, *pollute*, *purify*, which he tells us are occasionally entirely adequate for its translation.

The bare statement of Mr. Dale's monstrous doctrine is enough to condemn it. We do not suppose that he would find a scholar or man of taste in Christendom, who would regard the position as worth the trouble of refuting. Suppose we should be told that words of so decided and striking physical import as the English "plunge," or "immerse," had in English only a very few examples of figurative use; and that in nearly all the cases in which there was no literal plunging, or literal immersion, all reference to the primary idea was lost, and 'plunged in sleep,' 'drowned in care,' 'immersed in study,' were simply prosaic statements of a 'controlling influence.' Who would not instantly reject the statement as absurd? And not a whit less absurd is the affirmation when applied to the Greek βαπτω and βαπτίζω. Βαπτίζω, like our words 'immerse,' 'whelm,' 'plunge,' is a strong word; the physical act which it denotes is one that admits of being, and with the mind's love of analogies, inevitably would be, employed in a great variety of figurative uses. In some the figure would be retained in full force; in others it would be more slight. But to have all these figurative uses at once swept away, and all the tinge of rhetorical and poetic imagery which not only "Baptist writers," but every man of taste who ever read Greek, has recognized, exchanged for a "controlling influence"—involves an absurdity too great to need a moment's argumentation. Mr. Dale himself by rendering in every instance "merse," has contradicted his own theory, unless his uniform rendering is either intentionally false, or intentionally unmeaning. If "merse" is the best rendering which he could give in all these cases, or if it is a justifiable rendering, then his own examples falsify his theory—for "merse" can be used in no such latitude of signification as he claims for βαπτίζω. If we can "baptize" a man with "one drop of prussic acid," we cannot "merse" him in that remarkable way. It cannot be proved that "immerse"—we discard the barbarism "merse"—ever entirely loses sight of its primary import. Put Mr. Dale's principle to this simple test. He has been accustomed, perhaps, to exercises in rendering English into Greek. He takes this English sentence: "The sun exercises a controlling influence over the motions of the planets"—would he deem himself authorized to render the verb with its object by βαπτίζω? And if he did, would any body understand him? So of ten thousand similar cases.

And as his general principle is false, so his special handling of it is in the highest degree arbitrary. Three of the examples of "specific influence," are cases of the simplest possible use of βαπτίζω in its

primary sense of 'immerse.' One that of "immersing hot iron in water;" another that of "immersing Bacchus in (*τρος in respect to*) the sea; the third that of going to "immerse oneself into the sea," as matter of purification. On the last case four or five pages are expended in the idle endeavor to make it out something else than a simple immersion into the sea and that entirely equivalent to the dipping of βαπτω. On the second, Dr. Conant justly remarks that "to immerse Bacchus is nothing else than to temper wine"; but rightly classes it among the literal uses of βαπτίζω, the *imagery* being that of a literal submersion of the wine-God in the sea. Our author, confounding the *letter* of the command with its *inferred import*, says, "Well, then, the command is to baptize wine. How is this done?" Need Mr. Dale be told that the command is *not* to "baptize wine," but to "baptize Bacchus?" that "immersing Bacchus" is the literal act, but which is interpreted to mean "temper wine"? They are no more commanded to "baptize wine," than they are to "temper Bacchus." The fisherman had wit enough to know that the natural analogy to a literal submersion of Bacchus in the sea, which they could not do, was the submersion of wine (no matter how, by *pouring*, if Mr. Dale pleases) in sea-water, which they could. It is not, then, a case of "controlling influence," but of "mersion."


Mr. Dale's conclusion, given with the emphasis of capitals, is that whatever can "thoroughly change the character, state, or condition of any object, is capable of baptizing it;" "and by such change does in fact baptize it." The doctrine is unphilosophical and false. "A drop of prussic acid" that poisons a man, does not baptize (βαπτίζει) him. The financial kings whose purse controls the affairs of Europe, do not baptize them. The chemical agents that decompose and alter a substance, do not baptize it. The medicines that change a diseased body into a healthy one, do not baptize it. The locomotive that crushes a human being into a lifeless mass, does not baptize him. The wine that makes a man drunk, the questions that bewilder and confound him, the opiate that puts him to sleep, the rites that pollute or purify him, neither of them baptizes him. Death does not baptize a living man; and a resurrection to life does not baptize a dead one. To none of these things, as *literal facts*, is the word βαπτίζω applicable. To none of them is it applicable until they have received the magic touch of the imagination, and assumed the vivacity and picturesqueness of figure. Over against Mr. Dale's position we place this, that whatever the *imagination conceives* under the figure of an immersion, a plunging, a whelming, a submersion—and many of the above facts and innumerable others, are capable of being so conceived—may be desig-

nated figuratively by βαπτίζω. Beyond that the term cannot be extended. So long as the mind conceives them in their naked literalness—so long as they have not been tinged or transmuted by the subtle alchemy of the imagination, so long they lie totally outside of the sphere of βαπτίζω. Not one of Mr. Dale's examples disproves our position, his own translations being judges.

We cannot take leave of Mr. Dale's book without expressing our honest and profound regret that so much very earnest labor should have been so completely wasted. We do not remember a single point in which his book is not a failure. It is a failure in charging perpetually upon "Baptist writers" a usage of βάπτω and βαπτίζω, of "dip" and "immerse," which is common to them with the universal scholarship of Christendom. It is a failure in affirming a total separation in Greek classical usage between βάπτω and βαπτίζω, which it has not proved; which, in its extreme form of statement, is incapable of proof; and which, if ever so fully proved, would be as indifferent to the Baptist cause as the appearance of the last comet. It is a failure in its elaborately argued doctrine of a "controlling influence," which, if as true as it is the reverse, would be to the Baptist simply a matter of curious speculation. We stand on "βαπτίζω primary" and "the bond." In its literal import, even with all the alleged vagueness of act, and dark propensities to drowning, with which Mr. Dale has invested it, it is abundantly sufficient for Baptist exigencies. The book fails, if possible, still more signally, in that it discusses a purely scholarly question in a spirit of narrow and bitter partizanship. If Mr. Dale wished to break a lance with the critics and lexicographers on the meaning of a Greek word, it was competent for him to do so. A scholarly discussion is always welcomed by scholars. But a scholarly attitude is apparently beyond the conception of Mr. Dale. His volume would be retrenched of more than half its bulk by excising from it its assaults, at once needless and frivolous, upon "Baptist writers." In fact the entire substance of his book could be comprised, we believe, within fifty pages, of which one half would be false, and the other half irrelevant. Its large collection of passages from the English classics, illustrating certain words, may, for ought we know, be useful to Professors of English Literature, to whose attention we commend them. But for any display of sound scholarship or just criticism on its pages,—for any gleam of light which they shed on either "classic" or Christian baptism, they might as well have been left in their virgin whiteness. They could not well have been blander than Mr. Dale has made them.

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THE CAUSAL JUDGMENT.

FROM the intimate relation in which the causal judgment stands to natural theology and ontology, its genesis, authority, and proper interpretation are subjects of primary importance. If it be denied a place among our constitutional beliefs, and traced to a mere empirical source, then there is an end to all philosophizing. If it be not truly interpreted—if some of its contents be dropped out; or if elements not belonging to it be interpolated, the error, however subtle and difficult of detection, will bear fruit in the systems of faith and philosophy springing from it.

By the causal judgment is meant the affirmation of the intelligence, that for every change, whether in the world of matter or the world of mind, there must be a cause with powers adequate to produce it; or in the language of Kant, for every phenomenon there must be a corresponding noumenon. All psychologists admit the appearance of this judgment in the intelligence, but they differ very widely both as to its source and as to the authority properly belonging to it. Some philosophers, like Hume, have maintained that it is a mere suggestion of our experience of the regulated order of phenomena, which though not really found in that experience has imposed itself upon the intelligence under the false guise of a direct intuition. Considered as springing from this source, it is of course wholly without authority.

It was so regarded by Hume; and hence his Nihilism. Hence too the idealism, absolute and unqualified, of Hegel. The idealism of Bishop Berkeley was less thorough-going. Although ignoring the causal judgment so far as respects the phenomena of matter, he recognized it in relation to those of mind.

Dr. Thomas Brown by a singular confusion of ideas, mistaking for the causal judgment, a belief in the uniform course of nature, derives it by a process of induction from experience. He quite overlooks the quality of necessity which belongs essentially to the causal judgment, but which does not at all attach to our conception of the regulated order of the changes transpiring around and within us. We can suppose this order, under a different constitution of things, to have been very different from what we experience it. But we cannot suppose an uncaused appearance. We deny the possibility of a change to which nothing has contributed. Dr. Brown supposes the mind to be constituted in harmony with the course of nature, so that when it has once found two events conjoined in the relation of antecedent and consequent it instinctively expects them to be so joined ever afterwards.

Many philosophers, among whom we may mention Locke, and more recently M. De Biran, as also Prof. Francis Bowen, of Harvard University, have maintained that the idea of causation is given us in our conscious putting forth of power in the form of volitions, as when we *will* the motion of an arm, and the motion of the arm immediately follows. The idea of causation thus given in consciousness, we project outwards, it is said, into the phenomena of the external world. But this account of the causal judgment is equally defective with that of Dr. Brown; we are conscious of the volition as an antecedent, and of the movement of the arm as the consequent. But consciousness gives us no idea of the tie between them. This is as entirely hidden from us as the tie between antecedent and consequent in the natural world. In truth the movement of the arm, as we learn from the investigations of science, is not the immediate consequent of the volition. Other intervening agencies are called into play, of which consciousness gives us not the slightest notion. Nay, more; the volition is not in any proper, metaphysical sense, the cause of the movement. It simply liberates a certain amount of force stored in the brain and directs it along appropriate channels to the particular muscles upon whose contraction the movement is immediately dependent. The volition is no more the cause of the movement of the arm, than the hoisting of the gate is the cause of the turning of the water-wheel; or the opening of the valve is the cause of the working of the engine; or the closing of the electric circle is the cause of the transmission of the

message; or the applying of the match is the cause of the explosion of the gunpowder. The volition, the hoisting of the gate, the opening of the valve, the closing of the electric circle, the applying of the match, these serve merely to call into play the real causes, by supplying the last of the conditions necessary to their action.

But were the whole process of causation in the case supposed, from the volition to its outward manifestation in the movement of the arm, revealed to us in consciousness, which it is not, we should have only the empirical fact. It would lack the quality of necessity which essentially characterizes the causal judgment. This affirms not merely that every phenomenon coming within the sphere of sense and consciousness *has* a corresponding noumenon, but that for every change, whenever or wherever occurring, there *must* be a cause with powers adequate to its production.

By far the greater number of philosophers, and among them Descartes, Leibnitz, Reid, Stewart and Kant, have regarded the causal judgment as a simple primary datum of consciousness—a positive revelation of the intelligence. According to Kant, however, this direct affirmation of the pure reason is met by a counter affirmation equally positive—these two contradictory affirmations constituting one of his four antinomies. The mind affirms an uncaused event to be impossible. It is on the other hand incapable of conceiving an event as dependent on an infinite series of causes. But if in tracing the event backwards along the line of its antecedents, we stop at any point short of infinity, we have at that point an event uncaused. It was from these supposed contradictions of the pure reason that Kant was led to supplement it with what he denominated the practical reason.

Sir William Hamilton, unwilling to admit the falsity of the intelligence, seeks to avoid the difficulty encountered by Kant by deriving the causal judgment from the mind's *impotence*. The intelligence is not false, but weak. It does not affirm that every change must have a cause, but simply declares its inability to conceive of a change without a cause. This inability may arise from its own lack of power, and not from any impossibility in the nature of things. Such a derivation of the causal judgment not only saves the intelligence, but furnishes, as he thinks, a solution of one of the most difficult of psychological problems, the freedom of the human will. We quote his words:

To suppose a positive and special principle of causality, is to suppose there is revealed to us, through intelligence, an affirmation of the fact, that there exists no free causation; that is, that there is no cause that is not merely an effect, existence being only a series of determined antecedents and determined consequents. But this is the assertion of fatalism. An

affirmation of absolute necessity is virtually the negation of a moral universe, and consequently of the moral governor of a moral universe. But this is atheism. Fatalism and atheism are indeed convertible terms.

But the doctrine which I propose is not obnoxious to this objection. It does not maintain that the causal judgment is dependent upon a *power* of the mind, imposing as necessary in thought what is necessary in the universe of existence. On the contrary, it resolves this judgment into a mere mental impotence—an impotence to conceive either of two contradictories. And as one or the other of the contradictories must be true, and both cannot, it proves that there is no ground for inferring a certain fact to be impossible merely from our inability to conceive it possible. At the same time, if the causal judgment be not an express affirmation of the mind, but only an incapacity of thinking the opposite, it follows that such a negative judgment cannot counterbalance the express affirmation of consciousness, that we are, though we know not how, the true and responsible authors of our actions, and not merely the worthless links in an adamant series of effects and causes. It appears to me that it is only on such a doctrine that we can philosophically vindicate the liberty of the human will—that we can rationally assert to man, *fatis avulsa voluntas*.

We have only one criticism to offer upon this application of Sir William's doctrine. It takes for granted that the principle of causality, considered as an affirmation of the intelligence, is incompatible with free causation. Upon this depend its whole force and pertinency. Now, we believe this assumption to be not only unnecessary, but at variance with the fact as delivered in consciousness. The intelligence requires simply this; that for every change there must be a cause adequate to produce it. Of the character of the cause, beyond its simple adequacy, it affirms nothing. It may be a free cause—that is, a cause acting voluntarily; or it may be a cause acting necessarily, without will, without the phenomena of volition. The one answers all the requirements of the principle of causality, as well as the other. A cause necessarily implies substance—is substance. This may be quiescent or active; when it passes from the former state to the latter, there is actual causation. The power, the capacity for action is ever present in the cause. Its absence, or diminution or increase or modification in any manner would imply a change in that in which it resides, to which it essentially belongs. It is, however, brought into action—that is actual causation is determined, as we learn from experience, only by relation. The material elements in an insulated state give no indication of power. But when they are brought into the proper relations to one another, their inherent energies become manifest. Mind is called into action, or spiritual causation is determined by relation to ends. If these ends are purely

intellectual, the action determined by them is so. If the ends are moral, the action also partakes of their character. The true freedom of the ego consists in its absolute and unrestrained liberty to choose between two alternatives presented, or out of any number of courses offered, the one which it prefers. Of such liberty we are immediately conscious. A freedom higher or more perfect than this is inconceivable; and this freedom is entirely compatible with the principle of causality. The difficulty of conceiving a moral and accountable agent is not created by this principle, nor would it be at all alleviated by the removal of the causal belief, as proposed by Sir William Hamilton, from its place in the intelligence. The real difficulty consists in conceiving how, on the one hand, an intelligent being can be responsible for actions determined by motives growing out of his own nature and the circumstances in which he is placed, of neither of which he is the author; or how on the other hand actions not determined by motives thus originating can have any moral character. This difficulty, the attempted solution of Sir William does not reach.

But the derivation of the causal judgment from a mental impotence, not only fails to remove the difficulties connected with human freedom and accountability, but is obnoxious to the charge brought by Sir William against the ordinarily received doctrine. It opens the way by a still more direct route to Atheism. The everchanging phenomena of outward nature, *may*, or *may not* be supported and maintained by that which is more substantial and more permanent behind them. This mighty universe with its innumerable worlds and systems of worlds may be the work of an intelligent Creator who designed it for sublime and worthy ends; or it may have come into existence uncaused, the product of no intelligence, the fruit of no design—to accomplish no end. The most valued and best assured possessions, whether of the intellect or the heart, at the touch of this theory take to themselves wings and fly away. God, matter, and the human soul vanish into airy nothings.

Nor are the perils of the antinomy in question, to the intelligence, great enough to justify so desperate a leap in escaping from them. The two contradictories contained in it, if carefully examined, will not be found in equipoise as supposed. The mind affirms the impossibility of an uncaused event, or an uncaused commencement of being. But the mind does not affirm in like manner the impossibility of an event dependent upon an infinite series of causes, or of an uncaused Being having existed from all eternity. It simply affirms that it is unable, with its limited powers, to take in the conception of an infinite series of causes, or of an eternal existence; and in these two

affirmations there is nothing of contradiction. Indeed it is just as impossible for us to conceive of eternity, in which, however, we are compelled to believe, as it is to conceive of an eternal Being. It is just as impossible for us to conceive of matter as eternal, as to conceive of a change in the material world dependent upon an infinite series of material antecedents. It is just as impossible for us to conceive the eternity of God as it is to conceive the first creative act as dependent upon an infinite series of antecedents in the Divine thought.

John Stuart Mill in his treatise on Logic, defines the law of causation to be "the invariability of succession which is found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature and some other fact which has preceded it." So far from regarding this invariability of succession, (his principle of causality) as necessary, he does not think it established on a sufficiently broad induction to justify the assumption of its universality. His doctrine is open to the same objections as that of Dr. Brown which it closely resembles.

President Wayland derives the idea of causality from a faculty which he denominates original suggestion. In unfolding the idea, he fully recognizes its three essential characteristics—immediacy, necessity, and universality. Its authority is the same as that of any other primary cognition. His doctrine, therefore, is not open to any of the objections which lie against the theories hitherto considered. The only thing to be regretted in his treatment of the subject is that he confounds cause with fixed antecedent, or rather that he supposes the cause in all cases to be contained in the fixed antecedent. The fixed antecedent may be the true cause, as when a blow from the bat speeds the ball; or it may be only a condition necessary for bringing the true cause or causes into action, as in the case of the application of the match to gunpowder; or it may be the mere removal of something which obstructs the action of the true causes, as when water freezes on the reduction of its temperature to 32° Fahrenheit.

Dr. McCosh, a metaphysician of considerable acuteness, in a work published sometime since on the intuitions of the mind, although adopting the view generally received by thinkers of the present day, viz.: that the causal judgment is a positive datum of the intelligence, supposes it to be given in the form of individual intuitions, and that it is only by a process of induction from these individual intuitions that we arrive at the general proposition, that for every change, whatever its character, there must be a cause with powers adequate to its production. He supposes the case analagous to the inductions of natural philosophy and chemistry, in which we pass from

individual phenomena to general laws comprehending and expressing them. This we think manifestly an error. There is, in reality, no resemblance between the two cases. In the generalizations of science the law rests upon the individual instances standing under and supporting it. Our confidence in the truth of the law will in all cases be proportional to the exhaustive character of the induction by which it is reached. The causal judgment becomes no clearer or stronger by the repetition of the intuitions which give it. This judgment, expressed in its most general form, receives our assent as soon as we understand the terms of the proposition. Our conviction of its truth depends in no manner upon the number of individual intuitions in which it has been revealed to us. The character of necessity which he recognizes as attaching to the judgment should have saved him from the error of supposing it the product of a generalization.

Professor Noah Porter, of Yale College, in an elaborate and comprehensive work on the "Human Intellect," just published, maintains "that the mind intuitively believes that every event is caused, *i. e.*, every event is produced by the action of some agent or agents which with reference to the effect, are called its cause, or causes." He agrees with the school of M. De Biran, so far as to admit that we gain our first knowledge of causation from the experience of our personal causality, thus blending an empirical element with his causal intuition, and to that extent weakening it by taking from it the quality of necessity. In fact this quality, though formally recognized by him, does not apparently hold a sufficiently prominent place in his conception of the phenomenon.

Assuming, therefore, that the causal judgment is an immediate datum of the intelligence—a constitutional belief inwrought in our very natures, and of so imperious a character that we cannot resist it, if we would, we propose next to examine its contents. Of these we shall perhaps gain the clearest idea by considering first what is, and then what is not embraced in it.

The first content deserving attention is that of necessity. We believe, not only that every change coming within the sphere of our knowledge *has* a cause, but that every change whenever or wherever occurring *must* have a cause. This necessity is absolutely essential to bind together the other contents of the judgment, and make it a reliable basis for the deductions of either philosophy or natural theology. The omission of this content by Mill, Brown, and De Biran, is the principal source of the fatal weakness of their doctrines.

We may next inquire what is included in the idea of cause. Cause implies power. Power supposes that in which it resides, and from

which it is manifested; in other words it supposes substance—substance endowed with inherent energies, by virtue of which it is capable of acting, in certain ways, under certain conditions and within certain limits; which ways, conditions and limits, though determined by the nature of each particular substance, can be learned only from experience. All this we suppose to be included in the idea of cause, however suggested, whether by material or spiritual phenomena. The latter can no more be ascribed to a mere assemblage of powers, without any thing in which these powers reside, than the former. Beneath both there must be a substratum of being of whose energies they are the immediate manifestations. The causal judgment affirms nothing of the substance beyond its adaptedness to produce the effects exhibited by it. It throws no light upon the question, whether it exists *per se*, or *per aliud*; that is, whether it have an independent, or only a dependent existence; or, in other words, whether it has always existed, or whether it has been brought into existence by the exertion of creative power. On the latter supposition it would seem to require that in the act of creation, an energy should go out from the creator equal to the sum of the energies embodied in the things created.

If we modify or limit the idea of substance, given in the causal judgment, by making it self-existent, then we have, as a necessary consequence, either some form of materialism, or a finite and restricted theism, like that taught by Plato, or finally Pantheism in some one of its varied forms.

If we connect with the conception of finite substance, whether material or spiritual, the idea of dependence—that is if we suppose it, in accordance with the teachings of revelation, to have been created, and to be dependent for its continued existence upon the will of the creator, we have the basis of a true Christian theism. In proportion as we deny to substance, whether material or spiritual, inherent energies, in that proportion we approach to Pantheism, and if we will be consistent we must finally land there. Pantheism is the danger to which we are at present most exposed. It is met with everywhere. It crops out in our science, in our literature, and not unfrequently in our theology.

Another content of the causal judgment is the character of the tie or nexus between the cause and effect. This is not arbitrary, but essential. The cause, the substance which acts as cause, has a nature or constitution which precisely fits it for producing the particular effect or effects flowing from it. If it act at all, it must produce these effects. Nor can it produce any other. An atom of oxygen is constitutionally endowed with certain properties, from which spring all its activities.

An atom of hydrogen is in like manner constitutionally endowed with certain other properties from which spring all *its* activities. We cannot suppose an interchange of activities between these elements, even by the will of the Creator, except by an interchange of natures. The causal judgment forbids the supposition that the several elements were first created, and their functions afterwards arbitrarily assigned to them. It requires us to suppose the proper activities of each element to have been specially provided for in the act of its creation. These activities, as we learn from experience, are developed only under certain conditions, their manifestations varying as the conditions vary. We can never be sure that the causal power residing in an element has been exhausted—that is, that the element has exhibited all the activities of which it is capable, until we have seen it placed under every possible condition; or, more precisely, in every possible relation to the other elements and to the forces which act upon them. Hence the activities by which the organs of the plant and animal are built up, and the functions of life maintained, may result as immediately from the constitutional endowments of the different kinds of matter, as the more simple combinations and aggregations of inorganic nature. Indeed life itself, organic life, now wrapped in so profound mystery may under a more exhaustive and complete knowledge of the elements, resolve itself into mere physical relation. Could we bring the atoms of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, phosphorus, etc., into the same relation to one another which they hold in a grain of wheat; or, in other words, could we form of the proper elements a grain of wheat, it is not improbable that this artificial grain of wheat, if buried in a suitable soil, would germinate and spring up, and that we should have first the blade, then the ear, and then the full corn in the ear, as in the case of any other grain of wheat.

The conclusions to which the foregoing inquiry has conducted us may be summed up in the following propositions:—

1. The causal judgment requires us to suppose the existence of some form of substance or essence in which the causal power resides. Hence to suppose matter a mere aggregation of forces, or mind a mere assemblage of powers is violative of the causal judgment. There must be that from which the forces in the first case are evolved, and by which the powers in the second are exerted.

2. As the phenomena of mind and the phenomena of matter made known to us through consciousness and the five senses are totally unlike in character, the causal judgment requires us to refer them to substances or essences equally dissimilar in nature.

3. The causal judgment requires that the substance or essence,

whether material or spiritual, should be in its nature fitted to produce the effects to which it gives rise—that the proper conditions being supplied, so long as its nature remains the same, it *must* produce these effects and can produce no others. Hence we see that the Christian doctrine of a new birth, or a re-creation, is not only in accordance with reason, but has its foundation in a philosophical necessity.

4. To suppose the activities exhibited by the several elements, arbitrarily connected with them without any thing in their constitution determining these activities is violative of the causal judgment.

5. No effect or assemblage of effects can exceed in magnitude the cause or group of causes from which it proceeds.

6. The observed effects cannot in any instance be taken as a measure of the causal power residing in a given substance, as this substance placed under new and untried conditions, may evolve phenomena not hitherto witnessed.

7. If the phenomena presented disclose not only power, but power applied through special devices to the accomplishment of beneficent ends, the causal judgment requires us to suppose it under the direction of intelligence and goodness. Hence the innumerable combinations, arrangements and mechanisms by which in our world, the elementary powers of matter are modified and made tributary to such ends, offer a sufficient proof of an intelligent and beneficent Author, to which Author our whole natures lead us to ascribe every possible perfection. All the truths of natural theology as well as of philosophy will be found in the last analysis to rest on the causal judgment. We know God not in himself, but only through his works. We know matter not in itself, but only through its properties. We know mind not in itself, but only through the manifestation of its powers. The causal judgment does not authorize us, as some philosophers have supposed, to infer from the mere exhibition of power however great, an intelligent Author of nature. It is the means by which the power is developed, and the ends for which it is employed that reveal to us the existence and attributes of the Creator. His unity is disclosed in the oneness of his works.

8. The causal judgment simply affirms the existence of that in which the causal power resides. It affirms nothing concerning the mode of its existence. It may exist *per se*, or it may exist *per aliud*, that is, it may have been created and consequently be dependent for its continued existence upon the will of the Creator.

9. If we deny to God the ability to create substances or essences, whether material or spiritual, with inherent powers and the capacity

of acting through those powers, we do not merely limit him in his attributes, but we open the way on the one hand to materialism, and on the other to pantheism. Granted that the causal judgment requires us to conceive of substance as self-existent, and that all finite substances are necessarily included in the Infinite, whose existence, according to the received teachings of Des Cartes, was immediately revealed in consciousness, and Spinozism follows by strict logical sequence. Or if we allow to matter an independent existence, and in violation of the causal judgment, concede to its more subtle combinations and aggregations, the power of thought, we have the basis for a philosophic materialism. Indeed materialism and pantheism although apparently so unlike, and certainly differing widely in some of their aspects, are in reality but the dissimilar poles of the same doctrine.

10. Created moral intelligences must necessarily act under the limitations of their natures. This much is required by the causal judgment. A man cannot by *willing* make himself an angel. Neither can he by a voluntary effort alter at all his nature, or remove a single limitation imposed by it. His freedom, however, within the limited sphere of action assigned to him, is as perfect as it is possible to conceive. As a created being he is necessarily finite; and as finite he is necessarily fallible; and as fallible he is necessarily exposed to all the evils involved in actual failure.

In the beginning, the question, we may suppose, presented itself to Him from whom and by whom are all things, shall I create or shall I not create? Shall I call into existence moral and accountable intelligences capable of knowing, loving and serving me, and becoming ineffably happy through such knowledge, love and service, and yet from their finite natures necessarily fallible, or shall I restrain the energies of creative power and dwell alone through the cycles of eternity? In infinite wisdom and goodness, He chose to create; and when man made in His likeness, made a finitely perfect moral intelligence had failed, and lost the image in which he was created, God in infinite love and condescension allying His own nature to man's nature, lifted him from his fallen state, and put him a second time on probation under new conditions more favorable to his success.

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PROVIDENCE, R. I.



INFANT BAPTISM AN INVENTION OF MEN.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE SUPPOSED EVIDENCE FOR INFANT BAPTISM IN
THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES AFTER CHRIST.

Infant Baptism an Invention of Men; Or, Rev. Dr. Bushnell's Argument Reviewed. With Articles on Origen's Testimony respecting the Baptism of Children, and on Baptism for the Dead. By Rev. IRAH CHASE, D. D. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 530 Arch street.

THE published writings of Dr. Chase must be classed with the best contributions to our denominational literature. Indeed, it would be difficult to find, in the whole range of polemical discussion, as many articles as are comprised in the volume named above, which exhibit in so high a degree the great qualities of exact learning, clear statement, and perfect charity. The volume deserves to be studied as a model in these respects; and we propose to go over in the present article the same field of inquiry which engaged the attention of Dr. Chase during the last years of his life, for the double purpose of awakening a deeper interest in his writings, and of contributing the results of personal investigation. We say, that *Infant Baptism cannot be shown to have prevailed in the Christian world during the first two hundred years after Christ*. This statement does not agree with the opinion of very many historians, and shall therefore be justified by a survey of the testimony. It will be our aim to exhibit this testimony in its full strength, that the reader may be able to estimate its value for himself.

We begin with the Apostolical Fathers. Clement of Rome, who flourished in the last decade of the first century, has two passages in his letter to the Corinthians, which presuppose, it is said, the practice of infant baptism. They read as follows: "Moreover, it is thus written

of Job, 'Job was just and blameless, fearing God and abstaining from every evil;' but, accusing himself, he said: 'No one is free from pollution, even if his life be of but one day.'" (Chapter 17.) And again: "Let us consider of what material we were made, who and of what nature we came into the world, as if from the grave and darkness. He who made and fashioned us, introduced us into his world, having prepared for us his benefits before we were begotten." (Chapter 38.) These expressions are alleged to prove that Clement believed in the doctrine of hereditary sinfulness, and *hence* in the necessity of infant baptism. We object to the inference; for a belief in the doctrine of hereditary depravity does not necessitate the practice of infant baptism. It might lead to this practice when the doctrine of baptismal regeneration had become prevalent, but cannot be said to presuppose or prove it. These two passages are the only ones—a few from the Shepherd of Hermas excepted—which are cited from the Apostolical Fathers by Dr. Wall, in his History of Infant Baptism; and he has omitted nothing which could by any possibility be urged in favor of that practice. We reserve the testimony of Hermas for the next period; but refer to a passage in the epistle ascribed to Barnabas, and written before A. D. 120, which seems to us inconsistent with the prevalence of infant baptism. The author of this letter, after quoting three verses from the first Psalm, proceeds thus: "Consider how he has described at once both the water and the cross. For this is what he means: Blessed are they who, putting their trust in the cross, have gone down into the water; for they shall have their reward in its time." "In other words," remarks Dr. Chase, (*Christian Review*, Vol. XXV, p. 372), "the cross, the tree, is made fruitful by its connection with the water. Blessed is the true disciple! He is 'like a tree planted by the currents of water.' He is conformed to the cross. He follows it confidingly. He *descends into the water*, and becomes fruitful." And a little further on, in the same chapter, the writer of the epistle of Barnabas, says, referring to another passage (Ezekiel xlvii. 12): "This means, that we *go down into the water*, full of sins and defilement, but come up bearing fruit, having in our heart the fear and hope which is in Jesus, by the Spirit." This language signifies, (1.) That faith in Christ was possessed by those who submitted to the rite of baptism, and (2.) That they were expected to bear the fruits of genuine piety directly after baptism. And this language would not, we think, have been used, had the writer been aware that a large part of those addressed were, in all probability, baptized in infancy, without personal faith in Christ.

Passing now to the period of the early apologists (A. D. 140–190),

we find several statements in Justin Martyr, which have been thought to imply the prevalence of infant baptism. In his first apology, A. D. 139, he affirms that "many men and many women, sixty and seventy years old, *who were disciples (or disciplined) to Christ from childhood*, remain incorrupt," etc. (Chapter 15.) It has been claimed that the words, *ἐκ παιδων*, which we translate "from childhood," signify "from infancy," and that the word *ἐμαθητεύθησαν*, signifies "were made disciples," by baptism. Neither of these claims can be supported. For, according to the best lexicographers, *ἐκ παιδος* and *ἐκ παιδων* signify, respectively, "from a child," and "from children, or childhood," not "from infancy." Plato speaks of teachings in respect to the gods which must be heard *ἐκ παιδων*; Lucian affirms of the philosopher, Demonax, that he loved philosophy *ἐκ παιδων*; the Homilies of Clement (so called) use the same words in the same sense; and indeed the word *παῖς*, when it refers to age, never means an infant, but always a child or youth, old enough to receive instruction. Hence it is not very important to ascertain whether *ἐμαθητεύθησαν τῷ Χριστῷ* includes baptism, or not. We are satisfied, however, that in itself it does not. It merely describes certain persons as pupils, scholars, disciples of Christ, leaving the question of their baptism before instruction, or after it, quite undecided. Semisch translates the passage thus:¹ "Many men and many women, sixty and seventy years old, who from children have been disciples of Christ, preserve their continence," etc., and adds: "Nothing more is said than that many individuals of both sexes became disciples of Christ in early life." Yet Dr. Wall translates *ἐκ παιδων* "*in infantia*,"² that is, in infancy; and Trollope, in his learned edition of Justin's first Apology, makes the following note on the passage before us:³ "Although it does not necessarily follow that baptism is included in the word *μαθητεύεσθαι*, still it may be very reasonably inferred that some at least of these infant (!) disciples were also baptized in their infancy(!). Nowhere, indeed, does Justin positively assert that infant baptism was practiced in his time; nor on the other hand, is this the only passage in his writings from which the fact may be presumed." It will be noticed that this writer does not speak of the verb used as signifying in any case simply the rite of baptism; he only supposes that it may possibly include that rite. But if it merely includes that rite, what else does it signify when used of infants? Does it also retain some part of its primitive meaning,

¹ Justin Martyr: His Life, Writings, and Opinions. Translated by J. E. Ryland. Vol. II. 334, *seq.*

² *Historia Baptismi Infantium*, I, p. 35. The writer has not the English original at hand.

³ *S. Justinii Philosophi et Martyri Apologia Prima*. Edited with a Corrected Text and English Introduction and Notes, by the Rev. W. Trollope, A. M. 1845.

implying instruction, pupilage? Were they taught the gospel and led to receive it? If so, they were entitled, beyond a doubt, to baptism; but they must have been remarkable infants. Besides, the whole argument rests on the tacit but groundless assumption that *ἐκ παιδων* signifies "from infancy."

But from what other passage in the writings of Justin may infant baptism be fairly presumed? The following is the one referred to by Mr. Trollope: "And we, who through him drew near to God, did not receive the *circumcision in the flesh*, but *spiritual circumcision*, which *Enoch* and the like observed; and we received it by baptism, on account of the mercy which is from God, because we had been sinners, and it is desirable for all in like manner to receive it." (Dial., c. Try., c. 43.) To infer the practice of infant baptism in Justin's time from such language indicates at least a strong desire to find it. For the "all," for whom it is desirable, are expressly limited to those who can receive it *in like manner*—*ὁμοίως*—with genuine Christians. Yet both Wall¹ and Trollope appeal to this passage; the former concluding (1.) That Justin looked upon the rite of baptism as taking the place of literal circumcision, and (2.) That baptism was administered to infants, inasmuch as the Jews were circumcised in infancy. But it will be noted that Justin does not put baptism in the place of Jewish circumcision. He says distinctly that Christians receive *spiritual* circumcision through baptism, the same *inward* circumcision which was received by *Enoch* and the like. There may lurk in this passage a germ of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, but it affords no evidence that Justin esteemed the rite of baptism a substitute for the rite of circumcision.

To illustrate his views, we cite nearly or quite all the other passages of this work which refer to circumcision and baptism. Addressing Typho, the Jew, and his companions, Justin says:—

"That (the Jewish) circumcision is not necessary for all, but for *you* only, in order, as I said before, that ye might suffer for those things which ye now justly suffer. Neither do we receive the unprofitable baptism of cisterns, for it is nothing to this baptism of life. Hence also God proclaimed that 'ye forsook him, the living fountain, and hewed out for yourselves broken cisterns which can hold no water.' Ye indeed, who have been circumcised in the flesh, need your circumcision; but we, having this, have no need of that' (c. 19). Again: 'The circumcision in the flesh, from Abraham, was given for a sign that ye might be separated from the nations and from us (Christians), and that ye might suffer *alone* what now ye justly suffer, that your lands might become desolate, and

¹ *Historia Baptismi Infantium*, I, p. 25.

your cities be burned with fire, aliens devour the fruits before you, and no one of you go up into Jerusalem. For in no other way are you distinguished from other men except by your circumcision in the flesh" (c. 16.) Again: "To you therefore was that circumcision necessary, in order that 'the people might not be a people, and the nation not be a nation,' as Hosea, one of the twelve prophets, says" (c. 19). Again: "Isaiah did not send *you* into a bath, there to wash away from you murder and other sins,—you whom all the water of the sea is unable to purify,—but, as was fit, *announced* in ancient times this saving bath, *which belongs to those who repent* and are no longer purified by the blood of goats and of sheep, or by the ashes of a heifer, or by offerings of fine flour, but *by faith* through the blood of Christ and his death" (c. 13). "Therefore by the laver of repentance and of the knowledge of God, which was instituted, as Isaiah proclaims, for the transgression of the people of God, we believed; and we make known that the baptism which he announced and which alone is able to purify *those who have repented*, this is the water of life; but the cisterns which ye hewed out for yourselves are broken and useless. For what is the use of that bath which cleanses only the flesh and the body? Be ye *baptized as to the soul* from anger and from avarice, from envy, from hatred,—and, lo, the body is pure" (c. 14). Once more: "Blessed then are we, who have been circumcised the second circumcision with *knives of stone*. For yours, the first, was effected and is by means of iron, for ye remain hard of heart; but our circumcision,—which is second in number because set forth after yours,—by means of *sharp stones*,—that is, by means of *the words* of the Apostles of the *Chief Corner Stone*, which also was cut out without hands,—circumcises us both from idolatry and from all evil" (c. 114). The reader will do well to examine carefully this singular but characteristic passage. Finally: "What then have I to do with circumcision, who have received testimony from God? What need of that baptism has one who has been baptized with the Holy Ghost?" (c. 29).

From these passages it may be seen that, in the opinion of Justin Martyr, (1) the outward rite of circumcision was given to the Jews as a sign to distinguish them from all other nations, (2) that it was appointed with special reference to their hardness of heart, and to the ruin which awaited them for rejecting Christ, (3) that there is also an inward, spiritual change, sometimes called circumcision, which is effected by the Holy Spirit, (4) that Christian truth, the working of which is called a second circumcision, is instrumental of this spiritual change and purification, and (5) that baptism is also, in one instance, called a circumcision, inasmuch as this spiritual change is completed in it. It is evident, we think, that Justin had an indistinct idea of some resemblance between the rite of circumcision and that of baptism. It is still more evident that he associated the outward rite of baptism with a change of heart, while he did not associate the out-

ward rite of circumcision with any such change. And it is far more evident, that he distinguished between the proper subjects of circumcision and of baptism, ascribing to them totally different qualifications, in the one case, Jewish parentage, and in the other, repentance and faith. And lastly, it is worthy of notice, that he makes no mention of *infant* baptism, he never speaks of the baptism of *believers and their children*, while he does in so many words affirm that baptism belongs to such as repent and have faith in Christ.

But the most important statement in the writings of Justin remains to be considered. In his first Apology, (c. 61) we meet with this formal description of the ordinance of baptism, a description more elaborate and trustworthy than any other which has come down to us from the second century.

But we will also describe the manner in which we consecrated ourselves to God, having been made new by Christ, that we may not seem, by omitting this, to deal dishonestly in our exposition. As many as are convinced and believe those things, which are taught and said by us, to be true, and as promise that they are able to live thus, are taught to pray and to ask of God with fasting the forgiveness of their former sins,—we ourselves praying and fasting with them. Thereupon they are led by us where there is water, and are regenerated by the same method of regeneration with which we also ourselves were regenerated; for in the name of God the Father of all and Lord, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Ghost, they then receive the bath in water. And we have learned the following reason for this from the apostles. Since we were born our first birth in ignorance by necessity, from the intercourse of our parents, and have been in evil customs and sinful ways, that we may not remain children of necessity, nor of ignorance, but of choice and knowledge, and may obtain forgiveness of sins previously committed by us, in the water the name of God the Father of all and Lord is named over him who has chosen to be regenerated and who has repented of his sins, the one who leads him that is to be bathed to the bath saying over him this only. . . . But this bath is called *illumination*, because those who *learn* these things are illuminated in mind. Moreover, the illuminated person is bathed in the name of Jesus Christ who was crucified under Pontius Pilate, and in the name of the Holy Ghost who, by the prophets, foretold all things pertaining to Jesus.

On this passage Trollope remarks:¹

It will be observed that the second birth spoken of depended on the *will* of each individual, and consequently implies that the baptized person is an adult." "The words: 'Since those who learn these things are

¹ S. Justin Martyr's. . . Apol. Prima. . . p. 118. Note 27.

enlightened in mind,' says Otto in his learned edition of Justin's works,¹ show "That the appellation *φωτισμὸς* is chosen in view of the instruction which is given to the catechumens before baptism." "The faith and repentance of the person to be baptized were, in Justin's view," says Semisch,² "essential conditions of the baptismal blessing; not as if he looked on that faith and that repentance as peculiarly the coefficients of this blessing; he only required them as the *subjective preparations* by which the baptized was rendered *capable* of the baptismal consecration. . . . Wherever Justin refers to baptism, adults appear as the objects to whom the sacred rite is administered. Of an *infant baptism* he knows nothing. The traces of it, which some persons believe they have detected in his writings, are groundless fancies."

Without citing the opinions of other scholars, we remark that Justin here professes to give a faithful description of Christian baptism, that in his day (A. D. 139) the children of Christian parents must have been quite numerous, that he makes no allusion whatever to their being in any case baptized, and that he specifies a knowledge and belief of truth, together with a purpose to obey it, a desire to be baptized, genuine repentance for sin, and prayer for forgiveness, as prerequisite to this ordinance. In view of these facts we are certain that the prevalence of infant baptism in his time will appear incredible to any unbiased historical mind. Justin Martyr may be appealed to with confidence in support of the doctrine of believer's baptism as the creed of Christians in the first half of the second century, and in refutation of the statement that infant baptism was known to the churches of that period.

We may now pass on to the Shepherd of Hermas, a very unique specimen of Christian literature, assigned by the best authorities to about the middle of the second century. The writer purports to be Hermas, the principal teacher who appears to him an angel in the guise of a shepherd, and the tower seen by him an emblem of the church. Yet he professes to have received instruction also from a woman who appeared to him in visions. The following extracts relate to our subject.

"Why is the tower," inquired Hermas, "built upon the waters?" She responded: "Because your life has been saved and shall be saved by water." (B. I. V. iii. c. 3.) Again, he asks: "Why have these stones come up from the deep and been placed in the structure of the tower, *when, long since, they had borne the just spirits?*" "It is necessary," the angel replied,

¹ S. Justini Philosophi et Martyri Opera. . . . Edited J. C. T. Otto. Jena, 1847. I. p. 146. Note 14, ab fine.

² Life and Times of Justin Martyr, translated by J. E. Ryland. II. p. 333.

"for them to ascend through the water in order that they may have rest. For they could not have entered the kingdom of God, except by putting off the mortality of their former life. Hence those who were dead were sealed with the seal of the Son of God and entered into the kingdom of God. For before a man receives the name of the Son of God he is consigned to death; but when he receives this seal, he is set free from death and delivered unto life. But this seal is *water*,—into which men go down devoted to death, but come up assigned to life. Hence also this seal was preached to them, and they used it that they might enter into the kingdom of God." . . . I said also: "Why then, sir, did those forty stones which had this seal already, ascend with those from the deep?" And he replied: "Because these apostles and teachers, who preached the name of the Son of God, when they died, having this faith and power, preached to those who had died before and gave them this seal. Hence they went down into the water with them and came up again; but these (the apostles and teachers) went down alive and came up alive, while those who had died before, went down dead and came up alive. . . Only this seal was wanting to them" (B. iii. S. ix. c. 16).

All that can be inferred from such language is this, that the author of the Shepherd of Hermas considered baptism necessary to salvation through Christ. But it is worthy of notice that he describes those whom the apostles are said to have baptized after their death, as men who had fallen asleep "in righteousness and great purity, only they had not this seal" (Ib). They were the patriarchs, prophets, and righteous men of an earlier dispensation. They had gone to the other world as believers and were therefore qualified to receive baptism. Nothing is said of the infants of an earlier economy, whether they were circumcised or uncircumcised. And it may be added, that the author of this production did not look upon baptism as coming in place of circumcision, nor esteem the Jewish people and the Christian church as one; for the best men of the former dispensation must be baptized, even in Hades, in order to share the blessings of the latter.

But there is another passage to be examined. The various classes out of which believers are taken into the church of Christ, are represented by twelve mountains from which stones are removed and built into the tower; and the Shepherd-angel thus describes those from the twelfth mountain:

"They who believed from the twelfth mountain, which was white, are the following: they are as infant children, in whose hearts no malice springs up, nor have they known what malice is, but have always remained as children. Such then, without doubt, dwell in the kingdom of God, because they defiled in nothing the commandments of God, but remained like children all the days of their life, in the same mind.

All of you, then, who shall remain steadfast, and be as children, without doing evil, will be more honored than all who have been previously mentioned; for all infants are honorable before God, and are esteemed first with him. Blessed, then, are ye who put away malice from yourselves, and put on innocence. As the first of all will you live unto God" (B. iii. S. ix. c. 29).

It is here affirmed that "all infants are honored of the Lord,"—not the infant seed of believers, but *all* infants whatsoever. If this language implies that literal infants were at that time esteemed fit subjects for baptism, it implies their fitness *as infants*, without respect to parentage. But there is a better explanation of it. Paul had said, in his exhortation to the Corinthians: "In malice be children," or "play the child," and the writer of the Shepherd seizes upon this thought and characterizes one class of those who belong to the church as being in this respect infants, or like infants. But though he enumerates and describes the materials of his tower or church, he nowhere speaks of infants as having any place in it, but only of those who are like infants; nay, he teaches explicitly that all who are brought into the church, without faith, charity and the other Christian graces, must at length be cast out. (B. iii. S. ix. c. 15). Most untenable, therefore, is the position of those who defend infant baptism by appealing to this vague expression of the Shepherd of Hermas. His account of the church, though fanciful enough, is utterly irreconcilable with the hypothesis that infants in general, or the infant seed of believers in particular, were then reckoned as being in any sense among its members. His testimony is clearly in favor of believers' baptism as the only baptism then known to the church of Christ.

But we pass to the later Apologists (A. D. 190–240). Irenæus, who wrote his work "Against Heresies" at the very beginning of this period, first claims our attention. His words, supposed to indicate the practice of infant baptism, are in the following extract:

"He (*i. e.* Christ) was indeed thirty years old when he came to baptism. Then, having the full age of a master he came to Jerusalem, so that as a master he might rightly hear them all; for he did not seem to be one thing while he was another, as some say, introducing a docetic Messiah, but what he was that also he seemed to be. Being then a master, he had also the age of a master, not annulling in himself the law of the human race, but sanctifying every age by the likeness which it had to himself. For he came to save all by himself; *all*, I say, *who by him are regenerated to God*, infants and little ones, and children, and youths, and elderly persons. Therefore he passed through every age, and for infants was made an infant sanctifying infants; among little ones a little one sancti-

ifying those of that age and giving them an example of piety and uprightness, and obedience; among youths a youth becoming an example to the youths and sanctifying them to the Lord; thus also an elderly person among the elderly, that he might be a perfect master among all, not only in expounding truth, but also in age, sanctifying at the same time the elderly and becoming to them likewise an example. Then too he passed through even unto death, that he might be the first-born from the dead, holding the *primacy* in all things, the Prince of life, before all and excelling all." (B. ii. c. 22. §. 4),

In this passage everything depends on the meaning of the clause, *per eum renascuntur in Deum*, and especially upon the meaning of *renascuntur*. This word has been understood to signify (1) *are baptized*, or more exactly, are regenerated by baptism. Neander, in his History of the Christian Religion and Church, says "that it is difficult to conceive how the term regeneration can be employed in reference to this age to denote any thing else than baptism;"¹ but in a later work, his History of Christian Doctrines, he speaks more doubtfully, thus: "If by *renasci in Deum* baptism is here to be understood, there lies in the phrase a proof of infant baptism. . . At all events, the idea is here enunciated from which infant baptism must be produced, to wit, that human nature, from its earliest development has been sanctified through Christ."² But of this interpretation Dr. Chase says correctly: "The context is against it; for the context directs our attention to *Christ* and what he himself, personally, came to do for the human family. It is by *him*, and not by baptism, that they are here said to be renewed, born anew, or regenerated." And Hagenbach remarks, that "the earliest Patristic passage of Irenæus, (Adv. hæ. ii. 22. 4), does not prove infant baptism. It merely expresses the beautiful idea, that Jesus was Redeemer *in every age of life for every age*; but that he became so for children by the *water of baptism*, it does not say, unless one interprets baptism into the *renasci*."³ (2) *Are regenerated*, that is, spiritually; without any reference to the means, aside from Christ, by which this is wrought. If Irenæus believed in the salvation of infants through Christ, he must have believed in their depravity, in their need of moral renovation, and in the possibility of their having it through the Spirit; and, this being granted, the word *renascuntur* may represent this spiritual change in the case of infants as well as in the case of adults. There is nothing in the context to forbid this view; there

¹ See Vol. I. p. 311. We have not Toney's translation at hand. or, Bd. I. S. 537.

² See vol. I. p. 230-1, or Bd. I. 243.

³ Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3d Aufg. § 72, Note 4. See also the translation of this work by Dr. Smith, § 72, 4.

is no mention whatever of any outward rite. Nay more, the context, which insists that Christ passed through every age of human life, to sanctify it, not by baptism, but by his presence, teaching and example, is suggestive of a spiritual change simply, rather than of an external rite working a spiritual change, or an external rite alone. (3) *Are regenerated*, in the sense of being brought into a new relation to God.

"According to Irenæus," says Dr. Chase,¹ "Christ in becoming incarnate and thus assuming his Mediatorial work brought the human family into a new relation unto himself, and placed them in a condition in which they can be saved. In this sense he is the Saviour of all. He restored them, or summed them up anew in himself. He became, so to speak, a second Adam, the regenerator of mankind. Through him they are regenerated unto God: *per eum renascuntur in Deum*. The thought occurs frequently; and it is variously modified by the various connections in which it is introduced. . . . Parallel passages abundantly confirm the sense already given, as being the true sense of the passage before us." "By naming Christ the second Adam," remarks Duncker,² "he characterizes him primarily as the second *beginner* of the human race, who has recapitulated in himself, has repeated, saved and transformed in himself, the first and natural beginning of human development. . . . Christ, as the second Adam, is both the deliverer and the perfecter of the first Adam, and, with him, of the whole human race, inasmuch as the first Adam was the representative and real sum of all men. He did not, in his incarnation, take on himself and save a single man, but the universal man or humanity, and therefore, as the perfect spiritual Adam, he also became the spiritual father and head of the race, which, gathered into his bosom, *was born again to the divine life*."

This statement by Duncker is scarcely more than a translation of two or three passages from the great work of Irenæus, and we have no hesitation in saying that it is impartial and strongly corroborative of the last interpretation of *renascuntur in Deum*. By making the word denote the new relation to God, into which men are brought by the work of Christ, it agrees with the whole Christology of Irenæus, and with the main scope of the passage in which it occurs: we therefore adopt this interpretation as correct.³

Clement of Alexandria, also merits our attention. His writings belong to the close of the second century and the opening of the third. The heading of the fifth chapter of his *Paidagogos* reads thus: "*That all who abide by the Truth are Children to God*." And he goes on to say:

¹ *Infant Baptism*, pp. 84, 85. *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Nov. 1849. *Baptismal Tracts for the Times*, p. 65 sq.

² Duncker, *Christologie des heil. Irenæus*, ss. 161, 218.

³ See also an article by Dr. Sears in the *Christian Review*, Vol. iii. p. 206 sq.

It is plain, therefore, from the term itself that *Paidagogia* is the training of children; but it remains for us to consider carefully the children whom the Scripture refers to, and then to place over them the *Pædagogus*. *We are the children*; and the Scripture tells of us often and allegorizes us in many ways, representing by manifold names the simplicity of our faith. Hence it is said in the Gospel that, "the Lord, standing upon the shore, called to his disciples: 'Little children, have ye any meat?'"—addressing those who were on terms of intimacy with him as children. . . . Jesus also said: 'Suffer the little children, and forbid them not, to come unto me, for of such is the kingdom of heaven.' What is meant by this language the Lord himself shows, by saying: 'Except ye be converted, and become as these little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of God;' not meaning regeneration, but setting before us for imitation, the example of children. . . . Again, he calls them children; for he says, 'Little children, yet a little while I am with you.' Besides this, he likens the kingdom of heaven to little children, sitting in the market-place and saying: 'We have piped unto you, and ye have not danced; we have mourned unto you, and ye have not lamented,' and whatsoever else he added agreeably thereto. And not only does the Gospel mean this by the word children, but prophecy likewise agrees with it. Accordingly David says: 'Praise the Lord, O children; praise ye the name of the Lord.' Also by Isaiah it saith: 'Behold me, and the children which God hath given me.'

Clement then proceeds to compare this language with Attic Greek, and to bring forward other similar appellations of Christians found in the Scriptures, *e. g.* sheep, lambs, doves, calves, foals, young birds, infants and the like. Farther on he remarks, that

Christ has not used the appellation little children, as of those who are without understanding by reason of their age. . . . Hence we, the infants do not roll on the ground, nor creep, wriggling along, as it were, upon the earth with our whole body after the manner of serpents, as before, and impelled by irrational lusts; but, reaching upwards in soul, having abandoned the world and our sins, and touching the ground with a light foot, only so much that we seem to be in the world, we pursue holy wisdom, although it seems folly to those whose wits are whetted for wickedness. Hence such as have known the only God, the Father, are properly children, simple and infantile and guileless." . . . "If there is 'one Teacher in heaven,' as the Scripture says, confessedly all those upon the earth are fitly called disciples; for this is the truth, since perfection is with the Lord who teacheth always, and childhood and infancy are with us who are learning always."

After explaining still further in this chapter the terms applied to Christians, Clement addresses in the next chapter (the sixth), "those

who imagine that the appellation 'little children,' points to instruction in elementary principles," and remarks:

We are not called children and infants in respect of the childish and contemptible character of our knowledge, as the inflated Gnostics assert; for when we were regenerated we received immediately the perfection for which we were striving. For we were illuminated, and this is to know God. . . . Being baptized we are illuminated; being illuminated, we become sons; being made sons, we are made perfect; being made perfect, we are placed among the gods. "I said, ye are gods, and sons of the Highest are ye all." Moreover this transaction is often called grace and illumination and perfection and bath: "*bath*," by which we are thoroughly cleansed as to our sins; "*grace*," by which the penalty for our transgressions is remitted; "*illumination*," by which the holy light of salvation is attained, that is, by which we clearly see the divine; and we call that which wants nothing more "*perfection*." For what is there yet wanting to him who knows God? . . . Thus believing merely, and being regenerated, is perfection in life, for God is never weak. . . . Those bands (of ignorance) are severed, how quickly! by human faith and divine grace, while our faults are remitted by one healing medicine, spiritual baptism. . . . Catechetical instruction leads to faith, and faith is taught by the Holy Spirit at baptism.

From the language already cited we may see, that Clement of Alexandria applied the terms children, little children, infants, and the like, to Christians, in general, on account of their childlike spirit. We may also see that he applied the terms regeneration, illumination, perfection, and the like, to baptism, on account of some moral change which was supposed by him to be connected with the rite. And we may further learn, that he associated instruction, faith, choice, and the presence of the Holy Spirit in the candidate's soul, with baptism. Hence there is obviously no reference to literal infants in all this discussion about the effects of baptism; and therefore it is very difficult to believe that infant baptism could have prevailed in his day.

But we must examine another sentence in the *Paidagogos* (B. iii., c. 11.)

And let your seals be either a dove, or a fish, or a ship scudding before the wind, or a musical lyre which Polycrates used, or a ship's anchor: . . . and if any one be a fisherman, let him remember an apostle, and *the little children drawn out of the water*. . . . These last words, [says Matthies,¹] contain, we doubt not, a latent reference to baptism; yet they do not allude in the slightest degree to infant baptism specifically. For before the mind of Clement was Peter, whom Christ made a

¹ *Baptismatis Expositio Biblica, Historica, Dogmatica.* C. S. Matthies. 1831. p. 190-1.

"fisher of men;" and *παῖδια* signifies all men who are regenerated by baptism; drawn out, as it were, of an impious and wicked life and elevated to the truth. But six hundred examples of the same kind may be quoted from the *παιδαγωγός*, in which Clement means by the word *παῖδιον*—(opposed to *θεῖον παιδαγωγόν*) any man whatsoever, without regard to age; yet so that *παῖδια* are disciples whom the divine Logos leads to a true and holy life.

Matthies was a pedobaptist and his work is one of the ablest in support of infant baptism. If, then, the passage before us from Clement reflects any light upon the ordinance of baptism in his day, it must be upon the ritual act and not upon the subjects; it testifies of immersion, and not of infant baptism. We therefore close our examination of Clement of Alexandria with the statement that his writings do not make the slightest allusion to the practice or propriety of infant baptism, while, on the other hand, the words babes, little children, children, are employed so frequently to denote Christians as to presuppose or establish a *usus loquendi* in this respect.

The next writer in our course is Tertullian. He was a contemporary of Clement, though surviving him many years. His writings, for the most part, belong to the first quarter of the third century. In the following language from his treatise, *de Anima* (c. 41), he seems to connect regeneration with baptism. "When the soul, renewed by the second birth from water and supernal power, comes into the possession of faith, the veil of its pristine corruption is taken away and it perceives its whole light." Yet in the following extract from his treatise, *de Pœnitentia* (c. 6), while assuming that the forgiveness of sins is granted in baptism, he urges upon catechumens the duty of repentance as pre-requisite to that ordinance.

How foolish, how unjust, not to fulfil repentance, yet to expect the forgiveness of sins! That is, not to offer the price, yet to reach forth the hand to receive the merchandise. For the Lord has resolved to grant forgiveness at this price; by this payment of repentance he proposes that impunity be purchased. If, now, those who sell, examine beforehand the money which they bargain for, lest it be clipped, or scraped, or base, we believe that the Lord also, who is about to grant us so great a good as eternal life, *will test our repentance beforehand*. I do not deny that the divine benefit, namely, the blotting out of sins, is every way sure to those who are about to enter the water; but there must be labor to arrive at this point. For who will furnish to thee, a man of so unworthy a repentance, a single sprinkling of water? It is indeed easy for thee to approach by stealth, and for him who presides to be deceived by your assertions; but God provides for his own treasure, nor does he permit the unworthy to steal upon it. . . . Some, indeed, imagine that God

must of necessity give, even to the unworthy, what he has pledged, and thus make his free giving a servile act. But if he does it of necessity, and so against his will, he gives a sign of death. For who will permit that to remain which he has granted unwillingly? Do not many afterwards fall away? Is not that gift taken away from many? These are, assuredly, those who creep in, who, having approached true repentance, build on the sand a house ready to fall. . . . Is there one Christ for the baptized and another for the hearers (catechumens)? Is there a different hope of reward, a different fear of judgment, or a different necessity of repentance? That laver is the *sealing* of faith, which faith is begun and commended by a *penitent* faith—a *penitentia fide*. We are not bathed that we may cease to sin, *since we are already bathed in heart—quoniam jam corde loti sumus*. For this is the first baptism of the hearer, a wholesome fear. . . . Therefore it behooves hearers (catechumens) to desire baptism, not to take it prematurely.

The view which is here given of baptism strikingly resembles that presented by Justin Martyr, and does not require discussion. We turn, therefore to the *de baptismo* of Tertullian. This treatise was written against certain errorists who rejected water-baptism altogether, and was designed to prove the necessity of it to salvation. After establishing this point to his own satisfaction by a positive line of argument, Tertullian replies to certain objections which seem to have been urged by his opponents. *E. g.*, the apostles, with the exception of Paul, were never baptized. To this Tertullian responds by insisting that in all probability they were baptized by John prior to their connection with Jesus; but if this was not the case, their special relation to Christ may be regarded as an equivalent to baptism. Again, it was urged that Abraham pleased God, although he was never baptized. Tertullian does not respond that circumcision at that time occupied the place which was afterwards given to baptism, but rather:

In all things the later rules are binding, and those which follow control those which precede. Though salvation were formerly, before the passion and resurrection of our Lord, by bare faith, yet when faith was augmented by his birth, passion, and resurrection, then was added an enlargement to the sacrament, the sealing of baptism, the garment in some sense of faith, which was formerly bare; neither has it power without its law; for a law of baptizing has been imposed, and a form prescribed. "Go," said he, "teach all nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." When to this law was added the limitation: "Unless a man be born of the water and the Spirit, he shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven," he bound faith to the necessity of baptism. Therefore all believers from that time forward were baptized. (c. 13.)

In the seventeenth chapter he admits the propriety of lay baptism in cases of necessity—*quoniam reus erit perditū hominis, si supersederit præstare, quod libere potuit*—which seems to prove that in his opinion, some persons cannot be saved without baptism. But neither the terms of this extract, nor anything in the context, can be said to bring infants into the class thus referred to. Possibly he had in mind those who were guilty of having deferred baptism for the sake of longer indulgence in sin, and who were surprised in their career by the sudden approach of death.

Yet he does not overlook the case of little children, but in the eighteenth chapter writes thus :

They, whose office it is, know that baptism is not to be rashly granted. "Give to every one that asketh thee," comes under its own head, that of almsgiving. The saying is rather to be regarded : "Give not that which is holy to the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine," and : "Lay hands suddenly on no man, lest thou be a partaker of other men's sins." If Philip so readily baptized the eunuch, let us recollect that a manifest and distinct approval of the Lord intervened. The Spirit had commanded Philip to go into that road, the eunuch himself was not found idle, nor was he one who suddenly desired to be baptized, but he had journeyed to the temple for the sake of prayer, and had been impressed with the divine Scripture : thus it was proper that he should be found to whom God sent the apostle, and the Spirit commanded him to join himself to the eunuch's chariot, the Scripture in good time presents itself to his faith, an exhortation is taken up, the Lord is set forth, faith does not delay, water is not wanting, and when the work is accomplished the apostle is caught away. "But in truth Paul was also speedily baptized." Speedily, because Simon his host knew that he was made a chosen vessel. God's approval sends its claims in advance ; but every (human) application may deceive and be deceived. Hence, according to the state and disposition, and also age of each person, the delaying of baptism is more useful, but especially in the case of little children. For why is it necessary that their sponsors should be brought into peril, since these may abandon their promises by death, and may be deceived by the growth of an evil nature ? The Lord says, to be sure : "Forbid them not to come unto me." Let them come, then, when they grow up ; let them come when they learn, when they are taught whither they come ; let them become Christians when they are able to know Christ. Why does an innocent age hasten to the remission of sins ? In secular affairs men act with more caution ;—so that one to whom no earthly substance is committed is entrusted with the divine ! Let them know how to ask for salvation, that thou mayest seem to have "given to him that asketh." . . . Those who understand the weight of baptism will rather fear its attainment than its postponement : a sound faith is sure of salvation—*fides integra secuta est de salute.*

On these extracts we submit a few thoughts. They show, in the first place, that the baptism of little children, and possibly of infants, was practiced more or less in the time of Tertullian, or in the early part of the third century. They show, in the next place, that he was opposed to that practice and in favor of adult baptism. They also show that he esteemed genuine repentance, or penitent faith, pre-requisite to this ordinance. And, finally, they show that he connected the forgiveness of sins with baptism. It appears, moreover, from other passages that he looked upon the waters of baptism as a *medium* by which the Holy Ghost operates in some way upon the soul to renew and sanctify it. In a word his views of baptism agree in the main with those of Justin Martyr, Hermas, Irenæus, and Clement of Alexandria. The only strictly new point is that he opposes pedobaptism—and thereby recognizes its existence. We are called therefore, to ascertain, if possible, whether child-baptism was now for the first time making its way into the churches, or, though practiced from the beginning, was now for the first time opposed. For such reasons as the following we believe that it was just coming into use among Christians in Africa.

(1.) This hypothesis accounts for everything said by Tertullian. There is not an expression used by him which might not have been called forth by the introduction and occasional practice of pedobaptism: not a word which needs to be modified to suit this hypothesis. Hence the apostolic origin or general prevalence of infant baptism can never be *proved* by the language of this father. (2.) This hypothesis accounts for the silence of Tertullian on certain points. He recognizes by no form of expression either the antiquity or the general prevalence of pedobaptism. He replies to no argument from ecclesiastical tradition in its favor. Yet the method and thoroughness of his treatise *de baptismo* warrant us in believing that he would have replied to such an argument had it been in use; and the records of that age warrant us in saying that such an argument would have been used, if it *could* have been, in defence of pedobaptism. Nay, more, the writings of Tertullian himself authorize us to assume that he would never have arrayed himself against this practice, had it been general and founded on ecclesiastical tradition. For he was not yet a Montanist, and even after he became one, he spoke with the greatest reverence of whatever had been handed down, in the common faith and practice of the church from the apostles. No clearer evidence of this need be given than is contained in his work against Praxeas. (3.) This hypothesis accounts for the total silence of earlier writers on the subject of infant baptism. For more than one hundred, and

fifty years after the day of Pentecost, there is not a syllable extant, in the writings of apostles or Christian fathers, which refers in any way to the baptism of infants; not a syllable which recognizes the children of believers as entitled to the initiatory ordinance of church-life, because of their parents' faith. Is not this a most remarkable and inexplicable fact, if infant baptism dates from the apostolic age and rests upon apostolic authority?

But we may confirm our interpretation of Tertullian's language by citing a few passages from pedobaptist writers. Says Neander:¹

From his language respecting the magical power of baptism it might be expected that he (Tertullian) would favor infant baptism, and therefore his opposition to it tells so much the more against its apostolic origin, and must have proceeded from the great importance which he attached to its spiritual conditions. . . . Many persons have maintained that Tertullian does not speak against infant baptism absolutely, but only means that it should not be practiced generally, so that it is not forbidden in cases of necessity: this is not, however, what Tertullian says. The expressions we have quoted force us to the conclusion that he was an unconditional opponent of infant baptism. Thus we recognize in Tertullian the tendency of the advancing Christian spirit which led to the introduction of infant baptism, and, also, that which opposed it. In *theory*,² the tendency in favor of it soon obtained the victory in the Western Church; the magical notion of baptism, and the doctrine of original sin procured its reception in the North African Church, and it was henceforward regarded as an apostolical institution.

Matthies, in his learned work on baptism,³ employs the following language:

Tertullian shows most clearly what was the reason for practicing infant baptism at the close of the second and the opening of the third century. For this ecclesiastical father, who, as every one knows, strove with the greatest zeal to have every institution of the church whatsoever, if it was of apostolic origin, preserved, yet opposes vehemently the practice of baptizing infants; hence it is manifest, that at that time, certainly in the Carthaginian Church, pedobaptism had been received into use, and yet was held to be an institution *not derived from Christ or his apostles*. [Again, further on:] Since Tertullian, as we have already stated, was a most strenuous propagator of ecclesiastical tradition, and a most determined foe of novelties, Montanism excepted, it is obvious that

¹ History of Christian Doctrines, Vol. I., p. 232. English Translation of The Original Dogmengeschichte I., S 244-5, and "Antignosticus," Vol. II., pp. 336-7. Bohn's Edition.

² The italicising is ours, not Neander's; but it is necessary in order to express clearly the historical fact.

³ Baptismatis Expositio, p. 191.

the usage and custom of infant baptism had not as yet, at that time, become frequent in all the churches.

Finally, not to multiply quotations unduly, Hagenbach, in his "History of Christian Doctrines,"¹ observes that, "Infant Baptism had not come into general use prior to the time of Tertullian," a fact quite irreconcilable with its apostolic origin.

Before taking leave of Tertullian, we invite attention to the word *parvuli* in his argument against early baptism. It has been often assumed, though without sufficient reason, that this word refers to infants, strictly so called. But the word itself signifies little children, say, from three to eight or ten years old, and there is nothing in the whole passage cited from Tertullian which requires us to interpret it as a synonym for *infants*. The reference to sponsors is the only thing which can be urged in favor of this use of *parvuli*; but the duty of sponsors did not consist in taking care of infants, but in looking after the Christian training of children and youth; and we are taught by history that such guardians were often assigned to youthful Christians, yea, even to adults at their own request, as well as to those who were baptized in childhood or infancy. Mosheim, still a great authority, supposes that the assigning of sponsors to adult persons preceded the assigning of them to infants or little children.² In this connection, it will be remembered that Irenæus distinguishes *parvuli* from *infantes*, affirming that Christ gave to the former "an example of piety and obedience." Dr. Chase remarks:³

Here let it be distinctly noted that Tertullian was speaking, not of infants properly so called, but of little ones (*parvuli*) who had sufficient maturity to be taught lessons of Christian truth and duty. This was perceived by Bunsen, so distinguished as an investigator of civil and ecclesiastical antiquities: and in the work entitled Hippolytus and his Age, he says,⁴ "Tertullian's opposition is to the baptism of young, growing children; he does not say a word about new-born infants; neither does Origen, when his expressions are accurately weighed."

Our next authority is Origen, who flourished throughout the first half of the third century. According to the translation of Rufinus he says in his VIIIth Homily on Leviticus (c. 12. 1-8):

Hear David speaking: *I was conceived in iniquities*, says he, *and in sins did my mother bring me forth*, showing that every soul which is born in the flesh is polluted with the filth of iniquity and sin. And for this

¹ § 72, note 4.

² Ecclesiastical History, Vol. 1. p. 137, Murdock's Trans.

³ Infant Baptism, p. 87.

⁴ Vol. II. p. 115, (2d Ed.).

reason that was said which we have mentioned before, that *none is clear from pollution, not even if his life may have been of but one day.* To these it can also be added, that it may be inquired why—since the baptism of the church is given for the remission of sins,—baptism is given, according to the practice of the church, even to little children; for the grace of baptism would seem superfluous, if there were nothing in little children requiring remission and indulgence.

Again, according to Jerome's version, he thus speaks in his XIVth Homily on Luke (c. 2. 21-24):

Occasion being given in this place, I touch again upon what is frequently inquired about among the brethren. Little children are baptized for the remission of sins. Of what sins? or when have they sinned? or how can there be any reason for the laver in the case of little children, unless according to that sense of which we have just now spoken: *none is free from pollution, not even if his life may have been of but one day on the earth.* And because the pollutions of nativity are removed by the sacrament of baptism, therefore little children are baptized; for *unless one be born of the water and of the Spirit, he will not be able to enter into the kingdom of Heaven.*

And, once more, he uses the following language, if we may trust the version of Rufinus, in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (B. v. 9.):

Finally also it is commanded in the law that a sacrifice be offered for him who is born, *a pair of turtle doves, or two young pigeons, of which one is for a sin-offering, the other for a burnt-offering.* For what sin is this one pigeon offered? Can the new born child have committed sin already? Yet it has sin for which the sacrifice is commanded to be offered and from which one is denied to be free, *even if his life has been of but one day.* Of this sin, therefore, even David must be believed to have spoken that which we mentioned above,—*in sin did my mother conceive me*; for no sin of his mother is affirmed in history. For this also the church has received a tradition from the apostles to give baptism also to little children. For they to whom the secrets of the divine mysteries were committed know that in all there are the native pollutions of sin, which should be washed away by the water and the Spirit, and on account of which stains, even the body itself is called a *body of sin.*"

These passages agree in asserting that little children were baptized in the time of Origen for the remission of original sin; and the last one asserts that this practice was received by tradition from the apostles. In examining this testimony, we shall call attention to the historical value of the last statement, if it be from the pen of Origen,

to the import of the word *parvuli*, 'little children,' used in the several places quoted above, and to the probable authorship of these passages.

(1.) Let it be granted that Origen once speaks of pedobaptism as an "Apostolical tradition"; what then? The expression, Neander assures us,

Cannot be regarded as of much weight in that age when the inclination was so strong to trace to the apostles every institution which was considered of special importance; and when so many walls of separation, hindering the freedom of prospect, had already been set up between that and the apostolic age.¹ . . . "But this," which Origen testifies, says Matthies, "that pedobaptism is an apostolical institution cannot be of great weight, since the Alexandrian catechists are constantly in the habit of ascribing whatever they deem important to a 'gnostic tradition'; which indeed is the more to be observed in Origen, because he connected the notion of pedobaptism with the mythical opinion which he held concerning the lapse of souls"² [in a preexistent state].

We appropriate these statements of Neander and Matthies as fair and judicious. They estimate not too severely the age and the man, revealing the frailty of the basis for pedobaptism in a solitary statement of Origen.

(2.) The import of *parvuli* also deserves consideration.

A passage in the Alexandrian Church-Book [remarks Bunsen³] gives the true explanation of the assertion of Origen, himself an Alexandrian, that the baptism of children was an apostolical tradition, and it removes the origin of infant baptism from Tertullian and Hippolytus to the end of our present period, Cyprian being the first father who, impelled by a fanatical enthusiasm, and assisted by a bad interpretation of the Old Testament, established it as a principle. Origen in these passages, of which the sense is mainly the same, says that the Levitical injunction of the sacrificial purification for the first-born infant seems to him a proof that impiety and sinfulness attach to man from his birth, and that, for this reason, the church, according to apostolical tradition, performs the act of baptism even upon children. He uses the same expression for children which Jesus used when the disciples endeavored to prevent them from being brought unto him: "Suffer the little children (*parvuli*) to come unto me;" a word which Irenæus uses in the passage quoted in our First Part, implying a difference between babes (*infantes*) and boys (*parvuli*), obviously intending therefore to express what these words in the gospel clearly mean, little growing children from about six to ten years old. This, then, is also the true interpretation of this, and of the other two passages in Origen, where the same word occurs. But a com-

¹ History of the Christian Religion and Church. Vol. I. 314.

² Baptismatis Expositio. p. 194—5.

³ Hippolytus and his Age, Vol. III, p. 195.

parison with what appears from the Text-Book to have been considered apostolical tradition before the time of Origen, shows that no other interpretation is admissible. The Text-Book speaks of those who go down with the other catechumens into the baptismal bath, but are not yet in a state to make the proper responses: in that case the parents are bound to do it for them. This is doubtless the apostolical practice to which Origen refers. . . . The difference then between the Ante-Nicene and the later church was essentially this: the later church, with the exception of converts, only baptized new-born infants, and she did so on principle; the ancient church, as a general rule, baptized adults, and only after they had gone through the course of instruction, and as the exception only, Christian children who had not arrived at years of maturity—but *never infants*. Tertullian's opposition is to the baptism of young growing children; he does not say one word about new-born infants. Neither does Origen, when his expressions are accurately weighed. Cyprian, and some other African bishops, his contemporaries, at the close of the third century, were the first who viewed baptism in the light of a washing away of the universal sinfulness of human nature, and connected this idea with that ordinance of the Old Testament, circumcision.

To confirm these remarks, we quote a passage from Origen's XIXth Homily on Luke, Jerome's translation, which will illustrate the use of the terms *infans*, *infantulus*, *puer*, *parvulus*, and *pueritia*.

Not when he came to young manhood (*adoleſcentiam*), not when he was teaching openly, but when he was yet a little child (*parvulus*) he had the favor of God. And as all things in him had been wonderful, so also his boyhood (*pueritia*) was wonderful, so that he was filled with the wisdom of God. . . . When, therefore, as we have said, he was twelve years old, and according to the custom the days of the solemnity were completed, and his parents would fain return with the little infant (*infantulo*) Jesus, the lad (*puer*) remained in Jerusalem, and his parents knew it not. . . . It could not happen that she should fear the infant (*infans*) lost, which she had known to be divine. . . . When he was a little child (*parvulus*) he is found in the midst of the doctors, sanctifying and teaching them. Because he was a little child (*parvulus*) he is found in the midst, . . . questioning them; and this, as being suitable to his age, that he might teach us what is suitable for lads (*pueris*), although they may be wise and learned.

Here Jesus, at the age of twelve, is called repeatedly, not only *puer*, but *parvulus*, and even *infans*, nay, *infantulus*. But *parvulus* is the prevailing designation. We are indebted for this passage to the article of Dr. Chase, on The Testimony of Origen Respecting the Baptism of Children.¹

We have space for but one extract more. Celsus had boasted of

¹ See *Infant Baptism*, p. 192, seq.

the intelligence and respectability of those admitted to the heathen mysteries, and had then said: "Now let us hear what sort of persons these [the Christians] invite. Whoever, they say, is a sinner, whoever is unintelligent, whoever is a mere child, and in short whoever is an ill-starred wretch, the kingdom of God will receive him." Origen thus replies:¹

To these things we say, It is one thing to invite those who are diseased in soul to a healing, and another to invite the healthy to a knowledge and discernment of things more divine. And we, knowing both these, in the first place call men to be healed: we exhort the sinful to come to the words which teach them not to sin, and the unintelligent to come to those which produce in them understanding, and *the little children to rise in thought unto man*—*εἰς τὸ ἀναβαίνειν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον*—and the miserable wretches to come to a fortunate state, or, (what is more proper to say,) to a state of blessedness. But when those of the exhorted, who make progress, show that they have been cleansed by the word, and as much as possible have lived a better life; THEN we invite them to be initiated among us.

To be initiated among Christians was to be admitted to baptism and church fellowship. This passage demonstrates that little children—the word is *νηπιόους*—were not in his day admitted to baptism, until they had been cleansed by the word and had lived a better life, until they were old enough to be exhorted and to have a manly understanding. And it will be well to recollect that Origen's work against Celsus has been transmitted to us in the original Greek, not in a translation of doubtful fidelity.

(3.) The authorship of the three passages in Origen's works which are cited in proof of infant baptism. All these passages, it will be observed, are found only in Latin versions made by Jerome or Rufinus. These men flourished at the opening of the fifth century after Christ, when infant baptism prevailed in the church. If, then, they were at all in the habit of interpolating their own opinions into their versions of Origen, there is ample reason for suspicion of this on the topic before us. If they ventured to supply any supposed defects in his work, they would surely be likely to insert a reference, now and then, to infant baptism, if they found none in his commentaries. This must be admitted, we think, by every one who is familiar with the church in the fifth century. Let us, then, consider their pretensions to fidelity as translators.

We begin with Rufinus, who translated Origen's Commentary on

¹ Against Celsus, B. III, c. 59.

the Epistle to the Romans. And this, it will be remembered, contains the only passage in which Origen is made to call pedobaptism "an apostolical tradition." Rufinus himself thus speaks of this translation:

We desire to *supply* those things which were finished off by Origen in the hearing of the church *extemporaneously*, and not so much for the purpose of explanation as of edification; as we have done in the homilies, or brief addresses, on Genesis and Exodus, and *especially* in those things which were spoken by him on the book of *Leviticus*, in the style of peroration, but have been translated by us in the form of explanation. [Another of the allusions to infant baptism is in the homilies on *Leviticus*.] Which *labor of supplying* those things which were *wanting* we undertook, lest questions touched upon and left (which in the homiletic style of speaking is *often* done by him), should be distasteful to the Latin reader. Again: They say to me—since *very many* things among those which you write are regarded as your own, give your name in the title and write, *Rufinus' Books of Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*; as also among secular authors the title bears the name, not of him who is translated from the Greek, but of the translator. All this, however, they suggest, not from love to me, but from hatred to the author. But I, who have more regard to my conscience than to my name, although I appear to *add some things and fill out what are wanting*, or to abbreviate those which are long, do not, nevertheless, think it is right to steal the title of him who *laid the foundations* of the work and furnished materials for constructing the edifice. Let the reader judge, when he has examined the work, to whom he may please to ascribe its merit. For I have sought, not the applause of readers, but the benefit of proficients."

This is enough to shake and destroy all confidence in the passages cited from Rufinus' translation of the Homilies on *Leviticus* and the Commentary on *Romans*,—in the latter of which occurs the assertion that pedobaptism is "an apostolical tradition." Thomasius, in his learned work on the Theological System of Origen,¹ remarks: "Least of all have I dared to use the Commentary on the *Romans*, which, according to the peroration of Rufinus, seems to have suffered a complete transformation by the translator." "This work," testifies Redepenning, in his *Life of Origen*,² "is intermediate between a translation and a treatise,—a reproduction, according to the *views* and *wants* of a later century." It will also be recollected that Rufinus speaks of having taken *special* and *similar* liberties with Origen on *Leviticus*, so that his translation of that work may be regarded as

¹ Thomasius, Origenes. Ein Beitrag zur Dogmengeschichte des dritten Jahrhunderts, § 90.

² Redepenning, Origenes. Eine Darstellung seines Lebens und seine Lehre. II, § 190-1.

a "reproduction of it according to the views and wants of a later century," nay, "a complete transformation" of it, rendering it unworthy of confidence as a source from which to draw the opinions of Origen.


And as to Jerome, it may be sufficient to remark that Rufinus claims to have followed his principles and example in translating Origen, omitting heretical sentiments and inserting supplementary remarks. De la Rue, the Benedictine editor of Origen, says that "Jerome, as the learned know, was accustomed to insert occasionally some things of his own;" Du Pin, after speaking of Rufinus' translations, remarks that "*Jerome's are no more exact;*" while Erasmus assures us that one "is uncertain whether he is reading Origen or Rufinus."

Our conclusion, then, is this, (1.) That Origen's testimony to infant baptism as "an apostolic tradition," would not be at all conclusive, if we had it. (2.) That he nowhere speaks of the baptism of infants but only of the baptism of little children old enough to be taught the elements of Christian truth. And, (3.) That it is extremely doubtful whether he wrote any thing equivalent to the passages which are supposed to favor infant baptism in the translations of Jerome and Rufinus. *Hence the writings of Origen afford no satisfactory evidence of the practice of infant baptism in his day.*

In our presentation of the argument respecting the testimony of Irenæus and of Origen, we have drawn freely from the admirable articles of Dr. Chase; and the reader should by all means procure, if he has not done so already, the work named at the head of this article, and study its learned and instructive pages.

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THE GREAT PYRAMID OF GIZEH.

THE land of Egypt has always been a land of wonders. Deep mystery hung for long ages over its origin and earlier development. Even in the days of Herodotus, nearly half a millenium before the Christian era, the early history of the land was only dimly and indistinctly seen through the mists of the intervening centuries;¹ and that veil of mystery is even yet only partially lifted. The revelations that have been made merely serve to open to us new wonders, and bring us face to face with perhaps deeper and more impenetrable mysteries.

Great efforts have been made in late years to solve the questions thus offered to the human mind. The labors of the members of the French Institute who accompanied Napoleon to that land, of Rosellini, Wilkinson, Vyse, Lane, Osburn, and of the Prussian expedition under Lepsius, have done very much to enlarge our knowledge of the history, the antiquities, the monuments of Egypt; while the geograph-

¹ Wm. Osburn is by no means disposed to place a high estimate on the sketch which Herodotus gives of Egypt. He says, "It is a chaotic mass of notices compiled from the bad, perhaps scarcely intelligible jargon of his dragoman, wherein the man attempted to translate into Greek, of which he knew little, the narratives of the priests in Egyptian, of which he knew still less. There is a certain amount of truth lying under a score of mistakes, blunders, and misapprehensions, in almost every chapter of his book on Egypt." *Monumental History of Egypt*, Vol. I, p. 178.

ical explorations of Speke and Grant, supplemented by those of Baker, have at last revealed to us the long hidden secret of the Nile, Egypt's sole and mysterious river.

The pyramids of Gizeh have always been ranked foremost among the grand and mysterious monuments of that land of mysteries. They are situated immediately under the thirtieth degree of north latitude, about one hundred miles from Damietta, at the mouth of the Nile. They stand on the western side of the river, a few miles southwest from Cairo, looking on the east to the city of Cairo and the Mokattam hills, which stretch behind it to the southwest; and on the west to the desolate tracts of the great Lybian desert. Their location would naturally lead us to refer them to the earlier period of Egyptian history; for it seems indisputable that the progress of settlement was from the north to the south, following the course of the Nile towards its far distant sources.

From an early period they have excited the curiosity of every thoughtful traveller. By whom, when, and for what were they built? It has been assumed by many that they were designed for tombs. They admit that the structures are vast and must have been very costly; but appeal to the fact that the whole country is studded with elaborate resting places for the dead; that the cliffs along the course of the Nile are honey-combed with them; that from Beni Suef to Kenne, a distance of nearly two hundred miles, these cliffs are scooped out, with infinite labor and at vast expense, into spacious and often exquisitely finished chambers.

But the progress of research has at length led to the separation of things that differ. It is ever thus in the advancement of knowledge. Hence we have in natural history the division into orders, classes, families, genera, and species; the more minute and careful investigations of later years detecting differences unnoted in earlier researches, and marking these differences by new and more accurate classification. The pyramids have of late been more minutely examined, and differences have been detected which escaped the notice of former explorers. At length what is called the Great Pyramid of Gizeh has come to stand out from all other pyramids in solitary grandeur. It is found to be separated from others, not only by its size,—this was evident even to the hasty glance of distant observers,—but also by other, more distinctive and more important features. It has in consequence attracted to itself a special interest, and has given occasion to another Battle of the Pyramids, of longer duration, though not so bloody as that which broke the power of the Mamelukes and made Napoleon master of Egypt.

We cannot enter into all the details of the strife, but confine ourselves mainly to the works of C. Piazzi Smyth, Professor of Practical Astronomy in the University of Edinburgh, and Astronomer Royal for Scotland.

In the year 1864 Professor Smyth sent forth from the press his first work on the subject, entitled, "Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid." In this work he groups together for examination the various accounts given by earlier explorers of their observations and measurements at the Great Pyramid, with their speculations in regard to the design of the structure. Then he proceeds to develop what he himself believed to be the object of the builder, and to point out the special interest which the men of the present generation have in the vast edifice. If he be correct, it was designed to be of permanent utility to men in every land and in all their generations; hence the title which he gave to his book.

Of late years explorers have begun seriously to question whether it were really intended simply for a sepulchral monument. Measurements were made and coincidences noted which gradually gave strength to the conviction that it was designed for other and higher purposes. In 1839 Col. Howard Vyse communicated to Sir John Herschel his principal measures of the pyramid. That distinguished astronomer was very much struck with the mathematical and astronomical knowledge exhibited in the location and the configuration of the vast pile. More recently Mr. John Taylor studied with special care the proportions existing among its various parts, and was eventually led to the conviction that it was designed as a grand metrological monument—an eminently good, if not perfect, standard of weights and measures for the world. This was the opinion adopted and enlarged upon by Professor Smyth, in the work above mentioned.

His second and much larger work was issued in 1867. In the preparation of his first book he had found himself constantly perplexed by conflicting statements in regard to the materials used in different parts of the pyramid, and especially by the want of agreement in the measurements of the same parts. In order to secure more reliable data, he resolved to visit the pyramid himself, and seek for further satisfaction by personal examination, and by the most careful measurements, made with the best instruments that could be procured. Accordingly he sailed for Egypt in November, 1864. His object, as expressed by himself, was, "To visit the ancient pyramid where it stands, and has stood for so many thousands of years; and personally remeasure those parts of it concerning which all modern writers vary so much in their observations and statements, as to prevent any the-

ory—whether John Taylor's, or any other man's—from being either firmly founded, or satisfactorily refuted upon them."

On his arrival at Cairo he procured through the British Consul an audience with Ismail Basha, the Viceroy of Egypt, who after some delay, granted him important help in his work.

1. Conveyance for the whole party from the east bank of the Nile to the pyramids, and back again after the work should be completed.
2. Loan of government tents and right to occupy any tombs that should be found suitable for a residence.
3. Protection for the time mentioned (three or four months), to person and property.
4. A general cleansing of the interior of the Great Pyramid, as a preliminary to accurate measures.
5. Peremptory orders to the nearest villages to furnish supplies of food, at the ordinary market prices, during the entire period of their stay.

On the 7th of January, 1865, they set forth from Cairo, Professor Smyth and his wife, with their long train of attendants and all of his luggage. He had brought from England twenty-seven boxes of various sizes, mainly filled with scientific instruments to be used in his measurements; and to these were added all the many articles necessary, in order to set up a domestic establishment for three or four months at the pyramid. The last waters of the inundation of the Nile were just subsiding when they took their departure; and their short journey was lengthened by the necessity of making a detour, in order to avoid the yet lingering waters. On the morning of the second day they reached the pyramid, made selection of such tombs as they thought best adapted for their store-room, kitchen, and chambers, and were ready for the work which was to be done.

Of course the first undertaking was the general cleansing of the interior, which was to be done at the expense of the government. The pyramid, which is in round numbers nearly eight hundred feet square and not far from five hundred feet high, stands on a platform of solid rock. It is entered on the north side by a passage which opens about twenty-five feet above the level of the base and nearly in the center of the face. This is the only known means of access to the interior. The passage, which is 41.53 inches wide and 47.24 high, is inclined downward at an angle of $26^{\circ} 18' 10''$ nearly. After descending about eighty feet we come to the first ascending passage, which is the same in height and breadth as the descending passage, and rises at the same angle for a distance of 128 feet. This brings us to the Grand Gallery, rising at the same angle for 157 feet further. The

vertical height of this gallery is a little more than twenty-eight feet. At the upper end of this vast inclined gallery is a horizontal passage, or ante-chamber, leading into what has been called the King's Chamber, which is thirty-four feet long, seventeen wide, and nineteen high. From the lower end of the Grand Gallery another horizontal passage, 126 feet long, conducts us to the Queen's Chamber, about nineteen feet long, seventeen wide, with a ceiling, or roof, sloping both ways, twenty feet in height at the apex and fifteen at the sides.

All of these passages and chambers had been cumbered by the labors of successive explorers, quarrying into the solid masonry, in order to discover other chambers, or in search of treasures supposed to be hidden about the building; and by the constant tramp of visitors whom every steamer to Cairo brings to visit the vast structure. The Arabs, too, had filled up the entrance passage with sand at a short distance below the entrance to the ascending passage. This is not a hundred feet from the mouth of the descending passage, while the passage itself extends downward nearly three hundred feet further, and terminates in what is called the Subterranean Chamber. According to Alce Dobree, one of the guides, who conducted Professor Smyth in his explorations preparatory to the work of cleansing, the Arabs were "obliged to stop up the passage" to the Subterranean Chamber with a bank of sand, for the special benefit of the travellers who visit the Pyramid, to prevent them from being utterly worn out by their exploration of the interior.

Alce made some interesting revelations in regard to the crowds of travellers who visit the pyramids.

There's a great change come over all the travellers of late years. Formerly, whenever they visited the pyramids they would stay several days, and be a long time looking carefully at every tomb. . . . But now the travellers are always in such a hurry, and they are getting more and more in a hurry every year. One of the Arabs looking out now at the village, has only just time to cry out that travellers are coming, and immediately all the Pyramid Sheiks and all the guides run to the hill; but before they can get there the travellers are upon them, for they make their poor donkeys gallop through the sand; and the moment they arrive at the pyramid they call for their luncheon, never waiting for the corks to be drawn out of the bottles, but knocking their necks off on the stones and letting the pieces fall all about: and then they tell the Sheik, "Now look sharp, old fellow, and get us three Arabs apiece to take us up to the top of the pyramid that we may see the view, and be down quicker than any one else; and we'll time you by our watches; and they no sooner come down than they are on their donkeys again, and away they go over the plain to Masr [Cairo], and we never see them a second

time. Only a very few too of all these travellers ever go inside the pyramid; and as *they* don't pay any more than their friends who merely went up the outside,—the poor Arabs can't afford to let them know that there are many chambers or passages. It won't do at all to let the travellers stop too long inside the pyramid; outside it might be well enough if they liked it, but inside they are burning our candles all the time, and Arabs can't find wax candles by digging every day in the tombs.

The first care of Professor Smyth was to employ the men furnished by order of the Viceroy in cleaning out the accumulated rubbish and in washing down the chambers and galleries. When this was done—and it was the work of many days to do it—the work of measurement was begun, and for three months was faithfully prosecuted, “resulting altogether,” as the author says, “in a greater number of original and scientific observations of the great pyramid being obtained and brought securely home, than had ever been accumulated before.” The second volume of his work is mainly occupied with the record of these measurements, which are given in full, so that those who are interested in the subject may have before them the precise data from which the author deduces the conclusions that he announces in the third and last volume of the series.

We will notice some of the points which he has established by his measurements.

1. The base of the great pyramid is square.

The determination of this was a very difficult task. The pyramid was originally covered with an outer casing of smooth polished stones, presenting to the eye four plain triangular surfaces meeting in a point at the summit. These stones have been removed, leaving a succession of steps, up which the traveller ascends with difficulty to the top. The tearing away of this outer casing has left heaps of rubbish sloping up each side to the height of fifty or sixty feet in the centre of the faces. It is impossible to see from corner to corner of the base, or to measure it accurately with the line or rule. The first measurement which the author made early in April, 1865, was with a 500 inch cord, when the difference of the least from the greatest side seemed under 100 inches. Subsequently the four corner sockets cut in the rock, were uncovered by Mr. Inglis, a Scotch engineer. These show distinctly the outer line of the casing stones. Mr. Inglis found them marked sharply and immovably in the solid rock below, and the distance between them not to vary in any two cases above eighteen inches. A third measurement was made by Professor Smyth, by means of a Playfair altitude azimuth instrument

which he had carried with him. From this, which was not yet a perfect measurement, he made the length of the sides to vary not more than two and a half inches. Thus every measurement made with better means and greater care reduces the difference between the length of the sides, and approximates to the conclusion that the sides of the vast base are as nearly square as the most delicate human instruments, used with the greatest human skill, can make them.

2. The sides of the pyramid are found to be oriented with the utmost precision; that is, they correspond precisely with the direction of the earth's axis and a line drawn at right angles to it. The astronomical knowledge and the skill in applying that knowledge which are indicated in the precision of its orientation, are worthy of special note. The author well remarks, that "something may be added to its other meanings if one particular direction of its sides have been chosen out of all other possible ones."

3. The four sides incline towards its central vertical axis at equal angles. This common angle of inclination is found to be $51^{\circ} 51' 14.3''$. In comparing the vertical height which is thus determined with the length of the base, which is 9142 British inches, a remarkable proportion is discerned.

For while from the same base there may be raised, by altering the angle of the sides, any number of regular, though different, pyramids, it is here asserted that the angle of the sides of the great pyramid is precisely of such an amount, as to cause the linear proportion which the vertical height of the whole mass bears to twice the length of one side of the base,—to be precisely that of the diameter to the circumference of a circle—the invaluable quantity π of all modern mathematics."

In other words, the vertical height is to the length of all the sides as the radius to the circumference of the circle.¹

4. The great pyramid is located sensibly in the latitude of 30° . Its actual location is twenty-one seconds short of this. Professor Smyth thinks it would have been located with perfect accuracy on that parallel of latitude had the nature of the ground permitted. It is now crowded close as possible to the northern limit of the hill on which it stands, from which there is a slope down to a "bay of sand which intervenes to the north of it, and extends in that direction through several whole minutes of latitude." And "there is no other conspicuous or suitable rocky hill for the Pyramid to stand on except its own hill through all this region. There was, therefore, no choice

¹ Mr. Wm. Petrie, in a later letter on this subject, says that the four sides of the base represent a circle, and adds "Thus we have a radius set upright on its parent centre, and its own exact circle's length delineated systematically around it on the ground."

left to the builders but to place the Pyramid on the hill where they did place it." He thinks it evident that they were fully aware of the geographical error, slight though it was.

For why, otherwise, upon any hieroglyphic theory of the Pyramid that has ever been brought forward, has that most massive building of the world—when there was plenty of room southward for mere foundation,—been pushed so close to the very northern edge of the hill? Yea, even so dangerously close to its northern cliff, that there is, just in front of the northeastern corner of the Pyramid, a slicken-side scratched surface of rock, indicating a land-slip of a part of the hill to have already occurred there; and still worse, there is a deep cleft in the local rock, 'a chasm' according to Colonel Howard Vyse, preparing for another breaking away of the cliff, and passing slantingly under the foot of the very Pyramid itself. The builders, too, knew of this most dangerous feature, for they filled it up with good masonry to the depth of forty feet, and cemented it over; and they further made those enormous banks of their ancient rubbish on the northern front of the cliff outside, to keep it up, as it were; recognizing that a fall of that part of the work would be ruinous indeed to the Pyramid. As yet the rock has not given way, though it may always be considered as threatening; but meanwhile, if ever a building vividly represented the Scriptural phrase of standing on "utmost bound of the everlasting hills,"—it surely is the Great Pyramid; reared, and with a remarkable reason for it, on the very ultimate northern edge and brink of its steep-sided, desert, table-land."

5. The angle of inclination of the inclined passages in the Great Pyramid is $26^{\circ} 18' 10''$ nearly.

The question of the precise angle of the entrance passage was an important one, for it was desirable to know whether it had any astronomical significance. Did it point to any particular star? And, if so, to what star? Sir John Herschel in 1839 assumed that the date assigned to the Pyramid, "2123 B. C., was likely to be true; and then for the facilities of computation took four thousand years back from 1839, A. D., and computed for 2162 B. C., what large star, if any, fit to be polar star of reference for the naked eye, was at that particular distance from the poles. . . . On solving the problem, Sir John Herschel found—assuming the latitude to be 30° ,—that at the date in question, the star Alpha Draconis was in the required position within some $28'$; or close enough, in his very competent opinion, to settle that Alpha Draconis was the pole-star of the Pyramid building day, and of the northern hemisphere of the world, in and about the year 2161 B. C."

Subsequently, Egyptologists began to give an earlier date to the Pyramid; and it was supposed to have been built about the 3303 B. C.

If the course of Alpha Draconis, under the influence of precession be traced a little further back in point of time, the star will be found to have reached its closest position to the pole—almost at the pole itself—in 2800 B. C., roughly; and would again have reached some 3° or 4° therefrom, or seen at such a height above the horizon as to have its lower culmination in the direction of the entrance passage of the Great Pyramid, in the year 3400 B. C., nearly.

Here was an important question to be solved. It was to decide whether the pyramid was built about the year 2200 B. C., or 3400 B. C.—that is “which of the *two* occasions of that star being $3^{\circ} 42'$ from the pole, viz., before or after, the star’s closest appulse to that celestial pole (in 2800 B. C.) was *the* occasion intended to be typified.” Professor Smyth applies himself to solve, if possible, that question. He was struck with the apparent anomaly that of the two daily transits of a pole-star only the lower and less important was marked; as if, to the builders, it had been vastly more important than the upper and more visible culmination.

Why this strange anomaly, or preference? “For some good cause,” our respect for the long buried architects suggested; and the following presently appeared the most weighty, as well as the most simple reason that could be adduced,—“Because when that star was crossing the meridian below the pole, another and more important star was crossing the meridian above the pole; and it is not the manner of the Great Pyramid to wear its most vital signs “or meanings” in the most prominent and external situations.

That was merely an hypothesis to be tested; and on trying, by calculation what star or stars of chief importance crossed the meridian above the pole, and at any polar distance whatever, when Alpha Draconis was crossing below, at the 3400 B. C. period, with a polar distance of $3^{\circ} 42'$, we could find none. But the moment we tried the same thing for its 2200 B. C. epoch, we alighted immediately on the Pleiades.

The importance of this discovery the author unfolds with great minuteness. He calls special attention to the work of Mr. R. G. Haliburton on the year of the Pleiades, which he thus epitomizes.

The result of his inquiries into the literature of many nations, and the traditions of most existing savage tribes, has been to find traces amongst them all of their having once employed a common, universal, original system of chronology, based on the Pleiades, and in a manner equally simple and perfect. Thus the year begins on that one night when “the Pleiades are above,” or “are most distinct,” or “when most is seen of them,” or, in fact, *when they cross the meridian at midnight.*

Now this is a faultless principle of observation, that of a midnight noting of a star when at the culminating point of its celestial path, and to

which modern astronomy can add little else than merely some technical improvement of the means by which the principle is to be carried out; while, as a working method, through long periods of time, for determining the beginning of the new year,—it is not only capable within itself of the utmost precision, but has the same exactness after thousands of years, as after one year, subject only to a small and very slowly increasing natural correction. Very different, therefore, is this from the hopeless confusion of calendars which the more civilized nations of the world,—in its subsequent, but still early historical days,—were always floundering in, from accumulations of the annual difference between the real length of the year and their supposed length of it.

The star to which reference here is made, is Alcyone, or Eta Tauri, which has of late attracted the special attention of some of the ablest astronomers of the day.¹ It will be interesting to bear this in mind in connection with the following remarks by the author.

As Alpha Draconis,—recovered by Sir John Herschel, through means of the entrance passage being still visible,—may be regarded as the key and the Pleiades now found as the lock, let us see how the key works in the lock. Wherefore, compute the *absolute* right ascension of Eta Tauri, when it was at that peculiar *difference* of right ascension just described, or *opposite to Alpha Draconis at the time of that star being 3° 42' from the pole*, and what do we find? Why no less than this, that Eta Tauri was then at Oh, of right ascension, or in the equinoctial point itself, i. e., at the necessary and essential starting-point and commencement of all reckonings by Pleiades years; in the very beginning, therefore, of the Pleiades chronology, and at the epoch of all others during the last six thousand years, and many more too, when, if ever a monument was to be, or could be appropriately erected to symbolize and commemorate the Pleiades calendar, it should have been erected.

Not only, too, was the epoch thus remarkable in pure astronomy, but in its applied form to agriculture and the general affairs of men, it was equally precise and note-worthy. For when the Pleiades and the equinoctial point were on the meridian together at midnight, then the primeval year began *coincident with the autumnal equinox* of the northern hemisphere; and that autumn, as well as that night, became, agreeably with old tradition, “the mother night of the year.”

6. The apartment which is called the King's Chamber contains a coffer of dark, hard red granite; and the coffer and the chamber have a mutual adaptation.

The coffer is [as he says] at present an open, lidless, box-shaped, long rectangular vessel, cut out of a variety of red granite, having the hardness almost of a gem. It is a very successful mechanical performance, in

¹ Professor Maedler, of Dorpat, after a number of complex calculations, affirms that this is the far distant centre around which our solar system revolves.

the largeness, near regularity, and minute finish of the hollow as compared with the comparative thinness of the sides—seeing that it is all sawn or carved, without flaw or crack, out of one large block of the said adamantine material.

In the inside it measures 78.85 inches long, 26.70 wide, and 34.31 deep. The exterior 89.62 inches long, 38.61 wide, and 41.13 deep. On multiplying these two sets of figures, it is found that the cubical contents of the interior are one half of those of the exterior, within a very small fraction, which may be due to slight inaccuracies of measurement.

The King's Chamber is thirty-four feet long, seventeen feet wide, and nineteen feet high. Its walls, floor, and ceiling are composed of hard granite blocks. Those which compose the walls vary in length, but in height they are all equal. There are five courses from the floor to the ceiling, each of which is forty-seven inches in height. Professor Smyth measured these courses separately, all around the room, and ascertained that in no case did they vary more than one tenth of an inch in height. They are accurately fitted together, so that it is scarcely possible to insert the edge of a fine knife between the massy stones. He noticed, however, that the lower course, *measuring from the floor*, was not quite forty two inches in height, while all the others were forty seven. On further examination he discovered that the floor of the chamber did not extend beneath the walls, but was a platform rising up between them to a height of a little more than five inches. The mean height of the whole course from the floor is 41.8, while that of the coffer is 41.13. It would seem that they were designed to be, and probably were, originally equal in height.

Moreover, on computing the contents of the chamber to the top of first course of wall stones, he found it to be just fifty² times that of the coffer which is located within it, thus indicating a designed connection between the two.

7. It is remarkable that every line drawn through the important parts of the pyramid seems to have a special reference to some astronomical phenomenon. It is difficult to make all these apparent references intelligible without such diagrams as are furnished by Professor Smyth's book. Some of them, however, may be referred to as specimens. Let us suppose we have before us a vertical section of the py-

¹ In his measurement of the lower course he was compelled to take a mean, because the floor has been so much injured by those who have sought, by tearing it up, to discover hidden treasures or secret passages beneath.

² The number five with its multiples is constantly recurring in the measurements of the pyramid. The courses of stone from the base to the floor of the king's chamber are also fifty.

ramid, showing the base line, the north and south sides, the entrance passage descending at the angle of $26^{\circ} 18' 10''$, nearly the ascending passage and the Grand Gallery rising at the same angle towards the King's Chamber. Then a perpendicular dropped from the apex of the pyramid to its base will mark the southern end of the Grand Gallery, which, as we have seen, is about twenty eight feet high. If lines be drawn from the centre of the base through the upper and lower corners of the northern end of that gallery, they will mark respectively the upper and lower culminations of Alpha Draconis, the pole-star at the time when it is supposed that the pyramid was erected, 2170 B. C. A line from the centre of the base through the centre of the north end of the Grand Gallery of course will indicate the direction of the celestial pole, 30° altitude. If a line be drawn at right angles to this, passing through the lower corner of the north end of the Grand Gallery, it will of course be the line of the celestial equator. Now, from the point where the celestial equator intersects the base of the pyramid let another line be drawn upwards through the centre of the north end of the Grand Gallery, and it will mark the direction of the Pleiades in the year 2170 B. C. All of these indications are wrought into the plan of the vast fabric. If they be merely coincidences, they are very remarkable both from their character and their number. It would seem only natural to refer them to design on the part of the architect who planned the vast structure. It is very evident that when the pyramid was about to be erected the location, the figure, the size, both of the pyramid itself and of all its component parts, would need to be selected. The length of the base, the angle of inclination of the sides,—or what is same thing in result, the height of the apex,—the angles of the passages, the size of the coffer, the dimensions of all the passages and chambers—all these were wholly at the discretion of the builder,—all possible sizes and angles were before him, out of which to choose. From what he has chosen and builded into the solid stone, we must infer, if we can, his purpose.

Professor Smyth thinks it capable of demonstration with sufficient accuracy that the grand purpose of the builder of the pyramid was to erect, for all the generations of earth, a standard of weights and measures, more correct, simple, and satisfactory than any which the ingenuity of man has ever since devised.

The standard of linear measure which he deduces from the length of the base has a direct reference to the axis of rotation of the earth—the pyramid inch being the 250,000,000th part, and the pyramid cubit (25 pyramid inches) the 10,000,000th part of that same axis. And

this cubit, which corresponds, as he says, with the sacred cubit of the Israelites, is contained 365.25 times in the side of the pyramid base—a number equal to the number of days in the year; which he thinks not inappropriate, since “the standard of length is founded on the earth’s axis of rotation, the action of which mechanically makes the days.” He deduces, also, standards of weight and capacity, of heat, of angle, and of time, which have an intimate mutual relation one with another, eminently fitting them, as he says, to be accepted and used in all the world. Our space will not allow us to enter into all the minute details of this universal system. Those who are curious in this matter will find in his third volume all the particulars given at length.

Some small alterations [he says,] in our final figures, we may have to introduce in future years, if we live to see them, when new, better, and completer observations than our own shall have been made at the Great Pyramid. But in the meantime, we cannot, if we would, escape from the grand and accomplished fact that a magnificent metrology, worthy of all attention from scientific, commercial, and philosophical men, has been evolved from a sound treatment of all the best attainable measures of the entire Great Pyramid, both inside and outside, up to the present instant. It is, in fact the stones of the pyramid themselves “crying out.”

This whole metrological theory has been regarded by some as visionary and fanciful. Among these is Sir James Y. Simpson, a surgeon of Edinburgh, whose criticisms have been very severe. In a lecture before the Royal Society of Edinburgh, he characterized the theory as “a series of the strangest hallucinations, which many weak women believe, and a few womanly men, but no more.” In the course of his remarks he alluded to “the old Irish mausolea, scattered for miles along the banks of the Boyne—tall and large as little hills, like those of Newgrange, and showing in their interior large cyclopic chambers, the huge component stones of which were sometimes highly decorated.” He then boldly threw down the gauntlet to Professor Smyth, saying:—

If he would visit and measure them, he would perhaps find them as interesting and astonishing as others he had visited, or more so. Those of Brittany—many of them decorated interiorly—were perhaps older than those of Egypt, for they contained implements and weapons only of stone—not of bronze or iron. They were reared in the stone age—the Egyptian tombs were reared after metallic tools were invented. But if not content with the age of these immense western tombs or pyramids, we have besides cromlechs and megalithic circles, other remains of intellectual man in Europe undoubtedly older than the oldest Egyptian pyramid.

This statement presented a definite issue. It is no longer a mere question of the correctness or incorrectness of the metrological system which has been deduced from the Great Pyramid. It is the great question as to the intellectuality of man at the epoch when history first takes cognizance of his condition and his acts on this earth. Was he, when first met on the pathway of the ages, a mere overgrown babe, having yet to be set down to learn the alphabet of science and art? Or was he a man in mind as well as in body, familiar with abstruse processes of thought, and already able to assert his mastery over matter in its various forms, and to fashion for himself fitting monuments of his intellectual greatness? This is the question which has emerged during the process of discussion before the Royal Society of Edinburgh, on the metrology of the pyramid. Sir James Y. Simpson takes his position, affirming virtually the former, and challenges Professor Smyth to do battle for the latter hypothesis. Professor Smyth responds to the challenge in his last work entitled "The Antiquity of Intellectual Man, from a Practical and Astronomical Point of View." He says, in assuming the defence of his position:

We purpose, therefore, now to appeal to nothing but hard measured facts at, and in, the Great Pyramid itself; no matter what differently shaped building may stand in some other part of the world. And, if such sturdy data, on being compared with modern exact science,—as now conducted in our best schools,—do not then discover of themselves, and unassisted, some arguments for high intellectuality,—we shall willingly drop the Great Pyramid entirely, and cease to consider it a combined monument of mind and matter.

After what has been written above, it is not necessary to follow the author through his book, which is mainly a reiteration of what he had developed in his former and larger work. He can readily consent to hold in abeyance the question as to the metrology of the pyramid, and to appeal only to the proofs which it gives of high intellectuality. The pyramid belongs to science merely. It boasts no high decorative art. There is none of the massive grandeur of the Doric architecture, none of the more graceful elegance of the Ionic, none of the elaborate details of the Corinthian. It is rigidly, severely mathematical. No inscriptions adorn it. No symbols of idolatry mar its chaste design. Taking science as the standard of intellectuality, the proof from the measurements of the pyramid is clear and decided, that its builders had advanced far beyond the period of childhood. Such an edifice is one of manhood's richer and riper fruits. Yet one of the authors of *Essays and Reviews* has confidently asserted that "we may rightly speak of a childhood, a youth, and a manhood

of the world. The men of the earliest times were, in many respects, still children as compared with ourselves, with all the disadvantages that belong to children."

This at the first glance may seem plausible enough. Yet it is only theory, which must be tested carefully and thoroughly before we give it full acceptance. The Great Pyramid gives us one means of testing its correctness. This "hard measured fact" stands forth as the oldest existing monument of which the world is cognizant. Professor Smyth, in his former work, has justly said :

We cannot realize to ourselves too copiously that the Great Pyramid has been standing amongst mankind, by the testimony of all modern authors, 3500 years at least,—some say, very much more, as even 6500. It dates, therefore, even at the very lowest possible computation, in biblical personal chronology, not only before the "birth of history on that night when Moses led the Exodus out of Egypt," but before Jacob, and before Abraham; long before any known literal representation of language, either Hebrew, Sanscrit, or even Egyptian; before any papyrus that has been preserved, and before any recognized examples of even pictorial representations, other than a few carved and painted stones in and about the pyramids themselves.

In October, 1843, Dr. Richard Lepsius first visited the pyramid. In his letter, describing the feelings which were awakened, as he stood for the first time upon the summit of the vast pile and looked around, he says:

What a spectacle, and what recollections did it call forth! When Abraham came to Egypt for the first time, he saw these very pyramids, which had already been built many centuries before his time. I will not describe any further the thoughts and feelings which agitated me during these moments. There, at the goal of the wishes of many years, and at the same time at the commencement of our expedition; there, at the summit of the Cheops-Pyramid, *to which the first link of our whole monumental inquiry—not merely for the history of Egypt, but for that of the world—is immovably attached*; there, where I looked down upon the wonderful tombs, from which the Moses'-wand of science now calls forth the shadow of the ancient dead, and causes them to pass before the mirror of history, in the order of their time and rank, with their names and titles, and with all their peculiarities, customs, and surrounding accompaniments.

Again, towards the close of his laborious and careful researches at Gizeh, he says:

I have not yet found a single shield [the oval in which the kings' names were written] which could safely be placed before the Fourth Dynasty. It appears that the builders of the Great Pyramid desired to

assert their right, to having formed the commencement of monumental history, although it is as clear as day that they were not the first to build and to inscribe their monuments.¹

It is sufficiently established by these quotations, that of all known architectural monuments the Great Pyramid is the oldest. We have seen that the date as deduced from the angle of the entrance passage is about 2170 B. C. There has also been discovered a shield of one of the kings, a quarry mark on one of the stones in the pyramid. It was discovered a few years since in making excavations above the King's Chamber. From this it appears that the pyramid was erected in the times of King Shofu, or Saophis, or Cheops, who was a king of the Fourth Dynasty. Lesueur dates this dynasty 4956 B. C.; Lepsius and Bunsen, 3124 B. C.; Lane and Robinson, 2440 B. C.; William Osburn, 2228 B. C. This is a close approximation to the date deduced from the location of Alpha Draconis.

Now granting that this be the actual date of the pyramid, and that it is the oldest architectural monument in the world, it remains for those who maintain the development theory, and regard the earliest times as the childhood of man, to show how a monument stamped all over with marks of such high intellectuality came into existence at that epoch. If their theory be correct, where are the monuments extending through the periods of man's childhood and youth, by which they trace his progress from infancy to manhood? It matters not whether the actual date of the pyramid be 2000 B. C., or 4000 B. C., or 10,000 B. C. Let them thrust it back to the utmost limit of Hindu or Chinese chronology; it matters not, so far as the argument is concerned. In its scientific plan and in its finished execution the pyramid stands before them at any epoch, however remote, stamped with the evidence of the manhood of the race, and ever asking, and vainly asking, for the earlier monuments of infancy and youth.

So long as the evidence of a gradual development from the earlier to the later period of man's history is wanting, it should at the most be only propounded with the greatest modesty as an hypothesis which it pleases the holder to retain. Let him who holds an unsubstantiated

¹ This extract, from Bohn's edition, is evidently a mistranslation, for Lepsius could scarcely affirm that "they were not the first to build and inscribe their monuments," unless he had some positive proof to which he could point. But he had just before asserted in effect, that no older monument was in existence. If his language is at all susceptible of such a rendering, it must have been a *lapsus penne*, such as may easily occur in letters written as were his from day to day on his tour. What he meant was doubtless this, "They assert that they form the commencement of monumental history, and it is probable that nowhere were earlier monuments builded and inscribed."

theory, give it forth as theory; while he who has hard measured facts, is allowed to set them forth as facts.

It is not necessary to accept, at this stage of the investigations at the Great Pyramid, all the metrological significance which Professor Smyth thinks that he has discovered from it. We can note his conclusions as theories which have a semblance of truth, and wait for more accurate measurements of parts, whose size he was only able imperfectly to determine. There are also, as he himself has suggested, indications which invite further search for other chambers. These may yet be discovered, and much new light may be thrown upon the purposes of the builders. But whatever may be the number or the character of future discoveries, they cannot affect the significance of the main features of the edifice as developed by the measurements already made, nor detract from the evidence of the high intellectuality of its builders.


Professor Smyth, like his lamented countryman, Hugh Miller, has done good service in the contest against those theorists who aim to get rid of a Great First Cause, and to deduce all the phenomena of living beings from the operation of mere laws of development.

Hugh Miller threw across the pathway of the champions of the development theory a stumbling block, the stony fragments of the highly organized *Asterolepis* of Stromness, which, he says, "instead of being, as the development hypothesis would require, a fish low in its organization, seems to have ranged on the level of the highest ichthyic-reptilian families ever called into existence." He challenges attention to this hard fact, that "up to a certain point in the geologic scale we find that the Ganoids *are not*; and when they at length make their appearance upon the stage, they enter large in their stature and high in their organization."

In like manner Professor Smyth confronts them with the Great Pyramid—no rude structure, like the mausolea on the banks of the Boyne, the mounds of our Western States, the heaps on the shores of the Euphrates and the Tigris,—but a building combining accurate knowledge in its conception, with exquisite skill in its execution,—and he says, "up to a certain point in the historic scale, architectural monuments *are not*; and when this at length makes its appearance on the stage, it enters larger in its stature than its successors and as high in its intellectuality as any of them. This building, whence is it, of men or from God?" It matters not to which they attribute it; in either case the reply is fatal to their cherished theory.

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THE TÜBINGEN SCHOOL.

WHATEVER general literary and religious interest we may feel in the critical labors of Baur and his associates, we are apt to regard our connection with them as slight and unpractical. But we may easily underrate the influence of German thought on our own. Germany guides the theological thought of the world, and our literary intercourse with that country is too extensive, and the impression made there by the Tübingen school too great to permit us to look on as unconcerned spectators at the contest which is going on. Some time or other, we may be sure, Tübingen criticism will be a practical matter for us; all the sooner, perhaps, that we are now so much concerned about the antipodal movement of Ritualism. For these extremes, the one the negation, the other the arbitrary exaggeration, of Protestant freedom of inquiry, as extremes, have points of contact, and the teachings of history will lead us to see without surprise a reaction from one to the other. Much of the danger to be feared from any false system may be averted by a clear statement of its positions, and we therefore propose here to give something like a connected view of the principles and results of the Tübingen school, without attempting exhaustive recapitulation or detailed refutation. We shall refer chiefly to the works of Baur himself, in which is to be found a com-

plete presentation of his system, while his followers have usually confined themselves to working out particular points.

In 1831, the year in which Hegel died, three years before the death of Schleiermacher, and four before the publication of Strauss' "*Leben Jesu*," there appeared in the "*Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*," an essay by Dr. Ferdinand Christian Baur, which, though not producing so immediate and excited a stir as the work of his pupil Strauss afterwards, was destined to have more permanent results. This was "*die Christus-partei in der Korinthischen Gemeinde, der Gegensatz des petrinischen und paulinischen Christenthums in der ältesten Kirche, der Apostel Petrus in Rom*," the design of which was to show that the harmonious relations usually supposed to exist between Paul and the other apostles had no foundation in the history, and that the strife between the Petrine and Pauline parties was a more important element in the early church than had been up to that time believed. Baur had come to this position gradually. His first appearance, in 1818, was in a Review of Kaiser's "*Biblische Theologie*," where his standpoint is described by Zeller as "a philosophically colored supernaturalism." He still held to the credibility of the Evangelical Narratives, and especially of the resurrection. In his "*Symbolik und Mythologie*" (1824) he had advanced to the view that one religion differs from another only in degree of truth, and in 1827 had expressed his decided divergence from Schleiermacher by the assertion, that the historical Christ is simply he who gives expression to the idea of redemption involved in the ideal Christ. He passed then to historical criticism, came under the influence of Hegel, and finally broke with Schleiermacher in his "*Christliche Gnosis*." (1835.) From this time on till his death, six years ago, he wrote industriously, devoting himself chiefly to historical criticism and the history of dogma, laying great stress on the philosophy of religion, logic, and theology. The essay above named was expanded into the "*Paulus, der Apostel Jesu Christi*;" other works followed on Manichæism, the Christian element in Platonism, the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity, and the Incarnation of God, together with Critical Researches in the Canonical Gospels, and an examination of Mark. In the latter years of his life, he recorded his matured opinions in his "*History of the Christian Church from the rise of Christianity to the present time*," the first volume of which, embracing the First Three

¹ "The Christ-party in the Corinthian Church, the hostile relation of Petrine and Pauline Christianity in the early church, the Apostle Peter in Rome." Baur afterwards modified the position taken in this essay, and regarded the Cephas and Christ-parties as essentially one, as were also the parties of Paul and Apollos. See "*Paulus*" (2d ed.), p. 296, *seq.*

Centuries, is of more especial interest in our present investigation. Lately the Fues' Publishing House has issued in Leipzig his "Lectures on the History of Christian Doctrine," and "Lectures on New Testament Theology," edited by Dr. F. F. Bear. His life was full of work, and he fought his way, year by year, repelling the attack of such men as Neander, Hase, Dorner, Lekebusch, and gathering around him a body of disciples, Hilgenfeld, Zeller, Schwegler, and others, who may be said to constitute a school with him as leader, though he himself in one place, suspecting apparently that perfect originality in such discussions is not desirable, disclaims the "doubtful honor." It is true, his method cannot be said to be new, but the ability with which he has applied it to the New Testament, his general uncompromising consistency, and the destructive nature of his results, give his movement a claim to be considered a new one.

Premising, then, that the special feature of his school is historical criticism, let us sketch in few words the background of the picture of which he is the principal figure. The old Rationalism of Paulus, Eichhorn, Ammon, and Wegscheider was in its last throes. It had arisen in a negative, skeptical age, when the philosophy of Locke, proved to be defective and insufficient, yet maintained a certain sway, when the Wolfian system had degenerated into bare formalism, and the national religious establishments of Europe had sunk into spiritual deadness, into worldliness and corruption. It was a striking illustration of the dependence of philosophy on religion; along with the rejection of living faith in God came the lack of sympathy with the higher facts of human nature, out of which emerged a sterile philosophy without power over the soul. The Rationalism of the eighteenth century, the theological product of this movement of the age, could see in the Bible nothing more than the ordinary results of human intellect, of the mere mechanical discursive faculty—no deep consciousness of something above man, no longing after communion with the Divine, nothing higher than the dullest, most worldly human life. Its exegetical process, which led to an emasculation of the supernatural facts of Scripture, was very simple. For any miracle it is possible to find a parallel natural fact, which can be put in its place. Moses' wonderful deeds before Pharaoh were juggling tricks; Jarius' daughter was not really dead, but in a trance or epileptic fit; Jesus walking on (ἐπὶ) the shore seemed to his frightened disciples to be walking on the sea; his resurrection was a deceit or an illusion; inspiration is poetical elevation or common sense; and Christ a man, good or bad, simple or wise, ordinary or extraordi-

nary.¹ While sometimes a sense of the baldness of these views led to a partial admission of superhuman agency, the ordinary orthodoxy of the time so explained away the miraculous, in the anxiety to be rational, as to meet and touch its opponent, and the Natural Supernaturalism and the Supernatural Naturalism had reached about the same depth of nothingness. Schleiermacher ridicules the appalling pompousness of names, which came from the desire to define indefinable positions:

I, for my part at least, feel quite weary when I hear the *Ra* and the *Irra* and the *Supra* rushing forth, because it appears to me that this terminology becomes more and more hopelessly confused. But, in order that the concert may be complete in all its parts, I beg earnestly, in addition to the irrational and rational Supernaturalism, to propose not only a supernaturalistic rationalism and irrationalism, but also a naturalistic and unnaturalistic superrationalism.²

But now came the reaction in the double form of Romanticism and Hegelism, the one mystic-æsthetic, the other pantheistic. On the one hand against the tameness and deadness of the school of Paulus came the devotion to beauty and mystery, an æsthetic religion, which affected the age powerfully, and had various modifications and adaptations. It united itself with unbelief and with Romanism. It worshipped Shakespeare and ignored Jesus Christ. Schlegel went over to Rome. Fouché wrote mystical, chivalric religious tales. Schiller reposed in a Christless virtue, and Goethe espoused an unvirtuous pantheism. On the other hand, philosophy, dissatisfied with the fundamentally important yet negative results of Kant, went on through Fichte and Schelling to Hegel, who, feeling that the old Rationalism was in the highest degree shallow and unsatisfactory, in that it excluded God from the world, brought the two into a mechanical union and reduced the Divine Being to a process of growth. The theological representative of both these movements is Schleiermacher. Beginning, in the first part of this century, with an acceptance of Romanticism in its best form, as a recognition of the noble sentiments of the soul which ally man with God, he wrote his magnificent "Discourses on Religion" to set forth to the essentially worldly minds of his generation that there was a higher life before them

¹ We may note that some of the results of this now condemned school of exegesis coincide with those of their more philosophic modern brethren. Paul's conversion was a mixture of remorse and sunstroke, said the old rationalists, and so says Rénan. Röhr's portraiture of our Lord as a man of comprehensive views and noble purpose does not differ essentially from that of the "Vie de Jesus Christ." Strauss' mythical theory seems to be anticipated in the "Vindiciæ Sacræ Novi Testamenti." And so in other cases.

² Kahn's History of German Protestantism (Clark's translation), p. 190.

which they could not ignore. In opposition to the old Rationalism which brought everything to the tribunal of intellect, he emphasized the Christian consciousness which, by its own power, apprehends God and Christ and religion, and not unnaturally, so presented it that it is sometimes scarcely to be distinguished from the Intellectual Intuition of Schelling. Further, Schleiermacher was impelled by the same causes that acted on Hegel, to blend God with the world, or at least to adopt a tone and style of expression decidedly pantheistic. And so in giving the death-blow to Rationalism, he sowed the seeds of this great error, and bequeathed good and evil together to the following generation.

Finally it is to be observed that a school of historical criticism had sprung up in Germany in the eighteenth century, which we can trace from Spinoza to Ernesti and J. D. Michaelis, and so to Semler and Lessing. That it was a general tendency of thought is seen from the fact that Voltaire laid hold of it, with his superficial universality, and set himself to deduce the Bible from ancient mythology, and that Niebuhr applied its principles in a masterly way to the history of Rome. Spinoza's strictures on the authenticity of the Pentateuch are much the same as Bishop Colenso's, and Michaelis' comments on Moses are conceived quite in the Tübingen spirit; Semler, from his historical standpoint, "stripped off from the gospels all that was local and temporary," held that the general epistles were written to mediate between the conflicting parties of the Christian Church, and was especially destructive in his dealing with the monuments of the first four centuries; of a similar tone are the criticisms of the Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist (Reimarus), Lessing on the evangelical histories.

Such, briefly, are the elements out of which the Tübingen school was formed, such the leading tendencies of the thought of the age, when Baur stepped into the arena in 1831. His forerunners are Niebuhr, Schleiermacher, and Hegel. From the last he accepted, as a fundamental ontological principle the immanence of God in the world, and along with it, the impossibility of a "durchbrechung," an infraction of the constitution and nature of the world. This was an effort to avoid the mechanical theory of the old Rationalism, which made a complete severance between God and the world. But inasmuch as he could not abandon absolute human freedom, nor so degrade the Divine Being as to suppose him inconsistent in his modes of action, he was forced to make man and nature simply the development of the Absolute. The immutability of the laws of nature is merely the immutability of the Absolute Being, who in nature is only giving expression to the possibilities which lie hidden in his essence,

or making the potential actual. In man the Absolute first comes to consciousness of himself, and thence proceeds on the path of this higher conscious development. Every man is therefore an incarnation of God, only with a more or less feeble perception of the fact. But in time this perception will rise into clearness and certainty in the mind of some man, who will bequeath to the race the knowledge of the divinity, and be fitly honored as Son of God and Redeemer of men. Baur's Hegelianism means, therefore, a development of history according to unchangeably fixed laws, the impossibility of miracles, and the impossibility of a special incarnation of God in one man. We may reckon it good or bad that we recognize in him all the Schleiermacherian romanticism in contrast with the lowness and deadness of the Paulus School—good, because there is an acknowledgment of something in man akin to God; bad, because its plausible tone may sometimes mislead. At any rate he finds it impossible to ignore the great aims and lofty conceptions of some of the writers of the New Testament, and speaks of them appreciatively and approvingly. His method of historical criticism is far abler and completer than any that have preceded him. Christianity is a fact to be explained, and he proposes to explain it; it is a historical phenomenon, like Buddhism or Zoroastrism, and is to be referred to definite, intelligible laws; it professes to find its origin in certain documents, and the authenticity and credibility of these documents must be decided on with absolute certainty; moreover he will penetrate into the core of the history, and with unerring historical sense or insight, seize the ideas and motives and tendencies of the writers, form a picture of their inner life, and out of this solid material of fact and motive, of matter and form, construct the history aright.

In proceeding to describe Baur's method and results, it is proper to refer to the stress which he lays on the historical conception of Christianity. "My stand-point," says he, "is the purely historical, in which we have merely to grasp, as far as possible, what is historically given." He represents himself as the defender of this principle against opponents who could not deny its justness, and who yet were afraid to accept it in all its consequence, and quotes from one of them with approving surprise as follows: "the question is, whether we have a right to place primitive Christianity in the same point of view of historical development which has obtained universally in profane history, and, in Protestant researches, in all other departments of church history." "If research is not to have the right to regard the supernatural as natural, that is, as appearing and developing itself in historical connection, it would be wisest to do away with all further

scientific investigation."¹ With respect to which we remark that the alleged indisposition or opposition of orthodox writers to a scientific examination of the records of primitive Christianity, and to the conception of Christianity itself as a purely historical phenomenon, if it has sometimes been manifested, is totally unnecessary. By "the historical" is meant simply "what has actually happened," and we can have no faith in Christianity save as it is demonstrated to be, as it professes, a series of facts. We are not frightened, therefore, at the oft-recurring emphatic presentation of the "historical conception," "historical development," "pure objectivity." We hold a historical conception to be one founded on actual fact, a historical development to be a progress from the actual to the actual, and pure objectivity to contain nothing different from these. But in the emphasis given to the "pure," lies the intimation that the real facts have been colored and distorted, that the historical narrative has been made a mere vehicle for the opinions of the writer, that a subjective (and therefore untrue) form has been impressed on the objective material. In truth, the real question thus comes to be, what is historical, what are we justified in believing to have actually happened, and the sophistical assumption that the historical excludes the supernatural is contained in Baur's approval of the quotation given above, in which the right to regard the supernatural as appearing in historical connection is held to be the necessary condition of scientific research. For historical connection is tacitly assumed to be causal connection, every fact depending upon a preceding one, without which it were impossible; and the causes and facts are assumed to be such as we are now familiar with, and have reduced to scientific shape. In other words it is Hume's argument against miracles, conveyed in less clear form, and covered up with the portentous phrases, "development," "pure objectivity," "scientific investigation," and the like.

That we may understand more perfectly the issue here made, it will be well to examine the explicit statement of the historical connection of Christianity which is found in the first section of the "Church History of the first three centuries."

We stand, says Baur, at the beginning of Christianity, before the wonder of all wonders, the incarnation of the only-begotten Son of God. He who sees in this fact an absolute miracle abandons all historical connection, for a miracle is an absolute commencement; it is the task of the historical observer to resolve the miracle into its natural elements. Now we cannot fail to observe that the appearance of Christianity is simulta-

¹ Prefaces to the 2d Edition of the "History of the Christian Church in the first three centuries." See also the "Tübinger Schule," for a full discussion.

neous with that of the Roman universal dominion, and we cannot satisfy ourselves with the teleologic view of this coincidence. Rather the latter was the necessary condition of the former; for Christianity could not be, as it is, the universal form of religious consciousness rising above the partial and one-sided of other forms of religion, if the previous development of the world had not broken through the barriers of national consciousness, setting aside the eternal and internal separating facts. But this is merely the negative view, and the question is, not how far Polytheism and Judaism produced a religious sentiment favorable to the reception of Christianity, but what was the positive religious development of the world up to that time. Grecian philosophy and the religion of the Old Testament are the points of contact between Christianity and the previous period. From the former it received its distinctive principle that man knows himself as a moral subject, for this was the epochal significance of Socrates, this the central fact of Stoicism, of the Eclecticism of Cicero, and even of Epicureanism. It adopted the lofty monotheism of Judaism without its anthropomorphic and anthropopathic views, or its narrow-minded regard for outward forms, and allied itself with the deeper religious consciousness of the Therapeutæ and Essenes. It is impossible, then, to regard it as a purely supernatural fact without historical connection; all that it contains is the necessary result of preceding causes; itself is the end necessarily reached in the strivings of the constantly developing consciousness of humanity.

That is, Baur's account of the genesis of Christianity stands thus: all that it is may be accounted for as the product of natural causes; there is no need to suppose a miracle; therefore there was no miracle. In which he misapprehends the true nature of Christianity, exaggerates the real facts of historical connection, and assumes a false theory of the relation of God to the world. For he sees in Christianity only certain ideas, a pure monotheism, universality, moral consciousness. It contains all these, but they do not form its essence, which is the expiatory death of its founder, the Son of God, by which infinite justice and love are reconciled, and which procures for the believer a new spiritual life; and this life of loving obedience develops profound moral consciousness and universal sympathy. The death and resurrection of Christ form the historical beginning of Christianity, and are pure historical facts standing alongside of, yet distinct from, the religious development of the world up to that time. But if, with Baur, we look merely at the moral and religious ideas of Christianity, his statement is not without its difficulties. That there was a process of preparation for Christianity, in the whole world, Jewish and heathen, we learn from the phrase, (Gal. 4: 4), "when the fulness of the time was come"—and this not merely negative, but positive, a deepening, we may suppose, of the religious consciousness and there-

fore of the moral, and an increasing catholicity of view. But that the former came to Jesus or to Paul from Socrates is a wholly unwarranted opinion, and the intellectual connection between them cannot be shown. And as to the latter, it is strange that it was a Jew, a member of the most exclusive nation in the world, that accepted it, and forced it on the world. We will not stop to point out the difference between the universality of Rome and of Christianity, a phase of the question generally overlooked by the Tübingen critics, who imagine that they have done all that is necessary when they put side by side the all-controlling empire and the all-embracing religion. Further, Baur has erred fundamentally in taking it for granted that a miracle is inconsistent with the free development of humanity. God acts in man, not against, but in accordance with, the laws of mind. The work of the Divine Spirit in the soul is represented in the Scriptures as co-existing and parallel with the voluntary effort of the soul. But this, the great issue between Christianity and Pantheism, we cannot here discuss. With Baur the development of humanity is itself absolutely the law of being of the absolute, and therefore excludes miracle. We confess that just here Hegelianism, which is Baurism, seems to us weak and inconsistent. How can it call miracles necessarily unnatural? Granting that God never departs from his strictly regular line of action, the Hegelian cannot affirm that there is not a more general law in the universe, according to which these apparently unnatural phenomena recur at stated intervals. In physical science an exceptional phenomenon is not rejected, but rather regarded as evidence of unknown law—why not the peculiar phenomena called miracles? This view, advanced by Tholuck, has been characterized as a virtual abandonment of the miraculous,¹ on the ground that it dispenses with what is effected in it; a miracle is only valuable as a proof of divine revelation when it is known and felt to be superhuman, that is, unnatural. This is true as to man's experience, but does not effect the question as to the regularity of God's action. As an *argumentum ad hominem*, against the Hegelian, it is also true, that a mode of action in the Divine Being really regular may seem to us, wholly irregular, inexplicable, and unnatural.

From this general view of Baur's principles, we come to the examination of his special positions in reference to the historical monuments of Christianity; and it will be found that, in his professedly historical criticism, the exigencies of his theory lead him to arbitrary assumptions and violent distortions. It is necessary for him to inquire

¹ By Schwarts in his *History of religious thought in Germany from 1835*, (the date of the appearance of Strauss' "Life of Christ").

into the importance of the personality of the founder of Christianity, and into its original character and significance. We are thus led to the consideration of the evangelical narrations, and first Baur affirms an incompatibility between the representatives of John and the Synopticians, in which the preference is to be given to the latter. Of this assertion we say nothing now, purposing to return to it further on. Of the first three Gospels, Mark, Baur holds, cannot be regarded as independent authority, since it closely follows the other two, and Luke bears the evident impress of a Pauline, (that is, not original), conception of Christianity; Matthew, therefore, is to be accepted as relatively the most genuine and credible. We would be satisfied with this scanty admission, and willingly rest the argument for primitive Christianity on the first Gospel. As to the other two, however, Baur's rejection of them is unsupported by proof. The question as to the Pauline origin of Luke will come to be considered presently, and we can affirm of Mark that the argument, from external and internal evidence, for its genuineness and authenticity is unassailable. It has always been accepted as canonical, and the testimony of Papias, Justin Martyr, Irenæus, and Clement is perfectly clear as to its independence of the other Gospels, and the close connection of its author with the Apostle Peter. Though the shortest of the four, omitting much that the others contain, its claims to independence are established by the distinct and elaborate descriptions that it gives, (as, i. 21-28, 40-45; v. 40-41; vi. 21-29; ix. 14-29; xvi. 5-7), and by the fact that it has some things not to be found in the others, (as, the epithet Boanerges, and the passages iv. 26-34; vii. 31-37). But Mark is unfortunate in not positively sustaining the Tübingen view of the original character of Christianity, and is accordingly dismissed as without independence, though it may be cited to establish discrepancies which vitiate the narratives of the other Evangelists.¹

Returning to Matthew, it is held by Baur that the fundamental character of primitive Christianity is to be seen in the Beatitudes of the Sermon on the Mount, in whose contrast of poverty and wealth, earth and heaven, the present and the future, the Christian consciousness has its present ideality as the ideal unity of all the contrasts (*gegensätz*) which press on the temporal consciousness. Further, in this sermon is exhibited the ethical character of Christianity as a qualitative development of the Mosaic law which amounts to a quantitative difference, an elevation above the external and particular to the universal and unconditioned. The absolute content of Christi-

¹ For the theories of Hilgenfeld and Baur as to the origin of Mark, see Fisher, "Essays on the supernatural origin of Christianity", p. 178, seq.

anity is expressed in its moral consciousness. So, too, the relation of man to the kingdom of God is conceived of as a purely moral one, and even belief in the person of Jesus is not represented as the essential condition of this relation, as in the Gospel of John. It is not difficult to point out the error in this keen criticism. From two truths, the lofty moral consciousness given in Matthew, and the difference of the standpoints of the two Evangelists, it glides into two errors, that Matthew's Christianity is only moral consciousness, and that the views of the two writers are contradictory. Baur falls into the mistake of generalizing too widely, a common temptation to his school, and especially to men gifted with the power of making great combinations of historical facts. He shows lack of insight and comprehension also, if he does not see the genuine Christian feeling of Matthew, if he sees in the Beatitudes principally the gospel of the poor, if he cannot perceive that while Matthew emphasizes the moral side of Christianity, and his general view differs from John's as the character of the two men differed, it is untrue that in the first Gospel the personality of Jesus as object of faith and as Son of God is not distinctly brought out. The ideal unity of earthly contradictions is in Christ; the absolute content of Christianity is not expressed in its moral consciousness. In ch. x. 32, 33, it is the acknowledgment or denial by Jesus before his Father in heaven, which is to constitute the reward or punishment; in xi. 6, it is the personality of Jesus that is prominent, and not a system of morality; he appears as divine Judge in the xxivth and xxvth chapters; he is distinctly called Son of God in ch. iii. at his baptism, and by Peter, xvi. 16, 17, and the Johannean character of the passage, xi. 27, has long since been perceived. Of the resurrection we shall have something to say presently. These facts are ignored by Baur in the interests of a theory; his object is to show that in the first and only reliable Gospel we find nothing which may not be regarded as an expansion of the teachings of Socrates, and that Jesus himself made pretension to no higher position than that of ethical instructor.

In pursuance of this object, Baur inquires how this system of morality, (which would otherwise have met the fate of its predecessors, oblivion), acquired the concrete form which won supremacy in the world. Its historical importance depends on the person of its founder, and his significance is explained by reference to the prevailing idea of the Messiah, without identification with which faith in him could never have become a universal, all-controlling power. He himself came gradually to a recognition of the fact, as may be seen in his use of the name "Son of man," in the transfiguration and con-

nected events, and his public entrance into Jerusalem. This is a singularly weak position. We have already shown that throughout the Gospel of Matthew Jesus is the centre of religious faith and obedience, and the Divine man, the Son of God. Baur confounds the consciousness of Christ with the gradual evolution of its contents, as indeed throughout he fails to comprehend the essential unity of the different phases of development of the same germ; he cannot understand how the covered seed becomes the wide-spreading tree. It is especially surprising to find Baur making the Jewish idea of the Messiah the means whereby the consciousness of Jesus through the national consciousness grew into the universal consciousness. Let us admire the attempt to discover the natural elements of the miracle of the spread of Christianity by giving it concreteness and making it the embodiment of an idea. But the selection does not seem fortunate. The Jewish idea was, particularly at this time, a narrow one. The Messiah was to elevate the nation to a pitch of unexampled temporal greatness and glory, and the Gentiles were to share in the glory only by becoming Jews. The Jesus of Matthew is spiritual and unpolitical; he makes a little child the pattern of greatness in the kingdom of heaven; he forbids his disciples to proclaim him as Messiah (Matthew xvi. 20); is obedient to the Roman authorities; defers the throne of his glory to the final consummation of things, and makes its condition spiritual (cf. Matthew xix. 28 and xxv. 31-46); rejects the Jews (xxiii. 37-39), and gives his disciples the commission to teach all nations. How, then, Jesus of Nazareth, who taught so pure a morality, who so habitually and distinctly repelled the notion of temporal sovereignty, could have offered himself to the Jews as the Messiah in their sense; or how, starting from the Jewish conception, he could have attained to the universality of view which marked his instructions; or, how any part of the Jewish nation could have at all accepted a man as Messiah, who contradicted all the received notions of the position; or how the Gentiles could have accepted a system of religion clothed in a peculiarly Jewish dress,—are questions which it behooves the originators of this view to answer.

Baur's treatment of the death and resurrection of Christ is instructive as to his method. The two are related to one another as (subjectively) cause and effect. "His death," says he, "which seemed to threaten destruction, was the occasion of victory, inasmuch as it rendered necessary absolute rejection or implicit faith, and the latter, if strong enough to stride over his death, must advance to life; and so came the necessity for the resurrection." Here is a curious illustration of the Baurian conception of historical inquiry. "The real

character of the resurrection," says he, "lies without the circle of historical investigation." And why? we may with all humility inquire. Is it not a fact stated by Matthew with as much distinctness as the public entry into Jerusalem, and therefore entitled to as much credit? Can it be ignored as a fact, if the inquirer have proper regard to the "objectivity" of historical conception? But we are not left without an answer. "The necessary postulate for all that follows is not so much the fact of the resurrection as the belief in it." This, then, is what is meant by the "objectivity" on which so much stress is laid; we are to determine what is necessary in order to explain succeeding events, and the rest may be excluded from historical investigation. Similarly, if comets so far as we know, are not essential to the stability of the solar system, and not connected with its phenomena, they may properly be ignored by astronomers. It is sufficient that the disciples believed that Christ arose; whether he did or not is a matter of indifference. Its reality seemed to them necessary; and so it acquired a subjective reality. In this case, therefore, historical objectivity proves to be pure subjectivity. This is the way in which a method which plumes itself on its conscientious adherence to fact, disposes of a fundamental fact of Christianity. The real "historical" argument of Baur here is: the resurrection is a miracle; miracles are impossible; therefore the resurrection did not take place.

The more serious attack of the Tübingen School, however, is directed to another point. Christianity did not assume its proper form till after the death of Christ, so we believe with Baur, but we hold that its essence was always the same, that Paul only expanded the teachings of Jesus, against the view that he added a new and distinctive element to it. We meet here again the subtle sophistry which confounds organic development and mechanical growth. The disciples—such is the position of the Tübingen critics—were at first nothing but Jews who believed that the Messiah had come, and Christianity would have remained merely the faith of a Jewish sect if something had not been added to give universality to its principle. This "something," we believe, in accordance with the inspired narrative, to have been inherent in the nature of Christianity itself, and to appear, gradually and with more or less distinctness, among all classes of disciples. Baur, on the contrary, thinks it necessary to introduce a foreign element, or rather, he discovers two forms of Christianity, in hostile array, each with its set of ideas, everywhere clashing and struggling, but finally by mutual concession, by taking and giving, settling into the form of belief which constitutes our Christianity. It

is satisfactory to know that his method is "historical," and that he proposes to give ocular proof of all that he advances. We accompany him with pleasure in his survey of the historical monuments of that wonderful age which gave the world a new and universal religion, and the labors and struggles of the men who were to give tone to all coming ages.

The first sure historical footing he finds in the account of Stephen in the book of Acts. All that precedes is a highly colored sketch, the design of which is to glorify the apostles and the church. We feel ourselves embarrassed as to the treatment of Baur's criticism of the first five chapters of the Acts. It is a skilfully constructed cumulative argument, in which, holding his theory steadily in view, he makes everything bear on it, and clipping and expanding, asserting, suggesting, insinuating, by quibbles, conjectures, and distortions, accomplishes what an expert advocate does before a jury, he makes out a case; and one is wearied out with stopping at every sentence to define its fallacy, to detect the exact degree of error, to determine just where a false coloring begins, to drag forth the hidden assumptions which lead to conclusions, and in general to sift and examine what is not always worth examining.¹ The narrative in Acts is characterized by an elevated simplicity, and gives a graphic description of the enthusiastic boldness of the apostles, the wonderful effect produced on the people by their preaching and miracles, and the very natural indecision of the high priest and his party under the difficult circumstances in which they found themselves. If it were worth while, our space would not permit us to go into a detailed examination of Baur's assertion that this narrative was written for the simple purpose of dressing out the first years of the church with splendor. For "thousands" we must read "hundreds," while, *per contra*, the number 120 (i. 15) is to be corrected by Paul's 500 (I Corinthians xv. 6). The grand, elaborately described meeting of the Sanhedrim in the fourth chapter, when all the chief men came from abroad to Jerusalem, (*etc.* says Baur, in v. 6, though Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Tregelles read *et*), had a lame and impotent conclusion, since they did nothing but inquire how the apostles had worked the miracle. And how remarkable that it is Gamaliel, the teacher of the persecuting Saul, who is made the advocate for lenient measures. Now the criticism seems strange enough when we remember that the book of Acts, according to Baur, is a strongly Pauline production. But we are reminded that the greater the honor with which the author

¹ Paulus, der Apostel Jesu Christi, p. 20, seq.

wreathed the brows of the Jewish apostles, the greater the freedom and effectiveness with which he could afterwards magnify Paul at their expense. So flimsy are the considerations which lead to the view, (totally unnecessary, even if we consider the book to be of a mediating nature), that the author of the "Acts" has deliberately falsified the facts of the early history of the church at Jerusalem.

We shall not notice Baur's explanations of the miracles which he meets with in the book of Acts and elsewhere,¹ but confine ourselves to his dealing with what he is pleased to consider the historical facts. He regards the history of the Christianity of the first century, as has been stated, as the conflict of the Petrine and Pauline parties, and the germ of this movement he sees in the account of the Hellenist Stephen. His death is the dividing point; before that, Christianity was nearly Jewish, and now appears the free Pauline element. It is undoubtedly true that there is a close intellectual relation between Stephen and Paul, and a similarity in their modes of presenting the gospel, and we are not surprised to find among the Hellenists of the Jerusalem church a quicker apprehension of the universality of the religion of Jesus, and a greater catholicity of feeling. We recognize the fact that God's process of developing and fixing the gospel of Christ was not independent of the free mental activity of man. These Grecians, unshackled by the Jewish feeling which at first clung to Peter and the others, more naturally laid hold of the freeness of the gospel, and, when they were driven abroad by the persecution that arose in connection with Stephen, preached with power to their brethren, and established centres of Christian faith, as Antioch, independent of Jerusalem. But Baur sees in these newly formed bodies of believers a party hostile to the mother church, which had now come to be composed of Hebrews only. Such hostility, however, cannot be reconciled with the visit of Barnabas to the young church at Antioch (ch. xi.), which was not merely an indication of his personal kind feeling, but a proof of the hearty sympathy of the Jerusalem Christians. Further, it is probable that among the latter were still to be found Hellenists. The statement (Acts viii. 1,) that "they were all scattered abroad except the apostles," need not be taken with absolute literalness; or, if all left the city, some of those who returned would probably be Hellenists. And we seem to have an intimation of the

¹ With respect to the conversion of Paul, we hold that previous earnest thought and mental struggles (from reflection, according to Rénan, on the death of Stephen; according to Baur, on the death of Christ), are not inconsistent with the miracle, which was to him what the Pentecostal effusion of the Spirit was to the previously unclear mental processes of the other apostles.

presence of a Hellenistic element in the Jerusalem Church in Acts xi. 2, where Peter is called to account by "them of circumcision," this phrase indicating a strongly Jewish party in contrast with some other, as it certainly does in ch. x. 45.¹ There is, so far, no evidence of a diminution of cordial feeling between the various bodies of Christians, nothing contrary to the belief that the general advance of Christianity to completely spiritual views, was the work of Hebrews and Hellenists together, in which, if not always equally active, they were at one in purpose and sympathy.

But Stephen perished untimely, and it was left to Paul to work out his principles to their legitimate consequences. This, Baur thinks, he did so thoroughly as to excite a hostility between himself and the other apostles so deeply grounded and far-reaching that it gave color to the whole succeeding history, beginning a contest that was waged unintermittedly and fiercely for a century, and which drew into it almost all the Christian literature of the world. Baur finds confirmation of this opinion everywhere, and has gathered his materials with great acuteness of research, and for him the Pseudo-Clement is as good authority as the Pseudo-Luke. Of our canonical books, he relies chiefly on the Acts of the Apostles (a late Pauline production, falsely attributed to Luke), and the four epistles of Paul which he chooses to consider genuine, Galatians, I Corinthians, II Corinthians, and Romans.

The question which brought to light this fundamental difference of view between the apostles was one raised by certain Jews who came to Antioch, and taught that the Gentile converts must be circumcised and obey the Mosaic Law. Whereupon Paul took Barnabas and Titus and went to Jerusalem to settle it. Thus far we agree with Baur that Paul recognized the importance of the issue, and resolved to meet it. But our historical critic proceeds with the startling assertion that the real opponents of Paul and Barnabas were the elder apostles.² Is it possible that those differences of character and view which we have been accustomed to consider as proofs of the universality of the gospel, and illustrations of God's wonderful ways of working out his designs, are to be raised to the rank of antagonisms? Were Peter and Paul not loving brethren, united in doctrine and life in the service of Christ? Let us give a candid examination to the proofs of his position adduced by Baur.

¹ Even without this Baur's assertion is without proof, and the burden of proof lies on him.

² Baur insidiously presents Paul's late calling to the apostleship as a ground of jealousy between him and the older apostles. But none of Paul's self-assertion, (which is sometimes very strong), implies jealousy on either side towards the other. In his strongest denunciations of the Judaizing party he speaks of his brethren with respect and affection.

1. Baur holds that a question which excites so much feeling as is indicated in the 15th chapter of Acts could not have originated with a few extreme Judaizers with whom the apostle had no sympathy. This is a very weak assertion. The necessity of combating an error depends not on the station of its originators, but on the character of the error itself, and the probability of its becoming effective for harm. Here was a view which involved an annihilation of the gospel, and Paul, whose own experiences had impressed so deeply on his soul the antithesis of grace and works, determined at once to crush it. The more, that it had plausibility, seeming to honor God in honoring his law, and might easily impose itself on Christians, both Jewish and Gentile, who had not vigorously thought out the doctrine of grace. The truth was held simply in the concrete; the age of dogmatic construction was not yet reached, and men did not so easily see the contradiction involved in the attempt to make the law necessary to salvation. God raised up Paul for this very purpose, endowing him with a power of profound, trenchant logic, which went straight to the grounds of doctrine, and held them fast. The other apostles recognized the justness of his position when set forth and illustrated, and Peter indeed had already come to a concrete and partial conception of it; but from the nature of their minds they were not fitted to be the special exponents of what required, not simply conviction of truth, but dialectic power, and Peter in especial had an unfortunate weakness which led him on one memorable occasion to conduct which involved a contradiction of his own position. Whether, then, we consider the fundamental character of this error, or its plausibility and power for mischief, or the eminently clear and logical character of Paul's mind, it was very natural for him to act with decision on this occasion. We see, too, how he comes to stand over against the other apostles, not as opponent, but as superior in breadth of view and power of logic, and how natural was the fervor with which he repelled the intimation that he had gotten his doctrine from his elder brethren.

2. For it is Baur's view of Galatians ii. 6, that the phrase "who seemed to be somewhat" both points out the "pillars" of the Jerusalem Church as Paul's opponents, and contains a sneer at their presumed importance.¹ But here is in fact no derogatory tone, no harsh reference to the subjective standpoint of the opponents, but

¹ Lightfoot (Commentary on Galatians, in *loc.*), renders "those who are looked up to as authorities," and says, "much force is lost by translating *ἀσθενέστες* as a past tense, instead of as a present. The whole expression is depreciatory, not of the Twelve themselves, but of the extravagant and exclusive claims set up for them by the Judaizers." Cf. Ellicott (Commentary on Galatians), "those who were high in reputation."

merely a characterization of certain persons as occupying eminent station in contrast to the "false brethren" who were insignificant in station. He chooses to distinguish them thus, by position and not by name, both because his interview with them was more especially to his credit, and because he is driven to the necessity of asserting himself by the utterly groundless charge of inferiority and subordination brought against him by the Galatian Judaizers. But the succeeding statement is decisive as to the relations between the elder and younger apostles. Paul says, vs. 7-10, that James, Cephas, and John gave to him and Barnabas the right hand of fellowship (he could in this case properly name them, since their position here was perfectly in keeping with the dignity of their station); and this act (which Baur groundlessly represents as a civil severance of relation, a polite parting company), contained the expression of their hearty sympathy, and the recognition by Paul of their equality at least.

3. In Paul's memorable rebuke of Peter (Galatians ii. 11, *seq.*), Baur sees proof of a complete doctrinal rupture and undisguised bitter feeling between the two, and remarks that we are not told that they ever again came into closer relations. With respect to the doctrine, if a real rupture were to be found here, it would still be necessary to show that it was permanent. But there is no such thing, for the rebuke, as is pointed out by Ellicott and Lightfoot, is directed not against Peter's erroneousness of view, but against his dissimulation. This is plain from the fact that Paul appeals to Peter's knowledge of the truth (v. 16), and charges him with inconsistency. He withstood him to the face because he was condemned (*ὅτι καταγνωμένος ἦν*), by the very nature of the act, as well as by the decision of the Jerusalem brethren. Baur puts it clearly enough: "with cutting severity he holds up to Peter's conscience the inconsistency of his Jewish-Christian indecision (*halbheit*), which binds together faith and the law, is a logical as well as a moral fault, a contradiction by which he condemns himself." It is also to be observed that the same charge of dissembling is brought against Barnabas, who is therefore doctrinally to be put alongside of Peter, and whose complete agreement with Paul is not questioned. With respect to the personal relations between the two apostles, we have proof of a complete sympathy between them not many years after. We refer to the passage, II Peter iii. 15, where Peter fully endorses the doctrinal position of the "beloved brother Paul." We are not surprised to find Baur rejecting the authority of this epistle, and referring on the other hand to the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies for evidence of the fact that the Jews of the second century had not forgotten the harsh words spoken by

Paul to their apostle. Of a final reconciliation he finds the first hint in a church tradition, recorded in a tract which has come down to us in Cyprian's works. We rely, however, on the Second of Peter as genuine in accordance with the decision of the Latin and Greek Churches of the fourth century, and the internal evidence, in which there is nothing opposed to the authorship of Peter.¹

4. Perhaps the most formally philosophical of Baur's arguments is that in which he labors to establish the hostile relation of the Christianity of Paul to the law, a full recognition of whose obligation the critic assumes for the Petrine party. The proof of this recognition, the very gist of the argument, Baur leaves in the background, chiefly taking it for granted that the Judaizers were the representatives of one phase of Christianity. Historically, then, the first sign of the conflict is found in the Epistle to the Galatians, where Paul directs his attack against the troublers of the Galatian churches, presenting the incompatibility of Christianity and circumcision, assigning Judaism a subordinate position in the religious development of humanity, posterior and secondary to the promise to Abraham, putting it in its observance of days on the same footing with the heathen religion of nature, and far beneath Christianity, the religion of Spirit. In the Epistles to the Corinthians we meet with the same conflict, only now it has gone on from the doctrinal discussions of circumcision and festivals and Mosaism in general, to the personal question of the apostle's authority. Against him had sprung up the Cephas and Christ-parties, demanding, as essential to apostolic authority, a personal intercourse with Christ. In his vindication, he emphasizes the spiritual and internal as against the merely external, makes his claim to the apostleship essentially subjective, relies on the testimony of his consciousness and his work in opposition to the objective, historical calling and authority of the Twelve. In unison with this subjective position, he represents Christianity as the religious consciousness which has passed the bounds of Judaism, which needs no mediating human authority, but has attained to complete clearness, certainty, and freedom. Lastly the Epistle to the Romans was suggested by the freer position in which he stood to this leading Jewish-Christian Church, in which he had as yet not come in personal contact with opponents. Here he aims his deadliest blow at the particularism of Judaism, which he makes religiously not better, and morally worse,

¹ See "Horne's Introduction" (10th ed.), IV, 603, *seq.*, where Tregelles gives some remarkable coincidences between this epistle and Clement of Rome, Polycarp, and Irenæus, and adduces confirmation of its genuineness from Origen and Firmilianus, Bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia. For notice of Melito of Sardis, see Cureton's "Spicilegium Syriacum," and on Eusebius' account of Le Clerc. *Hist. Eccl.*, p. 442, note.

than heathenism. His aim is not so much to develop the doctrine of sin and grace, as to set forth the relation of Jews and heathen to one another; and he grounds the return of the former not on their nationality, but on the general truth that all will eventually return to the God from whom and through whom all things are, the doctrine of universal salvation in opposition to the exclusively Jewish dogma of eternal damnation. (ch. ix.-xi.) The *differentiae* of Paul's position, as thus stated by Baur, are, the broadness of view (*Weltanschauung*), which leads him to reject Jewish particularism, and systematically to depreciate Mosaism, and the subjective nature of his claim to apostolic authority. The second of these, in the exclusive way in which Baur puts it, we might easily show to be incorrect from the detailed accounts given in Acts of Paul's miraculous calling. But as Baur does not accept the authority of this book, we refer to the epistles cited by him; these not only contain a full recognition of the other apostles ("as the apostles," I Corinthians iv. 9), but rest his claim on the same consideration as their's, namely, that he had seen Jesus (I Corinthians ix. 1, and, especially, xv. 3-9, where we find a perfectly explicit statement and most cordial sympathy with the other apostles). It is, however, true that Paul does dwell on his work as establishing his apostolic claim (to the Corinthians he writes, "the seal of our apostleship are ye in the Lord"), brings his own personality out in bold relief, asserts the truth of his calling and his equality with the older apostles. All this belongs to the peculiarity of his position, as special maintainer of the unsavory doctrine of grace, and as lying under the necessity of repelling aspersions of his character intended to undermine his authority. In the turbulence of the strife into which the apostle's clear-sightedness and decision brought him, there come to light emotions and struggles which do not appear in the calmer productions of the other apostles. But to make such differences of life proofs of essential difference in view as to the ground of apostolic authority, is an offence to critical justness and insight. The fallacy in the argument from Paul's supposed hostility to Judaism has already been pointed out. In the first place, it is not the system, but the abuse of it, which he opposes, Jewish particularism, as Baur properly says. Jews and Gentiles stand equally condemned before God, and in need of the free salvation of Christ, and any religion which denies the all-sufficiency of Christ is a lie. But, the law is holy, was given to sharpen the conscience and lead to Christ; the Jew has a great advantage over the heathen in the possession of a higher, purer religion; and Judaism itself is swallowed up in Christianity; which last assertion the apostle certainly nowhere makes of any form

of heathenism. And, in the second place, supposing the existence of a distinctly anti-Christian Judaism (which is admitted), it is to be proved that Peter and his brethren favored it. Baur's proofs of this are all assumptions; he takes for granted that the Cephas-party was 'countenanced by Peter, without knowing what the Cephas-party was, or whether Peter had ever heard of it. With equal arbitrariness he says that the "letters of recommendation," brought by Paul's opponents in Corinth (II Corinthians iii. 1), were given by Peter. Throughout we find the tendency to confound principles with their applications, and to deprive the history of those admirable touches of individual character which light up Paul's epistles. Baur and his school systematically ignore the living personality of the New Testament writers, and make them nothing but embodied ideas, quite incapable of going out of the circle of thought which the critic marks out for them. Peter is declared to be Judaistic, and therefore woe to the epistle, purporting to be his, which shall manifest any of the spiritual catholicity of Paul;¹ he is an incarnate idea of Judaism, and cannot think a thought outside of it. To men filled with the fulness of a grand universal idea, we may surely allow something of the manysidedness which we do not deny to writers who have in every respect less claim to it.

5. Another noteworthy proof adduced by Baur of the hostility between Peter and Paul is a supposed tradition which identifies the mythical Simon Magus of the 8th ch. of Acts with Paul—a tradition held to be alluded to in the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies, and which was the embodiment of the bitter hatred of the Judaizing party towards Paul. This hatred would naturally vent itself in a myth in which Peter is represented as indignantly repelling an unworthy intruder into the church. Baur showed that Marcion holds the Simon Magus of the Pseudo-Clem. Hom. to be Paul; Hilgenfeld follows with an endorsement; Zeller points out that if we substitute Paul's name for Simon's in Acts viii., we have in historical form what the Anti-Pauline Jews (II Corinthians xi. 4 *seq.*, xii. 11 *seq.*, I Corinthians ix. 1, *seq.*) asserted; and Volkmer, (let him have the honor), completes the proof by identifying the offer of money made by Simon with the collection carried by Paul to Jerusalem. The account in Acts, otherwise obscure, now becomes clear; Paul, whose visions and ecstasies are set forth in Simon's magic, resolved to be recognized as apostle at all hazards, attempts to bribe the Jerusalem college, and is promptly repelled. The author of the Acts, unable to ignore this story, skilfully adopts it and places it before Paul's conversion, that it

¹ See Baur's remarks on First Peter, "Kirchengesch. d., 3 erst. Jahrh." s. 123, *folg.*

might not be referred to him, unwarily, however, retaining the Samaritan extraction of Simon, the mythical expression of the hatred of the Jews. We confess that we do not see the necessity for this absurd explanation of the narrative in Acts, which seems to us to give a good sense if taken literally. The historical proof of the existence of the myth or tradition is very slight; it does not appear before the spurious Clement, and has for its expounder the very untrustworthy Marcion; Tertullian does not refer to it, but speaks naturally of Simon as a real magician condemned by Peter, (*De Præscript. Hæret.*, 33); it is not alluded to by the other Fathers, and we may lawfully dismiss it.

6. The culmination of the strife between the Pauline and Petrine parties is reached, according to Baur, in the Gospel of Luke, whose Pauline character is revealed by a comparison between it and Matthew. The Christ of Luke is not the Jewish Messiah, but the Saviour of the world, and in this sense the Son of God, and the whole representation of his character is in keeping with this universality. Here is the same ignoring of the differences in character and aim of the two Evangelists, and unfair crystallizing of variety of view into inflexible opposition. We think it probable that if this well preserved individuality, (which is to us so satisfactory as a literary quality and as proof of genuineness) were lacking, its absence would be considered a serious objection, as indicating a pruning, emasculating process, which would stamp them as "*tendenzschriften*" of the most flagrant sort. Now, while Matthew, a Jew, writing for Jews, would naturally give, what is indeed an essential part of the argument, the proofs of the Messiahship of Jesus, Luke, a Gentile, writing to a Gentile, would as naturally dwell on the salvation provided for the whole world. Yet in Luke, Jesus is also the Son of David, (iii. 31; xviii. 38; xx. 41, *seq.*), and the kingdom of heaven is the antithesis of poverty and riches (vi. 20, *seq.*); and, in Matthew, Jesus is also the Saviour of the world, for it is Matthew who tells of the Magi (ch. ii.), of the centurion (ch. viii.), of the woman of Canaan (ch. xv.), of the rejection of the Jews (ch. xxi.); and of the instruction to preach the gospel in the whole world, (xxvi. 13; xxviii. 19). Baur adduces two special evidences of the Pauline anti-Jewish character of Luke. First, that he knows nothing of the identity of Christ's teaching with the law and the Old Testament. If this were so, it would prove as has been shown, not Luke's agreement with Paul, but his divergence from him, inasmuch as Paul was not an enemy of the law. But we can, against Baur, establish Luke's Pauline relation to the Old Testament by the incident, (Luke iv. 16-21) where Christ declares an Old Testament Messianic prophecy fulfilled in himself, by the endorsement

of the divine character of the writings of Moses and the Prophets (xxiv. 27, 44), and especially by the definite declaration (xvi. 17), "it is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the law to fail." Baur's manner of eluding this last passage is summary; for "of the law," he substitutes "of my words," and this may be taken as an illustration of a not infrequent style of text-criticism. Tregelles and Tischendorf do not even mention any such reading as "of my words," nor is there in the MSS. and Ancient Versions a single deviation from the received text "of the law." Whence then does Baur get his reading. It comes from the Gospel of Marcion, a heretical and partizan production, an acknowledged "tendenzschrift," of an exaggerated Pauline character, and yet adduced, against Baur's own laws of criticism, to establish a Pauline reading. Baur "has no doubt" that Marcion's readings in many cases are to be regarded as the genuine and original against Luke. But what is to decide? Luke, because a Paulinist, is to be corrected, against all manuscript authority, by an ultra Paulinist of late date, of whom Baur says that "he undeniably allowed himself abbreviations and alterations of the text in the interest of his Paulinism and of his gnosticism," and that his Gnostic dualism, (in which originated his opposition to the law), carried him beyond the Apostle Paul.¹ Collated, therefore, Baur's propositions stand thus: 1. Marcion is more Pauline than Paul himself in his opposition to the Jewish law. 2. He permits himself to alter the text of the New Testament to establish his positions. 3. Therefore he is to be regarded as a more reliable expounder of Paulinism than Luke. Not even the insurmountable difficulty of his position can justify Baur in such dealing with the New Testament text.² The second decisively anti-Jewish fact in Luke is his attitude towards the Twelve, whom he persistently presents in an unfavorable light, that he may establish Paul's apostolic authority. Then he omits the "significant" declaration of Matthew (xvi. 17-19), in which Peter is called the rock on which the church is to be built, and the authority given (xviii. 18), to forgive and not to forgive, while he exalts the Seventy (ch. x.) to the highest point of privilege. But these omissions would equally fix a Pauline character on Mark, who also coincides with Luke

¹ "Kirchengeschichte d. 3 erst. Jahrh." s. 75. folg.

² Tertullian, (Adv. Marcion, IV. 33) seems to adopt Marcion's reading: "Transeat igitur coelum et terra citius, sicut et lex et prophetæ, quam unus apex verborum domini." But Tertullian, generally loose in his quotations of Scripture, is here besides not concerned with criticism of the text as such, but specially against Marcion's Gnosticism. He points out the latter's alterations where they militate against the sympathy between Christ and the Creator, or the reality of Christ's human body; otherwise not. Thus, he does not refer to the omission of Luke 1-3, and xv. 11-32. His scattering commentary is not authority against the united testimony of all the MSS.

(viii. 54, cf. Mark v. 40) in the statement of the ejection of all persons but Peter, James, and John in the healing of Jairus' daughter. As for the Seventy, whom Baur declares to be the bearers of an idea which was to be realized in the opposition of Paulinism to Judaism, it is difficult to see in the narrative any special laudation of them. They are sent forth, and return, as Köstlin remarks, only to receive from Jesus an exhortation to humility, have no part in the subsequent privileges of the Twelve, and are indeed not mentioned again. These citations therefore fail completely to prove Luke's hostility to the law and to the Twelve.

7. Finally, Baur finds a strong Jewish anti-Pauline tone in the Apocalypse. The condemnation of eating flesh offered to idols (Revelation ii. 14, 20) is against Paul, who had not totally condemned it (I Corinthians viii.); it is Paul that the author has in mind when he speaks (ii. 2) of the false apostles in Ephesus, as also the number twelve (xxi. 14) necessarily excludes the former from the apostolic college. And doctrinally, while to Paul, the heathen consciousness of God and conscience are of equal rank with the Jewish law, to the author of the Apocalypse the Gentiles have no receptivity in respect to Christianity, and it is on the ruins of the heathen world that Judaism celebrates its final triumph. It is satisfactory to find that these are the considerations which are to establish the antagonism between John and Paul; they are not of great weight. The personal bitterness against Paul is assumed by Baur. There is no reason for confounding the calm logical statement of the religious grounds of action, the clear exhibition of the office of the free Christian conscience (in I Corinthians viii.) with the warm condemnation of the excesses of a heretical sect (in Revelation ii.). The "false apostles" are spoken of as contemporary with the writer, and a reference to Paul would be inconsistent with the date assigned to this book by Baur. Such characters were unfortunately not rare, and there is no necessity, and no shadow of reason for understanding them to include Paul. In asserting so strongly the Jewish exclusivism of the Apocalypse, Baur seems to forget first, that it is symbolical, and second, and that its symbols are taken from the Old Testament. Not only is the universality of its view apparent from such passages as ch. v. 13, and ch. vii. 9, but the Judaism throughout is merely external; under the Old Testament dress and body is seen the New Testament spirit. No circumcision, no appeal to a national covenant, no legal meritoriousness, but salvation through Christ, a life of tribulation followed by glory, cleansing in the blood of the Lamb, a relation to the Redeemer which is based on the individual consciousness and on his bearing towards the

individual soul. If heathenism is crushed, it is only as inimical to Jesus, (so Paul, I Corinthians xv. 25; II Corinthians iv. 3; v. 10, 11; vi. 14-18); and the absolute freeness and universality of the gospel is set forth with unsurpassed clearness and beauty in the last chapter: "whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely."

We have thus attempted to state briefly and fairly the general principles of the Tübingen criticism, and its special position in reference to the alleged Petrine and Pauline controversy; our limits forbid us to enter on the examination of what is called the Period of Mediation (represented by the book of Acts and various Epistles of Paul, James, and Peter), and the type of Christianity presented in the fourth Gospel. We have confined ourselves to Baur, and it may be mentioned that in a recent work by Zeller some noteworthy modifications appear. Thus, though miracles are excluded from historical investigation, as contrary to experience, the argument against them is characterized as (not worthless, but) very weak; certainly an important concession of principle for a Hegelian. Zeller also declares his accordance with Strauss' theory of the origin of the Gospels, which as mythical, that is, unconscious, is incompatible with the conscious, voluntarily determined, theory of Baur. Further, he regards the eschatological discourses of Jesus as coming essentially from Jesus himself, and thinks that the belief in the resurrection of the Lord must have had its ground in the words of Christ. In the main, however, his method is that of Baur, as well as the result of his inquiries.

The works of the Tübingen School will repay careful study, and have already had their effect in suggesting more thorough examination and profounder views of the historical monuments of Christianity. To say nothing of the able productions, more especially polemical, which they have called forth in Europe and America, it is to Baur that we owe Dr. Dorner's noble treatise on "The History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ," which appeared first in the form of an essay read by the author, in the Theological Seminary of Dr. Baur himself. There is yet more to do in the way of investigation, and while we thankfully recognize the fact that so redoubted an attack has issued in strengthening our defences, we may accept it as a call to gather up our strength and go deeper into the mysteries of the gospel of Christ, that we may unveil its beauties, evolve its power, and be filled with its spirit.

C. H. Toy.

GREENVILLE, S. C.



EXEGETICAL STUDIES.

"And supper being ended, the devil having now put into the heart of Judas Iscariot, Simon's son, to betray him."—JOHN xiii. 2.

THE expression, "supper being ended," has given much trouble to the critics, and considerable comfort to cavillers and skeptics. For it is impossible to harmonize the accounts of the last supper in the different Gospels, unless we assign the things recorded in this and several following chapters to the time while Jesus was at the table with his disciples. There is no room for them to have occurred after the supper was *ended*.

There are two legitimate ways of escape from this apparent inconsistency. In the first place the original text is doubtful here. Both the Vatican and the Sinaitic manuscripts, the two most ancient of all, have the present participle, *γινόμενου*, here, instead of the aorist, *γενομένου*. This reading removes all difficulty. It was "while supper was going on," not "when supper was ended." Professor Bartlett, in his admirable article on the Prominent Forms of Assault upon Christianity (see *Bibliotheca Sacra* for January, 1868), speaks of the difficulty as being removed by this different reading of the text. (p. 174.)

But there never was occasion for so much ado about the passage. Even according to the text of most manuscripts, there is really no contradiction or inconsistency. For the aorist participle does not require the translation, "supper being *ended*," but is fairly rendered "supper having been made ready," or "having begun." The proof of this sense is so abundant, that it seems strange the passage should ever have made any difficulty. See this same participle, in the same tense, in Matthew xiii. 21, "when tribulation or persecution has arisen"—not when it is

ended; Mark vi. 2, "when the Sabbath was come"—not when it was ended; Luke vi. 48, "when the flood arose"—not when it was ended; and so likewise more than a dozen times with such words as "day," "morning," and "evening." Indeed this aorist participle is used about a dozen times with the last of these words alone; and the meaning invariably is, "evening having come"—not having ended. In one place the present participle—*οἰστος*—is used as equivalent. (John xx. 19.) Dr. Campbell has a very sensible note on the passage. He seems to have seen more clearly than most critics, that there was here no "*nodus Deo vindice dignus*." Castalio came much nearer to a true apprehension of the expression, when he Latinized it by "*cæna parata*," than Jerome and Erasmus, who render it by "*cæna facta*," or Beza, who has "*cæna peracta*." Alford's note on the place is brief, but satisfactory.

"For we are laborers together with God; ye are God's husbandry, ye are God's building. According to the grace of God which is given unto me, as a wise master-builder, I have laid the foundation, and another buildeth thereon. But let every man take heed how he buildeth thereupon. For other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ. Now if any man build on this foundation, gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble: every man's work shall be made manifest; for the day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire; and the fire shall try every man's work, of what sort it is. If any man's work abide which he hath built thereupon he shall receive a reward. If any man's work shall be burnt, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved; yet so as by fire. Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you? If any man defile the temple of God, him shall God destroy; for the temple of God is holy, which temple ye are."—I CORINTHIANS iii. 9-17.

The apostle commences this chapter with a reproof of the Corinthian disciples for their carnal disposition. That disposition manifested itself in the partizan zeal with which they attached themselves to particular ministers of Christ, each one exalting his own favorite, and depreciating the others, as though the apostles and their companions were nothing better than rival candidates for the honor that cometh from man. Probably many of these cherished this partial and schismatic preference for the particular minister who had been the means of bringing them to the enjoyment of an assured hope, and of introducing them into the church by baptism. Indeed this seems to be quite distinctly intimated, not only in the 5th verse, but still more in an earlier part of the Epistle: see ch. i. vs. 12-16. Among other evil results of this condition of things, it evidently exposed the ministers of Christ,—who were but *men* then, just as they are now,—to the temptation of seeking to multiply baptized converts from other motives than zeal for the glory of God in the salvation of sinners. Thus this partizan spirit was not only sinful on the part of those who indulged it, but it tended to undermine ministerial character, and to corrupt the purity of the church,—just as it tends to the same results now. In view of these things, the apostle has here a word for all the parties concerned; first a word of rebuke for those who indulged this unchristian and mischievous temper, in vs. 1-4; secondly, a lesson of humility for ministers, reminding them, that though one might have

planted the seed of repentance and faith in the convert's heart, and another watered it till it blossomed into distinct hope and joy, still all these,—the repentance and the faith, the hope and the joy,—were not man's work, but God's gifts, in vs. 5-9; and thirdly, a solemn admonition to those who introduce persons into the church, to look well to it that they do not corrupt that sacred body by incorporating into it unworthy members, in vs. 10-17. In the second of the above divisions, the apostle employs an *agricultural* metaphor. Ministers, as God's laborers, plant and water God's husbandry or tillage. But before he enters upon the third division, he exchanges the agricultural metaphor for an *architectural* one, giving us, in v. 9, explicit notice of the change: "ye are God's husbandry, ye are God's building." This last figure he carries through to the end.

He himself, as a wise master builder, had laid the foundation of this building by preaching Christ as the believer's wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption (ch. i. v. 30). The foundation was thus laid and settled; there was no further question about that: but the upbuilding upon that foundation was left to the wisdom and faithfulness of those who came after him. Not what they should build *upon*, but what they should build *with*, was the question for them to decide; and concerning this he solemnly reminds them of their responsibility. The foundation was a tried stone, sure, elect, precious. It was possible to use such worthless and perishable materials, as wood, hay, and stubble, in the superstructure; but inasmuch as the building would certainly be subject to the trial of fire, only such durable and fire-proof materials as gold, silver, and precious stones were to be used. If these last were used, the building would abide the fiery ordeal; and its passing this trial without damage, would be a reward—a happiness, and an honor—to the wise builder. If those former combustible materials were used in constructing the building, its destruction by fire would be a loss—an unhappiness and a dishonor—to the unwise builder. Though saved himself, he would be saved as one who escapes from the flames that are consuming the house which he has built—he will escape with sorrow and shame. God's temple is precious in his sight. If any man destroy it, him will God destroy. If any man do it damage, he will suffer proportionate damage by the just judgment of God. To drop the figure, the malignant persecutors of God's church shall be destroyed; the unwitting but injudicious corruptors of it, by the introduction into it of unworthy, unregenerate persons, shall be punished. If that punishment should consist in nothing more than in seeing their work consumed, it would not be a light punishment for a true servant of Christ; and that the apostle has such a character in mind seems plain from v. 15.

There are two particulars, in regard to which the above exegesis may seem to need confirmation. The first is, the referring of the "gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble," to *persons* incorporated into the church by the minister, instead of referring them, as is commonly done, to true and false *doctrines* preached by the minister. Our defence of the former interpretation is, first, that it suits the context, which the other

does not; secondly, that it agrees with the *usus loquendi* of such terms as build, temple, &c., which the other does not; and thirdly, that it is imperatively required by the apostle's explicit and twice repeated declaration: "*ye* are God's building" (v. 9); "*ye* are the temple of God" (v. 16). In the face of such positive definitions, we should not be at liberty, even if the application of these terms in *other* passages was ambiguous, to understand them in *this* place of a system of doctrines, or of any thing else but a company of living persons. But an examination of the use of these words elsewhere does not reveal any such ambiguity. The common use of them is in perfect accordance with the sense which we have attributed to them here. See especially I Peter ii. 5; Ephesians ii. 21; II Corinthians vi. 16; I Timothy iii. 15; Hebrew iii. 6. We remark in passing, that the usage of the word "burn" is an additional confirmation of our interpretation. What intelligible sense could be attached to such an expression as the *burning up* of erroneous and heretical *doctrines*? But this is the very word repeatedly used of the finally lost, whether under the image of tares, chaff, or the harlot of Revelation. See Matthew iii. 12; xiii. 30, 40; Luke iii. 17; Revelation xvii. 16; xviii. 8.

The other particular which may need a word of justification is the interpretation given to the 17th verse. It is only the plainest reason—the plainest *necessity* we might rather say—which can justify the attributing of different senses to the same word, in the same connection, as is done in this case by our common English version. Certainly the word cannot be translated "defile" in both cases. Our interpretation allows the sense "destroy" in both cases, and at the same time avoids contradicting what is affirmed in v. 15.

If our interpretation is correct, this passage has a very important bearing on the question of the constitution of the church of Christ. It condemns every theory that adopts any other constitutive elements of the church except regenerate, believing persons.

"Let him that is taught in the word, communicate unto him that teacheth in all good things. Be not deceived; God is not mocked; for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap. For he that soweth to his flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the Spirit shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting. And let us not be weary in well-doing; for in due season we shall reap, if we faint not. As we have therefore opportunity, let us do good unto all men, especially unto them who are of the household of faith."—GALATIANS vi. 6-10.

This section enjoins liberality in giving for the support of religious teachers, and for other religious purposes, as the preceding section (vs. 1-5) enjoins gentleness and forbearance in the treatment of brethren who fall into sin. He that is taught the word is to repay the obligation as far as he can, by imparting of his good things to his teacher. The 7th verse is very often quoted and preached from, as declaring the principle, that the rewards of a religious life, and the penalties of an irreligious life, come upon men as the result of moral laws, as regular and irresistible as the laws of nature. We need not absolutely condemn such a general-

ization of the apostle's language: but it ought to be emphatically insisted on, that the apostle does not at once drop the subject which he had so distinctly and formally introduced in the previous verse. He keeps it in view throughout the four following verses; and they are all to be interpreted as having at least primary and direct reference to this particular subject. The sowing to the flesh, and the sowing to the Spirit, are to be understood as especially denoting the *using of our property* for carnal gratification, or for the promoting of spiritual interests. And the corresponding harvests of corruption and of life everlasting are represented here as the respective consequences of a selfish and sinful use of our worldly substance, on the one hand, and of a benevolent and religious use of it, on the other. The connection requires this; and this specific interpretation is confirmed by the agreement of the language with that which the apostle uses on the same subject in other places. Observe how he employs the terms sow and reap in I Corinthians ix. 11. "If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great thing if we shall reap your carnal things?" And, again, in II Corinthians ix. 6, "He which soweth sparingly shall reap also sparingly; and he which soweth bountifully shall reap also bountifully." In both these places the context shows clearly that Christian liberality in giving is what the apostle is enforcing; and in the former of the two passages, as here in Galatians, he is insisting particularly on the duty of giving liberally for the support of their religious teachers. The 9th and 10th verses of the passage before us, while they seem somewhat to extend the application to other forms of beneficence, clearly confirm our interpretation. We are to persevere in self-sacrificing beneficence to all men, but especially to our kindred in the faith.

Ministers must not allow themselves to be hindered, by a false modesty, from enforcing upon their congregations the duty of cheerfully giving an adequate support to their religious teachers, as well as of devising and executing liberal things in other departments of benevolent effort. They must, as Paul did, take good care to make their own unselfish character so unquestionable, that they can urge this duty on their congregations without being suspected of unworthy motives.

There is reason to believe that men in general—nay, that the majority of Christian men—do not consider how much of character is revealed by the use which they make of their money. It is an important sign of their ruling disposition, their master passion; and this is true, not only in the case of the comparatively rich, but of all except the very poorest.

The words rendered "cheerful" and "cheerfulness," are used in the Scriptures only in connection with this duty of giving. And they are very emphatic words. "God loveth a *cheerful* giver." (II Corinthians ix. 7.) "He that showeth mercy (or giveth in charity) with *cheerfulness*." (Romans xii. 8.) In this last passage, we should but be recurring to the origin of the English word, if we should substitute "hilarity" for "cheerfulness." Giving ought to be one of the Christian's most *joyous* acts, a tonic, a stimulant, that should raise our spirits to the point of exultation. How is it brethren?

"If any man see his brother sin a sin which is not unto death, he shall ask, and he shall give him life for them that sin not unto death. There is a sin unto death: I do not say that he shall pray for it"—I JOHN v. 16.

As thus translated, the verse prompts questions not easy to answer. What is the sin unto death? How can it be known whether any particular person has committed it? More than all, is it in accordance with the spirit of the gospel for the Christian to sit in judgment on his brother, and assigning him to such an awful doom, refuse to pray for him.

ἑρωτᾷν, here rendered "pray," has in the New Testament, besides its classic meaning of "to question," "to ask for an answer," the meaning of "to beg," "to entreat:" but as Trench says, it always "implies on the part of the asker a certain equality or familiarity, as of king with king; or if not equality, familiarity with him from whom the gift or favor is sought, which lends authority to the request." He also says that with the single exception of the passage now under consideration, it is never used in the New Testament to express the prayer of man to God, of the creature to the Creator.

But why make this an exception? What reason is there for giving *ἑρωτᾷν* here a meaning which it never has elsewhere? The obvious import of the passage is, let the Christian pray for his erring brother: if it is not a sin unto death, his prayer shall be granted: if it is a sin unto death, his prayer must be ineffectual; but let him pray for all, without *inquiring* as to the sin unto death, or undertaking to decide on the character and degree of his brother's guilt: God will determine what prayers shall be heard and what denied.

The majority of expositors connect *περί* with *ἑρωτᾷν*, but Ebrard, we think rightly, connects it with *λέγω*. In either case to translate *ἑρωτᾷν* "inquire" gives a meaning in conformity with the uniform use of the word, in accordance with the context, and in fullest harmony with the spirit of the New Testament.



NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Winer's Grammar. A Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament, prepared as a solid basis for the Interpretation of the New Testament. By Dr. GEORGE BENEDICT WINER. Seventh Edition, enlarged and improved. By Dr. GOTTLIEB LUNEMANN, Professor of Theology at the University of Göttingen. Revised and authorized Translation. Andover: Warren F. Draper. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. London: Trübner. Leipsic: Vogel. 1869. 8vo., pp. xviii. 728, Cl. \$5.00.

Translations from the German are often very unsuccessful, and it ought by this time to be known that the difficulty of making them is exceedingly great. The German philosophical terminology in grammar and theology, as well as in what we commonly call philosophy, has attained a copiousness and precision not equalled in English, and the unlimited supply of expressive compounds which the language admits can often be exactly rendered into English only by a wearisome multiplication of qualifying phrases. Thus the translator frequently seems compelled to choose between a weak or inelegant rendering, and one that will be inadequate or obscure. It is wonderful how different the two languages are, while yet so closely akin, and each so highly developed that they constitute the two foremost languages now spoken on the earth. They are alike in much that is elementary, the differences being chiefly felt when we attempt exact rendering, and that of discussions involving higher thought. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why so many men

imagine they can translate German, and do not know how wretchedly they fail.

Of all the noble German works butchered in English translations, few have fared so badly as Winer's Grammar. The American translation of the fourth edition is well known to have been poor. When it was announced, ten years ago, that the greatly improved sixth edition had been translated by Prof. Masson, in Edinburgh, the hope was confidently entertained that we should now have a satisfactory rendering. Mr. M. had been professor in the University of Athens, and it was supposed that he must be an excellent scholar, both in Greek and in German. The result proved that it was far otherwise. The translator of the edition before us shows an admirable delicacy in avoiding any direct censure of his predecessor's work. He simply says: "But although Prof. Masson's version has been retained as the basis of this, it is believed that hardly a paragraph of his work remains altogether unaltered; and sometimes the alterations amount in effect to a new translation,—a translation which for entire pages has but a few phrases in common with its predecessor." This tenderness of allusion to the abounding errors and faults which he had to correct, makes it all the more appropriate that his reviewers should speak plainly. Prof. Masson's translation was exceedingly bad. He had very loose notions of a translator's duty, making (without remark) not a few slight alterations to suit his own judgment or taste. Several conspicuous examples of omission subjected him at the time, it will be remembered, to severe criticism. He seems also to have been careless. The renderings of Greek into English showed that he was not a thorough scholar in Greek, as indeed was apparent from his "Prolegomena." And above all, he was grossly ignorant of German. The syntax of German sentences, the force of German particles, the meaning of even common German words, he has repeatedly misunderstood. Winer has not only failed to be rendered with precision and elegance, but has had to bear the blame, with English and American readers, of many an obscure statement which was plain enough in the original, and sometimes the sense has been utterly perverted. To take but one example, Mr. Masson (p. 479) makes Winer say that *ἐν* is sometimes used in the ecclastic sense in Greek authors, a statement strikingly discordant with the discussion that follows; when, in fact, W. says it was sometimes so "taken in Greek authors also," that is, so taken by certain critics whom he mentions. We will not go into the unpleasant task of setting down a list of blunders; it might not be a useless work, but we have no room for it.

Besides other advantages, this edition is beautifully printed, far surpassing the former translation and also the original. The more marked difference in size of type will be of considerable service to the junior student. Mr. Masson had done something towards breaking up into distinctly printed paragraphs the huge blocks of matter which, in true German fashion, Winer sometimes gives, and Mr. Thayer has judiciously carried this still farther. There is an excellent arrangement by which we find noted on the margin the pages of the 6th and 7th editions of the original, and those of Masson's translation. Many of the best commen-

taries in English and German refer to Winer by pages, and this arrangement will save much trouble. The indexes are admirable. The German editions are not obnoxious to Carlyle's comical complaints against German books for never having an index, but this translation has made great improvement, particularly in the index of passages in the New Testament explained or cited. This is in the original quite unsatisfactory, omitting many passages on which real light is thrown by the grammar, and yet including many on which nothing important is said. Prof. Warren, of the Baptist Theological Seminary at Chicago has here given us a *complete* index, *i. e.*, of all the passages referred to, and has marked with an asterisk those which are commented upon. Thus one may find it easy to make constant reference to Winer in reading his Greek Testament, and may also when wishing thoroughly to examine a particular passage, consult all the connections in which it is even cited. This one index occupies 61 large 8vo. pages.

Persons who have Mr. Masson's translation ought by all means, we think, to procure this new edition, not so much for the additions of Winer or of Lünemann, as for the immense improvement in the translation. If they make any considerable use of the great grammarian's work, it will be unjust to him and to themselves if they should be content with slovenly, inadequate, obscure, and often erroneous rendering, when it is now possible to do so much better.

No one who reads his Greek Testament, and who wishes to rely on the results of his examination, can afford to dispense with the diligent study of Winer. Many expressions in the New Testament which are not strictly unclassical, are yet rare and peculiar, and not easily understood by one acquainted with only the ordinary classical usage. There is also in it a good deal of later or of colloquial Greek, while the Hebraistic tinge is pervading and important. How can a man trust his interpretations of Paul simply from having read Demosthenes and studied Kühner? Yet there are still a good many men in England and America who, on the strength of their classical studies, undertake to play the critic about the Greek Testament without having studied its grammatical usage; and even when they make references to Winer it is often in such a way as to show plainly enough that they are not really acquainted with him. In fact, however, while some neglect, a still larger number of classical scholars exaggerate, the peculiarities of New Testament Greek. An accurate scholar in classical usage reads his Greek Testament, and being struck here and there by various forms and constructions quite unlike what he is accustomed to, hastily concludes that the New Testament Greek is so irregular and uncertain that it cannot be interpreted with exactness. We have known classical professors who found this notion a very convenient means of evading troublesome questions as to the meaning of words and passages. "The New Testament Greek is really so very different from the classic Greek—and I have never made it a special study," &c. Besides, there is a strong tendency produced by certain modern controversial interests, to make much of the peculiarities of the so-called Hellenistic Greek. Some have even wished to call it a distinct *dialect*, though this over-

statement of the case has not met with much favor. In order to know then, without underrating or overrating, just what and how great are the departures of New Testament Greek from classical usage, one must carefully study the Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament. And we may say that scholars of our own denomination ought, in view of the controversial efforts made by others, to give this subject special attention.

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten—as some persons appear to do—that Winer's Grammar, though so noble and valuable a work, is by no means a Supreme Court to give final decision in questions of exegesis. The unquestioning faith with which the Lexicon or Grammar is often consulted and its decision stated, may well provoke a smile. No such reverence is felt for any particular commentary, and yet a grammar or lexicon of the New Testament is, after all, as it has been remarked, a commentary done in alphabetical order, or in the order of the parts of speech. While Winer, faithfully studied, is enough for the purposes of many, indeed of most, yet one is of course not prepared to decide the higher questions of New Testament exegesis, without a far wider range of study.

It is exceedingly gratifying progress that has been made in the systematic and truly scientific study of New Testament Greek, since the day when, in 1822, Winer published the first edition of his grammar. It was a small and imperfect, though already valuable treatise, but it has steadily grown, by the author's own labors, and by the diligent use of what others were doing all around him, into the great work now left us; and to Winer, far more than to any other man, is due the progress just mentioned. But the work is only begun. The Grammar of the Septuagint, which Winer at the outset stated his intention to prepare, was never written, nor has that important and difficult task been attempted by any one. There has been much discussion about the value of Modern Greek for the study of the New Testament; but no one, so far as we are aware, has undertaken to put into systematic form the help which it affords in the several departments of the New Testament Grammar. In fact, every branch of the great subject so ably treated by Winer calls for renewed and sustained investigation. Winer's own work is by no means of equal value throughout. His treatment of the conjunctions is imperfect, unsystematic, and unsatisfactory; nor have the Greek conjunctions ever received the thorough discussion they greatly need, and would richly repay. With the prepositions he has been much more successful, but here also there is very obvious room for improvement. Baptist scholars are especially called to the study of the prepositions in the New Testament, since they are continually brought forward in our controversies on the one hand with pedobaptists and on the other with Campbellites. It is remarkable that the most comprehensive and thorough, and, in our judgment, most satisfactory discussion of the prepositions (as to their classical use) is in an American work, Harrison on Greek Prepositions. (Philadelphia: Lippincott. pp. 500).

But without pointing out other parts of Winer's work which appear

to us of inferior value, we conclude this notice by alluding to his doctrinal opinions, so far as they affect the value of the grammar. It is well known that he shows a strong inclination towards Socinianism. But in the grammar this is seen more from omissions than from distinct statements. As to the Atonement, what he says about *ἀνέρ* is not objectionable, and is substantially adopted by Ellicott; and the distinct and unquestionable use of *ἀντί* to express substitution in Matthew xx. 28, he simply passes without remark. As to the divinity of our Lord, his bias is distinctly but not offensively exhibited. In I John v. 20 it must be admitted that the common interpretation is not certainly correct. In his first edition Winer took an untenable position as to John i. 3, but that statement is wanting in the latest editions. His mode of quoting Romans ix. 5 (p. 586) is unfair, as it hides an important difference in the order of words between this passage and the others he mentions. And in discussing (p. 130) II Peter i. 1, it is not fair that the strikingly similar expression which occurs a few sentences later (i. 11) should be omitted here, and relegated to a note four pages back. Still, Winer has shown that the interpretation which represents this and similar passages, as applying the name "God" to Christ, cannot be regarded as grammatically *necessary*. With the exception of these words and passages, and of an occasional expression indicating his loose views of inspiration, there is nothing in the grammar positively offensive to orthodoxy; though we could wish to see certain grammatical passages brought into a deserved prominence, such as Winer does not give them.

We trust that this admirable edition of a justly famous and surpassingly valuable work, will gain an extensive circulation, and that the study of it will begin afresh.

The Revelation of Law in Scripture, Considered both with respect to its own Nature and to its Relative Place in Successive Dispensations.

The Third Series of the "Cunningham Lectures." By PATRICK FAIRBAIRN, D. D., Author of *Typology of Scripture*, etc., New York: Robert Carter & Bro., No. 530 Broadway. 8vo., pp. 484. Cl., \$5.00.

The author of this volume is well-known to the ministry in America by his works on *Typology* and *Prophecy*. He has here given us a treatise, which although scarcely equal to the other two, is an able and elaborate discussion of the theme announced in the title—the examination of law, not in the field of nature, but in the moral and religious sphere. Those who are acquainted with his former productions need not be told that he is a thorough scholar, a reverent student of Scripture, and that he closely adheres to the Calvinistic system of theology.

This survey commences with the relation of man at creation to moral law; he then considers the revelation of law, strictly so-called, in respect to the time and occasion of its promulgation; the law in its form and substance; relation to Israel; its economical aspect; its relation to the mission and work of Christ; to the church; and its re-introduction into the church of the New Testament in the sense in which law was

abolished by Christ and his apostles. Three supplementary dissertations follow, in which he discusses, I. The double form of the Decalogue, and the questions to which it has given rise. II. The historical element in God's revelations of truth and duty, considered with an especial respect to their claim on man's responsibilities and obligations. III. Whether a spirit of revenge is countenanced in the writings of the Old Testament. The last hundred pages in the volume are occupied with an exposition of sixteen of the most important passages on the law in St. Paul's epistles.

This book forms one of the series of the "Cunningham Lectures," and we seize the occasion to say a few words on the value of lectureships as a Christian instrumentality. By committing to trustees a certain amount, the interest of which is to be forever set apart for meeting the expenses of an annual course of sermons on specified subjects, the founder of a lectureship,—layman though he be,—may be a preacher to all his countrymen through all time. Among the many advantages of such a Christian lectureship we mention two. First, it tends to raise the standard of ministerial culture by offering inducements to engage in the special study of certain important themes. A lectureship, the basis and provisions of which are conceived in a wise and Christian spirit, offers a lawful prize to sacred ambition. How far such a prize has not been deemed unworthy the best gifts of the church may be seen from a simple mention of the names of such British lecturers as Samuel Clarke, Van Mildert, Hampden, Heber, Whately, Milman, Maurice, Alford, Trench, Wordsworth, Ellicott, Thompson, Mansel, Rawlinson, Farrar, Plumptre, Bernard, Liddon, and Garbett. Secondly, by carefully prescribing in the original foundation of the lecture fund the character of the subjects to be discussed and the qualifications of the lecturer, a tolerable degree of "orthodoxy" is secured. The trouble with most men when they devote themselves to a special topic is that they go to extremes. They need some sort of outward check and guidance, specially in these days of dissolving creeds. A lecturer left to his own judgment may unconsciously turn liberty into license and say many extravagant things; he is tamed into comparative sobriety of statement by the fetters of a trust-fund. Of course, the conditions prescribed in the original foundation cannot be too carefully phrased. In establishing, *e. g.*, an apologetic lectureship, the founder must remember that what is a living issue in one generation may be a dead issue in another. Let him therefore so shape the language of his endowment as to secure alike inflexibility of outline and flexibility of detail,—constancy of general aim throughout all time, and readiness of adjustment to contemporary forms of doubt. A lectureship, the terms of which are thus wisely phrased, may be of changeless value to the end of time.

The mother country is specially rich in foundations of this sort, such, *e. g.*, as the Boyle, established in 1692; the Lady Moyer, in 1719; the Lime St., in 1730; the Berry St., in 1733; the Coward, in 1739; the Warburton, in 1772; the Bampton, in 1780; the Donnellan in 1794; the Hulsean, in 1820; the Congregational, in 1833; the Cunningham, in 1862. We might also mention among Continental lectureships the Leyden,

founded in 1753; the Basle, in 1775; the Hague, in 1785; and the Haarlem, in 1786. It is surprising that the intense intellectual life of our countrymen has not long before this vented itself in a similar direction. The Lowell and Graham Institutes are the only instances occurring to us of American lectureships; and these can hardly be called Christian. What is greatly needed is a distinctively Christian lectureship. We can scarcely conceive how an American layman could render a more eminent and lasting service to the cause of truth than by founding in connection with some one of our institutions of learning, an apologetical, or theological, or ethical, or historical, or ecclesiastical, or exegetical lectureship. Let Baptists esteem it an honor to take the lead in this matter. John Lowell, a merchant of Boston, dying amidst the ruins of Thebes, provided in his will for the founding of the institute which bears his name. Whoever will perform a similar service for the church will earn in the highest sense the eulogy pronounced by Edward Everett on the generous testator when, introducing the first course of lectures of the Lowell institute, he said: "The few sentences, penned with a tired hand by our fellow-citizen, on the top of a palace of the Pharaohs, will do more for human improvement than, for ought that appears, was done by all of that gloomy dynasty that ever reigned. I scruple not to affirm that in the directions given by him . . . there is a better hope that mental activity will be profitably kindled, thought put in salutary motion, the connection of truth with the uses of life traced out, and the condition of man benefited, than in all the councils, rescripts, exploits and institutions of Sesostris and his line."

System of Christian Ethics; by Dr. G. CHARLES ADOLPH VON HARLESS.

Translated from the German of the sixth enlarged edition, by the late Rev. A. W. MORRISON, and revised by the Rev. WM. FINDLAY, M. A. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 8vo. pp. xvi. 511. Cl. \$3.75.

It is now more than a quarter of a century since the first edition of this work was published and met with such a favorable reception that a second edition was called for in the course of a few months. It wants the fullness of Reinhard and Schwartz, but is comprehensive in its scope. The author has endeavored to develop the true idea of Christian ethics, as it has been tersely defined by Tholuck: "Every other system of ethics leaves it doubtful how far men can advance toward a oneness with God and his will. But the system of Christian ethics reveals the prospect of an entire union with the Deity, and with his moral government." The work is divided into three parts: "The Blessing of Salvation," "The Possession of Salvation," and "The Preservation of Salvation, or, The Concrete Manifestation of Christian Virtue in the Fundamental Relations of Human Life." From its scope, and from the general execution of its comprehensive plan, it merits a place in the library of every one who is called to be a teacher of Christian morals.

We cannot enter into a detailed examination of the work, or we should be compelled to join issue with the author on some points; and cer-

tainly most evangelical Christians—even though they may accept his conclusions on infant baptism—will heartily dissent from the statements, that the Holy Spirit “by means of baptism begins his work in man,” and, that what “begins in a man in and by means of baptism, is the gracious presence and the activity of God, the Holy Ghost.” The wonder is, how one who in other parts of his work so fully recognises the sovereign power of God in the sinner's regeneration, could ever have made such statements, which involve necessarily the dogma of baptismal regeneration. Elsewhere, he says: “We become new creatures not by any act of our own, but by God's act.” “Just as we have the natural life complete by means of our birth, and do not make it so by our consciousness of it, so also, we have by that birth from God, our new life complete, which is a living and working of God within us, and do not first make it so by the fact of our becoming conscious of it. In our conscious possession, and the conscious entrance of our will into the potencies of the one life as well of as the other, we only fulfill the design for which both the natural and spiritual life were bestowed upon us.” It is very evident, that the author, in common with many others, needs the sharp incisive criticism which Baptists of keen sight and logical acumen would be likely to administer. An able, comprehensive Baptist literature, will be a great blessing to the theologians of Germany. It is when the whole body is “compacted by that which every joint supplieth,” that its increase is most harmonious and healthy.

But, while we should join issue with the author on some points, we cannot forbear to express our admiration of the manner in which he treats many of the branches of his subject, and with the clearness of some of the distinctions which he draws. No thoughtful reader can rise from the perusal of the work, without a consciousness that he has derived profit from its pages.

The style of the work, in some parts, might be amended. It sadly lacks, in some portions, that perfect lucidness which is the charm of some of the best writers in our own language. Such a sentence as the following will show the need of which we speak.

“It has already appeared in the relation of man to himself, that the self-consciousness of the Ego rests on an abstraction, by which man becomes conscious to himself of his Ego, or something which stands in contrast to the nature which belongs to it, and which is not comprised in the idea of the willing and knowing Ego.”

Rivarol said, in Berlin, in 1784, in an essay before the Academy, “that which is not clear, is not French.” He refers to the admirable clearness of the French, and calls it “the eternal foundation of our language,” (*base éternelle de notre langue*). It is nearly a century since the savans of Berlin listened to those words, and crowned the essay which embodied them. But after so long a time it cannot be said, with even an approximation to the truth, that what is not clear is not German. The author himself is fully conscious of this, for he says in his preface:

“The conviction presses itself upon me, that with us Germans, even those of the best tendency, systematic theology suffers from a certain af-

fect superiorly and abstract formulating of the thought, which stand in a not unsuspicious contrast with the divine depth and the fisherman-like simplicity of its apostolic origin."

This is frank, and of course will, as the author desires, "prevent unjust censure." He is fortunate in having so far and so successfully resisted the recognized national tendency. When the German breadth of view and thoroughness of discussion come to be supplemented by perfect clearness, it will be a matter of profound congratulation.

The Four Evangelists, with the Distinctive Characteristics of Their Gospels. By EDWARD A. THOMSON, Minister of Free St. Stephen's Church, Edinburgh. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh. 180 pp. 12mo. Price \$2.00.

The author of this work treats his subject in six parts:—first, the fourfold Diversity of the Gospels; then follows a separate discussion of the characteristics of each of the four Gospels, the whole closing with a brief discussion on their harmony. The plan is precisely the same as that which was adopted by Andrew Jukes in his well known "Characteristic Differences of the four Gospels, considered as revealing the various relations of the Lord Jesus," a work which was published in the year 1853. The author of this new work could scarcely have been ignorant of the existence of the lectures of Mr. Jukes, when he began to shape his own. Indeed the subject, the mode of treatment, and the mistakes of Mr. Jukes are repeated in this new work. Yet the later author does not recognize his predecessor, except by a single casual and unimportant reference to his book in a foot note.

If Mr. Thomson were indebted to Mr. Jukes to any considerable extent, courtesy would dictate that he should acknowledge it. If he were not, it would only have been doing justice to himself to make some further allusion to his predecessor, for the work is strikingly like his own, and he would naturally be supposed to be acquainted with it, as it was published fifteen years ago, and had been very widely circulated.

The main idea of the two works may be briefly stated. It is to show that each Evangelist designed to exhibit one special aspect of the Lord's character:—Matthew, to set him forth as the promised King, son of David and of Abraham; Mark, to depict him as the servant of God; Luke, as the Son of man; John, as the Son of God. Both what these different writers insert, and what they omit, and also the manner of presenting their facts and grouping their incidents, have special reference to the perfection of the picture which each designs to draw.

The reader cannot rise from the perusal of either the work of Mr. Jukes or that of Mr. Thompson, without feeling a new and more intelligent interest in the Gospels. But a full, exhaustive, and thoroughly appreciative work on the subject is still needed. Such a work will lead to a better acquaintance with our Lord Jesus, as a distinct person, with a personal character. As Mr. Bernard says, in his admirable "Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament:" "the Spirit was to testify of Jesus, and the fourfold Gospel is his permanent testimony. In it he has provided

that the foundations of our faith should be laid in the region where the foundations of all human knowledge lie, namely, in the evidence of the senses, in that which 'eyes have seen, ears have heard, and hands have handled, of the word of life.' He has provided, that the object of our faith should be known to us as he was known to those who saw him, that he should be clearly known by the simplicity, fully known by the variety, and certainly known by the unity, of the narratives which give to the world the perpetual and only representation of its Redeemer."

A work which shall fully develop the wisdom, meekness, patience, grace, and love of the Lord Jesus, as shown in these four narratives, will be of incalculable value, for as Mr. Bernard justly observes, it will be the most effective safeguard of doctrine, because, "the wisdom of God has ordered the teaching of the New Testament on its actual plan, laying first the living knowledge of the Lord Jesus, as the broadest and safest basis for doctrine and instruction in righteousness."

Jesus of Nazareth: His Life and Teachings; founded on the Four Gospels, and illustrated by reference to the Manners, Customs, Religious Beliefs, and Political Institutions of his Times. By LYMAN ABBOTT. With designs by Dorè, De Laroche, Fenn, and others. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, Franklin Square. 1869. Cr. Oct. cloth. 252. pp. \$3.50.

The value of this very readable book consists in the skillful manner in which the author has reproduced the scenes and circumstances of our Lord's earthly life. He has not attempted to discuss theological doctrines or investigate any of those baffling questions whose solution is so earnestly sought by the student of the Gospels. What his aim is, may be stated in his own words.

The evangelists have not illustrated the events they recount by any detailed explanation of the manners and customs of their age. For the most part they have assumed that their readers possess the knowledge so familiar, not only to them, but to their contemporaries. This life of the past, which has faded from sight before the brighter light of Christian civilization, I have endeavored, in these pages, to restore, by borrowing the pen of history to transport the reader into the atmosphere of the first century. I have thus sought to give to the life and teachings of Christ that significance which is afforded by a knowledge of his times and circumstances; to present the life of Christ in its appropriate setting. (Intro, p. iv.)

In pursuance of this plan, Mr. Abbott's first chapters give a vivid description of the Holy Land, illustrated by constant reference to places in our own country, an account of the origin and growth of the Jewish commonwealth, its popular suffrage, its representative assemblies, its judiciary, its political economy, and its decay, together with a description of Jewish civilization in the first century. Across the canvass, on which are sketched the dark features of the social and civil condition of the Jews in the time of Christ, some bright gleams shoot.

In addition to these higher seminaries, there was a parochial school in every village. Common school education we have borrowed from Judaism, though we have improved the pattern. A far larger proportion of the people could read and write in Palestine in the days of Christ, than in England in the days of Henry the Eighth. The unlearned fishermen

by the sea of Galilee were not absolutely illiterate. Few were the Jews who could not read their own Scriptures. In every synagogue was established an elementary school. Here a Rabbi gathered the children of the village, taught them to read and cipher, instructed them in their own national history, and in the requirements of the law, catechised them in the Jewish Scriptures, afforded them some knowledge of the later commentaries which the Scribes had founded thereon, and occasionally added some little instruction on such natural history and physical science as the imperfect knowledge of the day afforded." (p. 19.)

A connected narrative of the events in our Lord's life then follows, and the causes are discussed which led to the varying treatment he received from the Jewish people. The credibility of the gospel history is assumed, and those points on which Christian denominations differ are treated with candor. The author's interpretations are unsatisfactory; they fail to lay hold of the scope and meaning of Christ's words. How could this be otherwise, when Mr. Abbott believes that "Christ's teaching was stimulating rather than informing"? (p. 145). There is occasionally an *ex cathedra* decision of vexed questions: "This difference [the reports of the inscription on the cross] difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with any theory of verbal inspiration." (p. 478). Sometimes an inference is drawn, the propriety of which is not very evident. In the comment on the parable of the good Samaritan, it is said: "This drama is thus perpetually repeated; and in the nineteenth century, as in the first, the orthodoxy of a noble life is better than that of mere creeds and churchly traditions." (p. 348.) It is possible this may be true, but how can it by any extremity of torture, be drawn from the parable? Surely Christ denounced the "doctrine" and the "tradition" of the Jewish leaders as unqualifiedly as he did their lives. No weightier condemnation fell from his lips than that which was evoked by the "traditions" through which they made the word of God of none effect, and no more rigorous direction did he give his disciples than to beware of the "doctrine" of the Pharisees, which like leaven was inherently corrupt and corrupting.

The friends of the modern "orthodox," will doubtless be gratified to learn that the common conception of a strong family likeness between the Pharisees and the stricter portion of Christians is an erroneous one.

"It is true that the Pharisees did not forget what in modern days we sometimes fail to remember, that the Sabbath is a feast, not a fast. Isaiah had commanded that it be called a delight. To this command they yielded a cordial obedience. The day was one of festal rejoicing. Social entertainments were part of its religious observance. Every week the pious Jew repeated that Thanksgiving Day which New England enjoys but once a year. Walking, social visiting, even games and dancing, were part of the Pharisaic observance of the Sabbath day." (p. 201.)

It will be seen from these extracts that Mr. Abbott wields a spirited pen. Occasional inaccuracies and obscurities mar the grace of the composition: "Yet not even a false prophet could not ordinarily be punished, etc." (p. 35.) "Christ who had called his disciples from the peasantry innocent of all such ritual;" (p. 279) who were innocent, Christ, the disciples, or the peasantry? And what shall we say to the word with which the following sentence closes?

"It [the Lord's supper] is repeated in the mass of the Romish and Greek Churches; in the more simple, yet solemn ritual of the Episcopalians; in the still simpler, yet impressive service of the Nonconformists."

In the mouth of a young Episcopal acolyte, just learning to patter his liturgy, the word "non-conformists" would be intelligible and ridiculous, but what *can* it mean coming from a pastor of a New England Congregational Church?

We need a Life of Christ, such as has not yet appeared: one of wide research, of exhaustive investigation, of accurate scholarship, and of spiritual insight. When shall we have our Conybeare and Howson on the Gospels? What Christian scholar will make it his life work to rear this monument of sanctified learning?

The Law of Love, and Love as a Law; or Moral Science—Theoretical and Practical. By MARK HOPKINS, D. D., LL. D., President of Williams College. New York: Charles Scribner and Company, 1869—12mo. pp. 342. Cl. \$1.75.

Dr. Hopkins' established reputation as a Moral Philosopher, constitutes an antecedent recommendation of this, his last work, sufficient of itself to ensure for it a wide circulation, and careful study. This, like his "*Evidences of Christianity*" and "*Moral Science*," was first given as a course of lectures, before the Lowell Institute. Though the "Lectures on Moral Science" were published so recently as A. D. 1862, the present work is, by no means, merely another edition of that. The philosophy there presented does indeed reappear, but is thoroughly recast. The arrangement is entirely new. Points fully discussed in the former work are in this simply repeated, while many points of vital interest, either imperfectly presented, or wholly omitted there, are here thoroughly discussed, and their relation to his system exhibited. Such, and so many are these, that the author is fully justified in the publication of this new work—for it is strictly a *new* and most valuable contribution to moral science. The first part, "The Law of Love," is a discussion of the Theory of Morals. The second part, "Love as a Law," is the application of the Theory,—or Practical Morality. In this part, duties are divided into three classes—to Self, to Others, and to God. The last of these classes receives but little attention; the first two classes are treated with considerable fullness. In each of those two is a discussion of duties respecting Rights, Wants, and Powers; and in the second, also of duties arising from special relations. This practical part is eminently clear, direct, original, suggestive, and crowded with thought. Still, to the theological student especially, the first part must have the chief interest. The philosophy contained in the theory, is of course, the life blood of the entire system. Under these divisions are discussed, successively, *Law*, *Love*, and *the Law of Love*. In the Introduction the author notices ten theories respecting the ground of Right, and gives good reason for rejecting each. He treats them, however, as theories respecting the ground of Obligation, which may explain his omission of that one which finds the ground of Right in the nature or character of God. His own theory is, that the ground of obligation is to be found in the ultimate and supreme end for which man exists. He asks (p. 27), "can there be any more ultimate ground of

obligation, than that a man should propose to himself the attainment of the very end for which God created him." Hence, he affirms, (p. 71): "Moral Law is the affirmation by the moral reason of obligation on the part of every man to choose that as his supreme end, which God designed him for, and to do whatever would legitimately flow from that choice." He then states what was developed at length in his previous treatise, that man's highest end is supreme love to God, and impartial love to man. Joy is an end, only as being a result of love. Hence, he maintains, obligation is to choose this end, *i. e.*, to choose the love. "We *ought* to choose the good. . . . The choice is right," (p. 72.) Now plainly, he ought not to confound or identify the choice with the thing chosen. If he does not, then since obligation is only upon the choice, and the choice alone, according to the theory, has moral character, the end chosen, *i. e.*, love to God and men, has no moral character whatever. Still, we find it maintained, (p. 101), that love of others does embrace a choice of their supreme good for them, and that solely for this reason, love to them comes under Moral Law. Thus, we pass from absurdity into confusion. When the end chosen is our own end, love has no character, but when the end chosen is the end of others, and for others, love does have character, because in this case the choice is in the love.

Again, how by the philosophy of the book, is the distinction affirmed by consciousness, and admitted practically by the author to exist between moral ideas and feelings, and all others, to be explained? According to the philosophy, it should be a distinction of degree only, not, as it is, of intrinsic nature. No moral reason is needed, but reason only; for by the same power by which Dr. Hopkins ascertains the supreme end, he also ascertains subordinate ends. A moral ought, therefore, *ought* not, by the philosophy, to differ *in kind* from any other ought.

And when the seat of Moral Law is found in man's reason, as shown by one of the above quotations, and man is declared to be "a law unto himself," in the same sense that God is a law unto himself, (pp. 85-87), one cannot but ask, whether this is true interpretation, either of the Scripture quoted, or of human consciousness. The seat of obligation, the fountain of right, the throne of the moral universe, is it not in the character of God—there only, there forever? Law, is it not strictly *God's* law? There is a confusion in the treatise respecting classification, which, unfortunately, is not peculiar to Dr. Hopkins. After accepting the general analysis of the human powers into Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, he fails to adhere to it, and uniformly to range all cognitions, moral, as well as other, under Intellect, all feelings, moral, as well as other, under Sensibility, and all willing *other, as well as moral*, under Will. Thus, (p. 126), Moral Reason is given as belonging to the Moral Nature, but Intellect is placed among instrumental powers. (How Conscience could in the same place be ranked among the moral powers, when (p. 90) it had been formally defined as an exercise, it is not easy to see).—It would seem that if one makes Intellect, Sensibility, and Will comprise all the powers of man, and then makes another division of man on an entirely different principle, *viz.*, the gradational, that the two methods, so distinct, should

have distinct names. These names might be *Co-ordinate*, and *Gradational*, unless better occur, and then let a man know on which principle he is making an analysis, and not confound the two. Let him take care to interpret the human constitution by consciousness, and not by an assumed theory respecting the brute creation, as is done so often, and even in this work.

But, too much has been said of defects, when the excellences are so numerous and so signal. Beautiful in conception, both in the general and in the particular, keen and clear in analysis, usually perspicuous and transparent in style, bracing in spirit, like the air which its author has breathed to such good purpose, bold, original, fair—no minister who buys and reads the book will regret the outlay of money and time, and no layman will rise from its perusal without renewed gratitude for our colleges, so often slandered and abused. On the issue of this work we heartily congratulate, on the one hand the President as Giver, on the other the Public as Receiver.

The Evidences of Christianity, with an introduction on the Existence of God, and the Immortality of the Soul. By EBENEZER DODGE, D. D., President of Madison University. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 12mo. pp. 244. Cl. \$1.50.

President Dodge recognizes an obligation to his age, no less than to the classes he annually instructs; and this compact volume, filled with the ripe fruits of years of study, is an earnest of the purpose to serve his generation. It has been often a matter of surprise to us, how men of ability, filling important chairs of instruction for a lifetime, could keep an easy conscience, without making some important contribution to the cause of truth in their department.

This volume belongs emphatically to the nineteenth century. It deals with living questions. It treats of the doubts and objections to the supernatural origin of Christianity, and its divine character and power, which now agitate the world and the church: and it brings to their solution the latest results of philological and historical study, the scientific discoveries, and the philosophical thought and methods peculiar to our day.

The work exhibits great analytical power, and a fondness for analytical habits of thought. One feels that the author has a conscious mastery of the subject; comprehending it as a whole, and in all the relations of its several parts,—the outline of treatment is admirable, clear, terse, and exhaustive. The introduction discusses, as was fitting, the proofs of the existence of God, and of the immortality of the soul, with a special reference to forms of unbelief in our own age. Having thus laid a foundation for a divine religion in the character of God, and the needs of the soul, the way is open for a demonstration of the divine origin and nature of Christianity.

The order of thought in the successive chapters could hardly be improved; and the statement of topics discussed, at once interests the

reader, and kindles high expectations. The headings of the chapters are so compact and strong, as to have the force of arguments. They are, the Historical Character of the New Testament, Christianity a Supernatural Fact; Christianity a Divine Life; Christianity a Divine Doctrine; Christianity a Divine Law; Christianity a Divine Kingdom; Christianity a Fulfilment; Christianity a World-Power.

The analytical power in the discussion of the various topics, is as marked and satisfactory as in the division of the whole subject, and makes the work an admirable one for a text-book. It is better suited for study than for reading, and will be more popular with classes than with general readers. The habits of the teacher appear on every page; brevity and compactness of statement, the strong putting of individual thoughts, rather than the grouping of a series for popular impression; clearness of outline and force of suggestion, in place of fullness of statement. The work is a very timely one, and will supply a deficiency long felt in our higher schools and colleges; a brief, but comprehensive text-book, meeting directly, and in a convincing way, the current forms of scepticism. In the hands of a good teacher, this volume will be an admirable one, to impress young and inquiring minds with the breadth and fullness of the evidences of the divine origin of Christianity, and to show the weakness and arrogance of the unbelief of the day. It deals chiefly with the internal evidences, and proves that Christianity is its own best witness; thus, supplementing Paley, who busies himself with the defence of the outworks.

Lectures on the First and Second Epistles of Peter. By the Rev. JOHN LILLIE, D. D., late Pastor of the Presbyterian Church at Kingston, N. Y., author of "Lectures on the Epistles of Paul to the Thessalonians," etc. With an introduction by Philip Schaff, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 654 Broadway. 1869. 8vo. pp. 536. Cl. \$3.50.

These discourses embody the results of patient and vigorous study. The reader will not find here those excellent divisions that gave a charm to Dr. Brown's exposition of the same epistle, but the lectures are less diffuse and the exegesis more satisfactory. As a Biblical scholar, Dr. Lillie had few superiors in the United States, and his conclusions are generally the result of thorough investigation. One instance of an opposite character, we think, may be found on p. 801, in which he follows the mass of interpreters giving *μάρτυς* the double meaning of the English word witness, and, if we understand him, making the idea of spectator the primary one. If there is any authority for this besides that of commentators, we know not where to look for it.

We heartily commend this volume as of great worth to that large class of ministers who wish to expound the word of God to their congregations, to escape from the narrowness and poverty of human speculation into the richness of divine revelation, commending also to them the weighty words of one who himself has furnished a good illustration of the course he urges

upon others: "the minute study of the Scriptures, in the spirit of devotion, and under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, will lead us to truths and conceptions and emotions, of whose precious value and edifying power we shall not otherwise even dream. The mysteries of the kingdom of God come to us through these words of inspiration. A doctrine of grace may dwell in the right understanding of a single preposition. Who can measure the significance and worth of this one expression of the New Testament, IN CHRIST?"

OTHER PUBLICATIONS.

From the press of the Carters, ever prolific in good books, we have, *Our Life in China*, by Mrs. Nevius, pp. 504, 12mo. an interesting description of every day missionary life in China, just such a book as ought to be in all our Sunday libraries. Dr. Guthrie's *Studies of Character from the Old Testament*, pp. 329, exhibits the author's usual skill in presenting portraits. *Wind-wafted Seed*, pp. 443; *The Pearl of Parables*, by the late Dr. Hamilton, pp. 274, we take up with a feeling of sadness, that the gifted preacher who has so often charmed and instructed us, has finished his earthly work. *Scotia's Bards*, pp. 563, 8vo; an elegant volume, well adapted to make every Scotsman's heart swell with pride; on page 246 may be found the poem which was so great a favorite with President Lincoln. The imprint of the Carters is never seen on a valueless or unworthy book. Gould & Lincoln send us, *Seeds and Sheaves, or words of Scripture; their History and Fruits*; by A. C. Thompson, D. D., pp. 323; a collection of incidents illustrating the benefit which has been received from particular passages in the Bible. *Annual of Scientific Discovery, or Year-book of facts in Science and Art for 1869*, pp. 377, a most valuable compilation; it ought to be in the hands of every person interested in scientific progress. M. W. Dodd, 506 Broadway, New York, publishes *Watchwords for the Warfare of Life*; from Dr. Martin Luther, translated and arranged by the author of *Chronicles of the Schönberg Cotta Family*, pp. 330; every page containing something pithy and suggestive. From A. S. Barnes & Co., New York, we have received *Lessons in Political Economy*, designed as a basis for instruction in that science in Schools and Colleges, by President Champlin, of Colby University, pp. 219, 12mo. The author's long experience as a teacher, and his habits as a correct thinker, particularly qualify him for preparing such a work. The weakness of our nation is its ignorance of political science. Andrew F. Graves, Boston, publishes the *Governor's Pardon; or the Bridge of Sighs*, a 12mo. of 286 pages; we have subjected this little book to the best of tests, and it has been pronounced excellent. Among the recent minor volumes of the American Baptist Publication Society, are *Henry Hilliard, or the Three Friends*, pp. 192; *Wenonda, a tale of Indian Life*, pp. 108; *Count Ulrich, a tale of the Reformation in Germany*, pp. 160; *Children and Jesus*, by E. P. Hammond, pp. 144; *The Baptist Short Method, with Inquirers and Opponents*, pp. 216, one of Dr. Hiscor's excellent denominational works, decided, kind, and clear. G. P. Putnam & Son, New York, publish *Blind pits, a Story of Scottish Life*; the author displays great artistic power in painting female character; *The Cove Method for learning to draw from memory*, 12mo. pp. 130, intended to cultivate the eye correctly; *Search after Truth*; addressed to young men, by Geo. W. Eggleston, 12mo. pp. 267; written in a creditable style by a young business man. Baptists will think the book would not have been weakened by the omission of the argument on the Covenants; and the statements of the chapter on Happiness our Being's End and Aim are open to very serious objections. Lippincott, Philadelphia, publishes, *The Gospel in Enoch; or Truth in the Concrete*, 16mo. pp. 198, by Dr. H. H. Tucker, President of Mercer University, Georgia, whom we hope to meet again in the field of literature. The style is clear, pure, polished, and the book is sound in doctrine, and full ofunction. Messrs. Hurd & Houghton continue their reprint of *Smith's Dictionary of the Bible*. The merits of this edition are so well known, that further commendation seems superfluous. *The Comedy of Canonization*, Pott & Amery, New York, is a pamphlet with some fair hits against the Roman Catholics, but if any one enjoys good English, keen wit, and unanswerable logic, let him send 25 cents to the Catholic Publication House, 126 Nassau Street, New York, for the *Comedy of Convocation*. A new hand concordance of the Greek Testament, 12mo., has just been published in Stuttgart. The great English-German and German-English Lexicon, by N. I. Lucas, the work of 14 years, is at last completed. It is in four large 8vo. volumes, and is for sale by E. Steiger, New York. Price \$27.00. A new edition of Bagster's Polyglot Bible in two folio volumes, is announced by John Wiley & Sons, agents for the Bagsters; the price is \$60 in gold. The American Unitarian Association, issue Noyes' translation of the New Testament, from the text of Tischendorf. A translation of the four Gospels, after the same text, by the Rev. N. S. Folsom, formerly Professor in the Meadville Theological Seminary, is in press. We are glad to see that William Cullen Bryant proposes to give the public, during the present year, his translation of Homer's Iliad. The thousandth volume of the celebrated Tauchnitz collection has just appeared. It is, most appropriately, the New Testament, according to the authorized English version, with the various readings, and with foot notes.



THE BAPTIST QUARTERLY.

EBRARD'S VIEW OF BAPTISM.

Christliche Dogmatik, von JOHANNES HEINRICH AUGUST EBRARD, Doctor und Professor ord. der ref. Theologie zu Erlangen.
[*Christian Theology*; by J. H. A. Ebrard, Doctor and regular Professor of Reformed Theology at Erlangen.] Part III. Div. III. Chap. 2, §§. 526-538. Vol. 2, pp. 580-630.

WE HAVE long thought that a simple presentation in English of Dr. Ebrard's views of baptism, as given in his *Dogmatics*, would be an interesting contribution to our literature on that subject. The general repute of the author as an exegete and theologian, the high esteem in which this particular work has been held, and the intrinsic nature of his doctrine on the topics which especially concern us as Baptists, all combine to render it desirable that he should speak to those who can hear him only through the English language.

In the department of exegesis Ebrard is known by his commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews in Olshausen's work, and his editorial care of a subsequent edition of the whole. Besides this, he has written on the Apocalypse, and a learned work on the Gospel History. In systematic theology he had previously published a learned monograph on the Lord's Supper, in two stout volumes, and since the *Dogmatics*, he has given out a very instructive work on Pastoral Theology (including Homiletics), and an elaborate Liturgy for the churches under his official care. These are only his more prominent achievements in the various fields of theological literature.

In his doctrinal position he claims to represent substantially the German Reformed principles of the Heidelberg Catechism. He indi-

cates, however, in an eminent degree, the effect of the long existing union (or mixture) in Germany of the Reformed and Lutheran schools, in modifying peculiarities on both sides; and even apart from that, the Calvinism of this work is so far softened from the pristine sharpness of the "five points" that scarcely one of the older Reformed dogmatists would own relationship to their modern advocate. This remark applies particularly to the doctrines of predestination and perseverance. In his views, however, of the person of Christ, the depravity and ruin of man, and the inspiration of the Bible, Ebrard takes an advanced orthodox position. And on all points, whether right or wrong, he is what he is from his interpretation of Scripture. His work finely illustrates the idea of a system of theology, as setting forth the previously received views of the church modified to correspond with the now currently approved teaching of the word of God on its several chapters. Thus, while giving the tenets of earlier theologians, and the dogmas of the church, it is remarkable for the candor, independence and ability, with which it subjects all to a fresh comparison with the declarations of the Bible, and pronounces judgment finally according to its voice. It is scarcely less interesting in fact from the stimulus which it gives to exegetical inquiry, and the satisfaction which it affords as an explanation of the Scriptures, than as a statement of the doctrine of his church. It has accordingly been received with high appreciation by a wide circle of those devoted to such studies. It was employed, we believe, in the Theological Seminary at Mercersburg, if not as a text-book, at least as a work of special reference in the study of theology.¹ Ellicott often appeals to it, in his commentaries, as an esteemed authority in doctrinal interpretation.

As it regards the style of the work, what we are about to extract from it will justify, if not demand, a word of remark. While comparing favorably with other German writings in respect to the facility with which it discloses the author's thought, it is eminently open to objection on the score of literary finish. This seems to be the point at which Mr. B. F. Westcott aimed when he spoke² of "Ebrard's usual want of taste." Allowance is to be made here for the necessity of repetition involved in the very plan of presenting each topic to the reader, first, in its general relations to other parts of the system, then

¹ In his doctrine of the Lord's Supper, Ebrard even expresses a special complacency with the former writings of Dr. Nevin on that subject; but we suspect that the great advance of Sacramentarianism at Mercersburg has left the former as far behind as Dornér now declares himself to stand.

² Introduction to the study of the Gospels, p. 323.

separately as held by earlier writers of high standing, then as enjoined by the church, and finally as warranted by holy Scripture. The author claims indulgence, moreover, from the consideration that he writes "not to be read, but to be studied." Scientific accuracy and completeness are his object, and not to give literary pleasure. This may justify his frequent patchwork of sentences made up from his own German, from the Latin of the Reformed scholastics or of the church symbols, and from the New Testament Greek. It will scarcely be to any English mind a sufficient apology for the introduction of such barbarisms as "protoadamite," "anagenetic," and the like, however compendiously expressive these terms must be conceded to be. But beyond this, we find everywhere an absence of grace and amenity in the writing which seems unworthy of the often excellent thought, as though to get out the meaning, no matter how uncouthly, had been all for which the writer cared.

On the subject of baptism, with which we are more immediately concerned, as the views of the author are to be given below, it is scarcely necessary to premise that they are strikingly interesting, whether satisfactory or not, and even though to many of our readers they will seem strange. In regard to what constitutes baptism, as a religious *transaction*, in the view of sacred Scripture, in regard at least to the external form of the rite, and the persons who are properly its subjects, he earnestly maintains every tittle of what we, as Baptists, claim to be authoritatively established; while he speaks of the *efficacy* of baptism, sometimes like a Puseyite, sometimes like a Campbellite, but remaining all the while a German Reformed Presbyterian. Content himself to follow the degenerate practice of modern Christianity among most western churches, he yields to no Baptist in strenuously insisting on the indispensableness of immersion to the Biblical conception of baptism; and we can scarcely refer to a more clearly concise refutation than his of the various grounds on which Pedobaptists generally uphold infant baptism as a Scriptural or divinely prescribed ordinance. He would perpetuate this too, however, as an allowable and beneficent custom, for reasons for which a Baptist, if he wished to find a Scriptural expression, is driven to the precept, "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake."

It is pleasing to see that Ebrard, although aware of the existence of Baptists in his neighborhood, and in part seeing the encouragement they would derive from his utterances, does not swerve from the course of interpretation followed hitherto by leading German scholars. One conversant with their writings can hardly help suspecting of late some

effect upon their views of Scriptural baptism from the presence and rapid multiplication among them of our brethren. To some it has seemed of the special providence of God that the movement of Oncken and his coadjutors should have been kept back until the world had received the unbiassed testimony of one or two generations of the giants of modern Biblical learning on the subject before us. But we repeat our gratification that Ebrard, while distinctly facing the Baptist positions, not only withdraws nothing of what others have conceded to us in the matter of scriptural authority, but goes beyond most in the advocacy of views like ours. How different from the method of our antagonists generally on this side of the Atlantic! Yet we suppose that he loses nothing in the effect of his argument by his candid admission of obvious truth. Sure we are that we should be more easily won to the remaining views of a man who fairly conceded the New Testament rite to have been what it plainly was, than by any of the successively vaunted mares'-nests discovered by our American inventors of definitions for the word baptizein. Where Ebrard expressly notices our principles, he does it with a courtesy which makes us wish that we could agree with him. By such an enemy, especially, *fas est doceri*; and if the following extracts shall, at any point, suggest error or deficiency in our view of the sacred ordinance, it would be a pleasure to receive correction from such hands.

Readily to understand a part of what follows, it is necessary to remark the exact position which the "Sacraments" occupy in our author's theological scheme. They are taken up near the end of his Third (and last) Part, which treats of "The Glorification of God [in Christ] as the Finisher," that is, of salvation. The sacraments are means of grace, but of a particular kind. The word of God, also, is a means of grace, specifically the vehicle of preventing grace (*gratia præveniens*) the organ of the Spirit in *conversion*; the Spirit, namely, as of the Father, drawing men to subjective repentance and faith in Christ. The sacraments, on the other hand, are the vehicle of efficient grace (*gratia operans* or *coöperans*), the organ of the Spirit in *regeneration*; the Spirit, that is, of Christ objectively communicating to the believer His own blessed Person, and establishing with him that ineffable union in which the essence of the new life consists.

Not only does our author thus distinguish between conversion and regeneration, in respect to the divine agency concerned, but (following Schleiermacher, and in agreeing with many of the better German theologians) he evidently makes the former logically prior, nay even chronologically separated from the latter by a quite appreciable in-

terval. So, at least, we must think, when he declares that besides the inward condition of personal repentance, Christ has conditioned (*gebunden*)¹ this regenerating agency upon certain outward visible actions to be performed on the penitent by others. True, he holds in another place,² that regeneration is synchronous with conversion, that so soon as conscious faith is exercised the soul unconsciously receives Christ himself in the new birth; but how this can consist with the reiterated dictum that baptism is the divinely appointed vehicle of regenerating grace, we fear no one out of Germany can perceive. Repentance, *μετάνοια*, precedes *ἀναγέννησις*, regeneration. In the former, man is conscious, active, spontaneous, but not independent of God's assistance. The converting, or (if one of Ebrard's convenient designations may be allowed) *metanoëtic* agency of the Holy Spirit, draws men to Christ in conversion. Its end is reached, its effect is produced, when its subject voluntarily yields to the call of God in the gospel, turns from sin with full purpose of heart, believes in Jesus Christ, and of God's great mercy craves pardon and eternal life. The instrument in this work is the word of truth. The man is thus converted, and up to the limits of his own will, and even of his consciousness, becomes a new man, consecrated to his God and Redeemer. But behind his will, outside of his consciousness, lies a great province of his being, not controlled by one, nor under the survey of the other, yet determining in the main his voluntary and conscious experience; the substance of the mind as distinguished from its exercise, the *ὕψιστος* underlying the *νύησις*; and this it is which is the subject of regeneration. With this centre and core of our being, this *nature* of the soul, Christ enters into that blessed union by virtue of which the believer lives anew, and yet not he, but Christ lives in him, "I in them and they in me." This is the new birth. This also is the work of the Holy Spirit, and this preëminently—man being here simply passive and unconscious—His *anagenetic* function, as the Spirit of Christ conveying Christ substantially to the believing soul. And of this communication of himself, the sacraments are the appointed and ordinary occasion and medium, baptism for the renewing of spiritual life, regeneration; and the Lord's Supper for its perpetual nourishment and support.

Without pausing to criticise this representation of the economy of the sacraments, we now pass to his discussion of baptism in particular. This he introduces (§ 526) by a reference to circumcision, the analogue under the old dispensation, of baptism in the new. He finds it to have been primarily a *sign* of the necessity of purity

¹ § 462, p. 379.

² § 446, p. 326.

in that seed of Abraham (Genesis, ch. xv.) through which salvation should come to the world. Not for that time a mark of purity; a mark rather of the actual impurity of the procreative agency of sinful man, but signifying the need and predicting the reality of complete purity to be realized in the supernatural generation of the promised seed.¹ Circumcision was also a *pledge* of grace, in so far as it signaled an invisible act of God in constituting its recipient a member of the covenant people, and a sharer in all the provisions which were involved in that relation. It served, moreover, as a *seal* for each male Hebrew, permanently recognizable in his own person, of membership in the covenant of promise. It was thus the token and condition of participation in the preliminary and typical "covenant of promise."

Our author sees only another type and precursor of Christian baptism in the baptism of John. "John the Baptist," he says (§ 527), "as the prophet of the transition from the old covenant to the new, declared circumcision insufficient to secure admission into the kingdom of God, the covenant of *fulfilment*." "He demanded not only typical purification of the procreative agency in regard to posterity, but that each man should personally and for himself repent, nay, even die and be buried in death, and come forth from death as a new man. This demand he expressed not in words, but in a symbolic act, when he called on the Jews to be baptized, that is, immersed under the water."² But Ebrard, in opposition to most of the older Protestant divines, holds, as indeed the idea of a type of Christian baptism plainly implies, that the act administered by John was of different

¹ Galatians iii. 16; I Corinthians xv. 47.

² Ebrard here refers, "on the symbolical import of immersion," to a former passage of the work, which we translate, "The immersion in holy baptism is commonly received as a symbol of mere *cleansing*, a right thorough *ablution*, as it were. That may be *convenient* in order to justify its substitute, *aspersio*, but it is wrong (*verkehrt*). The symbolical import of the dipping (*Tauchen*) lies in the man's going under and in his new coming forth, as Luther has already so correctly and strikingly expressed it: 'That the old Adam may be drowned and a new man come forth again.' As a symbol of cleansing, the Israelites had their lustrations. John the Baptist (or whoever, perhaps, before him, had introduced proselyte baptism) must doubtless have had a reason why the ablution did not satisfy him. It needed to be indicated, in John's case as well as in the proselyte baptism, that the candidate must become a *new man*. Hence Christ also denominates his own burial in death, and resurrection, a baptism (Luke xii. 50; Mark x. 38). Peter, too, understands it in the same way, when (I Peter iii. 2) he called the drowning of the antediluvian world in the flood, and the coming forth of a new race, a type of baptism; or should that drowning be perhaps a mere *ablution* (washing off)? as it is said in Brammic myth: 'The time of the washing off of all flesh is at hand!' Again, Paul (in I Corinthians x. 2) must have thought of something else than an ablution when he calls the departure from Egypt, where Pharaoh was drowned, but Israel, as a young child among the nations, was born from the womb of affliction, a baptism. Or was that cloud of fire there possibly to wash the Israelites occasionally with a shower?" § 462, Rem. 1.

significance and inferior efficacy to that of the mature ordinance in the Christian church. "There lies in the baptism of John only the demand, only the postulate, Thou deservest to enter into death; thou oughtest to emerge from the flood as a new man; and as a mere symbol of a mere postulate it is essentially different from Christian baptism, and is accordingly distinguished clearly enough in the Holy Scriptures, as a baptism with water, from the baptism of Christ with the Spirit and with fire." "As a mere symbolical demand for subjective conversion, without any added promise of an operation of grace, the baptism of John stood even below circumcision, which was a real *pledge* and *seal* of the covenant of promise. In another respect, indeed, it stood higher than circumcision, inasmuch, that is, as it belonged to the new covenant, the covenant of fulfillment, though as a mere guide and not as a sacrament."

On this it may be remarked, that by the baptism in the Holy Spirit and fire (Matthew iii. 11), which was to characterize Christ's ordinance Ebrard appears to understand baptism in water made by Christ's appointment the vehicle of the regenerating Spirit's influence. The "fire" was seen in the tongues of flame accompanying the Spirit which enveloped the Apostles on the day of Pentecost; and it typified the effect of that Spirit thenceforth to be communicated through baptism (Acts ii. 38, xix. 2f).

Ebrard makes much in favor of the essential difference between the two baptisms, of the passage Acts xix. 3-6, with how little conclusiveness any one who has studied the subject must be aware. He supposes that the older Reformed theologians who, "with the solitary exception of Witsius," held, against Papists and Socinians, the identity of John's baptism with that of Christ, were misled by confounding repentance with regeneration. "Because the baptism of John was a baptism of (subjective) repentance, it was, they thought, a baptism for regeneration. They placed Christ's baptism, therefore, not perhaps too low, but that of John too high. Turretin (17. 34, contr. 1) assumes, in the latter as well as the former, a *testificatio promissionis per aquam*, and a *promissionis ipsius cum elemento hoe ejusque ritu copulatio*. On Matthew iii. 11, he says, *non distinguuntur baptismi sed baptizantes*."¹

We prefer to translate more fully now the two or three sections in which Ebrard lays down the doctrine specifically of Christ's baptism, as given in the Scripture, in the standards of the (Reformed) church, and in the systems of their theologians. His statement of the Biblical view is alone of any polemic interest to us; but the earnestness,

¹ Witsius, on the other hand, says: *A Deo erat baptismus Joannis, non a Christo*.

frankness, and scholastic erudition of his whole treatment of our denominative ordinance seem to justify us in reproducing it here, in all its essential features. We shall endeavor to give not merely the sense, but as far as possible the form and style of his discussion, so that the reader may in effect read Ebrard himself. This will involve the introduction of many Greek and Latin phrases, besides the more formal quotations; but the Greek is that of the New Testament; and the Latin so plain to even a tyro that we need not occupy space in translating it.

{§ 528.)

Christian Baptism.

If Christ, in the institution of the sacrament which, as to its substance, took the place in the New Testament of circumcision in the old, connected it himself, *as to its form*, with the baptism of John, we must not forget, if we would fully understand this connection, that between the baptism of John (Matthew iii. 11, and par.) and the institution of Christ's baptism there lie two links,—Christ's reception of baptism at the hands of John (Matthew iii. 13), and his baptism of blood on the cross (Matthew xx. 22f). That he might lead us over from the typical water-baptism of John to the real Christian water-baptism, it was necessary that he, the true High Priest, should first himself traverse the way, before us and for us, from the typical baptism of John, through the real baptism of blood. As the *sinful Israelite*, in the baptism of John, declared by a *symbolical* act: "I *deserve*, such as I am, to go under and perish [lit. drown, ersäuft werden], I *need* as entirely new born to arise out of the flood;" so the *sinless Israel of God*, when he suffered himself to be baptized by John, declared in a likewise *symbolical* act: "I, who do not deserve death, will suffer myself to be buried in death that I may rise in a glorified body." Thus, this first expression of his willingness to die stands parallel with the second (Matthew xvi. 21; xvii. 5), and a third (John xii. 22–28); and upon all the three declarations the Father pronounces the same Amen of his approbation. But as Christ went forward from the declaration and promise to the fulfilment, as he (unlike the Baptist) came "with water and blood" (I John v. 6), that is, as he was *actually* buried in death, the innocent for the sinner, and thus paid the price of sin, and won for himself and us the new life of immortality and glory, then came forth from the grave the firstling among many brethren, the second Adam, the progenitor of the deuteroadamitic humanity,¹ so also the baptism afterwards established by him is no longer a merely *symbolical* or *declarative*, but a *real* and therefore a *regenerative* act; not a mere *symbol* of a *postulate*, but with that also a *pledge* and *seal* of a *heavenly act*. The meaning is no longer, as in the baptism of

¹ To designate the relation naturally existing between mankind and their progenitor Adam, as fallen, sinful, unredeemed, Ebrard employs the outlandish but convenient adjective, "protoadamitic," while their relation to Jesus Christ as the Redeemer of the race is "deuteroadamitic." The corresponding substantives are "protoadamite" and "deuteroadamite."

John; *just as* thou sinkest into the water, so *should* thy old man die; *just as* thou comest forth again purified, so *shouldst* thou go forth from this baptism a new man; but it is now: *So truly* as thou art now immersed *art* thou in the mediatorial death of Christ buried with him, and made partaker of his atonement (*expiatio*); *so truly as* thou now emergest from the water, *is now a new man* created in thee, is Christ born in thee. And thus baptism, by virtue of this *union of the pledge and seal with the symbol*, stands parallel with circumcision; but stands as the pledge and seal of fulfilment in the new covenant, high above the pledge and seal of the old covenant of types.

All this appears clearly enough from that *position* which the institution of Christ's baptism assumes in the New Testament economy of salvation, but is confirmed by a series of express *passages*. If it belongs to the essential dignity of Christ that he baptizes (Matthew iii. 11) not merely with water, but with the Holy Ghost, it would beforehand seem strange if he had not in the very founding of his baptism (which he besides so clearly distinguishes as baptism in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, from the baptism of *μετάνοια*.) indicated this its higher potency. But he *has* actually indicated it, for first (Matthew xxviii. 16ff. in Galilee) he commanded them to baptize the nations; then (Acts i. 5, in Jerusalem) he promised the disciples that they should first of all be *themselves* baptized with Spirit (in express reference to Matthew iii. 11); next (Acts ch. 2) occurred the outpouring of the Spirit, the baptism "with fire and Spirit;" and now, *fourthly*, the Apostles *first* began (Acts ii. 41) to fulfil that command (Matthew xxviii.) upon others. So closely did the baptism *by* the disciples with water and Spirit grow out of the baptism *upon* the disciples with fire and Spirit. And so the baptism of the Spirit (Acts viii. 14; x. 47; xix. 6) is regarded as belonging, and with all the extraordinary charisms of the Apostolic age, *rightfully* to baptism in water.

In Acts ii. 38, again, to the baptized is promised, not without participation in the atonement (*expiatio*), therefore not as conceivable without substantial regeneration, the *ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν* together with the *δωρεὰ τοῦ πνεύματος*. Nowhere is (subjective) repentance, *μετάνοια*, named as the thing signified (*res*) of Christ's baptism, as it is in Matthew iii. 11, the *res* of that of John, but the *μετάνοια* should have gone before the Christian baptism as a merely subjective condition precedent.¹

Still more clear is Ephesians v. 25-27. Christ gave himself to death for his church, that he might sanctify her (change from profane to holy), purifying her through the bathing in water in the word (*λοῦτρον ἐν ῥήματι*).² But clearest of all is Romans vi. 3ff. Through Christian baptism *we are buried into Christ's atoning death, in order to rise with him, the risen, to a new life*. Very far, therefore, from merely declaring ourselves liable to death in a *symbolic act* (a *βάπτισμα μετάνοιας*), we experience a *real in-*

¹ Acts ii. 38-41; likewise viii. 37; according to the reading very doubtful, however, of the Text. Recept.

² Καθαρίζειν in the Levitical sense: pure is that which may approach the holy God without being consumed.

visible act, performed upon us on the part of the Triune God, of which the *pledge, sign and seal* is the visible act. We, the guilty ones, who ought each for himself to be plunged in the death of punishment, are buried, instead, into the death which Christ suffered for us, and are "crucified with him" (v. 6), but hereby also become partakers of his resurrection not less than of his death (v. 5). We live now to God in Christ (v. 14). This is "the circumcision without hands, the circumcision of Christ," (Colossians ii. 11, 12) with whom we are buried through baptism, and in whom we are raised again through faith. And so are we saved (I Peter iii. 21) through *that* baptism whose type was, not the destruction in the flood of the antediluvian world, but the salvation, through the flood, of Noah—the emergence, that is, of a typically new humanity from the flood-grave of the old. Through *that* baptism we are saved, whose type was the going forth of Israel out of the Red Sea (I Corinthians x. 2), in which Egypt perished. An act which has facts, and facts of deliverance too, of redemption, for its types, must itself be a fact of redemption, and cannot be a mere symbol. Only then can Christian baptism be called in Titus iii. 5 a bath of *κατεργασία καὶ ἀνακαίνωσις* if in it *the old man with his guilt is actually buried in Christ's death, and a new man born to life in the man, if Christ himself, in short, is born in the man.* Compare Galations iii. 27: *δοὺ γὰρ εἰς χριστὸν ἐβαπτισθητε, χριστὸν ἐνεδύσαυθε.* Christian baptism, in the apostolic sense, is therefore a visible act, to which the Lord has attached, as a pledge and seal for those to whom Christ was preached, and who have come to subjective *μετάνοια*, the invisible, mystic act of *real, substantial regeneration*, and *with that* (a) justification once for all, and (b) the commencing new life, the commencing sanctification.

Remark. Of infant baptism no notice can as yet be taken here, where the problem is to develop the *Scripture doctrine* concerning the sacred rite.

After this exposition of the idea of baptism, according to the teachings of the Scripture, our author has a section on "the doctrine of the church concerning it." This, he states (§ 529), summarily thus: "Holy baptism is a transaction in which, on the ground of Christ's baptism of blood, there is joined with the visible act of immersion (Untertauchen) in water, the invisible act of a substantial regeneration by Christ through the Holy Spirit, under the condition of previous conversion." This is confirmed and elucidated by quotations from all the principal symbols of the Reformed churches. More specifically then the church doctrine on this subject is digested into the following propositions:

A. The water in baptism is a symbol, namely of the blood of Christ into which we are buried. *The act of immersion* is first a *symbolic act* signifying and figuring that burial; but secondly a *pledge and seal* of the invisible act joined thereto, after its institution by Christ, of regenera-

tion and the appropriation of the righteousness of Christ. *Baptism as a whole* is not a symbol, nor yet a pledge and seal, but a double transaction in which to the symbol and pledge and seal is joined the substance, to the visible, external act, the invisible, heavenly, inward act.

B. The *operans* [that which renders efficacious] in baptism is not the water, and not the officiating minister of the church, nor is it again the visible act; but Christ through his Holy Spirit. The visible act is for Christ only *means* (instrumentum), which is not essential for him (so that he would be at all unable to supply the want of visible baptism);¹ nor has he by this means bound his own hands (so that he would be at all constrained to bestow the regenerating grace on him also who has refused to repent).² Not on his own account, but *on ours*, has he connected the invisible act (non sine conditio) with the visible, in order that (a) our subjective conversion should concentrate itself even to the desiring of baptism (Acts viii. 36), and to the *confession of repentance and faith* therein involved, and that (b) the *objective substantial regeneration* may be sealed to the convert by a *pledge* simultaneous with its mystical occurrence.

C. For this very reason there is no abrogation, through the junction of the invisible act with the visible, or of the res with the signum, of the universal law that regeneration can only take place where the subjective conversion exists. Baptism, as such, is instituted precisely for converts, for penitent and believing persons, and is an act of *μαθητεύειν* (Matthew xxviii. 19); and it never occurred to the Apostles to administer baptism to unconverted Jews or heathen. We are buried with Christ through baptism (Colossians ii 12), and *through the faith* in him are risen again. Baptism and faith belong together (Mark xvi. 16.) An immersion in the name of the Trinity, performed *upon* an unconverted person,³ would be no more baptism than it would be if performed by those not Christians. The two *conditions*, without which a baptism is impossible, are (a) that the administering agent is *Christ's church*, through her organs; hence a baptism performed, we will suppose, by Christian children on a Jewish child, although with water and the Scriptural formula, but in *sport* would be no baptism; and just as little, one performed by *antichristian* sects *denying* the Son of God; and (b) that the candidate should have offered a confession of *μετάνοια*. (In this we must, for the present, leave infant baptism entirely out of view, since the nature of baptism cannot be derived from the custom of infant baptism, but this must be judged by that.)

Following this section are three remarks, the first relating to the sense of the term *μαθητεύειν*, in Matthew xxviii. 19 :

In the idea of this there are given these two momenta; (a) *βαπτίζοντες*

¹ Comp. Acts cc. 2 and 10, where he, without water baptism and before it, bestows the regenerating and charismatic gifts of the Spirit.

² Acts viii. 13, 21-23.

³ The author doubtless means a person knowing himself to be unconverted. And so of the administrator.—T7.

αὐτοὺς, (b) διδάσκοντες αὐτοὺς τηρεῖν κτλ. Μαθητεύειν is to be a scholar (Matthew xxvii. 57), then to gain any one as a scholar, to make one a disciple, or Christian (Acts xiv. 21 ; Matthew xiii. 57). So here, it denotes *the last result*. Out of the ἐθνη disciples of Christ should be made. This is done through the ἐθνη being baptized and being taught to keep the commands of Christ. That this does not exclude the idea of instruction of another sort given *before* baptism, namely, the preaching of the gospel, is shown by the practice of the apostolic age.

The second remark, treating of questions in reference to the *administration* of baptism, maintains that while the officiating agent is properly the regularly instituted minister of the church, still in cases of *actual necessity* baptism may be performed vicariously by any member of the church. Calvin, however, thought otherwise. He defends the objection of the church (in confessio Helvetica post. 20: Scotica 22) to baptism by midwives, from the charge of cruelty to souls, by showing that the church held the baptism of infants to be permitted, but by no means necessary. She may ascribe some significance to infant baptism, with reference to the future religious development of the child living, but must reject as superstitious the doctrine of its absolute indispensableness to salvation.

Remark 3. That a baptism without water, or with any other than the formula of its original institution, would be no baptism, is self evident. Equally so that nothing depends on the degree of subjective faith, in the officiating minister. For not he, but the church through him, performs the visible, and neither he nor the church, but Christ performs the invisible act, Conf. Helv. post. 19. "Fideles . . . agnoscunt operari Deum in sua institutione, ideoque sacramenta perinde ac ex ipsius Dei manu (se) percipere, et ipsis ministri vitium, si quod insigne illi insit, non obesse, quando agnoscant, sacramentorum integritatem dependere ab institutione Domini. Discriminant aperte in administratione sacramentorum inter Dominum ipsum et Domini ministrum, confitentes sacramentorum *res* dari ab ipso Domino, *symbola* autem a Domini ministris."

In section 530, on the doctrine of the scholastic theologians, Ebrard brings forward the views of a multitude of noted authorities, Bucanus, Burmann, Maresius, Musculus, Polanus, Wendelin, Wolleb, Turretin, Van Til, Pictet, Witsius, and others. Their full definitions of baptism, several of which are separately given, we have not space to quote, but will transfer our author's paragraph, in which he digests their doctrine under the three heads of the *matter*, *form*, and *end* which comprise the essence of baptism.

A. The *materia* (ex qua) is duplex, an external and internal.¹ The

¹ We omit, as being unnecessary after the above general enumeration of writers, the multiplied references to authorities on each item of this statement.—*Tr.*

first, or the "signum," is the water, and that aqua *pura*, without salt, spittle, milk, honey, oil, and the like. The *materia interna*, or the "res," is, in *general*, "Christus," Christ's person, which is likewise the *materia cœnæ* in general (since in both sacraments we receive first and above all Christ himself, then such and such gifts from him); but some make the *materia interna* to be the sanguis Christi. The *materia interna specialis* in baptism, as distinguished from the Lord's supper, is the *regeneratio through unio cum Christo*, in order to *mundatio a peccatis propter Christi sanguinem*; or it is (Bucanus) "*tum sanguis et spiritus Christi, qui aquæ respondent, tum insitio in Christum et hanc consequens remissio peccatorum.*"

B. The *forma* is likewise two-fold. The *forma externa* consists in the *actio immersionis vel adspersionis (vel simplicis vel triplicis)* and the *verba institutionis*.

Both these are essential, but whether *immersio* or *aspersio*, is thought unessential, with an appeal to Mark vii. 3, where βαπτίζεν they supposed was used also for "wash."

The *forma interna* consists of two parts: (a) *the significatio* or symbolical analogy between signum and res, since, namely, *immersio et emersio illustre symbolum fuit sepulturæ et resurrectionis Christi*, and consequently *regenerationis, qua peccato mortui vivimus justitiæ*. With that, baptism has indeed the quality also of a symbol of purification or washing, and in particular is the *aspersio* (Wolleb) a symbol of the ablutio peccatorum as the *result* of regeneratio. The other part is (b) *the obsignatio*, since through the *forma sive actio externa* the *actio interna* is not merely represented figuratively as to its quality, but also *actually* bestowed, sealed and really communicated. Thus Wendelin, th. 12: *Forma interna consistit in significatione, obsignatione et præbitione rei signatæ per signa*. Some, like Van Til (similarly Burm. and Polan.), combine the res and *forma externa* in the conception of "*administratio externa*," and the res and *forma interna* in that of the "*operatio interna*." Some again, like Bucanus, distinguish with greater *logical accuracy*:

I. *Materia externa=signum=aqua. Materia interna=res=sanguis Christi.*

II. *Forma externa=pignus=immersio vel aspersio. Forma interna=res=actio Christi, regeneratio.*

III. *Conjunctio signi et rei:*

(a) *Analogia* inter materiam externam et internam, ac formam externam et internam(=signum et rem), (b) *copulatio formæ internæ (rei) cum forma externa (pignore).*

C. From this it already appears what is the specific operation of grace (efficacia) which takes place in baptism, or, in other words, the *finis baptismi*. There is, namely, the *finis principalis*, the *insitio in familiam Dei* et *obsignatio regenerationis*, or, as Wendelin and Polan. more accurately say, [baptismus]

significat
obsignat
præbet }

{ regenerationem
(a) remissionem peccatorum
(b) unionem mysticam.

To this are added *finis minus principales*, namely, *ecclesiæ discretio*, *obligatio ad sanctificationem*, *testificatio fidei*.

From the *nature* of baptism, as thus explained, it being the act of the *implantation* of Christ in us, and of us in Christ, or the *founding* of the new deuteroadamitic life, it follows that this sacrament is to be administered *but once* to its subject (in contrast to the Lord's supper as the *nourishment* of this life; *nascimur*, *pascimur*).

In a remark on this section, the question is considered whether in baptism sins to be committed are washed away, in the *ablutio* which is declared, as well as those already committed. The answer is yes; since by means of regeneration the entire *satisfactio vicaria activa et passiva* of Christ is appropriated by the believer. There is thus bestowed upon him the total indivisible *justitia Christi*, from which follows the forgiveness in succession of all and every sin.

The difference between the views of the Roman Catholic and the evangelical Protestant church is stated thus: The Romish church regards baptism as a *particular work of expiation*, the evangelical as a *sign* and *pledge* of the eternal expiation made once for all. The Romish church regards baptism as a single act *magically* affecting the life development of its object, expiating his *past* sins and abolishing the concupiscence towards *future* sins; the evangelical church regards it as a sign and pledge of the *birth of a new man*, with which is given once for all the forgiveness of *all* sins, but not the cessation of evil concupiscence, or of the old Adam.

The discussion of baptism, in respect to its nature and form, is concluded by a section (§ 531) which gives the theological definitions concerning the *causa* (of the gracious effects) *necessitas*, *impedimenta baptismi*. The efficient cause is Christ through the Holy Spirit; the instrumental cause is the minister duly called. The benefit of baptism is communicated by God to the recipient, through his minister.

In consistency with this principle the dogmatic theologians uniformly held that there is no such *necessity* for external baptism, that God may not, where it is wanting either through the fault of men, or unfavorable circumstances, regenerate and save the converted man. Again, it follows that God cannot have so bound his own hands and enslaved himself to the officiating man in baptism as unconditionally to regenerate and save every one who is baptized. God's *ordo salutis* under which the minister works prescribes conversion, faith, not less than baptism, as essential to the experience of forgiving grace, and

cannot be abrogated by a perverse administration of the latter by men.

Baptism is instituted for converts, not for unconverted persons (we must still keep the custom of infant baptism out of sight), and therefore if the outward act be performed on an unconverted man, regeneration would no more accrue than it would in the case, for example, of a beast or inanimate object, upon which the outward act might be blasphemously performed.

Hence, want of faith in the recipient is an *impedimentum* (obstacle to the efficacy of baptism), which, when perceived, should prevent the administration of the rite, and which, if the rite has been administered under a mistake as to the existence of this impediment, necessarily hinders the intended result. From the simply ministerial character of the administrator it was held, again, by the old authorities, that the reality of baptism depends not at all on his personal faith, but alone on the *administratio legitima*, and the faith of the baptized. Hence, the validity of *heretical* baptism, with water and in the name of the Trinity, was unanimously admitted in accordance with the early Catholic judgment. Some writers, however, remarked that it was wrong, without the most stringent necessity, to seek baptism at the hands of heretics (*e. g.*, pontificiorum). A fourth conclusion, from the same premises, was that as only *the minister of the church* is the instrumentum in baptism, most obviously all such sects as deny the fundamental teachings of the Christian church, and are no longer branches of it, cannot possibly, more than Jews or Turks, perform true baptism, no matter what mode or formula they may employ. The case of a Pole is mentioned, who, sincerely penitent, had, in the absence of any one to baptize him, baptized himself, but who was rightfully (not *re*) baptized by the next evangelical missionary.

Calvin (4, 15, 20,) held, in common with many of the Reformed, that baptism administered by a layman was invalid.

Rem. In opposition to this stern rigor, baptism in German Switzerland (where it is always performed in the midst of the public worship, immediately after the sermon) is *administered also by unordained candidates*; that is, when such an one takes the place of the pastor in preaching, he takes his place also in the baptism.

It cannot have failed to strike every reader how carefully our author has excluded infant baptism from all participation in his *idea* of the divine ordinance. Nor does it appear to unsophisticated minds how he is ever to bring it in, with the slightest countenance from the

word of God, as expounded by himself, or from the venerated authorities of his church. He must, of course, bring it in, however, but the manner in which he actually treats of the subjectum baptismi—under which head the question of infant baptism is learnedly and with great candor discussed—we have not room here to explain. That must be reserved till another time.

On the representation of the subject already made, we would remark that it is uncommon to meet with an adversary whose spirit we so cordially approve, and whose reasonings on those points about which we are specially concerned, lead so obviously to the conclusion which we accept. As to what baptism is, in the view of Scripture, in distinction from what it signifies, or what it does, we do not see that Ebrard need have any difficulty with the apposite article in the strictest Baptist creed. That it is the immersion in water, by the organ of the Church, in the name of the blessed Trinity, of one credibly professing repentance toward God and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ, this, and whatever else any of us include in our definition of baptism, Ebrard also assumes it to be. He assumes, moreover, that it does not embrace anything else. No rite, ceremony, agent, qualification, means, does he allude to as requisite or appropriate, beyond those which we hold that the word of God prescribes. And he *assumes* this to be the teaching of the word of God, so manifest and unquestionable, that he does not anywhere, in his article, seem even to think of any question as to the New Testament "mode" or outward form of the ordinance. The prevalence in modern times of another usage (sprinkling), he ascribes to the intrusion of infant baptism without a shadow of warrant from the Bible. So far, his teaching would probably satisfy any Baptist church to which he might desire admission, and we should suppose our brethren in Germany would find it valuable testimony to the correctness of their distinctive position. We do not wonder at hearing, from the preface to his later work on Pastoral Theology and Homiletics, that he has been charged by his brethren with "Baptistic tendencies," in consequence of the publication of these sentiments, especially taken in connection with his clear denial of the sacramental character, and divine authority of infant baptism.

To all thus believing everywhere we extend our cordial sympathy, and to all acting consistently with such faith, and from all, we offer and ask fellowship. Indeed, we are sanguine enough to think that we see, in the proclamation of such views in such a quarter, hopeful tokens of a union among believers in the profession of Christianity such as many of the best are sighing after, but often, it would ap-

pear, without an inkling of the way in which it is to be brought about. This, we say, without thinking for a moment that in "the peace which yet shall be" all Christians differing from us must adopt specifically Baptist sentiments,—wheel into line on our left, while we stand as the pivotal centre,—or in any way succumb to us. We mean rather that we see ground of hope in the disposition, here so signally manifested, to refer questions pertaining to *the constitution and ordinances of the church* directly, candidly, submissively, to the decision of the Bible. Thus, if ever, and not otherwise, is the glorious unity and completeness of Christ's "macrocosmic" body to be manifested to the world; certainly not by denying either that he has intelligibly laid down regulative principles concerning the essential organization and usage of his churches, or that these principles are applicable to churches as they now exist. Most willingly do we admit, most fervently hope, that in such a revision of the divine grounds of ecclesiastical practice, we ourselves also may share in any needed correction.

Meanwhile, we think we may fairly claim that so long as men of such learning and ability concede (against their own allowedly spurious custom), IMMERSION of believers to have been the baptism instituted by Christ through his Apostles, it is for the interest of Christianity, that some of its professors should yet longer maintain simply and purely the appointed usage. When eminent scholars frankly admit that modifications of that usage, which it is convenient for them to adopt, are still deteriorations, rendering it "inadequate," if not null, plain Christian people may at least be excused if they deem it necessary to hold fast to the *adequate* rite. If the Christian immersion merely symbolizes, and that because it is immersion, so great facts as the believers' death to sin with Christ, and his resurrection in him to a new and holy life, there are many that *will* insist on being marked with Christ's own sign. If in this they may declare, in a visible proclamation, these high truths, as a testimony to men and perhaps a gratification to angels, they will not be content, were the cost a thousand times greater, to forego the privilege. If baptism may and must signify this much, as we gather from the incidental utterances of Holy Writ, it may be designed to intimate volumes of meaning, sometimes felt by those concerned in it, which it has not pleased its author clearly and in words to reveal. All this, if it only *signify* great and precious facts of salvation; but if, as our author holds, it rather accomplishes those facts, is at least a factor towards the result, or even the vehicle upon which they are borne to their completion; if it is our Lord's deliberately chosen means to such

end, what presumption must it be in us to substitute something else, and present to God the alternative of either withholding from us the proposed blessing, or conveying it through a channel of *our* selection! It is as though the great King in Zion had carefully prescribed the ceremonial by which he would wed the church, his bride, and then the human celebrant had required the union to be effected in some other way, or not at all. 'Is it then a marriage?

Having gone so far in agreement with Dr. Ebrard, touching the nature of baptism, we gladly recognize in his doctrine concerning its *efficacy* an occasion for fresh scrutiny of the inspired word. Some of our readers, perhaps, recoiling from the pernicious chimera of "baptismal regeneration," which many of his expressions suggest, will have rejected his view without further consideration. But "baptismal regeneration," in any of its familiar significations with us, is far enough from what our author considers the effect of the sacrament. What this is, must be estimated constantly in the light of his distinct and frequently emphasized tenet of the separateness and priority of conversion in the *ordo salutis*, as the believers' own, though not unaided work. Only upon this, as the indispensable condition, follows necessarily the establishment in his soul of the mystic union with Christ. This latter is the true parturition for the new man, the birth from above, the Scriptural regeneration. This is simply and exclusively the work of Christ through the Holy Spirit. Baptism as an act—*opus operatum*—cannot regenerate, can in no way save, effects nothing. There is no magical efficacy in that water; there is no priestly prerogative of the officiating minister. A present Christ alone works in it and by it, alone gives it all its value and power. Even he honors it not at all except when it meets a soul hungering and thirsting after him with repentance and faith. To *every* SUCH soul, as we understand our author, Christ will communicate himself with or without baptism; but regularly, and in the intended economy of salvation, baptism is the ceremony of Christ's incorporation with the believing soul. Although Ebrard has not employed the figures which we just now made use of, it may illustrate his meaning to say that, what the marriage rite does to perfect the union of the espoused pair in holy matrimony, that baptism does in the consummation of the union between Christ and the believing soul, wherein it lives no more by itself, but Christ lives in it and its life is Christ. Thus, baptism does not (any more than marriage) mark the union as before established, but establishes it; marks its establishment indeed, but not merely marks; it guarantees and seals the same for the perpetual contentment of the believer, and as a memorial to the God of his salvation.

We think this may be taken as a rough epitome of our author's teaching on this subject, so far as comprehensible, apart from his account of infant baptism and of the offices of the church.

Whether this is a correct representation of the virtue of baptism, whether God does really accomplish any such benefit through it, whether, in short, baptism is an ordinance or a sacrament,¹ is simply a question of Biblical interpretation—as Ebrard also assumes—which every one must decide for himself. And happily every one may decide it for himself. Neither Pope, nor council, nor doctor, is required as arbiter. To the law and the testimony! Let there be only a simple and unbiassed willingness to receive its verdict as supreme and unquestionable in the case!

We doubt not that here some of our readers, while strenuously rejecting baptismal regeneration, in every established sense of the phrase, and wishing, perhaps, that our author had avoided the mention of it, will be glad to have baptism, the most prominent ordinance in the New Testament, earnestly honored as something more than a mere sign. Others, and probably the large majority, are content to think of baptism as a ceremony denoting grace already experienced at the hand of God, and the public dedication of the candidate to God's service. What is *done*, in baptism, is rather *by* the candidate towards God and fellow men, than *upon* him by God. Anything beyond this is not unnaturally feared as threatening the pure gratuitousness of salvation, and so the honor of Christ, the author and giver of it. Yet those of the other side may be warranted in the feeling that this is not all, perhaps not the principal thing effected in baptism. As a matter of experience, they ask whether they have not, in the holy ordinance, felt conscious of a peculiar effect of grace received, a blessing which no act of obedience on their part, as such, no profession of faith made by them, ever gives. They have seen the countenance of the baptized shine with lustre from heaven, never before seen, or repeated afterward, on earth. It was manifestly the espousal of the soul to Christ. Thus are they constrained practically to suppose that they are, in this ordinance, subjected to an operation of Christ, made the recipients of grace by which they are furthered in the mystic life, quite otherwise than they could have been through any other, though equally trying, exhibition of their faith, or patience, or love. And as a question of interpretation, they, too, have already asked: What mean those words of wonders, "Arise, and be baptized, and *wash away thy sins*;" "Except ye be *BORN of water* and

¹ *Sacramentum est visibilis forma invisibilis gratiæ in eo collato.* Hugo of St. Victor, *vid. Hagenbach's Hist. of Doctrines*, II. 77.

of the Spirit;" "he that believeth *and is baptized* shall be saved;" being "**BAPTIZED into** Jesus Christ;" being "*buried with him* in the baptism;" and others of like import? Can due weight be given to these marvellous utterances of the Holy Spirit while that is placed uppermost in the "matter" of baptism, which is not so much as named in Scripture in connection with it, and that, on the other hand, carefully belittled or explained away which the Scripture plainly, emphatically, repeatedly, perpetually ascribes to it? It may be difficult to conceive distinctly the inspired account of the value of baptism, except under these figures, and so to explain it to the theoretical understanding; but then it is quite too easy, many will feel, to declare that all such passages mean something a great deal less than they say, or very different from that—as different as seeming from being.

To some it will even appear that much of the importance apparently attached by many among us, at the present time, to such questions as, Whether the New Testament expressly states that the act of baptism on the believer's part must come prior to his eating of the Lord's supper, is owing to the inadequate, not to say shallow and inane notion entertained of baptism, the initiation to a Christian life. Why, indeed, if it be merely the act of the recipient, his profession of faith, or a sign only of what has previously and completely transpired for him, need so much account be made by God or man of the order in which it comes in? But is not the Lord's supper for his body, the church? And is there any other way recognized in the New Testament by which one may be incorporated into this body than by being "baptized into Jesus Christ?" This relation of the sacraments, universally recognized by the old theologians, is intimated in their phrase already quoted: *nascimur, pascimur*.

If we ask of such: Do you then hold that God *regenerates* the already believing soul in baptism? Is it not preposterous to speak of regenerating one whose faith proves that he is already alive? they might refute our metaphorical objection by the metaphorical answer, that there is life before birth. More deliberately some will say that they would prefer to avoid the use of the term "regeneration" here, and would be better pleased with Ebrard's discussion if he had called baptism the sacrament of the Saviour's mystic union with the believing soul. But then they have to consider that the Scripture itself calls baptism the bath, or bathing, of regeneration; and, although it may be possible, if other Scripture require it, to understand this emblematically, it actually falls in well with what we read elsewhere of the nature of baptism, if understood as the rite from


which the believer comes forth *for the first a new man*. And so they may call on us to review the few places in the New Testament—as distinguished from our formal systems of theology—which speak of “regeneration,” being “born again,” being “begotten” of God; and see whether they do not lead us to believe that the new *birth*, the being “*born again*,” is the full emergence of the believer into the company of the saints, that is, into the body of Christ, which may well be solemnized by a visible ceremony, and that ceremony a sacrament. Before that the penitent, the believer is “begotten” indeed, is alive, but with an inchoate, embryonic life, not yet duly manifested nor fitted to share in the work of God’s children.

Here and there one, at least, already cherishes among us, more or less distinctly, sentiments like these; and it would not be strange if their number should increase through the more searching and profound, yet reverent and believing, investigation of the word of God which, amid so much that is frivolous and perverse, has of late been happily illustrated by many Biblical scholars.

Whether this is to prove so or not, and whether it be desirable that it should or not, we, surely, of all Christians, may readily accept whatever of efficacy towards the believer’s salvation, any one may discover certified by the Bible as contained in our characteristic rite. It cannot disturb, but only strengthen us, if this should be demonstrated to be not only a token of past, but a vehicle of present grace. The more of saving help God has connected with it, and especially the more he has made that help dependent on its purity and completeness, the more necessary is it that we should maintain that purity and completeness as once delivered to the saints. Having held fast to it, defended it, bled for it, considered mainly as Christ’s appointed symbol, through all the Christian ages, we certainly shall not lose attachment to it, when it is shown to be of even more substantial importance than we had perceived.

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GOETHE'S FAUST.

IT was on the twenty-second of March, 1832, that Goethe came to his earthly end. He had been seized with violent fever a few days before, and was rapidly failing, though he himself had no idea that the end was so near. Sitting in his easy chair on that March morning, he had been gazing out once more upon the face of nature, which he had known and loved so long and so well, and had cheerfully talked of the coming of another Spring; but as the hour of noon drew on, his sight and speech gradually became dim and indistinct, till at half past twelve—his last words “more light” having just escaped his lips—the Great Seer closed his eyes forever on all earthly scenes. Strange opposition, in this our double sphere of existence, that while the sun was high in the heavens, and all nature was rejoicing in his light, there should sink to his final setting that great luminary of the world of mind. And so departed the greatest poet of his country and his age, who, by the might of his genius, fully developed under the most fortunate circumstances by the most assiduous and various culture, had held during his long career a sovereign rule over the spirits of men.

Of all the great works of this remarkable man, the poem of Faust is the most characteristic. It is a monument of his genius in all the periods of its development, the consummate result of the poetic ac-

tivity of his whole life. Only five days before his death he wrote in a letter to William Von Humboldt,—and they are his last written words,—“It is now more than sixty years since the entire conception of Faust first stood before my mind.” But, as he says in the same letter, the poem was not composed continuously, but at intervals, the manifold elements of the plan being wrought out singly, according to the interest they had for him at the time. Thus the composition of the first part covers a period of more than thirty years; it was published as “A Fragment” in 1790, when the poet was about forty, and in its complete form in 1808. The third act of the second part appeared as late as 1827, and the remaining four acts were written after the age of seventy-five, and the whole published after the poet's death. On the day when he had written the last passage, he said to Eckermann, “My remaining days I may now consider a free gift; and, indeed, it is all one to me, what I now do, or whether I do anything more.” What Horace said of his patron Mæcenas, may be said, therefore, in a still higher sense of Goethe's Faust—it was the theme of his earliest and of his latest song. Even in his boyhood his imagination was seized by the weird story of Faust, as he read it in the then popular book of Meynenden, and saw it in the puppet shows at that time so common in Frankfort. In his student life at Strasburg, when he was himself full of aspirations for knowledge, yet ever unsatisfied with his attainments, the character and career of Faust so fell in with his own experience, that he then conceived the idea of its poetic treatment. Three years later the conception had taken form within him, and he began to give it expression; and from that time to the last of his life, he was busied, though sometimes at long intervals, in filling up the grand canvas which the conception required; the poem grew up into being even with his own spiritual growth; the manifold scenes of the great Dramatic Mystery successively unfolded themselves, and rose to the view, along with his own ever widening observation and experience; and the last scene of all, that scene, which opens to us glimpses into the invisible world, reached its consummation only a year before the poet's own departure from the earth.

This poem, which thus represents Goethe's entire life, stands also in closest relation to the life of his age, especially of the German people. It entered into that life even as a vital force, giving impulse and character to its higher manifestations in literature and art, and to the thoughts and convictions of the popular mind. Appearing in a transition period of unrest and excitement, it seemed to be a sovereign word which all were waiting to hear; it acted like a sudden

inspiration on all minds; all poets, writers, thinkers, all departments of intellectual activity, felt its influence; all the arts of design united to reproduce it in impressive forms; music, too, gave it utterance in many-voiced song; and the stage exhausted its resources of scenic talent and skill to bring to the eye and the mind of an enthusiastic public, a living representation of its pictures of life and manners. Probably no poem of modern times has had so many readers; readers of all ages and classes in society, of every stage of intelligence and culture. It has been alike the favorite of the unthinking multitude, and of men of the most thoughtful minds. The common people never tire of those scenes which portray the griefs and the joys of ordinary life; they read the story of Margaret for the hundredth time with an ever new interest, and her very face and form seem to be present to their sight, even as one of their own kindred, familiar to them in their homes, even as to the ancient Romans the images of their ancestors and their household gods. Not less marked has been its influence upon the profoundest thinkers; with whom it has been a cherished companion in their hours of solitary meditation upon the ever insoluble and ever fascinating problems of human being. Niebuhr describes it as a book which touches the deepest springs of thought and feeling; Hegel pauses, in the midst of one of his most abstruse expositions, to illustrate his doctrines by the words of Faust; and Schelling has pronounced the poem "an ever fresh source of inspiration," and counsels all young and aspiring students to draw from its perennial sources that force which emanates from it, and moves the innermost soul of man. The secret of such a popularity lies not alone in the poetic and dramatic power of the work, marvellous as this is, but in the fact that all this marvellous power is employed with infinite skill in representing truths of surpassing moment in human life. It is more than a drama, instinct though it is with the dramatic spirit, and though its characters move before us like a human presence; it is more than a tragedy, though it answers the conditions of tragic poetry by moving the passions through the agency alike of pity and of terror. It is a dramatic poem of human life and destiny; its themes involving all that is most momentous in man's being and condition; with a great poet's insight and utterance, it tells through one form of human character and experience the story of man's nature; its relations to God and the world, the conflict of its passions, its ideal longings struggling against the fixed limits of necessity, its perpetual contradictions of strength and weakness, knowledge and ignorance, truth and error; and above all these, and underlying them all, that mysterious contest, that awful antinomy, of good and of evil.

It falls in with what has now been said, that this poem, like all the great poems of the world, rests, in its essential subject-matter, upon the ground of fact. As in the old story of Antæus, it draws its strength from the soil of human experience. The basis is real. With all the fables that have gathered about the name of Faust, and formed a Faust Legend,¹ as truly as that of "Achilles' wrath," or of "Pelops' line" in antiquity, Faust is a historical person. We have not space even to indicate the manifold elements of the legend; nor need we narrate all that is known of the man. His career belongs to the sixteenth century, the time of the Reformation, and of the revival of learning. He was born at Knittlingen, a little town in Wurtemberg; and a few miles from the birth-place of Melanchthon.

Melanchthon himself knew him at Wittenberg; and there are writings extant of two of the Reformer's pupils, which record narratives they had heard from their master, in which he speaks of Faust as a countryman and personal acquaintance, and mentions facts in his student-life, and then denounces him in words quite foreign to the Reformer's usual gentle spirit and classic style, as "a shameful beast," and "a cloaca of many devils." Faust studied chiefly at Cracow, but for a time, also, at other Universities. He is spoken of as a Doctor of Theology, and well versed in the Scriptures, as a Doctor of Medicine, and a famous physician, also as a mathematician and an astrologer. Melanchthon testifies of him, in all sincerity, that he carried a dog about with him, who was the devil in disguise; also that he boasted that by his skill in magic, he had won for the Emperor all his victories over the French. He speculated, it was said, day and night; and in his ambition for superhuman knowledge and power, gave himself to magic arts, and leagued himself with the devil, and after a lawless career came to a dreadful end. Such are the chief things told of Faust by men of the time, celebrated for learning and piety; and it is no wonder that, in an age and among a people, where witchcraft was believed in with a more than New England faith, the fame of Faust soon ran over all Germany and Europe, growing ever larger as it ran, and tales were told without number, of his conjurations and mighty magic. These elements, the real and the fictitious, of the Faust story, Goethe has wrought, by his genius and his art, into a new creation, a Faust of his own, into *Goethe's Faust*; it is the old air with variations, but such variations as could emanate only from an original genius; the conception of character is the same, but it is

¹ The completest view that we have seen of the Faust Legend is contained in Heinrich Düntzer's "*Goethe's Faust*," published at Leipsic, 1857. The work contains, also, a very valuable commentary on both parts of the poem.

recast in a finer and grander mould, ennobled and enriched by that faculty so rich in Goethe, which Milton calls a "universal insight into things," and set forth and adorned with a wealth of poetic beauty, "which has in it everything of enchantment, which a magician could either give or desire."

We propose to take such a survey of the poem, as may serve to show its moral significance; to endeavor to bring out the form of character which it presents, and the several stages of its career, together with the lessons it teaches.

At the outset, we have the poet's guidance for the foreshadowing, in the Prologue, of the moral conditions of the life of Faust. It is called the Prologue in Heaven, and is constructed upon the model of the Introduction of the Book of Job. We are lifted, in imagination, to the courts of heaven, to the very presence-chamber of the Lord. In those heavenly hosts that throng around in shining ranks, and in Mephistopheles, who comes also to present himself before the Lord, we seem to touch, at their very springs in the invisible world, the powers of good and evil, which are to invest with their mysterious conflict of agency, the life of a human being on earth. The voices of archangels utter forth in adoring, jubilant song, the high praises of God; the sun rounding his appointed course, and ringing out his rival accord in the music of the spheres, the pomp of the swift revolving earth, its brightness of day alternating with awful night, the foaming ocean heaving up in its broad floods;—these, and all His sublime works, past comprehending, are glorious as on time's first day. But this celestial harmony is broken in upon by one voice of discord, the voice of Mephistopheles, who draws near and addresses the Lord in words which are his alone, as the spirit of scoffing and contradiction, as the accuser and tempter of men. *He* has nought to say of suns and spheres, he only sees how man is vexing himself, the little god of the world, who is just as odd a creature as at the first. Far better off would he be, if he had not in him the glimmering light of reason, which he uses only to make himself lower than the brutes themselves. "Doctor Faust" in particular seems to him, if a servant of the Lord at all, to serve him in the strangest fashion. He will have the brightest stars of heaven, and the highest joys of earth, and both together leave him all unsatisfied. The tempter asks only that he may have him under his guidance, and he shall be utterly lost to the Lord's service. The Lord replies, that Faust wanders now in perplexity; he may be brought out by and by into clearness; the adversary may tempt him, so long as he is on earth, since man is subject to temptation during all his earthly probation; this human soul he may drag down to his

own path if he can; but at last baffled and in shame, he may have to confess that "a good man in his dark strivings is conscious of the right way."

In the opening scene, we are introduced to Faust, in his study at night, in the midst of his books, where, in intellectual pursuits, his life has hitherto exclusively lain. Conscious of the highest powers of thought, and instinct with boundless desires, that yearn after all, and more than all, that man can ever attain, he has been striving with the vehemence of a character far less wise than strong and noble, for the conquest of absolute truth. But alas! the tree of knowledge, always one of good or of evil, according to the spirit of the soul that gathers its fruit, has yielded him only vexation and disappointment. A generous avarice for intellectual wealth has been his master passion; but it was avarice still, and left his soul in a sense of spiritual need, because he lacked the virtues of content and moderation, and faith and love, and reverent submission to the conditions of all human endeavor. He has compassed the circle of University learning, has mastered philosophy, law, medicine, and theology too; he has won all titles and dignities of scholastic life, he has enjoyed an enviable celebrity as Professor these ten years past; but the result of all is no inward satisfaction, no revelation yet of the secrets of the world; and he sits now brooding over the dismal conviction, that all knowledge is vain, all knowing impossible. Gone, utterly gone, is the fancy that he can know anything himself, or teach anything that can better mankind. So it was once in the poet's own experience, as he has himself recorded it; "I too had ranged through the whole round of knowledge, and was early enough led to see its vanity;" and a wiser than either has told the same sad story: "And I gave my heart to know wisdom; and I perceived that this also is vexation of spirit. For in much wisdom is much grief, and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." With this despair of knowledge, Faust painfully feels how he has, in the meantime, lost all chance of earthly happiness. He looks forth from his gloom, upon the brilliant arena of the world, and sees how men have won its fair prizes of wealth and pleasure, and rank and power, and it maddens him now to think, that all these, which in his eager pursuit of truth he has ignored and despised, he has now sacrificed and lost. And this is the running over of his cup of bitterness.

What now can he do? It is not in his nature to succumb, and make peace with his condition. No; by some hitherto untried means, he is still bent upon reaching the goal towards which he has been striving; he insists upon the absolute satisfaction of his desires for

knowledge. Despairing of this attainment by his own faculties, he will call to his aid supernatural agencies. Extremes meet; and this man of Promethean nature, who has aspired to possess himself by his own intellectual force, of the secrets of heaven, will superstitiously invoke fancied powers of the spirit world, who shall reveal to him, in open vision, the mysteries of the universe. With this new purpose hope revives once more; the ardor of his passionate soul is all aglow again; he plunges into the books of magic, and studies its signs and spells. As he gazes upon the sign of the Macrocosm, the mystic sign of the universe, he feels the presence of hovering spirits, on whom he calls. The inward tumult is stilled, as the powers of nature seem to be unveiling all about him. His poor heart fills with joy, as he discerns the harmony of forces, which live in the vast frame of the world, the ceaseless energy of their reciprocal action, all weaving themselves into the whole, and each working and living in the other. But too soon he finds, that all this is for him but a majestic show, phenomena alone, brilliant as they are; of these harmonious forces, he has himself no immediate apprehension; the sources of life he cannot penetrate; the spirits he invokes answer not, for over them he has no power. Baffled here, he turns him to another mystic sign, that of the spirit of the elemental world, the spirit of the earth. To this he finds himself more nearly allied; of this spirit he may aspire to be a peer; he is proudly conscious of entire manhood, strong to know all and brave all that belongs to earth, to carry in him all its weal and all its woe. He feels the spirit to be near, close at hand, scarce veiled from his sight; and in the hope that he is now to have pure insight into the very being of nature, and with every faculty strained to welcome the revealing, he must call, he must be heard, though it cost him his life. But at the very moment when what he has so hotly wished appears, and the spirit stands before him in all its flaming glory, he can not bear the sight, and horror-struck, turns him away and hides his face. Now he must hear the spirit's awful rebuke for his arrogant pride, in defying the limits that bound man, and in presuming to match himself with spirits. He must learn that he is like the spirit he can comprehend, not that he has summoned as his equal; man may not gaze into the inner heart of nature; her mysterious being and force are hidden from his view; the ever-changing life of the world is only the vesture of the Deity; man may not see God at any time, only His manifestations can he see and know.

Disappointed in these new hopes, and rudely thrust back upon the dim lot of mortals, Faust sinks down in humiliation to his own bitter reflections. He looks over all his career, and contrasts this despair of

his manhood with the glowing hopes of youth, when his soul exulted in constant progress, when fair visions of rising truth made all bright the horizon before him. The mysteries of man's double being, the material and the spiritual, the ideal and the real, press upon his soul with all their awful weight. He is bitterly conscious how man finds his finest spiritual desires humbled and withered by the earthly element, that clings to him, and is all about him. The claims of everyday life press down with rudest force our noblest aspirations; the glorious feelings that have made our inner life, are deadened by contact with the world, and our high ideals, that have risen so grandly before the soul, melt and pass away at the touch of ugly reality. Such thoughts as these possessing the soul of Faust, the sight of his books, for so many years his chosen companions, is now odious; the study, where alone has been his home, is now a very dungeon; nay, the world itself only a prison, its walls bounding him on all sides, so massive they cannot be pierced, so high he cannot scale them. As he gazes in despair on all the objects around him, the shelves of gloomy volumes, the ghastly array of instruments of science, a bright shining phial of poison fastens his eye like a magnet. He grasps it and greets it devoutly as the hope and deliverance of his perplexed soul. Those sweet, sparkling juices, once mixed by himself with cunning hand, shall bear him in peace to new shores and lasting day. By their friendly agency, more potent than study or magic, he shall pass quietly out of his prison limits, and, as a free spirit, range in the bright regions of pure and perfect knowledge. He is raising the cup to his lips, when from the adjoining church, there breaks upon his ear the Easter song of the angels, chanting the great theme of the resurrection.

“Christ is arisen!
Joy be to mortal man!
Whom, since the world began,
Evils inherited,
By his sins merited,
Through his sins creeping,
Sin bound are keeping.”

His rash hand is stayed, his purpose arrested, his soul deeply moved as he listens. Strange power of music that so calms his surging passions; strange the power of mental association, that sounds, falling upon his ear, so strike the electric chain of thought and feeling, as to flash before him all the forgotten past, and give such force to the memories of innocent childhood, when faith and knowledge went hand in hand, and believing and doing were one. He listens to

the message of those Easter sounds, though they speak to no faith in his own heart. No longer can he aspire to those spheres whence those good tidings come; but those old familiar strains, heard in his childhood, have power yet to call him back to life.

—"Now memories sweet,
 Fraught with the feelings of my childhood's prime,
 From the last step decisive stay my feet.
 Oh! peal, sweet heavenly anthems, peal as then!
 Tears flood mine eyes, earth has her child again."

Faust has now reached a crisis of great moral peril, when, for a brief season, it is not clear whether he will go on in a path of error, or turn back to right. This transition stage Goethe represents in a series of scenes, which hurry us forward, with an ever heightening interest, awakened both by their poetic and their moral power, to the catastrophe of the first part of the poem, in Faust's fall, and the tragedy of Margaret. We are to see how transient is the sacred stillness that has come from that Easter hymn; how soon come back upon him all the old, restless desires, the dull, gloomy discontent; how, with the extinction of all faith, his before dormant passions awake, and assert their claims, till turning his back upon all his high aspirations, he is ready to join hands with Mephistopheles, the spirit of evil, with whom he has been all the while unconsciously in parley.

We see Faust next, no longer in his study, but in the midst of nature and of the moving throngs of men. It is spring-time, when nature is renewing her glories; it is the afternoon of the festive Easter-day, and the common people, all strangers to the strivings which have so embittered the life of the recluse student, are hurrying forth from the haunts of daily toil and care, in quest of holiday mirth and pleasure. Faust has at his side his *famulus* Wagner, the very antipodes of himself, a dry, plodding man, a disciple of the letter; and not of the spirit, who has taken to books and study as a means of getting on in the world, and who, in his dull level of mediocrity, fancies himself a match for the *Dii Majores* of the learned world. Goethe treats him with infinite skill as a foil to Faust; and it is one of the finest of the many contrasts of the poem. Faust enters into the scenes of life about him with all the deep-moved sensibilities of a strong nature. It delights him to see river and rill all free again, to see the fields again green with promise. He beholds, with a strange joy, the gay multitude of men and women, straying in parties over garden and field, and blithely basking in the sunshine to-day, and making the spring air ring with their hearty glee of shout and cheer.

Ah! thinks he, what pleasure is here! How much wiser these simple people than I, for they know how to be happy! But by and by, while he is gazing upon the setting sun, as he gilds the landscape with his departing rays, and is speeding on to light up other scenes, the sight reminds him how darkness has just set upon his bright hopes, and start into new life all his infinite desires, and he longs for friendly wings, that he may strive after the bright god in his glorious course. Then he might soar above this narrow spot of earth to regions of serene air, night left behind him, day always before him, and the heavens above all bathed in undying light. But even while he dreams, the sun is gone. Another glorious dream, a bright delusion, but of briefest possession, a type of all our noblest aspirations! The learned Wagner at his side cannot comprehend his master's mood. He, too, he says, has had his fanciful hours, but was never stirred by such impulses as these. He soon gets sated at looking on fields and woods, and never in his life did he covet a bird's wings, that he might fly away through the air. His are the joys of mind, and he has his charmed hours, when, in the long winter nights, he communes with books. Ah! when he can unroll a precious parchment, then all heaven comes down into his soul. Faust tells him that he knows only the one impulse of the human soul, let him never know the other. Within his own breast are dwelling two souls, the one struggling to be severed from the other; the one cleaves to the earth, with organs like cramps of steel, the other lifts itself from the mists of earth to its ancestral skies. His longing desires are inflamed with the more ardor by contact with so different a nature as Wagner's. While Wagner describes the joy, which his studies yield him, Faust feels more than ever the weight of his own lot, in which, despairing of knowledge, he hates the very thought of books. He has in him already the rising desire to exchange "gray theory for the golden fruits of life." He would fain range abroad in the world, and musing no more over dull learning, restore his tortured soul in the manifold interchange of enjoyment and of life. Oh, that the spirits that float between earth and heaven, would come down and bear him on their pinions to new and varied existence! Oh for a magic mantle to waft him away to far-off worlds!

Next we find Faust in his study again, returned from his walk, and bringing from it a frame of mind softened by the scenes he has witnessed without, as well as by the gathering shades of evening. The better soul seems to be awake within him; he will persuade himself that his wild desires are now in slumber; that the love of man and the love of God are now re-kindling in his heart. Soon, how-

ever, he discovers this to be a delusion, the influence rather of recollections than of present thoughts and feelings. He must soon confess to himself that the wished-for peace is not within him; that strive as he may, it will never more well up in his heart. In his extremity he will turn to divine revelation, to the New Testament. He will translate a passage from the original into his dear native tongue. He siezes the book, and opens to the first chapter of the Gospel of John. But how can he, whose faith has disappeared, approach the Bible, with that humility and trust which are the necessary conditions of its healing and saving powers? On the very first verse he is at a stand, he is mastered by the spirit of contradiction, which drives him to a downright denial of the language of Scripture. "In the beginning was the *Word*"? No, "The Word" cannot be put at so high a value as that; certainly it was not that which was "in the beginning." And so, by a purely subjective process of criticism, he sets himself to inquiring and establishing for himself what was in the beginning, and finally writes, "In the beginning was the *Deed*." Thus the inwrought skepticism of his mind, which has returned unsatisfied from all his investigations, comes into fatal conflict with the child-like faith which the Scriptures teach and require; by and by the general conviction, that all human life is but a bitter jugglery, siezes him more strongly than ever; he is ashamed of the weak emotion, that kept him back yesterday from breaking away from such a world as this. That, too, was only a delusion, which cheated the little remnant he had, of child-like feelings, by memories of a happy past; and so with all feelings that seem to promise satisfaction; they are only cozening and deceitful powers to bind us by their mocking fascinations to this dreary den of the world. With an awful desperation of soul, he is now ready to break with everything; he utters curses on all the finest feelings of man's heart, all the virtues and tender graces of life, hope, faith, love, and above all, patience; and shattering with one blow the moral world, throws himself into the companionship of the fiend, to make in his company, the perilous transfer of his strivings from those higher regions where he has found no satisfaction, to the lower arena of sensual enjoyment, where he is destined to a far more awful disappointment.

It is here that Goethe draws from the legend, and represents, according to his own conceptions, the league of Faust with Mephistopheles. Indeed, in the scenes over which we have now been passing, he has represented Faust's gradual approaches to evil by the presence of Mephistopheles, in various fantastic forms; but now that the hour has come, and all is ready for the tempter, he is made to reveal him-

self in human form, and talk with him as man to man. Goethe's Mephistopheles is no mere poetic personification of evil in man, of the perverse tendency of the human will; such a creation were only an enlarged *alter ego* of Faust, and a very tame and lifeless dramatic figure. He is made to represent moral evil as a reality existing independently of the poet's fancy, and only capable of personification because it has such an independent existence; he represents moral evil, existing as such a reality, not merely in man, but beyond man; moral evil, as a real power, everywhere and actively existing, and only to oppose, and disturb, and destroy all that is fair and true and good in the world; in Goethe's own language, Mephistopheles is the spirit that "evermore denies; what is called sin, mischief, in short, evil,—is his proper element." It is this dread power we are now to see, not only personified, but in human form, in closest union with the destiny of Faust; to tempt, and if he may, drag him down to perdition; to be a chosen and sworn companion, a guide and servant, through all his probation in the present; whether at last, and in the endless future, to be his master, we can only now divine from the intimations in the Prologue.

It is essential to observe how Goethe conceives the moral condition of Faust, through the scene of his contract with Mephistopheles. The decisive moment, when the contracting parties come face to face, is that in which the imprecations upon all good things have just come forth from the lips of Faust. As a prelude to the offers of Mephistopheles, we hear the chorus of evil spirits, mourning, with an awful irony of melodious song, the overthrow of so fair a world, all its beauty now crushed and lost, and calling upon the destroyer to build up a new world, fairer and more glorious, to begin a career of action and pleasure, on which all siren voices shall chime in his ears. Striking the key-note of this fiendish song, Mephistopheles bids Faust no longer sit here, a melancholy, despairing dreamer, but forth with him into the living world of men. He will be his companion, his servant, to bear him to a more congenial sphere than that of dull, unsatisfying thought; let him only bind himself to him, and he shall have satisfying joys at last; more shall be his than eye of man has ever seen. Faust replies, that he has, indeed, too proudly dreamed, that he has soared too high, and that now the chain of thought has snapped, and all knowledge is to him a loathing. He is ready to rush into the tumult of passion, and as he cannot pierce the mysteries of knowledge, he will fathom the depths of feeling. He will experience all, whether of pain or of pleasure, that can fall to the lot of universal man. Yet of satisfying joys he will not hear; least of all can such a one

as Mephistopheles, who cannot comprehend the strivings of the mind of man, give him aught that can yield the satisfaction he craves. Indeed, so confident is he in this conviction, that he passionately lays the wager, that if ever he is lulled to security by sensual enjoyment, if ever he says to the passing moment, "Stay, thou art so fair!" that day shall be his last, and the last of Mephistopheles' service.

"The clock may stand, the index fall,
And time and tide may cease for me."

Thus, on the one hand, Faust will plunge into the tumult of sense, as a new arena of activity for his restless desires; he ventures the perilous companionship with evil, proudly confident that it shall never be his master, and excusing himself with the delusive plea, that in his extremity he has no other alternative. On the other hand, Mephistopheles sees in Faust already a sure victim; he gloats over the assurance that soon he shall bring down this high soaring soul with him to his own place; he shall be whirled round and round in the eddies of appetite and passion, and at last be drawn into the vortex, to be lost forever in the abyss. With such a contract, signed and sealed with blood, they go forth into the world together.

We do not propose to dwell upon the first scene in Faust's new career, the *Auerbach Cellar* in Leipsic; a famous drinking place, which has still a great *renown* for its traditions of the real Faust's most famous feats of magic. Here Faust is to be addressed by the coarsest forms of enjoyment, in a drinking-bout of German students, where bad wine and worse wit make up the sorry entertainment of the night. But he is ill at ease in all this wassailing, he has no heart for it, and is glad when he has it all behind him. We need also only touch upon the next scene, the *Witches' Kitchen*; where witchery is to renew the youth of Faust, and wake in him youth's wildest passions. Revolt-ing as is this scene, it has a rightful place in the drama. Even as the fatal temptation of Macbeth is set forth by the prophetic greeting of the witches on the blasted heath, so Faust comes into this den of sorcery to be touched and tainted by spiritual impurity, and at last to be seized and held spell-bound by its foul fascinations. Though at first he expresses himself as disgusted at the loathsome creatures about him, yet by and by he is infected by their atmosphere; he drinks the witches' potion, and it works on his brain like madness; he sees in the magic mirror the form of a beautiful woman, and straight-way desires blaze up within him he has never known before. He hurries from the spot, Mephistopheles promising him the sight, in the real world, of the fairest of women; and directly Margaret appears

upon the scene, whose beauty and goodness are destined to make her the object and the victim of his passionate and unhallowed love.

We enter now the charmed circle of those scenes, in which the genius and art of Goethe have wrought, from the realities of humblest human life, the moving tragedy of Margaret. On this part of the poem we would gladly linger long; but we must remember that these scenes, for most readers, of paramount, and for all, of such absorbing interest, while they are a tragic whole in the narrower lot of Margaret, are only a tragic passage in Faust's life, out of which he is to struggle into other spheres of experience and action. Though we move here among forms of ethereal poetic beauty, yet all is in spirit, intensely, terribly real; the characters, incidents, experiences, are all human; so human that they have readiest speech for every reader; it is the music of humanity that we hear, from its strains of ecstatic joy down to its wildest wail of woe, all the passions in turn "snatching the instruments of sound, and proving their own expressive power." It is a story of love, seduction, and ruin; ruin involving not only Margaret herself, but all that still peaceful world of her home, with its priceless possessions of innocence, affection, and piety; a wide spreading ruin, gathering, as it spreads, the quick following horrors of her mother's death-sleep by a draught given her at Faust's suggestion, the killing of her brother in a duel by her lover, and, by and by, child-murder by the outcast and crazed mother; and at last, her peace gone, her good name, her earthly hopes, everything gone, save her penitence and her faith in the divine mercy,—her own imprisonment and execution. No sweeter creation than Margaret ever arose out of poet's imagination. Such innocence is hers, such artless simplicity, such a sound, natural sense, in short, such an exquisite naturalness of character; poor in all worldly things, but rich in the charms of person, and the inner graces of woman's nature, pure instincts, all deep, true feelings,—a sweet and virtuous soul; how can you imagine, as you first see her issuing from the church on that fatal day, that even now invisible evil spirits lurk for her coming, that the demon of destruction has marked her for his own? She secures our sympathy and affection at the very first, and even to the bitter end, loses them never. We are strangely touched, as we see the first rising of love in her soul; as we hear her ingenuous wonder, what so great a man can see in so simple a creature as herself; we joy with her, when she reaches the full consciousness, that he is really hers, and she is wholly his; we can revere and bow before the devotion of her love in her solicitude about her lover's faith, and the fine sense of her heart, that makes her shrink with horror from "that

man he has with him," on whose very brow she sees it written, "that he can love no living soul." And after her fall, how we mourn with her in her unutterable sorrow; we shudder at the horrors of her remorse in the cathedral, when the terrible words of the "*Dies Irae*" sound in her affrighted ears; we bend and must needs pray with her in the penitent, heart-rending grief of that prayer to the Virgin, which no one can read or hear with dry eyes; and when at last, in the dungeon, she submits herself in trusting faith, to the judgment of God, that voice from above, "is saved," gives us a sweet relief, in the assurance we were so ready to receive, that the weary one is forever at rest, where the wicked cease from troubling.

But the spiritual history of Faust himself, as it is portrayed in these scenes, awakens an interest no less powerful. Horace has asserted that poets are better moralists than philosophers, that men learn more ethics from the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* than from the treatises of Chrysippus and Crantor. And certainly these fine delineations of the workings of man's moral nature, in conflict with excited passion, and the impressive lessons they have fastened in the minds of thousands of readers, go far to establish the Roman poet's position. As in the thoughtful poem of Tennyson, we hear the "Two Voices" within the soul of man, in their alternations of passionate longing and of awful remonstrance, indeed, we may rather say, we see in action the conflict described by an inspired pen, and we hear the lamentation extorted from the conscious weakness of humanity, "Oh, wretched man that I am!" And before we leave the first part of the poem, the story of which we have now sufficiently told, let us dwell for a brief space upon one or two of the decisive moments of this contest within the breast of Faust.

We select, for the first illustration, the scene in which Faust is brought by Mephistopheles to the chamber of Margaret in her absence. Faust has seen Margaret and is enamoured of her. He feels nothing, knows nothing but lawless passion, and clamors with Mephistopheles for immediate possession. Mephistopheles promises him all in the end, and meantime a visit to her room. There he shall be by himself, and revel in dreams of pleasures yet to come. But how these Satanic words fail of fulfilment! What a change comes over the soul of Faust, when he treads the precincts of virtue, and breathes the atmosphere of contented innocence! Like the mild shining of the sun and the soft serenity of the air after a furious storm, better thoughts and feelings steal in upon him, and hush to stillness the mad tumult of desire. As he feels the spirit of order and purity that reigns in the place, he is humbled to self-loathing, to think what

a base impulse brought him here. And if she were to enter now, how would he rue his wanton sacrilege, how he should sink at her feet, dissolved in shame! He rushes out, with the purpose never to return.

We leave several passages which unfold, in successive meetings, the mutual love of Faust and Margaret, and come to the scene of the *Wood and Cavern*, and the next following dialogue of Faust and Mephistopheles. Faust has now met Margaret again and again, and is all conscious of the unspeakable worth of her goodness, of the preciousness of a true woman's love; he has felt in his own breast the power of love, but passion is stronger there; and in his dread of wrong doing, so close at hand, and the frightful evil it will work, he flees the presence of the loved one; he hastens away from the dwellings of men to the still and lonely woods. But the solitude of nature is no moral security for his heart, so ill at ease, and not settled in truth; and even in the deep forest, in the dark cavern, he encounters the tempter face to face, and is tempted beyond his strength. The adversary plies him first with mocking laugh and sneer. He derides Faust's comfortless, owl-like moping in clefts and caverns, his lapping nourishment, like a toad, from oozy moss and dripping stones. Precious communion with nature! A rare pastime! There must be something of "the learned Doctor still sticking in his bones!" Faust urges what new life-power he gains by roaming thus among the scenes of nature. With yet sharper sneers Mephistopheles ridicules all Faust's transports about nature, all such swelling of a poor human soul to take in the six days' work of creation, how charmingly consistent they are with a lover's raptures, how much better after all the real delights that may be his than such ideal vamping. He then makes Faust to feel the forlorn condition of Margaret in his absence, how she sits lonely and despairing, his image never out of her mind. Instead of lording it here over the woods, far better that he should hasten to her comfort, and reward her for her love. Faust feels the tempter's words, and bids him begone, nor dare name her or bring her image to his thoughts. But Mephistopheles insists that something must be done; that she thinks he has deserted her and gone forever. The thought of desertion sets back upon Faust the whole tide of his passion. He can never forget, he will never forget her. But then the peril to her by his return, the ruin so imminent! No joy could he have in her love, if he is to undermine her peace. And yet she thinks him false, is disconsolate without him; besides, is not his own love a genuine, a natural one? He must, he will go back, whatever it may cost either her or himself. And so passion triumphs over his better nature.

After Margaret's fall, Faust flees, driven by the tortures of remorse. But he comes back to perpetrate an act, which he had never foreseen in all his dread anticipations of Margaret's ruin. Her brother had meantime come back from the wars, a soldier of rough manners, but of brave heart, who had tenderly loved his sister, and felt her disgrace like a stab in the heart. He meets Faust and forces him to a duel, and is himself slain. Faust must now flee for his personal safety, and leave Margaret again, and to aggravated wretchedness. The interval of flight the poet fills up with the scene of *The Walpurgis Night*, in which he represents the Witches' Sabbath on the Brocken in all the fulness of the superstitious ideas which prevailed in the age of Faust. Many parts of the scene are difficult to understand, and the whole is revolting to study. But it seems to be designed to show how the tempter strove, though in vain, to sink Faust in licentious indulgence, and so drown his anguish, as well as his memory of Margaret; to show how the excitements of a sensual life could no longer attract him after his experience of Margaret's love; and how in that love, in spite of all his guilt, he had found a power that was to lift him out of the low career into which he had madly plunged. From all the foul orgies of the witch-night on the Brocken, his thoughts must needs go back to the forsaken, unhappy Margaret. As he is whirling in the mazes of the dance, he sees in the distance a beautiful girl, of ghastly pale face, who seems to be dragging herself towards him, like one with shackled feet:

"It cannot, cannot be, and yet
She minds me of sweet Margaret."

Mephistopheles tries to laugh him out of the idea; it is only a magic shape, no real thing. But Faust is riveted to the form, and presently he sees, strangely adorning that lovely neck, a single red cord, no thicker than a knife-blade; such are the fancies that trouble that guilty soul; such are his presentiments of the evils so soon to come.

From this frightful dream-land the poet brings us down to earth again, and to a scene in prose,—the only prose scene in the poem,—charged with awful realities. We find Faust and Mephistopheles, of a gloomy day, on an open plain. Faust has just learned all that has befallen Margaret; a crazed wanderer, and now in prison, awaiting a criminal's doom. He curses Mephistopheles, that he has kept all this from him, all the while lulling him with vapid dissipations, hiding her wretchedness, and leaving her to perish without help. He is conscious, as never before, of the destructive power of evil, and bewails his fate, that has fastened him to such fellowship of sin, and

mischief, and shame. He hastens away,—Mephistopheles compelled to follow and aid,—to the rescue of Margaret. And here we come to the last scene of the first part,—the prison scene,—the pathos of which who can describe? Here Faust sees Margaret once more, and for the last time; but how changed! and yet the same! Crouching on her bed of straw in the corner, wild of look, her reason wandering, “like sweet bells jangled,” uttering wild snatches of song confusedly mixed with thoughts of her youth and beauty, and dim memories of her love and her guilt, of her child and her mother, whose deaths she raves through with horrible distinctness of detail; but shining bright through all the confusion, her sweetness of nature, her love for Faust, and above all, with all her crushing sense of shame, her faith in the mercy of a forgiving God. At first, she knows not Faust at all, she thinks it is the jailer, and complains that he has come too soon; then as Faust falls by her side in his distress, she gladly thinks that it is some one who will kneel with her in prayer. At last she hears his own voice, and rushes to embrace him, and in a brief, lucid interval, lives over her love again, in the sudden joy of his presence. But when she dimly discovers that he will rescue her, she cannot hear of it. She will go out with him, if the grave is there, with him to the eternal resting-place, but not a step other than that. Then her reason wanders into the wildest, saddest confusion of thoughts and memories, to come back in a brief last moment, at the sudden appearance of Mephistopheles, in the utterance of her pious submission to the judgment of God, and of her trembling solicitude for her lover. Mephistopheles hurries away Faust, with the ominous words, “Hither come!” But that last voice of this “First Part,”—the voice of love “from within,” calling after Faust, and dying away, “Henry! Henry!”—is it a plaintive prophecy, by and by to be fulfilled?

We come to the exposition of the second part of this poem, rather from a feeling of necessity, than from an admiration for its contents. Without a survey of it, our task would be unfinished, and the view of Faust's career incomplete. But it must be confessed, that the Second Part is far inferior to the First in conception and in execution, and fails to take a strong hold of either the understanding or the heart of the reader. It has, indeed, an affluence of literary and poetic material, for Goethe has enriched it from the abundant stores of his various and life-long studies, and adorned it with all the refinement of his culture. But while there is an onward and upward progress in the career of Faust even to the consummation, there is a marked falling off in tragic and in moral interest, and a decline also in the poetic, not so

much in respect to fulness of imagery, but, as it seems to us, in the quality of the poetry. You miss that genial union of thinking and imagining which belongs to genuine poetry, where the thought is born in the soul together with the fancy, and comes forth into a perfect oneness of image. You seem here to see the two processes at first apart, the thoughts forming themselves in the mind, and then the imagination clothing them in poetic forms. Hence with all the poetic that is here, there is so much that is unpoetical. You are indeed in a poetical world, a world of the imagination; all is unreal, dreamlike; but it is ungenial, it does not awaken emotion; you do not so much admire as wonder; you are curious, indeed, with wonder what all this is, where you are, and why you are here at all. You are traversing a vast realm of allegory, where ever flit about you mystic figures of thinnest ærial texture, of all times and regions, indeed all forms of being; shades from Hades, creatures of mythology, Helen and Paris leading up all classic antiquity, and all the classic myths following in their train; all engaged with sprightliest activity in many and complex performances, the full import of which you may not quite clearly discover till after many close observations, and perhaps not even then. These allegorical figures awaken no commanding interest; you do not feel drawn to them, nor do you long to recall them when they are gone, or keep them with you in delighted memory; they are very brilliant, and sometimes they troop before you in gorgeous splendor; but they have more light than warmth, you feel them to be cold and frosty, with all their glittering brightness. It is also fatal to the popularity of the allegorical poetry in this part of Faust, that what it represents does not address the sympathies of the mass of mankind. The Faery Queen, and The Pilgrim's Progress draw the sources of their universal and enduring interest from truths which are familiar to all human experience. We love to journey with Christian, and to wander with the Lady Una and the Red Cross Knight, because we have so much in common with them as human beings; we fight with them in their battles, we suffer their defeats, and exult in their victories. But here the allegory symbolizes the fortunes of art, literature, science, all learning, ancient and modern; and these, too, in their very culminations, as they are reached in apprehension and sympathy only by men of the greatest refinement and cultivation. Not many readers can behold and enjoy the glorious forms of classic letters and art in the imposing assemblage of allegorical figures in the *Classical Walpurgis Night*; and it is probably the rare lot of only the choice and master-spirits of the race to sympathize with the exalted Faust in his intuitions of ideal beauty in the sight of the conjured Helen of Troy.

For reasons such as these, this Second Part of Goethe's great poem has by many been summarily condemned to the regions of the obscure and unintelligible; but the evidence is inadequate to such a sentence. There are doubtless some parts which have never been satisfactorily explained; but the labyrinth is not so intricate and dark but that by some friendly thread of guidance¹ we can trace the course of Faust through the windings of his perilous way, and come out with him again into light and freedom.

Let us now go through with this Second Part, dwelling only upon what is essential to a view of Faust's ever struggling but upward career. We can take with us, as a guide, the significant remark of Goethe himself, published in an announcement of the *Helena*, in his *Kunst und Alterthum*, "*that the composition of a Second Part must necessarily conduct a man of Faust's nature into higher regions, under worthier circumstances.*" This emerging into higher regions, the poet represents in his best manner, at the very opening of the First Scene. Faust has resorted again to meditative communion with nature, and this time has derived the utmost good that this source of healing can yield. The airy elves that breathe sweetest music over his unquiet slumbers, at least soothe his troubled soul; and he awakes to greet with a fresh vigor and courage the coming of a new day, and to struggle, though with calmer endeavor, in paths of better activity. Mephistopheles still goes with him, such were the terms of both the contract and the Prologue; and according to his promise, is now to conduct Faust to 'the great world' of human life. So Faust is now brought to an imperial court; even as Goethe himself became the central personage at the small but brilliant court of Weimer. It is a time most propitious for able and aspiring men; for the affairs of the realm are in the utmost disorder, and the emperor, a weak sovereign, and fond of pleasure, will welcome aid from any quarter. What position of influence Faust himself reaches we are not informed; but Mephistopheles becomes Court-Jester, and very soon jests with the emperor and all his subjects in a very reckless fashion. A grand council assembles; and the emperor, more impatient of business than usual, for it is now carnival-time, is vexed beyond measure with the complaints that come in from all departments of the disordered empire. The bottom-line of all the evils from which the state is suffering seems to be the extraordinary scarcity of money. There is absolutely none in the emperor's

¹ We have been indebted for such guidance, in some parts of the poem, to Dr. Karl Köstlin's book, entitled "*Goethe's Faust, Seine Kritiker und Ausleger*," Tübingen, 1860. Eckermann has also preserved for us in his "*Conversations*" with Goethe, much valuable exposition, from the poet's own lips, of some passages in the Second Part.

coffers, next to none anywhere, the revenues are all clutched by the Jews before they come in; all property is mortgaged to the top, all trade is dead-locked, and bread comes on to the table *eaten in advance*; in short the whole empire is on the brink of ruin. In this exigency, Faust seems to think himself allowed to do what other men have done of more experience in state-craft; he is drawn by Mephistopheles into quite hollow expedients for a supply of money; apparently forgetting what once he told Mephistopheles, that the devil's gold, like mercury, always slides away from the hand. Mephistopheles unfolds to the emperor a plan for a new kind of currency, far more convenient than specie, and just as good when you know where the specie is, and are willing to wait, till you get it in hand. He dilates upon the vast subterranean treasures in the realm, which, of course, belong to the emperor, as well as the brains and hands which are needed to get them. He pictures to his fancy the gold and the jewels that ever since the days of the mighty Romans, successive generations have, in times of trouble, buried under ground. What vaults and cellars were waiting to be blown up, and reveal their riches of gold, and silver plate, and coined money! How often has mere chance turned up to the peasant a pot of gold, as he ploughed the soil! Now let all these treasures be deliberately dug for, and brought to light and use. The emperor is at first incredulous, but finally is full of faith in the new scheme. Here is certainly a prospect of relief; the scheme shall be tried; but, meantime, let the trumpet sound, and all celebrate the waiting joys of carnival. As if in preparation for the golden days that are coming, the emperor and court now take part in a superbly appointed masquerade, in which Riches plays a prominent part. Without attempting to describe this grand court-show, we need only mention that the chief personages are Plutus, the god of riches, who is represented by Faust, and Pan, the god of universal nature, who is represented by the emperor. Plutus appears in a chariot drawn through the air by four dragons; he scatters, as he passes along, bright gifts upon the crowd below, who eagerly snatch them, as they fall. At length, the chariot descends, and a huge chest, filled to the brim with golden stores, is set upon the ground; and as the emperor Pan draws nigh, encircled by a chorus of nymphs, a deputation of gnomes bear the chest, and with low obeisance, lay it at his feet. And so the emperor is symbolically declared lord of the treasures hidden in the earth. A scene laid upon the following day, and appropriately called the *Pleasure-Garden*, pictures the carrying out of the scheme of Mephistopheles, and its immediate result in a sudden plethora of the money market. It appears that in a lucky inter-

val in the masquerade, Mephistopheles had contrived to secure a few pen-strokes of the great Pan's hand to a certain bit of otherwise insignificant paper. These had been multiplied, by clever hands, a thousand-fold, signature and all, and the blanks filled out; and so had gone forth, to the unspeakable relief of a distressed people, an abundant issue of Imperial Treasury notes, of all convenient denominations; the notes to be taken up *without delay* when certain untold treasures buried in the emperor's lands were raised up and put into the imperial vaults; and these, moreover, were to be raised up immediately. Great were the mutual congratulations of emperor and heads of departments, and courtiers and common people, on that same *Pleasure-Garden* occasion. The Commander-in-Chief announces that the pay is settled in advance, and the army was never in such a loyal mood. The steward of the imperial household is enraptured to think that bill after bill has been paid, and that the claws of the monster usury are dulled. The lord-treasurer brings word that it is gala-day on 'Change, and all through the town; that the people have plenty of money, and without being plagued with big money-bags; and that one-half of the world seems to think of nothing but eating, while the other half is strutting about in brand-new clothes. The emperor is strangely perplexed at these tidings. At first he is in a rage. He remembers that he signed one piece of paper last night, but these thousands he hears of must be forgeries. But when the treasurer explains it all, and when he learns how much good has been done, his emotion subsides through wonder into a happy content. "And all this," he exclaims, "passes with my people for gold? Suffices with the army and court for full pay? Very well; surprised as I am, I must let it pass." The poet leaves the reader to imagine the final results of this stroke of Mephistophelian finance; and if he be charged with lightness in introducing such an episode into his great theme, it may be said in defence that earnestness and humor are very near together in human nature and in human life, and, moreover, that wise men, no less than arrant knaves, have blown similar financial bubbles in the real world. We have no theory to propose touching the meaning of this scene at the imperial court; and we have been somewhat perplexed by the ingenious but conflicting theories of learned commentators; but we may readily infer that Faust must have soon discovered how hollow are often the ways of the great world, how unsatisfying the life of courtiers, and how slippery and perilous the paths trodden by statesmen and financiers.

But what has been now described marks only the introduction and the transition to Faust's main career at the imperial court. We have

to confess, however, that it is very difficult at first to know for certain what was really going on in Faust's own soul, in his own inner life, for some time to come, from the two acts which now follow. Gay and gorgeous as are all the scenes, they are laid in far-off dream-regions of allegory; it is all phantom-land, in figures, movement, all the shadowy goings-on, with Faust himself seemingly the only veritable human element, and not a word from any creature else, that seems to come out of real human lips. But when we get beyond wonder, in all this mystical world, and discern some significance in all these manifold forms of brightness that flit in from all around, and unite in such harmony, the Grecian Helen *rediviva*, brightest of all, courted and won by the modern Faust,—we are sure that those “higher regions” which the poet so dimly hinted at, are the regions of ideal beauty, and that thither Faust has now turned the strivings of his restless soul; to the love and pursuit of the beautiful, which he will apprehend, and possess, and enjoy in all elegant letters and art, and most of all, in poetry. The love of beauty has been always a strong element in his being. Beauty he has loved in nature, for whom he has always had a true lover's devotion; beauty in woman, in form and in character, though there his love was mixed with passion, and led to sin and sorrow. Now ideal beauty he will seek and apprehend, and make a real possession, in all purely intellectual spheres, where it may be embodied in lasting forms. For this new career he has at court, where all else is so unpromising, ample and alluring openings; even as it was with Goethe himself in his court-life at Weimar. The emperor, with all his weaknesses, will be a patron of art; he is not without culture himself, and in his coronation visit to Italy, caught some glimpses of the wonders of beauty in the ancient world. It is under such fortunate circumstances, that in these scenes, so brilliant, so elaborate, and withal so very fantastic, Goethe represents the exalted, but at last unsatisfying experiences of Faust in a life of the widest and truest literary and poetic culture, or as Goethe and the Germans are fond of calling it, of highest æsthetic culture as an artist. In the portraiture of such lofty experiences as these, it were natural in any modern fiction, whether in prose or in poetry, that the author should educate his hero not only by solitary study at home, but especially by residence in the ever-enchanted lands of classic literature and art; where, on the sacred soil once trodden by the long departed great, and yet bearing everywhere the precious weight of the monuments of their genius, he should commune with the spirit of the past, and ascend to the very sources of all which makes life ideal. But for a hero like Faust, who belongs to the opening of modern civilization, when the reviving glories of classical learning were just red-

dening the horizon, and whose image, from such a time, has on us a kind of glamour of sorcery, with Goethe, too, for the poet, who heralded and ushered in a later new era of literature and art, a more striking,—if we may so say,—a more sensuous proceeding was no less natural. So Goethe, in these scenes, siezes and moulds to his larger uses those portions of the tradition in which Faust plays his magic part before Maximilian, and, among other necromantic achievements, conjures up the beautiful Helen, and woos and wins her for his own. It lies outside our present purpose, and we have neither the ability nor the inclination for the task, to attempt a detailed unfolding of these complex parts of the poem. We shall touch them in the briefest manner, venturing hints, as we pass, at the probable indications they give us of the progress of Faust in this exalted region of his new endeavors. The emperor wills that Faust summon up the Grecian Helen; in her must be seen, in distinct form, the ideal of beauty. The wondrous task is achieved, but with small aid of Mephistopheles. Beauty, he confesses, lies beyond his realm; those long vanished heathen heroines are safe away in a select place of their own; but still there are means within Faust's own reach. Faust must first penetrate to the abodes of "The Mothers" of all,—mysterious divinities, dwelling in deep, untrodden solitudes,—with whom are the archetypes of all things, and so the original form of beauty; from whom they all proceed, to whom they return, from whom and by whom alone they can come back to the light of day. So does the poet seem to represent, by an image drawn from classic sources¹, the idea of beauty as intuitive, resting in the inmost nature of man. For Faust himself the apparition of Helen is far more than an emperor's holiday show; she rises to his awakened sensibility, like a golden exhalation, in all her ineffable loveliness; there suddenly breaks into his spiritual atmosphere the vision of the beautiful, out of that buried but ever-living world of ancient art, hitherto so strange to him, and strange no less to all modern life, before the new birth of classic antiquity. And, as in the experience of so many men of fine spiritual nature,—of Goethe himself, in his Roman life,—he is overpowered by the vision; he is transported by that glorious form, so suddenly revealed for an instant's gaze; and he wanders half beside himself, haunted by the image, insensible to all else, and sighing for a prolonged and perfect sight to follow that ravishing

¹ Goethe says himself, in Eckermann's "Conversations," that he "found in Plutarch, that in ancient Greece, the 'Mothers' were spoken of as divinities; and that all the rest was his own invention." The passage the poet referred to is probably the one in Plutarch's *Marcellus*, c. 20. Düntzer also quotes Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum*, c. 22, and also Diodorus Siculus, iv. 80. Köstlin cites also Plato, *Phaedrus*, c. 27.

glimpse. This longing must be stilled, if not satisfied. Faust must find his way to the world of classic beauty, the ideal Hel'as, for there, if anywhere, is the vanished Helen. But a guide is needed; and he is furnished by an invention of the poet, which is one of the strangest of the many strange phantasms of this part of his work. We are suddenly back in Faust's study, where our old friend Wagner is installed, and has been all these years, now more learned than ever, and a great alchymist. He has long been busy in his laboratory, trying to discover the principle of life, and has just succeeded to a charm; and now out of one of his mysterious bottles springs forth a lithe intellectual creature, a tremulous, ethereal being, pure intelligence,—Homunculus by name,—and he is to be Faust's guide. Under such questionable guidance,—whether Homunculus be the spirit of learning, of study, or the personification of Faust's own ideal strivings, we know not,—Faust is brought to the classic Hellas, and sees revealed to his gaze all her ever-living forms of beauty and grandeur. Her gods and goddesses all pass before his delighted vision, her heroic men and her fair women, all the bright forms of her mythology, the beings that people the sea and the air, denizens of wood, valley, fountain, and river,—all are to him real presences, as if they had imperishably survived the historical passing away of the ancient world. But for ourselves, we have been unable to sympathize with the enthusiastic praise bestowed by some of Goethe's admiring critics upon this part of the poem; indeed, we have had to wonder at Faust's words of passionate admiration at the many marvels that were thronging around him. This famous scene of the *Classic Carnival* is certainly affluent in its stores of learning, in some passages most elaborately poetic, and everywhere enlivened with most genial humor; but the impression it makes is not noble, it stirs no grand emotions; it is a ghostly, nay a ghastly, company you are in all the while; surely a winter at Rome, a month of study in the gallery of the Vatican and of the Capitol, a single reading of the Iliad, were better than a dozen such Carnivals, for a reproduction of the genius of ancient life and art.

But this *scene* of the "Classic Carnival" is only subsidiary to the *Act* of the "Helena," Faust's wandering amidst the wonders of Hellas to the discovery and possession of Helen herself, his upward progress in æsthetic culture to heights of attainment, which have been reached only by the few Goethes of modern times. We presume not to dwell upon the great merits or the equally great defects of this part¹ of the

¹ Carlyle wrote many years ago one of his most characteristic articles on the "Helena," which has been re-published in his *Miscellanies*. If our readers are not already familiar with it, and desire to pursue this subject further, they will find in that article a very full and admirable exposition of this Act of the poem.

poem; on the one hand, the poet's masterly treatment, in diction and in numbers, of the simplicity and dignity, and the stately march of the classic Greek muse, and of the various grace and pomp and freer movement of the modern Romantic; and on the other hand, the perplexed mixture of the most incongruous elements, the real and the imaginary, history and allegory, which gives a radically artificial character to the total conception. It belongs to our plan only to indicate its chief features and their probable bearings upon this stage of Faust's career, and the mutual connections, which it seems meant to illustrate, of ancient and of modern culture.

Like Orpheus and Æneas, Faust makes the descent to Hades; and more successful than the Thracian lover, secures the return of Helen to the upper air. The Spartan queen appears, on her return from Troy, before the palace of king Menelaus; but though she sees "Tyn-darus' high house" standing there as erst in all its grandeur, she is not destined to re-enter as its queenly mistress. New fortunes await her, such as Homer never dreamed of. A new abduction is at hand. She must escape the wrath of her injured lord, and be borne for refuge to a new world, which is to be made bright by her beauty. Accordingly, with a truly romantic independence of the unities, the poet transports her away from Sparta, over sea and land, and lets her gently alight, herself and chorus sadly bewildered, amidst worn, gray walls, in the court of a mediæval castle, where the noble Faust, begirt with pages and esquires, stands ready to greet her, and bid her knightly welcome to his halls. With all homage of admiration is thus the beautiful spirit of ancient art first greeted in the modern world; and the gallant wooing in these castle halls, not without happiest answering tokens, is most auspicious for Faust's onward progress, and for the fortunes of the new culture which he represents. But the course of true love never did run smooth; and there is nothing too strange for the errant course of this Act, aptly called by the author "*a Classico-Romantic Phantasmagoria*." The wooing is suddenly interrupted by the startling tidings that Spartan Menelaus is approaching, at the head of those heroic forces, once the ruin of Paris and his sire, and of ill-fated Ilium. But the chivalrous Faust, nothing daunted, goes forth with his gathered hosts to the onset; and achieving a bloodless victory, the most renowned, perhaps, of all the victories of peace, he proceeds with all serenity, to portion off conquered beautiful Hellas, with all her outlying dependencies, among his brave followers, of hitherto unknown speech and race, German and Goth, Frank and Norman. Yet Sparta, Helen's ancient home, is enthroned over all; and so Faust and the world-famous queen of

beauty, now hie them to "Arcadia, near by Sparta's land," where they live in happiest union, "thrones changed to bowers, and Arcadian-free their felicity." With such marvels of invention does the poet shadow forth not only the consummation of Faust's æsthetic culture, but also by his union with Helen, the harmonious blending, in all the domains of that culture, of the ancient and the modern, the classic and the romantic; and moreover and finally, by a crowning phantasm, which we have not the courage to encounter, the offspring¹ of this union,—a peerless offspring, nobler than either parent,—the genius of the poetry of the nineteenth century. But not even Arcadian bowers can be a lasting abode for Faust's aspiring soul; culture, though it were the truest, and of the truly beautiful, is not all of life, nor yet the highest; out from it Faust must pass up to something nobler and better, which shall at last yield him satisfaction. Of this we get a poetic glimpse at the very close of the Act where Helen disappears. With parting words she vanishes, her form melting into thin air; but her robe and veil dissolve into clouds, which lift up Faust, and bear him away far above the world, to which he is to re-return anon, and enter upon a new and the last stage of his unresting career.

Faust returns to earth, and now to the real world of action, a contemplative, ideal life left behind him with the vanished Helen. He now desires to quit forever a life of enjoyment, even in those nobler forms in which he has sought it, even in enthusiasm for high art and elegant letters. He will now employ all his powers in a sphere of practical activity, where he will have at heart the weal of his fellow-men, and labor with cheerful freedom in the service of mankind. Even his refined culture has yielded him only a higher kind of selfish enjoyment; but now in a career of active exertion for the good of others, he sees a moral dignity; he will be conscious of himself as only a part, as one member of the whole body of his race, for which it was designed that he should labor with the full vigor of his faculties. But he brings out with him from his recent pursuits one great element of success in his new career; a sense for the high, and the noble, and the perfect, and an antipathy to all that is common, and hollow, and unworthy; so that with lofty ideals in his mind, he will project and execute plans which will be fruitful of beneficent results. Accordingly we find him turning again to nature, but with a practical purpose. He gains from the emperor

¹ Goethe says himself, in Eckermann, that he intended "Euphorion" to represent Byron! His words, in speaking of Byron, are as follows: "I could not make any man the representation of the modern poetical era, except him, who undoubtedly is to be regarded as the greatest genius of our century."

a large tract of coast-land, hitherto uninhabited, and seemingly uninhabitable; and this waste wilderness he recovers from the elements that have desolated it, and makes a fruitful soil, on which by and by grows up a great, free, and prosperous community, rich, and happy, and useful in industrial arts, thriving trade, and extended commerce. To such busy and fruitful activity he devotes his last years; an activity which ever gives him new occupation and new satisfaction, always richer means to larger ends, in which he has a conscious joy of having gained great possessions by his own exertions, and which he is assured is promoting the physical and moral well-being of multitudes of men. But the poet is not unmindful, that in all this life of useful occupation, Faust is not free from error and wrong, that Mephistopheles is still by his side, and though having ever less power over his intentions and acts, yet continues to involve him in evil and trouble. One episode he here weaves into the drama, to show the evils incident to a sense of increasing prosperity, and an ambition for yet larger dominions. Faust has built a palatial residence, from which he can see his ships, as they go out from the near harbor to all parts of the world, and come back laden with their rich cargoes. But near by, and on a little eminence, and intercepting his view, is an humble dwelling, under the snug shelter of a few linden trees, where live in quiet content an aged pair, who rejoice in the classic names of Philemon and Baucis. That little estate he longs for, and must have; exactly on that eminence he would build a high look-out, whence he may have a survey over all his broad acres, and far away over land and sea; the very sight of the little cottage and the lindens, not his own, stings him to the heart; it were enough to spoil the possession of the world. It is the old story of Ahab and Naboth's vineyard, and a worse than Jezebel is at hand, to bid him "arise and eat bread, and let his heart be merry." He summons Mephistopheles and orders him to get the old people away to a better estate he has ready for them. It is the order of a covetous heart, but it is executed by a foul wrong, which that heart had not bidden, at least in words. On that night the cottage is fired, and the old couple perish in the flames. Bitterly does Faust repent him of the rash command, and indignantly disavow its rasher execution. And feeling how sin still clings to him in all his endeavors, he looks back with deepest sorrow to his compact with Mephistopheles, formed in evil day, when he madly strove to break through the limits of man's being, and in his despair cursed himself and the world, which he has since found so rich in beauty, and love, and hope, and patience, such a wide and ever-widening arena for free and ennobling and beneficent action. In this consciousness and confession of his past errors, the poet seems

to indicate the final triumph in Faust of good over evil; all magic arts of superhuman striving now abjured and renounced, he finds man's highest good in free activity within the appointed limits of his being, for the general welfare. In such activity we see him employed to the end, carrying forward his ever widening, never completed plans; toiling under the burden of growing cares, and bearing up under the increasing pressure of age; even in outward blindness, the inward eye undimmed, and the spiritual force unabated; till at last, in the joyful assurance of having created a space for the home of millions of men, a free people on a free soil, he utters that word of satisfaction to the passing moment, "stay, thou art so fair," and his earthly career is ended. On coming at last to this conclusion, the reader may well have the greatest doubts, whether this departure of Faust was a Christian's death. And with such doubts in his mind, he will approach that last scene, in which Faust's destiny is revealed, with a wonder, if indeed such a death is to be an entrance to a Christian's heaven; and at the same time, he may have some perplexity at the thought that such a man after such a probation should wander with Mephistopheles and his like in all the endless hereafter. But the concluding scene of the poem, which opens to us the unseen world, and brings us quite to the verge of heaven, leaves no doubt as to the poet's own conceptions. Like Dante and many other poets, Goethe avails himself of the image in the Epistle of Jude, of Michael the archangel contending with the devil about the body of Moses, and so describes a contest over the grave of Faust between the powers of good and evil. But Mephistopheles and the rebel crew are awed away by the throngs of descending angels and redeemed spirits, who strew roses, as they come, and make the air radiant with light, and vocal with their heavenly song. Then upwards the angels soar, bearing the soul of Faust, higher and higher ascending, met in the air by other hosts of heavenly ones, the glorified fathers of the church, choirs of blessed Magdalens, among them the once named Margaret, and still ever upwards they move, the heavens all melodious with their song, till at last, we hear wafted down from the highest regions of air the words of the angels as they bear into heaven itself the new redeemed soul:

Delivered is the noble soul
From evil's dread dominion;
Who toiling ever struggles on,
Him it is ours to ransom;

And if indeed 't was his to share,
A part in love celestial;
Then hastes the blessed host to meet
And crown him with their welcome.

We have given this passage, though in an unworthy rendering, because it contains the poet's solution of the salvation of Faust. It is this onward striving of a ceaseless activity which Goethe has made a chief characteristic of Faust's career. In all the stages of that career, we see wrought into living practice the word of the "Preacher, the son of David," "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might." In all action, Faust has struggled with difficulties, obstacles, temptations, evil, making them subserve yet higher strivings and higher living; and for him, while engaged in this noble strife, have heavenly powers of love ever watched and warded, and lent their celestial aid. Such, at least, is the poet's own interpretation of the passage, as he gave it to Eckermann. We quote his words, as we leave the poem, only premising, that we think every reader will find in them a far more distinct utterance of Christian truth, than he has discovered in the poem itself. "These lines," he says,¹ "contain the key to Faust's salvation. In himself an activity becoming constantly higher and purer, eternal love coming from heaven to his aid. This harmonizes perfectly with our religious view, that we cannot reach heavenly bliss through our own strength, unassisted by divine grace."

We have been so long occupied with our survey of the contents of this poem, that we have but the briefest space left for any reflections on the lessons it teaches; but perhaps these have been anticipated in the course of our remarks. It may be enough to add, that what has won for Faust so many willing ears and hearts, is the voice it has given to the longing of the human soul, implanted in its innermost being, for some all-satisfying good; to its restless and yet weary strivings to reach such a good, and the manifold disappointments and despair with which it has so often come back from its wanderings to and fro, nowhere finding rest. How full is the world of such spiritual experiences, in the history of the humblest and of the most exalted souls! They enter into the most real life of men, in all times, under all skies, they are embodied in the truest literatures in every form of human speech. And as we find the clearest witness to the divine source and true destiny of the soul in this aspiration for real and lasting good, in this restless craving for the satisfaction of vast and

¹ Eckermann's *Conversations*, (translated by Margaret Fuller,) Boston, 1839, p. 409.

immortal wants, so do all its dark struggles, and all its humiliating and debasing errors and delusions, and the unrest and unhappiness they create, testify no less clearly to its present fallen state. The "dream" of the poet thus becomes the experience of the race:

"An infant crying in the night,
An infant crying for the light,
And with no language but a cry."

This cry of the soul for light has nowhere found a clearer utterance in modern literature than in the *Faust* of Goethe. It is this infinite longing for some true and all-sufficient good that make the central force in *Faust's* being, and furnishes the never-ceasing press of motive to all his career. It is this which drives him from one sphere of activity to another, from unsatisfied speculation to unsatisfying magic, from theory to real life, and through all scenes of life, the highest and the lowest, sensual pleasure, worldly ambition, intellectual culture. In the "vanity and vexation of spirit" of which *Faust* has constant experience in all these scenes of endeavor and labor, the poet has clearly taught, at least on its negative side, the great truth of the soul's high destiny. Indeed only in that sad but most instructive Book of Ecclesiastes are we taught more impressively, how vain is all earthly good, how inadequate all human wit and travail, to the satisfaction of the human soul. Like the Royal Preacher, Goethe has also inculcated the wisdom of resignation and of strenuous activity within our allotted sphere; yet he has failed to bring us to that grand "conclusion of the whole matter, Fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of man." But only from the experiences of those who have learned in the school of Christ, and have been enlightened and renewed by divine grace, do we reach, in its positive form, the great truth that man was made for God, and only in him can find fulness of blessing and peace. How does this truth shine out in the writings of Augustine, who, after having traversed the whole world, and consulted all its oracles, and found them dumb to his anxious question, "Who will show us any good," heard at last a voice¹ as from heaven, speaking out of "the lively oracles" to his stricken and contrite spirit, "Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying; but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ;" and in that voice found entire response to the cravings of his soul, and by its guidance reached the crowning experience of perfect and enduring peace, in the knowledge of God as revealed in Christ and by Christ, and in His


¹ Aug. Conf. viii. 29.

love and His service. How simply is this truth declared in that golden saying of his,¹ "Our rational nature is so great a good, that there is no good, wherein we can be happy, save God;" and how is it summed up in that brief prayer,² the utterance alike of true wisdom and devout piety: *Fecisti nos ad Te, Domine, et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in Te!*"

JOHN L. LINCOLN.

PROVIDENCE, R. I.

¹ Aug. de Nat. Boni, c. 7. ² Aug. Conf. I. 1.



PROTESTANTISM : AS A FACT, AND AS A FORCE.

Sermons on the Failure of Protestantism, and on Catholicity. By the
Rev. FERDINAND C. EWER, S. T. D., Rector of Christ Church, New
York. New York : D. Appleton & Co.

THE controversial interest excited by these sermons, as delivered, had in a great measure subsided even so early as their first appearance in a volume. Only a few months have even now elapsed since the Rector of Christ Church was permitted to feel that his pulpit had become the centre of a first-class sensation, and almost, apparently, to hope that he himself had been appointed to usher in that great "crisis" at whose "opening," as he assured his hearers in the first of his sermons, "God hath cast our lines;" that as Arianism and Trinitarianism had marked the first and earliest of such "crises," and the division of the Eastern and Western Church still later, constituted the second, and the grand conflict of Romanism and the Reformation yet another, and the rise of Wesleyanism in England, the latest, so now out of some fresh development of Catholicity, as opposed to Protestantism, a new movement was to proceed, with himself as the leading apostle. In concluding his sermon he announces that "the first campaign is closed;" from which it seems right to infer that the movement has already begun, the war opened, and that the disastrous overthrow which Dr. Ewer seems persuaded the array of Protestantism has suffered at his hands is but a beginning and a foreshadowing. We cannot but think that this rather defiant attitude was in great

part a consequence of the impression which, somewhat to his own surprise evidently, the preacher found himself producing, and that, as was perhaps natural, he mistook a sensation for a crisis, and the wordy clamor of the newspaper press for the voice of Providence.

This too flattering estimate had been already discredited when the sermons as printed came from the press, so that those journals which have shown some excitement while they were in process of delivery, seemed to think the book scarcely of sufficient consequence even to attack. As treated by Dr. Ewer, in fact, the interest of the subject is necessarily superficial and transient. His method is that of a man who, looking hastily over the field of view he proposes to himself, seizes upon a few salient features, or what seem to be such, selecting those only which can be made to answer a certain end, and persuades himself that thus, in the functions of a special pleader, he discharges the office of a public teacher. The interest awakened by such methods of discussion, however grave and important the theme, must be transient. At the same time it may be conceded to Dr. Ewer that he has performed a valuable service, though by no means in the way contemplated by himself, in calling attention to a subject that is entitled to more consideration than it has received. Not from his point of view, but from their own, these questions are all exceedingly important. *Is* Protestantism a failure? Is it a success? Has it, perhaps, *partially* failed, and only in a measure fulfilled the great end which must have been contemplated in it by divine Providence? If so, what are the causes of this, and what the remedy? In a word, what is Protestantism itself? What has it been set to do in this world? How far is it *doing* what it was appointed to do? Those most friendly to the claims of Protestantism may be willing that these questions should be submitted to the severest scrutiny, and to concede with all frankness, all that can justly be claimed by opponents. They are well deserving of examination, not simply that it may be ascertained how the account of Protestantism stands at some partisan tribunal,—not at all in that view,—but how its account stands as a providential instrumentality appointed for the enlightenment and salvation of the world.

An example of Dr. Ewer's *ad captandum* method of discussion, is found in his definition of Protestantism. On page 15 of his book he says: "The two basis ideas of Protestantism are, first, the Bible, and the Bible only for Christians; secondly, each man practically his own infallible interpreter of it." Were these, in their proper statement, the whole of theoretical Protestantism, it would still be true that the phraseology in which they are here given is prejudicial and mislead-

ing. It is no doctrine of Protestantism, at all, that "each man" is "his own *infallible* interpreter of" the Bible. Protestantism does not recognize human infallibility in any sense, or in any relation. It knows as little of "infallible interpreters," as it does of an infallible church, or an infallible Pope. It teaches that man is not sufficient unto himself either as a student or as a teacher of divine things, and hence claims, with conscious need and sustaining trust, the promise of "the Spirit of Truth." Yet upon this word "infallible" rests no small part of that representation of Protestantism in which Dr. Ewer charges it with failure. He asserts that in maintaining its principle of private interpretation it has "spread broadcast the rampant spirit of practical individual infallibility," inducing, among its various fruits, that prevailing skepticism for which he holds Protestantism responsible, and that division into "sects" of which he constantly makes complaint. Even the former of "the two basis ideas of Protestantism," as he terms them, he so interprets as to give it a false meaning. Thus on page 57: "Protestantism founds the church on the Bible, making the Bible prior. On the other hand, Catholicity rests the Bible on the church, making the church prior. Ask a Protestant which he believes first, church or Bible, and he will say, 'Bible.' Ask him which he believes *because* of the other, and he will say, 'I believe in a church, because I believe in the Bible.' 'You start, then, with the Bible?' 'Yes.' 'But how do you know the Bible is the Word of God?' 'Why, I know it because "all Scripture is given by inspiration of God." 'But, my friend the question is, *what is* Scripture? How do you know that these sixty-six books are the "Scripture?" 'To which question, of course, he himself answers that *the church* declares what is Scripture, and that believing first in *it*, we have then the means of knowing in what to believe as the Bible. Now, the truth is that Protestantism recognizes both the Bible and the church, and rates as of the highest consequence the testimony which the church bears, and has continued to bear, during all these ages, to the inspired Scriptures of God. It is a garbled and false view of its faith in this respect to say that Protestantism founds the church or the Bible in any such sense as to exclude the testimony of the church in the Bible's own behalf, and so to compare its reasoning upon this subject to that by which "the world is put very comfortably on an elephant, and the elephant on a tortoise, but the poor tortoise rests nowhere." Protestantism recognizes the Bible and the church as both alike and equally from God; as originating and growing together; as "the two witnesses whose joint testimony constitutes a perfect evidence, while their separate testi-

monies are mutually confirmatory; understanding, of course, by "the church" that small body of faithful men and women in which Christ dwells, represented in the organized Christian congregation.

Evidently, a right definition of Protestantism is vital to any adequate view of what it is either as a fact or as a force, and essential to any correct answer to the question what it has been appointed to do in this world, and whether *that* it has done and is doing. It so happens, now, that Protestantism defined itself at the very outset of its career in a manner as complete as could be desired. The *Protest* at the Diet of Spire, April 19, 1529, which was an event in the progress of the Reformation so momentous and significant as to have given the name to that great movement by which it has ever since been known, was occasioned by the renewing of certain pretensions, on behalf alike of Papal and Imperial usurpation, which afforded opportunity for the assertion of principles fundamental both to the Reformation and to Protestantism. In that *Recess*, or Edict of the Diet that occasioned the Protest, three things were denied to the Reformers. The first was, freedom of thought and expression in things religious; the second, the right and duty to consult, in matters of religious opinion, the Word of God as a supreme authority; the third, the privilege of seeking by propagation of what was held as truth, to win those in error, enlighten their minds, and save their souls. The special provisions of the edict were:

That every religious innovation should continue to be interdicted in the places where the Edict of Worms had been carried out; and that in those where the people had deviated from it, and where they could not conform to it without danger of revolt, they should at least effect no new reform, they should touch upon no controverted point, they should not oppose the celebration of the mass, they should permit no Roman Catholic to embrace Lutheranism, they should not decline the Episcopal jurisdiction, should tolerate no Anabaptists or Sacramentarians.

The Edict of Worms required that the Reformation should be extirpated with fire and sword. That of Spire re-affirmed that former one, with the modification, that in places where the Reformation already prevailed, its adherents might be left in peace, provided they kept absolute silence upon their points of faith, gave adhesion to certain radical doctrines of Romanism, and held themselves in readiness to aid in the extinction of certain sects that were specially obnoxious; John of Saxony, Philip of Hesse, Luther, Melancthon, and the rest were by no means disposed to accept this as a righteous decision of a matter involving such vast interests. Accordingly, they brought

forward their "Protest," of which, as D'Aubigne says, the following passage presents the essential part:

The new edict, declaring that the ministers shall preach the gospel, explaining it according to the writings accepted by the holy Christian church, we think that, for that regulation to have any value, we should first agree on what is meant by the true and holy church. Now, seeing that there is great diversity of opinion in this respect, that there is no sure doctrine but such as is conformable to the Word of God; that the Lord forbids the teaching of any other doctrine; that each text of his holy Scriptures ought to be explained by other and clearer texts; that his holy book is, in all things necessary for the Christian, easy of understanding, and calculated to scatter the darkness; we are resolved, with the grace of God, to maintain the pure and exclusive preaching of his only Word, such as it is contained in the biblical books of the Old and New Testament, without adding anything thereto that may be contrary to it. This Word is the only truth; it is the sure rule of all doctrine and of all life, and can never fail or deceive us. He who builds on this foundation shall stand against all the powers of hell, whilst all the human vanities that are set up against it shall fall before the face of God.

Whoever will read these words carefully, will, we think, agree with us that they assert these three grand principles: first, *that religious thought and opinion should be free*; second, *that the Word of God is supreme*; third, *the right and the duty of proselytism*; in other words, practical obedience, by each Christian in his own sphere, and with the use of his own opportunities, to the Lord's great command, "to preach the Gospel to every creature." This we take it, is Protestantism. Having those essential principles, this as its nature and embodiment, it was brought by divine providence upon the actual scene of things to do a certain work. Has it done it or not?

Dr. Ewer's method of treating the subject, under this aspect of it, is as purely fallacious as in the instances already pointed out. To show this, we have but to turn the tables upon him, and when he asserts "Protestantism is a failure," reply, "Well, but is Catholicity a success?" We are quite willing to accept, for the present purpose, his own definition of Catholicity. He uses the term as synonymous with that of "Church," and of "the Church" he speaks in what he calls the three great branches, the Roman Church, the Greek Church, the Anglican Church; including in the latter, the Episcopacy of the United States. The Anglican Church, of course, he accepts nearly as it stands, without criticism, save that in the title it bears upon this continent as "The Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States," he repudiates the word "Protestant." Of the other

two branches, he says : " There are certain views held in the Roman Church which are not Catholic, that is to say are not held by the Catholic Church ; and yet Rome is a Catholic Church. . . . And there are certain views held in the Greek Church, and certain other views held by our Church, which are not Catholic ; and yet the Greek and the Anglican are both Catholic Churches." That is to say, each of these branches, has received into itself certain innovations which are not according to the truth, and so far forth as that is in error ; but all three nevertheless unite to constitute the one Church—Catholicity. We do not consent to this use of the term Church, but for the present will allow the three religious bodies, of which Dr. Everts speaks, to be grouped and designated by the other title. This Catholicity, then, is it a success ? If the method of judgement which our author used for Protestantism is a just one, and fairly tests the questions whether Protestantism has failed or succeeded, it is equally just as applied to " Catholicity." The charges against Protestantism are three in number :

As a religious system, Protestantism fails to get at the masses ; nay, there were vast regions of country where the fundamental principles, (to wit, private judgment, and the dogma of a church invisible only,) took deep and general root, but in those countries it has absolutely lost its hold on the masses it once swayed ; secondly, the logical issue of Protestantism is Rationalism, *i. e.* Protestantism logically destroys Christianity ; thirdly in the lands where it has prevailed, as in Germany, parts of Switzerland, New England and elsewhere, the historical event has substantiated the logical anticipation.

Now we are not so absurd as to suppose that if it can be proved that Catholicity has, in all these respects, itself failed, and perhaps in other ones equally or worse, that will demonstrate that Protestantism has *not* failed. What we claim is, that the method of argumentation is itself fallacious. It proves nothing either for or against either Catholicism or Protestantism. One might take Dr. Ewer's book, and following his line of argument throughout, by exactly the same process of reasoning, and in a similar array of facts and figures, prove that Catholicity is a failure. The same three charges can be substantiated against Catholicity, with a far more condemning effect. Neither does Catholicity " reach the masses." Catholicity, also, has logical tendencies which land men in rationalism ; in kingdoms and empires where Catholicity once was, and to-day is, in Italy, France, Austria, and England itself, the " logical anticipation " in this respect has been " historically substantiated." All these points could be made out perfectly, if it were worth while to present this argument, yet

they would leave this real question, as between Protestantism and "Catholicity," precisely where it was before.

As respects "reaching the masses," the failure of Catholicity is signal. It is not reaching the masses, simply to gather them in crowds to places of worship. Crowds frequent pagan temples quite as much as they do Catholic cathedrals. Unless, when assembled there, the truths and motives of religion are so brought to bear upon these masses as that they shall be bettered for this life, and saved for the next, they are not reached. Now, the condition of the masses, as respects religious light, and moral and social elevation, in all Catholic countries, especially those where "Catholicity" is supreme, as in Romanist lands, and those under the sway of the Greek Church, absolutely prove that in whatever throngs the people there may be drawn to places of worship, they are left unreached in so far as influences tending to elevate, purify, and save them are concerned. After all that may be here said of the failure of Protestantism to reach the masses, it is still notoriously the fact,—a fact noticed by all travellers, and insusceptible of denial,—that in Protestant countries this class of the people is many degrees higher in moral and social status than is found in Catholic countries. Whenever, even amongst ourselves, the religious belief of the inmates of prisons, jails, and almshouses is ascertained, the Catholic representation far outnumbers the Protestant one, while in all our large cities, the districts where crime most prevails, where there is most of the infection of every moral and social disease, where there is most of poverty and misery, are the districts occupied by the Catholics. As to the Anglican form of Catholicity, it does not reach the masses in any sense. Its places of worship, so far from being thronged by this class, are avoided by it. In mighty London, the State churches are morally and religiously well-nigh as powerless, so far as the great body of the population is concerned, as if their doors were closed from year's end to year's end, and were it not for "Protestantism," those hundreds of thousands of souls would be almost as ignorant of a way to be saved as the millions of Peking.

The logical tendencies of Catholicity towards Rationalism are certainly not less than those of Protestantism. Dr. Ewer's claim in behalf of his own system is that it protects men from infidelity, by requiring them to believe in Christianity upon the authority of the church. His complaint against Protestantism is that it inclines men to infidelity by encouraging them to think for themselves. We know of no stronger argument a rationalist could have than that a religion must be radically wrong which is afraid to trust itself to the conditions and consequences of free thought. In point of fact, the grand

protest of rationalism has always been against *authority* in matters of belief, and Protestants in their controversies with them, have constantly been obliged to defend themselves against the charge of requiring faith upon the authority of churches and creeds, and to show that it is demanded rather upon the authority of a divine revelation. Catholicity meets this grand objection of rationalism without a single satisfactory word to say in its own defence. It is in the position of demanding faith in truths professedly addressed to human intelligence, yet not as an intelligent faith, but as a blind submission to ecclesiastical *dicta*. It is in the position of preaching a gospel which it yet withholds, and, while announcing its mission as a messenger of God, refusing to communicate that message freely, and in the terms of its original statement to all. Rationalism mocks, as it justly may, at such pretensions, and the hardest task of Protestantism in its dealings with the rationalists, is to convince them that, in these respects, it is not "*Catholicity*." As to the "historical" substantiation, no fact is more certain than that rationalism, covert or out-spoken, nowhere more abounds than in the Catholic countries. Would the Pope be the most abhorred temporal sovereign in the world, if his spiritual sovereignty had any assured basis? Would Italy be in a state of chronic revolt against him, if underneath all its apparent Catholicity there were not the ever active fires of a rebellious rationalism? Would France, while one of the most Catholic countries of the world, be the most infidel, if "*Catholicity*" were not itself, in this particular, an enormous failure? The bosom of the Anglican Church itself, cherishes some of the most objectionable forms of modern rationalism; while in Germany, if the free thought of Protestantism has developed a rationalistic tendency, it has also shown the power to control it, and in these later times is correcting it with elements of truth and life which the rationalism of France and Italy, where Catholicity rules, gives no signs of having felt.

But this line of remark need not be continued. We do not regard it as settling anything; it only shows how Dr. Ewer's array of arguments, facts, and figures comes to nothing as regards the proposition he set out to prove. The same method of reasoning equally avails to prove the "failure" of Protestantism and of Catholicity. It actually proves the failure of neither. The real issue lies back of all this, and the claims of the two systems must be tried upon far other grounds. There is, however, as intimated in the beginning, this point of inquiry that is pertinent and important: "How far is it true that Protestantism has come short in its mission? And if, to any extent it has in this way failed, what are the causes? Of this the real

question before us in this article, we must be careful not to lose sight.

A glance at those three principles which we have stated as containing the substance of Protestantism, will show that they tend toward a single practical result, and that is to concentrate the grand interest of religion *in the individual*; to lay upon each individual man its responsibilities, offer to each its hopes, and summon each to its work. Protestantism demands that every man shall think for himself in matters of religion; it simply gives him the Bible to form his faith and his life by, and requires of him that having attained to faith himself he shall consider himself personally called and commissioned, so far as in him may lie, to convey "a like precious faith" to others. If it were the purpose of our argument to justify these principles, we might point out their eminent consistency with what appears as the leading peculiarity of our Lord's own teaching. He did not deal with men in classes, in organizations, or through any system. His own personal ministry, even, he performed without perfecting that organization, that kingdom of God on earth, to establish which was one part of his mission. One cannot but be strongly impressed with the degree in which, under his ministry, the grand interest and the grave responsibilities of religion were concentrated in the individual. Each disciple was to weigh and decide the Messianic claim for himself, and had just this one thing to do,—take upon him the yoke of Christ, learn of him, and follow him. That great apostacy, to which Dr. Ewer applies the name of "Catholicity," asserted a wholly different principle. It concentrated the interest, the spiritual power, the authority, and the hope of religion wholly *in the system*. To this day it is marked by the same feature. It rests the promise of salvation upon a man's connection with this system. He must be in the church, he must receive grace through the sacraments, he must believe as the church tells him to believe, he must rely on the mediatorship of a priesthood, he must hope for no divine favor that does not flow to him through instituted channels, that is not confirmed to him by the sanction of ecclesiastical shibboleths. Herein consists that enormous spiritual despotism which the world bore as a burden, till, wearied and disgusted, it threw it off, while, in the reassertion of that principle which embodied itself in our Lord's person and ministry, Protestantism was born.

We claim, therefore, that the special mission of Protestantism is to make religion a personal matter with each individual man, put before each one the terms of salvation in the "easy, artless, unencumbered" form ordained by the Redeemer himself, and lay upon each, as stand-

ing before God in the grand accountability of his moral freedom, its high responsibilities. Its preëminent office is to relieve the world of oppressive ecclesiastical systems, restore the simple order of Christ's kingdom, and take away from between the soul and its Saviour those intrusive pretenders which would share with him the right and the power to save. As man's great interest in this world is the salvation of his soul, so the central thought in Protestantism has respect to this, and aims at putting each man upon those simple terms of salvation which the gospel in its original form appointed. But just as the interest of personal religion becomes the centre and soul of innumerable other interests, so this main idea of Protestantism branches out, in its practical tendencies, in many directions. It embraces, in its real scope, all human interests, and views its work as still unfinished while there remains any form of evil to be remedied.

Now, the question, as between Protestantism and Catholicity, and with special reference to the results of their trial of strength thus far, has respect to the growth and power which the central principle of each has attained, and the attitude in which each, in this regard, stands to-day before the world. There is a superficial aspect of things which if made the rule of judgment may wholly mislead. Every apparently damaging fact which Dr. Ewer asserts of Protestantism might be a fact indeed, and still the triumph of Protestantism as a principle and a truth be beyond question. There may co-exist with them,—as we claim that there does co-exist with them so far as they themselves exist at all,—another state of facts showing that notwithstanding these apparently doubtful manifestations, the state of things in this world has been made to undergo a change so radical in its nature, so far-reaching in its tendency, as to put the question of success or failure beyond dispute. How stands the account as between that assertion of dominion over the thought and conscience of mankind against which the Reformers protested, and that principle of freedom from accountability to man in things of the soul, and that sole accountability to God and his word which the Reformers asserted? It must at least be admitted that in the lapse of three hundred years the face of the world in this regard, and in certain resultant particulars, has wonderfully changed. Religion is a matter with which men and women are now dealing as one lying between their own personality and that of God. In place of spiritual serfdom has come spiritual freedom, in place of inertness activity, while for pedlers of indulgences, selling salvation and the forgiveness of sins at altars and church-doors, there are found witnesses of Jesus, offering a free salvation through atoning blood. The point at issue

between the Papists and the Reformers, at the Diet of Spire, was exactly this: "You shall *not* teach religion in any other way than as the Pope permits. There shall *not* be any way of salvation offered save through the church and its sacraments. What popes and councils have settled shall *not* be controverted, nor appealed from their tribunals to the word of God. The human conscience shall *not* be free; it shall wear the yoke and the chain still, and rebellion shall be punished with dungeons and fire." Protestantism asserted the contrary of all this, and we have lived to see the day when that assertion is made good. The condition of the world, as respects religious truth and religious freedom is what "Catholicity" declare it *should not be*, what Protestantism declared it *should be*. The freedom thus asserted and thus won may have been abused; it is none the less a grand achievement. The activity in religious thought and life thus superinduced may not always be in the directions or with the results most to be desired; yet how much better is it even so, than a dead and rotting formalism!

We look upon human freedom in general, intellectual developement, social and political progress, as incidental to the main work of Protestantism. Dr. Ewer scoffs at those who claim these as proofs that Protestantism has not failed. He says the intellectual awakening of Europe began long before Luther, and would leave his reader to infer that "Catholicity" has been its special friend and promoter. He is very careful to keep out of view the fact that this intellectual awakening occurred as a revolt against Catholicity; that popes, and priests, and monks, and State-churches, whether Roman, Greek or Anglican, have always been its uncompromising foes; that, in that collision of the awakening intellect of Europe, Protestantism was born, and that while ever since, Catholicity and intellectual progress have been enemies, Protestantism and intellectual progress have been allies, with one spirit, one mind, one interest. The printing press is indeed older than Protestantism; but that does not make it any the less true that to Protestantism the press owes its freedom, and hence its noblest achievements, while between Catholicity and a free press there has been perpetual war. It is, besides, a remarkable fact that political liberty has prospered only in Protestant lands. In England itself the political freedom enjoyed is due, not to Anglicanism, but to Puritanism. The politically free States on the continent of Europe are the Protestant States. So far as Catholicity makes itself felt in the sphere of human progress at all, it is felt there only to hinder and repress. Protestantism may not always have been wise in its measures, but its tendencies have been invariably right. It has had its extremes and

abuses ; but the principle at the heart of it has always been a conservator and a purifier, so that it has shown itself both able and willing to rectify its own mistakes.

We shall presently notice particulars in which we freely concede that Protestantism has not as yet realized all its aims, and shall try to indicate some of the reasons of this. That it has wrought a great work on the earth may be confidently claimed. It has completely changed the moral, social, political, and religious status of mankind. Just in the operation of those principles which enter into it, of freedom of conscience, loyalty to the divine Word, and zeal for human salvation, it has already done much to remedy the mischief of spiritual and political tyranny, and to establish among men that kingdom which is "righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost." In the department of religious activity we might say much of its achievements. Faults there are, as in all human work ; but it is none the less certain that it is in the Protestant method of work that religion is made the great power it is. The emphatic words of Professor Saint Hilaire, the brilliant French writer, may illustrate one view of this :

I have travelled much in the North and the South, and have been much struck by one fact. Wherever the Bible is not the corner stone of education, of society, of life in general, there is no literature for children, none for the people at large. Look at Spain, Italy, France itself, every land, in short, in which the Bible is not read. There is no reading for the child, none for the working man. In Germany, in England, on the contrary, we find a mass of popular and juvenile Christian literature, in which the national genius is reflected as in a mirror. . . This is the juvenile and popular literature which I cannot but covet in behalf of my native land, accustomed as she is for two centuries to reign over Europe in the empire of mind, thanks to her immortal phalanx of great writers, to whom one art alone is lacking, that of speaking to the young and popular mind, and of reaching it by frequent appeals to the heart.

This may stand as one instance of the way in which the Protestant principle works, illustrating the rest. To doubt of the vast and beneficent forces combined, not only in the churches and ministry of Protestantism, but in the ever multiplying forms of auxiliary labor, or to look upon these as aspects of a failing cause, and of a work futile and contemptible, is to expose a degree of shallowness in both observation and reflection which one cannot contemplate without amazement.

It is time, however, that we passed to another branch of our general subject. The charges made against Protestantism would never

have engaged even temporary attention in the degree they did, if there had not been something in the existing state of facts to lend them an apparent authentication. There are certain admissions that should be frankly made; facts in the history and present status of Protestantism that should neither be evaded nor concealed. They contain a *most* important lesson, and if to bring them forward in any mere dispute upon the question whether Protestantism or Catholicity has most failed, is to study them from a point of view quite too low, as an admonition to Protestants themselves they cannot be too earnestly studied. If Dr. Ewer had treated them in this way, it would have been a service indeed to the cause of truth and of piety. Protestantism has not failed, but Protestants have committed grave faults, the practical consequences of which lend to its enemies these weapons of assault. Special forms of Protestantism may even be conceded to have disappointed expectation, and in their development assumed directions very unlike what was contemplated. The Lutheranism of Germany, the Puritanism of New England exhibit at least offshoots of tendency and influence which, could they have been foreseen, would have been a sorrow and an amazement to the true-minded and true-hearted originators of this grandest movement of modern times. Protestant zeal has not always been zeal with knowledge, and it is undoubtedly true that if the old ecclesiasticism tended to inertness and spiritual death, the free thought and free action of the antagonist system have, as might have been expected, not always shown the sanctity of a pure Christian motive, nor the wisdom of a sound Christian prudence. Beyond question, besides, the workers in the Protestant field have reason to scrutinize well their methods, and to ask themselves why it is that with so much reached and done there remains still so much more that is out of reach and undone. Thoughts, and queries, and suggestions, coming up in a Christian convention held in New York, while Dr. Ewer's sermons were in process of delivery, were interpreted by him as yielding to him, wholly, the main points in his allegation against Protestantism. His last sermon in the series, accordingly was a flourish of trumpets upon this note. We believe that the tone of remarks at such conventions is often mistaken and misleading. Crude thoughts are put forward in a crude way; generalizations attempted upon a most narrow and superficial observation of facts, and censorious criticisms prompted sometimes by overmuch zeal, sometimes by personal jealousies or ambitions. We trust that such gatherings render to the general cause an important service; yet no one can doubt that this service would be far more important and more valuable, if those who direct in them were men better informed and

better prepared to undertake a true diagnosis, and propose the true remedy. If we attempt to offer here two or three suggestions as to the causes of those partial failures in Protestantism which its staunchest adherents most keenly deplore, we wish to be understood as putting them forward only as suggestions, and with a consciousness that to other minds another class of causes will very likely present themselves as more radical and more influential.

I. The first which we name is *lack of fidelity to first principles*. No system of truth, and no intellectual or religious movement should be held responsible save for those practical results to which its own principles lead. If those principles are misapprehended, poisoned or perverted, or if professed adherents, following their development to a certain point, stop short because finding their own prejudices or preferences in collision with them, and thus the movement branches into directions never proposed by its originators, or in other respects becomes stunted and ineffectual, the fault must be made to rest where it belongs, and that will not be with the movement itself, or with its principles. So when such facts appear, they become reasons, not for discarding the movement as essentially false, but for returning to its first principles, reaffirming afresh its radical elements, and renewing the effort in the line of its original setting out.

Now, we need not hesitate to admit that so far as the Rationalism of Germany is concerned, it had its origin in the bosom of Protestantism. We may even acquit very many, at least, of its most active promoters of any design to destroy the foundations of human faith, and also of positive irreverence for those inspired Scriptures which, nevertheless, they have "handled" so "deceitfully." Their sad and mischievous error lay in misconceiving wholly the relations of reason to faith, and misinterpreting the providential design in that freedom which had, in the directing of great events, been ensured to the human intellect. The right of each man to interpret the Scriptures for himself, was construed as a right for each to sit in judgment on them, and when the ecclesiastical tribunal had been discarded, arrogant reason erected one of its own. That principle which lives at the very heart of Protestantism was forgotten or denied, that the word of God must itself try and prove everything; that word of God was treated as no longer "the law and the testimony" according to which all teachers must speak, if there be any light in them, and the human judgment exalted into the place of supremacy. This was not Protestantism, nor was it any legitimate birth of Protestantism. When, as Hurst says, "fledgling theologians would come home from the University, and read aloud to the family-group the notes of lectures

which they had heard during the last semester, the aged pair, looking up in wonder, might well say, 'the good and great doctors of our Reformation never taught such things as these.' And when their sons would answer, 'Oh, the world has grown much wiser since their day,' they revealed the evil thought in which, not in the devout yet sturdy faith of the Reformers, Rationalism was born." There is reason to believe, moreover, that many of the Rationalists themselves, carried away by some theory of interpretation, were scarcely aware of their own errors. Schenkel was taken by surprise when his "Character of Jesus" was denounced as rationalistic, and seems not to have been aware that in this work he had belied his former more evangelical record. Had the German theologians stood firm by the three grand principles of Protestantism, especially that which asserts the supremacy of the word of God, they would never have wandered into Rationalism.

Like things might be said of rationalistic development in this country. It is quite possible that the free-thinking of New England is a reaction from the strictness of the early Puritanism, and the intolerant spirit which the founders of New England, contrary to their own principles, manifested, may have had much to do in provoking the intellectual revolt of a later day. This is just what has happened to Catholicity, as represented both in Romanism and Anglicanism. The oppressions and vices of the French priesthood must be regarded as the real creators of the Voltaire school of infidelity, while English Rationalism is that opposite extreme which the extreme of high-church pretensions has begotten. The historian, Froude, one of the leading English liberals, is the son of that Froude who was the friend and co-worker of Newman and Pusey. Whether it be a truth or an error that is pressed to such an extreme, whether it be that the original principle of a movement is wrong and but carried out to its logical results, or is right but disregarded, in either case a like state of facts may arise. The true philosophy, however, is not to denounce alike true and false first principles, or infer their falsity from their abuse, but ascertain their real nature, and if true, stand by them.

There is another particular in which this want of fidelity to first principles appears, and which we must not pass without notice. When Protestantism broke away from the Papacy, it did not, as it ought, break away wholly. That mischievous doctrine which is at the foundation of the whole system of Papal usurpation, that the church has a certain power of legislation in matters of practice if not in matters of faith, was most unhappily retained. There are few intelligent

Pedobaptists who will maintain that their observance of the leading Christian rite is in the strict sense scriptural, as respects either its mode or its subjects; there are many of them who think it sufficient to trace an observance or principle of organization to the second or third century. The plea, in fact, that this or that in Christian organization or Christian rite is "non-essential" is a direct and palpable violation of that principle in Protestantism which declares that all things, in Christian faith and practice, shall be tried and proved by the Scriptures. The Baptists, at the outset of their present denominational organization, brought nothing papistical with them, because, as a people, they had never been in any papistical connection. They belong to the general body of Protestants, only in the sense of standing opposed to "Catholicity" in all its forms. They were not represented at the Diet of Spire because not of those who had ever acknowledged in any way the Pope or his laws. The first principles of Protestantism had been their principles from time immemorial, and it is no assumption in their descendants now to say that if Protestantism had been as true to its own first principles as they and their fathers, through the long line of their "succession," have been, "Catholics" like Dr. Ewer would not have found such a superabundance of "sects" to sneer at as is now the case.

II. The second special fault in the practical development of Protestantism of which we propose to speak, is *inharmmonious working of instrumentalities*. "Catholicity" has a certain apparent advantage in the perfection of its machinery. Simply as machinery it is beyond comparison superior to anything Protestantism has yet produced, or, we trust, will ever produce. Ages have been industriously devoted to its construction, and to the perfection of its parts. There is a certain advantage, no doubt, so far as mere uniformity of faith and practice is concerned, in having at Rome, at St. Petersburg, or at Lambeth, in the Catholic climacteric, a theological and ecclesiastic fogleman, whose every utterance and motion shall be copied and repeated all over the world. There is an advantage, to the same end, in being able with efficient pains and penalties to control every Catholic who becomes recalcitrant, to regulate the smallest detail of a priest's dress, and to make sure that in the prayer-book there shall not even be a comma out of place. How much is gained to the cause of religion in the operation of such machinery, is quite another question. Protestantism, at all events, has none such, and the disadvantages it labors under in consequence it must bear as it may. "Catholicity," it is certain, never has the pain of seeing its parishes "burnt over with revivals." It has the most ample success in keeping the

spiritual atmosphere "neither cold nor hot," and may justly claim that rarely if ever does an earnest zeal disturb the boundaries of a decorous formality. Its lay-element it holds in with bit and bridle; an accomplishment in which it has the satisfaction to see its skill emulated by some Protestant denominations. The trailing robes of its priesthood are seldom or never trodden upon by the foot of the laity, and it runs no risk of being travestied or misrepresented by the blunders of some unclerical tongues. Protestantism must confess itself at a disadvantage, in all these particulars.

In seriousness, it is undeniably the fact that Protestantism has suffered a degree of temporary damage through its deficiency of machinery, although this is almost infinitely compensated in other ways. Upon the Protestant system it is competent for any man or any association of either men or women, to originate measures in the general work, and to work quite after their own fashion. They are restrained only by those inevitable conditions which affect all human undertakings, and in accordance with which what is feeble must die, what is foolish will be smothered in the ridicule it causes, what is outlandish will excite only contempt. Subject to those conditions Protestant men and women are workers in a common field with equal privileges allowed to all. The consequence is that many things arise in the nature of projects, schemes of reform, methods of evangelism, associations and combinations of various sorts, some of which provoke public laughter, some come into collision with more settled and orderly methods, some are found to have in them germs of the largest good, and capabilities of adjustment with the general system which render them ultimately, if not at first, of the greatest benefit. There has been a great deal *outré*, and in some respects damaging, in the current revivalism. Yet he is a most superficial observer or a most unfair reasoner who does not admit that all the same this method of Christian work has been, and is, of vast service to the cause of piety, and of mighty power in the conversion and salvation of man. The lay-element in Protestant churches is not always judicious in its zeal, and pretensions are sometimes put forward by the advocates of some of the associations in which this element is chiefly represented, which can by no means be admitted. These are but the early, crude manifestations of a power in the churches which has been latent quite too long. They have in themselves the principle of their own cure. For the time, these things seem to mar the beautiful order of Christ's earthly kingdom, and to deface, almost to dishonor, the fair structures of religion. They are, in fact, that process of self-education through which Protestantism, like every other active force, must pass, and how-

ever some present damage may appear, they are no more signs of "failure" than is the misshapen limb of a tree a reason why it should be condemned to the axe and the flame.


III. What we notice, last of all, is *deficiency of spiritual power*. The simplicity of form given to the kingdom of God on earth by the hands that first wrought upon its structure, must impress every thoughtful reader of the New Testament. Of the cumbrous and complicated system with which ecclesiastical history subsequently makes us acquainted, there is then not a trace. The local church, its pastor, its preached word, its ordinances of baptism and the Lord's supper,—these are the whole of it. Of any intention that by a combination of churches, by grades of ministerial office, by right of legislation and right of rule assumed and exercised by popes, by councils, by consistories, by synods, of an intention that by such means consummated in alliances between the church and the State, there should grow up any vast ecclesiastical system, there is no sign whatever. Every proper aim which may have been contemplated in any of these additions to the originally simple order was to be reached in quite another way. The church unity was to be "unity of the spirit in the bond of peace." The law that should rule was to be always "the law of Christ," according to which Christians are not to impose burdens, but "bear one another's burdens." Discipline and government were to have always one intention, to "gain" the "brother," and their exercise was lodged, simply, solely, and finally, in the church. "Tell it unto the church," is always the first thing and the last thing to be done, when proper personal endeavor to "gain" the offender shall have failed. There is not, in all history, a more amazing example of what human ingenuity can do in perverting original simplicity into ultimate complication, an order of things beautiful for fitness to a single design into cumbersome and bungling ill-adaptedness, than what one sees in "Catholicity" as compared with the church of the New Testament. Protestantism has not thoroughly done its work, we are sorry to say, in restoring that simple order, but it is to its praise that it has at least made the attempt.

Now, it is manifest that the efficiency of the New Testament church was conditioned upon its spirituality. Such a simple order could be made equal to a contest with organized error throughout the world, only as it should be filled, pervaded, and made mighty "through God." Catholicity sought the same, and by a different method, and upon a different condition, and failed. Protestantism, if it recovers the method, takes with it the condition. The power of Protestantism, if it has any, is *spiritual power*. Its other deficiencies and faults will

find a remedy when this deficiency is met. Nor can one set a limit in his thoughts, to the power a body of Christians would have, who should loyally adopt, and faithfully carry out to their last result the principles so nobly avowed now almost three centuries and a half ago, and in doing this seek and have a measure of spiritual power like that which dwelt in the churches of the earliest age. Sectarian divisions and rivalries could not live under such conditions; infidelity would be abashed, and its irreverant clamor die into murmurs, if not into silence, in presence of God's church thus made "fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an army with banners;" collisions of methods and instrumentalities would rarely then be seen, and personal and other emulations be sanctified by a nobler zeal; while "Catholicity" would begin to see, at last, the futility of these mummeries over each childish toy of which it now watches with such grave concern. If God will give his churches, in answer to their more earnest prayer, a larger measure of spiritual power, then will be found in this the remedy for the faults of Protestantism, and the best refutation of the charge that Protestantism is a failure.

CHICAGO, ILL.

J. A. SMITH.



CRAMP'S BAPTIST HISTORY.

Baptist History: from the foundation of the Christian Church to the close of the Eighteenth Century. By J. M. CRAMP, D. D., author of "A Text-Book of Popery," "The Reformation in Europe," etc., etc. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 530 Arch St.

THIS work supplies a lack which has long been felt. Dr. Cramp deserves the gratitude of every Baptist. He has wrought a good work and wrought it well. He makes no pretence of encyclopædic learning. He does not ballast his pages with multitudinous references, for a vain show. But no one can read this work without recognizing the genuine piety, the sincere desire for truth, the diligence, sound judgment, and caution of the author. He does not profess to know the secret of God,—where the church was after God drove her into the wilderness. He marks the fading of her light as she is withdrawn, and hails with joy her reappearance. When the record stops he is not ashamed to confess that he knows no more, and does not hazard mere conjectures. Where the record is clear, he does not fail to give us, with hearty sympathy, in good terse English, the simple story of the people, to whom, under God, we owe the transmission, through blood and tears, of the precious principles we hold.

At the present day it is thought by some eminent Christians, Principal Cunningham among the number, to be of small account how we define a church, except that it consists of believers. But the reformers, and the giant theologians of the seventeenth century, thought it of vast importance to set forth very carefully-worded defi-

nitions of a church. The Romish apostasy, as well as Protestants, holds that the church consists only of the faithful (*fideles*), those who have faith; but she understands this faith to mean subjection to the church, all who have been brought in and consecrated by baptism. The Protestant confessions unite in setting forth three marks of a true church: The profession of the true faith; the unmutilated administration of the sacraments; and the exercise of discipline. As Baptists, we would not be unwilling to accept these marks, if we interpret what is meant by the unmutilated administration of the sacraments. Deeply impressed with the truth that the churches are the earthly types of the Bride of the Lamb, and that we can only read ecclesiastical history aright, when we clearly perceive the New Testament model of a church, Dr. Cramp first sets before us this model, before proceeding, by the light of history, to trace these churches through the centuries. Like the "annals of the poor," the tale is "short and simple." Paul's fear with respect to the Corinthian Church was soon realized in all the churches. "As the serpent beguiled Eve, through his subtilty, their minds were corrupted from the simplicity that is in Christ." The name of Christian spread far and wide, but the cross was exchanged for the Labarum, and, decked with the tinsel and gaudy hues of the Roman and Byzantine courts, a fair form, said to be of perfect virginity, was accepted in place of the Bride.

The sections of this work which Dr. Cramp would rewrite, were strength and time given him, are those relating to Baptists just before and during the Reformation. The desperate, heroic contest of the Baptists, during the Reformation, all over central Europe, against Rome and Reformation run mad, has never been written. The records of this battle of "babes and sucklings," by whom God ordained strength against "enemies and avengers," are in the archives of the courts of that day, or are written in the pamphlets which Baptists were able to publish secretly. Thank God, many of these records are coming to light. Within the last thirty years several studious Germans, Roman Catholics and Protestants, have written monographs on prominent Baptists of the reformation period, Schreiber on Hubmeyer, Keim on Hetzer, Heberle on Grebel, Hast on the Anabaptists, Röhrich on Baptists in Alsace, Professor Cornelius, now of Munich, on the Munster Uproar. His chapter on the hymns of the Baptists is so full of sympathy, that one can forgive him much of his erroneous conception of them in other respects. These and other writers have no sympathy with the views of the Baptists, but their works serve to help us in our investigations.

The researches of Hahn, Dieckhoff, Herzog, Todd, Maitland, Gilly,

Bradshaw, and others, have thrown a flood of light on Waldensian history, and tend to dispel the illusions and perversions of their history by Perrin and Leger, the Calvinistic historians of the Waldenses. The late discovery of Waldensian manuscripts in the libraries of Dublin and Cambridge, have proven these falsifications. The libraries of Dublin, Cambridge, Geneva, and Grenoble, contain the only authentic manuscripts of the Waldenses known to exist. A few have been published. Those a Baptist would most like to see are awaiting the enlightened liberality of some of our generous promoters of learning, to be deciphered and copied, that the long-disputed question, as to what the Waldenses believed and practiced, may be decided by the best authorities. Several facts touching the Waldenses, are most interesting to Baptists. First—They were the inheritors of the faith the Albigenses sealed with their blood, and that faith, set forth by the preaching of Peter of Bruis, Henry of Lausanne, and in the records of the Inquisition, included churches of believers, baptized upon a profession of their faith. The Waldensian commentary on Canticles 4: 8, says, that the baptism of the Spirit must precede the baptism of water, for the former lends to the latter all its worth. And in another Waldensian work, *Novel Confort*, the signs of the new birth are said to be, "putting away the works of the former birth, walking in the way of regeneration, washing the conscience with spiritual water, purifying the heart from carnal thoughts, and putting on purity the wedding-garment." It is amazing, if the Waldenses were pædobaptists, that Bucer should labor through many pages to prove to them the validity of infant baptism, and urge them to reject the baptism on a profession of faith of those who had been baptized in infancy. Secondly—There is a striking parallel¹ between the pre-Reformation principles of the Waldenses and the principles of the earliest defenders of what was called, by Luther and Zwingli, anabaptism, or catabaptism. The Waldenses held most sacredly that it was unlawful to take an oath, to defend themselves, to go to war, or for a Christian to take a civil office that would require him to pass sentence of death on his fellow men, and for these views they were willing to give their lives. These were the views of the Baptists of 1525, in Switzerland; tenets for which they suffered the loss of all things at the hands of Swiss and German Reformers. Thirdly—Goebel, in his excellent work on "Christian Life in the Rhine Provinces,"² has acknowledged this similarity between the Waldenses and

¹ See J. H. Halbertsma. *Der Doopsgezinden Herkomst*. Deventer. 1843.

² Max Goebel. *Gesch. d. Christl. Lebens in der rheinisch-westphälischen evangelischen Kirche*. 3 vols. Coblenz, 1862. vol. 1. 41.

Baptists, and the fact that, where the Waldenses were most numerous before the Reformation, there they disappear at the time of the Reformation, and Baptists are most numerous. Switzerland, Moravia, and the Netherlands, were the countries where the Waldenses were most numerous just before the Reformation, and these are the lands where the epithets of scorn and reproach, anabaptist and catabaptist, were applied to vast numbers of men. Cardinal Hosius, who thoroughly knew the state of Europe at the time of the Reformation, declares (*Opera* 112, 213,) that the Waldenses rejected infant baptism, and baptized all who came to them, yet that some of them were pedobaptists. And his account agrees with the Romish writers of preceding centuries. Again, a resolution of the town-council of Groningen in Friesland, Holland, dated 1517, *i. e.*, before the Reformation, warns away all anabaptists (*Ypeij en Dermout, Anteekeningen*, vol. 1. p. 49), and Ypeij and Dermout (*Geschiedenis der Nederl. Hervormde Kerk*, vol. 1, 141, 147,) assert that Waldenses and Baptists were one and the same people. We might cite many more proofs, but only add, that thoroughly organized, well disciplined Baptist churches appeared as if by magic in the early part of the Reformation, in St. Gall, Zurich, Waldshut, Augsburg, Nürnberg, Strasburg, etc., long before Zwingli or Luther dared to lay hand on the discipline of their churches. The church in Augsburg, in 1527, numbered 800 members; that in St. Gall, over 1,200.

We mention these facts, not as proof positive that Waldenses and Baptists were the same people, but as strong testimony in that direction, which should incite us to more diligent and thorough study of this point and connection in our history. If it shall appear that Baptists are the true successors of the ancient Waldenses, and that the claim of three centuries, on the part of pedobaptists, to be their lineal descendants, is a fond illusion based on the dexterous manipulation of Waldensian records by Perrin and Leger, it will not be the first time that Baptists, through their gross negligence, have permitted others to enjoy their fair inheritance.

There is to be a resurrection of character, as well as of life, and we sometimes see this as vividly exemplified in this life as when "the bodies of the saints which slept, arose, and came out of their graves after Christ's resurrection, and went into the city and appeared unto many." Under Metternich, to be a republican in Austria, was to be a very imp of hell. Under Zwingli and Luther, to be a Baptist, was to aggregate in one's self all impish delights in sin under a profession of exalted piety. The length to which Luther and Zwingli allowed themselves to go, in practical denial of their most cherished princi-

ples (for infant baptism is an utter denial, in deed and doctrine, of justification by faith, and of God's election of his people), is so astounding that we would not believe it unless their own sign-manual testified to it. Zwingle, in his reply to Hubmeyer,¹ (whose exalted character all writers of the present century acknowledge), published just after his martyrdom at Vienna, addresses him as roasting in hell for his sin against infant baptism. In the library of Heidelberg University (Codex 435. p. 33) is preserved the "advice of the theologians at Wittenberg to slay the Baptists by the sword," signed, "Placet mihi Martino Luthero." From that day to this the name of Baptist has been an epithet of the most scornful reproach in Europe, on political as well as religious grounds, though not one instance can be produced where their presence was injurious to the state, or they ever rose in rebellion. They were dreadful heretics from established state churches, and would strive to draw men to purity of faith and discipline even with their last breath. But Oncken, and Köbner, and Lehmann, and Wiberg, and Cretin, together with many other consecrated souls, are living God's rebuke to the hoary reproach, as many have done before them, and history has begun to raise from the dust the pure and holy characters of many of the early Baptists.

We give but one example. Ludwig Hetzer has been quoted by all writers on the history of antitrinitarian views (by Bock, Trechsel, Sandius, Fock, and others,) as one of the first to promulgate these views at the time of the Reformation. He was a man² of gentle spirit, of fine poetical talent, of deep piety, of great learning, one of the first Hebraists of his time, long an intimate friend of Zwingle, and of all the South German and Swiss Reformers. In 1526, he became a Baptist. From that time he was hounded till the dogs lapped his blood under the scaffold in Constance, in February 1529. Kept in prison for months, without any charge against him, except that he was a Baptist, he was brought up suddenly, on the third of February, 1529, before the court, on an accusation of polygamy. He was immediately sentenced to be burned the next morning; but, at the instance of some of the chief men, the sentence was changed to beheading. He died, as he lived, committing his soul to Jesus. One hundred and thirteen years before, out of the same gate, and along the same path Hetzer trod to death, a thin weak man was hurried to the pyre in cloth-

¹ H. Schreiber. *Taschenbuch für Geschichte in Süddeutschland*. 1839-40. Hagen. Deutschland's literar. u. religiös Verhältnisse in Ref. zeitalter. 3 vols.

² "Hetzerum commodissimi ingenii hominem meministi, quo cum et ipse tot modis claro viro, linguis etiam et admirabili ingenii dexteritate praedito, non semel egi, ne supra quam deceret, sapere pergeret." Vadiani Epist. ad J. Zuiccium. Cal. Augusti, 1540.

ing blazoned with emblems of devils, amid the jeers and scorn, the pride and pomp and circumstance of the great attendants on the Council of Constance. John Huss died in the greatest disgrace, and under the mightiest curse Rome could belch forth. But his character has had its resurrection. Hetzer passed beyond the spot forever sacred to the memory of Huss, to the gallows-tree. Condemned and hurried to death by Protestants, his name was blackened by Zwingli's assertion that he wrote against the divinity of Christ, a book no one ever read, and by the charge of polygamy, made by those who knew better, (the Blarers), and who had been his friends, but now sold him for a few pieces of silver. A verse of one of his hymns has been quoted as proof positive that he rejected the atoning blood of Jesus.

Ja, spricht die welt, es ist nit not,
 Das ich mit Christo leyden :
 Er leid doch selbst vor mich den tod,
 Nu zech ich auff sein kreiden ;
 Er zalt vor mich,
 Das selb glaub ich,
 Darmit ist ausgerichtet :
 O bruder mein,
 Es ist dein schein
 Der Teufel hats ertichttet.

But this hymn, containing this verse, was chosen by Freylinghausen, and Francke of Halle, for their book of spiritual hymns, which they sent forth to aid in leading souls to a closer acquaintance with the Saviour ! Only by the most compulsory contortion of the words can any other than a meaning of deepest devotion be wrung from them. Hetzer's translation of the Prophets, made the year before his death, published just before his imprisonment, gives no sign of deistical views, but the reverse. This translation, which passed through thirteen editions in four years, from 1528-31, has become so scarce, that only four copies are known to exist ; two are in Basel, and two are in the Bucknell Library of Crozer Theological Seminary. His other works are also at Upland, and they deny utterly the charge of rejecting the Saviour as God over all blessed forever. All the works of Hubmeyer, and the letters of Grebel, rest quietly at Upland, to rise up in God's good time and put to shame the calumny against the work of the Holy Spirit.

The learned Prof. De Hoop Scheffer, of the Mennonite Seminary, at Amsterdam, in connection with Frederik Muller, Esq., of Amster-


dam, antiquarian, facile in every language of Europe, and deeply interested in whatever concerns Baptist History, is now searching the archives of the courts of the Netherlands, from 1525 to 1560, for records concerning Baptists. Already he has found much that throws light on our history, and he expects soon to give the result of his studies to the public. We await them with great interest. Within a few months, on one of the dusty shelves of a great European library, has been discovered a pamphlet, written by a nobleman of Augsburg, in 1526, entitled "A True History of the Baptists." Of course the authorities removed his head from his body, for daring to think and write on such a subject.

There is a future for Baptists. Their history shall have its resurrection. God grant that every Baptist may heed Dr. Cramp's last words (pp. 584-589).

If it is true that the Apostolic churches were Baptist churches, they were the purest Baptist churches the world has ever seen; yet out of them, by a gradual fall, by fellowship with the world, by love of display and worldly ways and practices, has come the awful apostasy that has clouded and cursed the world for centuries. Are we better than those early churches? Only by the Holy Spirit and by a close walk with Jesus, by the profession and preaching of the true faith, by the unmutated administration of the ordinances, by the faithful exercise of discipline in our churches, shall we hand down, bright and clear, the unspeakably precious truths we have inherited. In simple intelligent reliance on God's word of grace let us strive to set that forth by word and work. As we look back through the centuries, we see the Saviour's words written in a noon of living rays, "not one jot or tittle shall pass away till all be fulfilled," we catch the spirit of Hubmeyer's strong assurance, "Truth is immortal," (*Die Wahrheit ist untödtlich*,) we must pray, while souls remain in darkness, the prayer of Hetzer, "O God, set free the captives!" ("O Gott, erlös die Gfangnen!")

HOWARD OSGOOD.

UPLAND, PA.



ROYAL AND REVOLUTIONARY SPAIN.

WITH the Atlantic Telegraph giving daily bulletins from the Constituent Cortes, it would be useless for a quarterly publication to attempt a chronicle of the revolution; and a very slight acquaintance with the complicated nature of the problem now working out by the Spanish nation is enough to deter any sensible writer from playing the *role* of the prophet. But perhaps a brief review of the historical causes that have concurred to make Spain what she is, will enable us to form a truer estimate of the national tendencies than would otherwise be possible, and to appreciate the meaning and significance of what is transacting, as it were, before our eyes. We do not indeed believe, with some enthusiastic votaries of the philosophy of history that it is possible in any such degree "*rerum cognoscere causas*" as to give some foresight of what is yet future. The complexity of physical and moral agencies is too great to enable any but an omniscient mind or a mind inspired by the Omniscient to read in them with accuracy the character of coming events. History is full of surprises, and Spanish history abounds in them. But what was startling to the contemporary observer, resolves itself to the retrospective student as an orderly and natural result of recognizable causes.

The Spanish monarchy dates from the fifteenth century. The Ibe-

rian peninsula has been conquered successively by the Carthaginians, the Romans, the Vandals, and the Saracens. The Romans, as was their wont, so impressed themselves upon the country and its language, that few traces of their predecessors are discernible, though there are believed to be some remnants of the ancient Cantabrian tongue in the Basque language spoken by the Biscayans and other tribes on the northern border of the kingdom. Under the Roman dominion, down to the sixth century, the country enjoyed a season of tranquillity and prosperity, though sharing with other provinces in the evils which marked the "decline and fall" of the empire. The peninsula was overrun in the sixth century by the Vandals and other Gothic tribes, among whom in the following century the Visigoths became supreme. But their dominion was not long undisturbed. In the year 711 a Moorish army invaded the kingdom, defeated the Visigoths in a great battle, killed their king, and soon overrunning the whole country drove them to the fastnesses of the mountains. From these retreats they gradually descended and recovered portions of the lower countries. The kingdom of Leon was founded about the middle of the eighth century, and as the strength of the Moors declined several independent states were formed. Castile and Aragon, the most powerful of them, gradually absorbed most of the others. The union of these crowns by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, the conquest of Granada, the last possession of the Moors, and of that portion of the kingdom of Navarre lying south of the Pyrenees, made Spain a united monarchy, which the conquest of Naples and the discovery of America made also the most powerful in Europe. Charles the First (the Fifth, of Germany,) joined to his Spanish heritage that of Austria and the Netherlands. Philip the Second conquered Portugal, and was the husband of Queen Mary of England. There can be no doubt that at that time, and relatively to other European states, Spain was more powerful than any empire has since been. Macaulay has strikingly depicted the colossal figure with a few strokes of his pen:

The empire of Philip the Second was undoubtedly one of the most powerful and splendid that ever existed in the world. In Europe, he ruled Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands on both sides of the Rhine, Franche Comté, Roussillon, the Milanese, and the Two Sicilies. Tuscany, Parma, and the other small states of Italy, were as completely dependent on him as the Nizam and the Rajah of Berar now are on the East India Company. In Asia the king of Spain was master of the Philippines and of all those rich settlements which the Portuguese had made on the coasts of Malabar and Coromandel, in the Peninsula of Malacca, and

in the spice islands of the Eastern Archipelego. In America, his dominions extended on each side of the equator into the temperate zone. There is reason to believe that his annual revenue amounted, in the season of his greatest power, to a sum near ten times as large as that which England yielded to Elizabeth. He had a standing army of fifty thousand excellent troops, at a time when England had not a single battalion in constant pay. His ordinary naval force consisted of a hundred and forty galleys. He held, what no other prince in modern times has held, the dominion both of the land and of the sea. During the greater part of his reign, he was supreme on both elements. His soldiers marched up to the capital of France; his ships menaced the coasts of England.

It is no exaggeration to say that, during several years, his power over Europe was even greater than that of Napoleon. The influence of the French conqueror never extended beyond low-water mark. The narrowest strait was to his power what it was of old believed that a running stream was to the sorceries of a witch. While his army entered every metropolis from Moscow to Lisbon, the English fleets blockaded every port from Dantzic to Trieste. Sicily, Sardinia, Majorica, Guernsey, enjoyed security through the whole course of a war which endangered every throne on the Continent. The victorious and imperial nation which had filled its museums with the spoils of Antwerp, of Florence, and of Rome, was suffering painfully from the want of luxuries which use had made necessities. While pillars and arches were rising to commemorate the French conquests, the conquerors were trying to manufacture coffee out of succory and sugar out of beet-root. The influence of Philip on the Continent was as great as that of Napoleon. The Emperor of Germany was his kinsman. France, torn by religious dissensions, was never a formidable opponent, and was sometimes a dependent ally. At the same time, Spain had what Napoleon long desired in vain, ships, colonies, and commerce. She long monopolized the trade of America and of the Indian Ocean. All the gold of the West, and all the spices of the East, were received and distributed by her. During many years of war, her commerce was interrupted only by the predatory enterprises of a few roving privateers. Even after the defeat of the Armada, English statesmen continued to look with great dread on the maritime power of Philip.¹

But in this case, as in others which history records, the increase of the royal power neither implied nor caused a corresponding increase of prosperity to the nation. The union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile was not a union of the two kingdoms. Both were limited monarchies, both possessed representative assemblies, and the people of both were warmly attached to their ancient liberties. The fact, however, that the royal power was concentrated, while the legislative power and parliamentary privilege were divided between the

¹ Review of Lord Mahon's History of the War of the Succession in Spain.

two assemblies of the two nations, would have made it easy, had there been no change of the balance of power, for the sovereigns to thwart, to humble, and finally to suppress, the assemblies by which they were constitutionally restrained. By opposing the Cortes of one kingdom to those of the other, taking advantage of their mutual jealousies, it was possible essentially to limit their power and to extend the authority of the crown. This policy was pursued by Ferdinand, whom the death of Isabella left in sole authority over their joint dominions. The discovery of America and the important conquests gained on both continents, immensely strengthened the royal power without augmenting that of the Cortes. In vain they asserted their ancient privileges, and the people in vain rose to support them. The veteran armies of Charles the Fifth, and of Philip the Second, proved too much for undisciplined popular enthusiasm. Free institutions decayed, and finally perished, during the reign of the first king of the Bourbon dynasty. Monarchy became absolute, maintaining its supremacy by the sword. Parliamentary rights and privileges were obsolete, and known only to antiquaries. That a people is surely degraded by the loss of political freedom, is a truism which scarcely needs to be articulately stated. The facility with which free constitutions have since been adopted and cancelled, re-adopted and again rejected, not on their merits, not by outward constraint, but upon the impulse of intrigues in the court or in the army, is sufficient evidence of a decayed public spirit, and an ill omen for that Spanish Republic which (at the present writing) in lack of an available candidate for the throne, seems to impend.

But nations whose political activity is suppressed, may avert some of the worst effects, by increased energy of action in other directions. Even the pursuit of material gain is better than utter mental torpidity. Spain has some important natural advantages, the improvement of which might have done more for the increase of wealth than all the spoils of her foreign conquests. Her soil, in the Southern provinces, and on the slopes descending from the mountains towards the sea, yields a various and bountiful return for tillage. There are extensive tracts of broken and comparatively sterile surface which have for centuries been the pasturage ground of flocks that furnish their fine wools to the commerce of the world. Silk is largely produced. Her forests might have been of great extent and value but for the ignorant recklessness with which they have been swept away. Besides the grape and its choice vintages, there is an abundance of semi-tropical fruits and nuts, and the finer varieties proper to the temperate zone. The mineral resources of the kingdom are great.

Before the discovery of America, Spain was one of the chief sources of the supply of precious metals, and her lead mines have since yielded largely. With so much of the raw material available for profitable manufacture, such as iron, wool, silk, leather, no natural impediment would seem to lie against excelling in diversified forms of industry. \ Enough has been done to show both how much might have been done, and how little avails the largest liberality of nature when not seconded by the energy of man. \ Ports on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean invited to commercial enterprise. But the long struggle with the Moors, and discovery and conquest in America, opening an almost boundless field for the pursuit of wealth and renown by achievements in arms, ingrained in the national mind a love of wild adventure inconsistent with a patient cultivation of the arts of peace. The multiplication of honorary distinctions won in this way, which have been carefully handed down the lines of descent, has produced a considerable population so proud as to feel degraded by labor, though often too poor to subsist in comfort without it. About a hundred years ago there were reckoned some half a million of *hidalgos*, or descendants of the Visigoth chiefs who reconquered the country from the Moors. The intolerable pride of a *hidalgo* needs no description. To these are to be added the *grandees*, or families ennobled by the King, and it would hardly be extravagant to add the whole Spanish population, not including Jews, Gipsies, descendants of Moors, and other tribes. Every true Spaniard is a gentleman, and as such, however wretched his poverty, feels himself superior to sordid toil, and submits to it with reluctance. The nobility not only swelled the idle population, but by their vast landed possessions, held in strict entail, checked the development of agriculture. With all their greed of land, the Spanish nobility and gentry have no love for rural life and enjoyments. It may be added that the Church was also a grand monopolist, holding, as recently as in 1812, nearly one-fourth of the entire soil of the kingdom.

If the Church had done nothing worse for Spain than to interfere with the development of industry and of her material resources, the evil would have been comparatively slight, admitting of an easy remedy. But the priesthood made themselves the chief agents in the work of enslaving and debasing the people. Spain was eminently "the Catholic" kingdom. The orthodoxy of the Western Church was her glory.* It was a Spanish synod in the sixth century by which that interpolation was made in the Nicene Creed which forms one of the chief technical grounds of separation from the Eastern Church. That extreme assertion of the Latin theology,

made in Roman Spain, was a typical prophecy of the fanatical attachment to Romish orthodoxy which has been a distinctive trait of the later national character. Yet this sentiment has no just claim to be called natural, as if the Spanish mind had been in some manner preconformed to the Roman dogma. It required a brutal enslavement, a murderous and remorseless discipline, the rack, the gibbet, the stake, to make the name of that strong and haughty people a synonym for sullen bigotry. No European nation had a fairer promise. The martial qualities developed in their long struggle with the Moors were indeed unduly cultivated at the expense of other valuable traits of character. But they were an adventurous, courageous, resourceful people, tenacious of their purposes, and of personal and national honor. Their early superiority in arms was not more decided than their eminence in letters, in statesmanship, and in diplomacy. Spanish literature and art had a splendid dawn, but their day was short and troubled. Without civil freedom there is no room for statemanship. Without intellectual and spiritual freedom there can be no living literature. They do not die at once, but die they must. As the Roman Empire at its beginning, inheriting the fruits of the liberty it subverted, might have seemed to surpass the Republic in its development of genius, so the impulse which the Spanish intellect had received in the fifteenth century did not show its whole power until the period when the axe was already laid at the root of the nation's liberties.

Spain was "the Catholic" Kingdom. But when the mind of Europe began to revolt against the superstitions of the mediæval Church, Spain was no exception to the movement. That the Reformation, when it came, would have been in Spain all that it was in Germany, had it been permitted to make its way without violent resistance, cannot be affirmed. There were precursors and preparations in the one case that had no existence in the other. But neither is it clearly evident, often as it has been asserted, that the Latin nations are Roman Catholic by any native or necessary tendency. The Gospel was given for man. We do not believe that any portion of the race have been so created or providentially trained as to have an instinctive preference for such a profane parody upon the Christian system as Rome offers for the true faith. The adherence of Latin Europe to the papacy is not a mystery requiring for its solution the theory that there is some sort of consanguinity between them and popery. The Spaniards were too busy with their contest against Mahommedanism to be as open, as they might otherwise have been, to a sense of the corruptions of Christianity. But they shared in

the common movement of the European mind. Protestantism was introduced. It gained adherents. But the Inquisition was beforehand with it. Reconstituted, in 1481, by Ferdinand and Isabella, with enlarged powers, it became a tremendous engine of despotism. It has been computed that in Castile and Aragon thirteen thousand persons suffered death for heresy, between the date just given and 1518, and that nearly 200,000 suffered other punishments. Allowing that there is some exaggeration in these statements, as Roman Catholic writers maintain, enough remains of indisputable truth to make it evident that Protestantism was *burned* out of Spain. It has been said that the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church. And it is true, no doubt, that Christian martyrdom is eloquent preaching. But there may be persecution thorough and persevering enough, if not to exterminate the seed of the church, to postpone for an indefinite future its germination and growth.¹

The Inquisition did not confine itself to the detection and extermination of heretics. It was an engine of despotic power and in turn guided the policy of the State. It drew from Ferdinand the decrees by which Jews were banished from Spain, and at a later period instigated the banishment of the Moors, measures which impoverished the kingdom, and retarded civilization. There remained a few who professed themselves good Catholics while secretly cherishing the prohibited worship, some who met in darkness and strict seclusion to curse the objects of their public reverence. The Inquisition was as hostile to free thought in science and philosophy as in religion. It kept the press under strict censorship. No book could be printed

¹ An article in a London journal falls under our eyes while we write, which indicates that the crimes of the Inquisition even now cry out with effect upon the popular sentiment of Madrid. "Levelling the ground, the other day, for the new square of the Dos de Mayo, at Madrid, the workmen came upon a mass of charred bones, and other half-calcined remains, which the traditions of the place, corroborated by orthodox records but too exactly kept, declared to be the relics of those who had perished in the fires of the Inquisition. As spade after spade was driven into the black dust of premature Protestantism, exclamation followed exclamation, each deeper if not louder than the last, of wonder and shame at the circumstantial evidence thus tardily afforded of the devilish deeds done in despotic days gone by. In the dreary period when Spain, bound hand and foot by the civil power, was given over to the tormentors, by Philip II., Philip III., and Philip IV., there was no appeal of humanity throughout Spain, save that of the forked tongue of flame to heaven as it rose from the pitiless stake. The Holy Office reigned supreme in the palace and in the cottage, in the boudoir and in the barrack, in the study of the recluse, and over the printing types of a censored press. The nerves of the nation's soul were kept numbed by fear; but whenever they momentarily relaxed into a spasm of free life, they were seared by hot and holy irons. Nor sex nor age were permitted to plead exemption. The remorseless scythe cut down all, flower and fruit, tares and wheat, and bound them in bundles for the burning; and, after each *Auto da Fe*, thanksgivings were offered up in the name of Church and State, that nonconformity no longer polluted the land. Year after year, and generation after generation,

without its permission. Under its pernicious influence, the minds of the people were benumbed and their moral sentiments depraved until they were capable of finding a savage delight indifferently in a bull-fight or an *auto-da-fe*. Time brings its revenges. Spain ceased to breed either great statesmen or great soldiers. The Austrian line of kings became extinct and was succeeded by the Bourbons, whose administration was at first milder and more intelligent. But they sunk, by the same necessity which absolutism can never escape, to the level of their predecessors.

It is needless to pursue into its details the history of the national decay, or even to note the stages of decline. Enough, to show the condition to which kingcraft and priestcraft, in their unchecked sway, brought a brave and high-spirited people. During a period of sixty years, from the death of Philip the Second (1598), the population of the kingdom declined. At the close of the eighteenth century it had scarcely recovered the loss. For the last sixty years there has been a moderate increase. Before the secularization of the ecclesiastical property in 1835, it was estimated that only one-fourth of the soil was cultivated. Agriculture was rude and scantily productive. Narrow and vicious legislation, burdensome taxes, and the low state of general intelligence combined to depress every form of industry. No country in Europe is so ill-provided with the means of internal communication. Except between some of the most important places, there are scarcely any roads, and very few bridges. No railroads existed till 1848, and the lines since built do not extend in their combined length more than a thousand miles. The law and

the fell work of uniformity by law went on. The cries of agony were drowned by the roll of drums, and the chant of hallelujahs; and the cinders of misbelief were buried where the hapless confessors gave up the ghost, in the soil of the Quemadera de la Cruz, which being interpreted, means the burning place for convicts of the cross."

"But in fulness of time the moral earthquake has reached even Madrid, and the Christian Golgotha gives up its dead. Layer after layer of accusing dust, Jewish, Moorish, Huguenot, Sceptic, indistinguishably mingled now, is day by day exhumed to smite the national conscience, and sting it to remorse for having so long slumbered while the relics of these unvindicated victims slept. Buried ignominiously there for more than a century, nameless and dumb, they rise up now in multitudes which no man can number, and appeal mutely, but irresistibly, to emancipated Spain never to let kingcraft or priestcraft bandage its eyes again. Thus unexpectedly Torquemada turns up as the conclusive witness against himself on the atrocious system of intolerance with which throughout all time his name will be associated. The discovery and exposure of his helpless prey, featureless, formless, and voiceless though they be, have done more, it is said, to choke down the insidious pleadings of his canonical successors to retain a modified grip over individual conscience, than all the argument and eloquence of theorising politicians. The picturesque details of the exhumations at Quemadera de la Cruz, by M. Echegary, have had more effect upon the popular mind, and upon that of the Cortes, than even the statesmanlike reasoning in favor of toleration by M. Castelar."—*The Examiner*, May 18.

its administration were little better than organized injustice. Life and property were lamentably insecure. The press was under strict censorship until 1835. It was with great difficulty that license could be obtained to publish a book on any subject. And since not more than a fifth of the population can read, the present freedom of thought and utterance signifies less than might otherwise be supposed. Most to be lamented is the general irreligion of the intelligent class. The Inquisition could prevent the profession and propagation of Protestantism. But it was not in the power of despotism, however cruel, to arrest the exercise of thought. No pains and penalties could prevent people from seeing the hollowness of the established religion. And as in France, (when a like demonstration was going forward, with the same suppression of purer forms of Christianity) to abjure the Church was to fall into utter unbelief. The main religious issue to-day, among the educated classes in Spain is not between the Romish and the Protestant faiths, but between Christianity and some form of philosophical or scientific "no-religion." As for the ignorant masses, they worship the images of the Virgin and the Saints, with no higher notion of divinity than is possessed by the average pagan. As much as this is avowed by members of the clerical party, and claimed to be, on the whole, a state of mind that is advantageous to the people.

Thus royalty and priestcraft in Spain went their own way, and such was the end thereof. To such a state had they reduced the kingdom of Ferdinand and Isabella, the colossal empire of Philip the Second. The French Revolution came, a terrible tempest, but yet a purifier of the political atmosphere. Spain felt the effect, though Napoleonism, in its last and worst phase came near hopelessly marring the process, causing her to share the evils of revolution, but threatening, by the reaction it provoked, to deprive her of the compensating benefits.

With the end of the Bonapartist usurpation, the people whose patriotic energy had recovered the national independence, demanded guarantees of civil liberty. The liberal constitution of 1812 was the result. This continued in force only until Ferdinand VII. was firmly seated. He illustrated anew the ingratitude of kings, and the proverbial unteachableness of the Bourbons, by declaring it void. After a time the people appealed to arms, and he again yielded, but by an invasion of the French in 1823,—a restored Bourbon being then King of France,—he was "compelled" again to declare himself absolute. The civil war which arose on his death, in 1832, between the supporters of Queen Isabella and those of Don Carlos (who claimed the

throne by virtue of the Salic law excluding female succession, denying the validity of the act by which that had been set aside in Isabella's favor), after a severe struggle for several years, resulted in victory to the Queen's party. Her necessities had led to an alliance of the Queen Regent,—Isabella was but an infant,—with the liberal party. The Constitution of 1812 was again proclaimed, with some modifications. Under the new regime an impulse was given to political reform. Most of the convents were suppressed, the church property was confiscated, and the church establishment greatly reduced. In 1830 the clerical body numbered 152,305, including 54,600 monks and nuns. In 1861 the total had been reduced to 43,000. The system of public instruction was improved, schools were established, the censorship of the press abolished. The reign of Isabella has been, on the whole, one of progress in freedom and intelligence, an advance made against great obstructions and reverses. Repeatedly has the reactionary party inaugurated a despotism, sometimes in form, by rescinding or mutilating the organic laws, sometimes nullifying the constitution while ostensibly administering it. The priesthood has been a perpetual conspiracy, the Carlist faction always ready to take advantage of what might "turn up," the chiefs of the army holding the substance of power, and every party depending for success on the chances of securing their support. The constitution can scarcely be said to have had a fair chance for more than three or four out of the last thirty years. But against its abrogation certain strong reasons have been always effective. The clerical party have constantly aimed at the revocation of the acts for secularizing the ecclesiastical property. The reader of English history remembers that the Parliament was ready, at the instance of Queen Mary, to pass laws for reconciling the kingdom to the Roman See, and for burning heretics, but would never hear of relaxing their hold on the plunder of the church. The Spanish submission to the demands of Rome was not confined to such profitless service. But the most that was granted was to arrest the sales of church lands. As to undoing what had been done, that was not to be thought of. But the churchly conspirators thought of nothing less, and it was alarm at the prospect of their seriously attempting this, with the support of the Queen and an unscrupulous ministry, which aided to unite all sections of opposition in the movement that sent her majesty beyond the Pyrenees. Another intrenchment of liberty which the royalist and clerical conspirators instinctively attacked, and the people instinctively defended, was the municipal and communal right of self-government. The bane of France is the entire absence of indepen-

dent local administration, — of anything resembling our State, county, district, township organization. Paris is France. The government, in its minutest ramifications, is directed from the capital. Whatever form of government predominates over the whole, — monarchical, republican, imperial, — it is essentially bureaucratic. But Spain has preserved through all vicissitudes, since 1812, the substance of a local administration in the hands of the people. It has thus happened that the people have enjoyed some valuable immunities of civil liberty at the very time when the central administration was wholly in the interest of the court and the Jesuits. But perhaps the strongest advantage in this contest, was in a circumstance intrinsically of the least importance: the burden which the dissoluteness of the Queen threw upon the reactionary party. It is to the honor of the Spanish nation that, whatever by-ends may have been had in view by the military leaders who effected the revolution, one chief reason for their success was the fact that the people were too heartily ashamed of their sovereign to lift a voice or strike a blow in her defence.

✓ We have not left ourselves space to speak of the Revolution at length, and there is less need, because the event is unfolding while we write, and what seems true on the day of writing may be proved false before the day of publication. Two or three general remarks may be ventured, suggested by what has been said, or by well-known incidents of Spanish history.

Whatever may be the judgment of those whose opinion is drawn from materials inaccessible to the public at large, it must be acknowledged that the course of events thus far has been honorable to Spain, and hopeful for the future. ✓ The Queen fled, the leaders of the revolution formed a provisional government, and the power and responsibility of reorganizing the kingdom were committed to the Constituent Cortes. The provisional government committed the error of delaying too long the meeting of the Cortes, and the graver error of attempting to forestall the verdict of the nation by declaring in favor of monarchy. The order for disarming the people and the consequent bloody collisions with the republicans, was a blending of crime and folly, the whole effects of which have not yet been seen. The indications are that these and other proceedings have made the parties so distrustful of each other as to excite reasonable apprehensions respecting the future tranquility of the country. But even with such provocations, all parties have shown a degree of self-control that was hardly to be looked for.

The provisions of the Constitution on which the Cortes have nearly concluded their deliberations, and the tone of deliberation that has

prevailed, alike testify to the temperate views held by all sections of the liberal party. While a sensible man will not judge of the republicans of France by the representations of their malignant enemies, we cannot but rejoice that in Spain no ground has been given for even pretending a fear of communism and of social anarchy. The Constitution defines with admirable clearness and thoroughness the rights of personal liberty and security, and guards the legislative authority and the sovereignty of the people against all danger of misconstruction. Religious liberty is guaranteed. This is done in what seems to Americans an ungracious and reluctant way,¹ and is coupled with a provision for establishing the Roman Catholic church. But it seems to have been designed to secure the substance of liberty with the least shock to the long-rooted prejudices of the nation. In this respect it may be advantageously compared with the original form in which the Toleration Act was passed by the English Parliament.² No one who is even superficially acquainted with the character and history of the Spanish people, can think such precautions superfluous. The history, as we have said, is full of surprises. A remarkable trait of the national character is a certain slowness to kindle into excitement, which seems at first view to be apathy, and is strikingly contrasted with the intensity of passion which follows. This was illustrated in the War of the Succession, 1702-1713. The army of the allies marched to Madrid without serious opposition, and occupied some of the strongest ports in Spain. The people appeared indifferent to the Bourbons until their cause was desperate, and then, on a sudden, rose with such fury and unanimity in their support, as to assure them of success. Napoleon disposed of the kingdom to his brother with scarce a whisper of popular discontent. But the world will not soon forget with what startling effect a volcano of insurrection burst over the whole country. A Spanish statesman may be excused if he looks beyond the quiet

¹ In the following terms:

ART. 20. The nation obliges itself to maintain the worship and the ministers of the Catholic religion.

ART. 21. The public and private exercise of any other worship is guaranteed to all foreigners resident in Spain, without other limitations than the universal rules of morals and of rights.

ART. 22. If any Spaniards profess any other religion than the Catholic, all the dispositions of the foregoing paragraph are applicable to them.

ART. 23. Every Spaniard may found and maintain establishments of instruction, or of education, without previous license, save the inspection of the competent authority for reasons of health or morality.

² As to which see Lord Macaulay's admirable account in the third volume of his *History of England*, chap. xi

acquiescence of the people to-day, and calculates the possibility that they may rise to-morrow. Possibly, too, the voting of a proposition that *if* Spaniards profess another faith they shall be protected,—a contingency which most of them will regard as inconceivable on any extended scale,—will not secure practical toleration if Protestantism should seem likely to gain any considerable body of adherents. The peaceable distribution of many thousand Bibles and tracts, and the undisturbed celebration of Protestant worship in Madrid, are favorable indications that the principles of religious liberty are respected, not only in the Cortes, and by the more enlightened classes, but are sinking into the hearts of the people. There will be a necessity for great prudence on the part of those who shall attempt to propagate a purer faith in the country at large.

These remarks assume that the leaders of the Revolution are honestly seeking to establish a free government. This charitable presumption, unhappily, must be indulged with considerable reserve. It is the misfortune of most continental countries, that they are governed by the army, and by whatever party can command the support of the army. Popular suffrage does not counterbalance the military power. Napoleon rules by the sword, but legitimates his rule by the votes of the peasantry, which he manipulates at pleasure. The assent of the English Tories to household suffrage with the hope of controlling the poorer class of voters by intimidation and corruption *has not yet been proved* to be a mistaken policy. The mass of the Spanish peasantry are as ignorant, certainly, as the French, and are as subject to the priesthood. The best intentions of the most patriotic Spaniards may yet be frustrated by military ambition. This cause of the uncertainty can never be eliminated until time has been given for the elevation of the people in intelligence and public virtue, so as to make their collective might superior to that of any class. [^] If, by the good providence of God, the immediate perils of the situation can be overcome, and a stable constitutional government, monarchical or republican, can be successfully administered for a few years, with practical as well as professed liberty of religious teaching and worship, and if evangelical Christians energetically and wisely improve their opportunity, our best hopes and aspirations for Spain, will be fulfilled.

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ANCIENT BAPTISTERIES.

AMONG the many objects of interest which the ecclesiastical structures of Italy present to the architect, the antiquarian, and the Christian, the edifices erected for the administration of the rite of baptism have not received the attention they deserve. It is the design of the following article merely to name some of these baptisteries, and to state some facts concerning them, ascertained by recent personal observation. It is greatly to be desired that extended surveys and photographs of these interesting works be prepared and made generally accessible.

Distinct buildings, erected as baptisteries, may now be found in at least sixteen cities of Italy, viz: Rome, Ravenna, Florence, Pisa, Parma, Brescia, Arcoli, Cremona, Genoa, Novara, Padua, Verona, Lucca, Pistoja, Siena, Bologna. Of these, some are plain and unpretending edifices, indicative of the style of the age in which they were designed. Others are more elaborately decorated, while a few, such as those at Pisa and at Parma, are magnificent marble structures, of great diameter and height.

These monuments of the practice of immersion in Italy, date back to the fourth century. Previous to this there may have been artificial baptisteries; if so, they were of a temporary character, and gave place to fabrics constructed of more durable materials. The first Chris-

tians would naturally and necessarily select natural baptisteries, such as rivers, lakes, and the sea; and where these were not readily accessible, the fountains and open cisterns abounding in Oriental countries. In the countries where Christianity gained its first converts, great care was taken, and great expense incurred, in all the cities and towns of any size, to secure a copious supply of good water; a fact to which the noble aqueducts still remaining, and the ruins of many others, continue to testify. At the present day, in Rome, Naples, Florence, Genoa, and other places, there are large fountains in the public squares, where water is obtained in abundance by all who will; and, at many of them, there may now be seen, almost every day, women washing soiled garments. Beside these, in the court of every considerable house and public building, there is always found a depression at the centre, into which enters the water from the roofs, flowing over the pavement. This construction was more common in the days of our Saviour than now, as is evident from the uncovered ruins of Pompeii, where may be clearly seen the plan of building among the Romans. In every house, of any pretensions, the outer wall was made for strength; high, thick, and solid, with very few openings for light or air. To obtain these latter, it was necessary and customary to construct the rooms or apartments against the outer wall, leaving an unoccupied space at the middle, of more or less ample dimensions, according to the size of the house. Upon this open space, or court, the various rooms at the outer wall fronted with their windows and doors; the upper apartments having galleries all around the court, and the roof of the house extending over the galleries, as well as over the rooms. These galleries, with their columns, arches, and cornices, afforded large opportunity for architectural embellishment; and, while from the exterior, a house might appear unsightly, even hideous, in the massiveness and roughness of its unembellished walls, a view of the interior, from its court, would fill the beholder with surprise and delight. This is the type to which all Italian and Oriental houses were made, in a greater or less degree, to conform. The court, being open to the skies, received the sunshine and the rain in common with the roof of the house. The rain water from the roof descended to the pavement of the court, and, together with that which fell upon the pavement, found its way to the cistern, or depression, at the centre. This cistern, sometimes, in the better class of houses, contained a fountain, from which water, brought by pipes from some neighboring eminence, was thrown upward, moistening and cooling the atmosphere, nourishing the plants and flowers at the margin of the fountain, and giving health to the occupants of the house. The surplus

water was carried off by a waste pipe. These fountains, or cisterns, are many of them of ample dimensions to serve as baptisteries, and not only is it probable that they were used for this purpose, but it cannot be doubted that these courts served as a type of the great baptisteries afterwards erected, and some of which, as they now appear, we shall more particularly describe.

In Rome, is a building known as "*S. Giovanni in Fonte*," and commonly called the "Baptistry of Constantine." It is located within a few yards of the great church of St. John Lateran, once the city Cathedral. It is built of brick, is octagonal in form, and about 75 feet in diameter. It was erected by Constantine, and is decorated with marbles, the remains of buildings still more ancient. The two columns at the eastern entrance, and the eight principal columns of the interior are of porphyry. These latter eight, said to have been the gift of Constantine, are so disposed in plan as to form an octagon having its sides parallel with those of the building. The columns are not all alike, some having capitals of the Ionic order, and others of the Composite order. They were not made for this building, but were doubtless taken from the ruins of some heathen temple. These columns carry an entablature by which they are connected, and upon which stands another series of eight columns, smaller than the former. Upon these latter rests the octagonal drum of the lantern or cupola. The whole interior has a very antique appearance. The mosaics, on a gold ground, with which the ceiling of one of the two small chapels connected with the building, is decorated, are of the fifth century, and are among the most ancient mosaics of Rome. The usual restorations and repairs have been effected upon the building, from time to time, and some additions and decorations have been made by various pontiffs; but the walls and general arrangements are doubtless substantially the same as at first constructed. In connection with the work of restoration, the names of Sixtus III, Hilary, Anastasius IV, Urban VIII, and Innocent X, are mentioned. These last two restored it as it now is. The building, as a whole, has a very plain and ordinary appearance, and, except for its antiquity, and historical associations, would awaken but little interest. The object for which the building was erected, attracts at once the attention of the visitor. At the centre, within the area bounded by the eight columns, there is a depression in the pavement of the floor. This depression, or well, is octagonal in plan, with sides equi-distant from and parallel with the sides of the building, and guarded with a heavy railing and balusters of marble. The railings at the sides of this well, three feet seven inches high, measure eleven feet in length

each, or, together, eighty-eight feet, the well being about twenty-eight feet diameter. The well is paved with marble, and its depth is twenty-two inches below the pavement of the building, or thirty-two inches below the marble coping upon which the railing stands. That the well was deeper originally, is shown by the marble panelling of the sides, the lower rail or band of which, is now almost entirely buried. It was originally, no doubt, about three and a half feet deep.

At the centre of the well stands an urn of green basalt, of sufficient size to immerse a child in. This urn is elevated upon a pedestal surrounded by steps. Access to it is obtained by first descending into the well, through a gate in the marble railing, down the marble steps, and thence across the pavement of the well, to the steps surrounding the pedestal upon which the urn stands. This is so inconvenient and unnatural a contrivance, as to carry conviction to any candid mind that the urn was not a part of the original plan. It has been added since. The large quantity of water required to fill the well being out of all proportion to the size of the infants brought there for baptism, and the desire of the officiating priests for an arrangement which would secure the performance of the rite without necessarily wetting his own garments, were the reasons for introducing the urn. Before the urn was placed there, the ordinance was administered to adults in the well or baptistery in presence of the assembled congregation standing within the building, and the candidates for baptism used the two small rooms, now called chapels, for changing their garments. Here is a building, planned and constructed for the express purpose of administering the rite by immersion, built in the early part of the fourth century. This building is a history in brick and stone. Constructed originally for immersion,—the immersion of adults,—as is shown by its antique baptistery; the font of green basalt placed upon the floor of that baptistery, testifies, in enduring marble, to the fact that the baptism of infants has supplanted the baptism of adults. And the small bowl-sized fonts now used, not in baptisteries, but in churches, are so many more monuments of another fact, that sprinkling has supplanted immersion.

The baptistery of the city of Ravenna, on the easterly shore of Italy, is of equal antiquity with that of Rome. It was erected in the fourth century, and was restored, in 451, by Archbishop Neo. Like that of Rome, it is octangular in form, and the large well at the centre, built of slabs of white marble and porphyry, with an ambo or recess for the officiating priest, testifies to the ancient practice of immersion.

The baptistery of Florence is an octagonal structure, larger and

finer than that of Rome. It is 100 feet diameter, and is supposed to date from the sixth century. It was a complete building in 725. Its floor is paved with marble, and one may walk freely across it without obstruction; there is no sunken baptistery with its guard railing around it, as at Rome; no, all is clear and plain now. But in the pavement there is seen the coping of the original baptistery that once occupied the centre of the floor. The coping forms an octagon, of about the same diameter as that at Rome, and bears an inscription which attests the fact of the former existence and size of the sunken well, and that in its place a font has been substituted. But the supplanting was not done as at Rome. Here the change was more thorough and complete, and suited more perfectly to the new practice of the rite. The depression was filled up, and floored over with marble tiling, to compare with the floor of the building, preserving only the coping to mark the location, the form, and the size of the original baptistery. The Romanists, having no need to obliterate the evidences that immersion was the original mode, carefully made this inscription, and to this day, speak freely of immersion as the original practice. Their apology for the change in mode, is the authority of the Church, an authority, in their minds, equal to that of the Bible.

At Brescia, in the north of Italy, a circular building of the ninth century is called the "Old Cathedral," but from its form, externally and internally, and the fact that the centre part of the floor, that included within the circular colonnade, is depressed below the other portion, the indications are that it was originally not the Cathedral but the *Baptistery*.

At Bologna, also, the church of St. Stephanus, erected in the eighth century, is supposed to have been the baptistery. It is now used as a chapel, as is the case with the baptistery of Florence, and many others. Many of the baptisteries of Italy now have, and, probably, they all had, baptismal *fonts* of ample dimensions for the immersion of children. Among those that now have them may be mentioned the baptisteries of Cremona, Parma, Verona, Pistoja, Amalfi, Ravenna, and Pisa. The fonts in these are each hewn from one immense block of marble, usually from 8 to 12 feet diameter. The one at Verona is 31 feet circumference, from one piece of Veronese marble. That of Parma is of yellowish red marble, in one piece, very large and octagonal in plan, but it is not now used; a small font at one side being found quite sufficient for all present needs. In nearly all the cities of Italy, a smaller font, holding a few quarts of water, is now employed. These, generally, are not located in the baptisteries, but

in the cathedrals, the baptisteries being turned from their original purpose, and now used as chapels.

Among the late baptisteries, one of the most splendid is that at Parma, 1186-1281, constructed entirely of red and gray Veronese marble. The baptistery of Pisa, commenced in 1152, is a circular building, 116 feet diameter outside, 99 feet within, built of solid marble, its walls being $8\frac{1}{2}$ feet thick. The centre is sunk three steps below the surrounding pavement, from which the spectators witnessed the performance of the rite. The building is lofty, and is a fine specimen of Italian Gothic architecture.

Knight, in his *Ecclesiastical Architecture of Italy*, says: "In the early ages baptisteries were always separate buildings, and always either in a circular or octagonal form. The baptism of adults only took place at the three great festivals of Easter, Pentecost, and Epiphany, and, in consequence of the restriction, very large numbers of persons were baptized at the same time. Distinct and spacious baptisteries were, in consequence, erected, and, as plenary immersion was insisted upon, a circular bath was provided in the centre of the baptistery, into which the neophytes descended by steps. The inconvenience of increasing multitudes, as well as the progress of refinement, gradually led to a change of system. Plenary immersion was no longer insisted upon. The ceremony was transferred to the church, and the baptisteries were gradually deserted. Adult baptism now became the exception, and infant baptism the rule."

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EXEGETICAL STUDIES.

Style of Mark xvi. 9-20, as bearing upon the question of genuineness.

PROBABLY few of the critics who have condemned this passage, or pronounced it doubtful, would have done so, but for the supposed proof that its *style* is broadly different from that of Mark. This difference is asserted, in strong terms, by several of the ablest recent writers. Meyer says that "with v. 9 we suddenly come upon an excerpting process totally different from the previous mode of narration, while the passage in general, contains no peculiarities of Mark (no *εὐθὺς*, no *πάλιν*, etc.,—but the baldness and lack of clearness which mark a compiler), and in single expressions is altogether contrary to Mark's manner." Fritzsche had already stated it in much the same way, declaring that the passage consists of obscure, and, in part, unsuitable compends of passages from the other gospels, and that the "*dicendi genus*" is "*concisum, abruptum et aliquot verbis et structuris a Marci more sejunctum*." He frequently refers to an earlier writer, Schulthess, who pointed out in the passage a much larger number of peculiarities of diction than Fritz can acknowledge as real. Alford says, "The internal evidence, which is discussed in the notes, will be found to preponderate *vastly against the authorship of Mark*;" and this internal evidence consists almost entirely of supposed peculiarities of diction.

Many recent writers take it for granted that all this is true, very naturally supposing that the able scholars just mentioned, some of them giants of erudition, could not, upon such a point, be mistaken, and finding their lists of words, upon a cursory reading, very striking and convincing. Norton declares (Genuineness of the Gospels), that "there is a dif-

ference so great between the use of language in this passage, and its use in the undisputed portion of Mark's gospel, as to furnish strong reason for believing the passage not genuine." Wordsworth, who is, in general, ultra-conservative, says, "There is, however, internal evidence which would seem to indicate that this portion is *not* from the pen of *St. Mark* himself. Many expressions occur in this section which are not found in any portion of *St. Mark*," etc. Ellicott offers the conjecture that the passage may have been written by Mark "at a later period, when verbal peculiarities might have altered." (*Life of Christ*, Lect. I). Westcott (*Int. to Gospels*) looks upon the verses as canonical, but says without reserve that "they cannot be regarded as part of the original narrative of *St. Mark*." Alexander, and Scrivener (*Int. to Criticism*) merely exclaim against the folly of building any argument upon slight peculiarities of style, asserting that like minute variations may be found in any writer whatsoever. But there *is* something in style. How far we may rely on supposed resemblances or differences is often a very difficult question; but it will not do to "pooh-pooh" the whole matter, to stigmatize the immense labor of modern German scholars in this direction as all folly, because there have been exaggerations and errors.

Meantime no one, so far as I know, has carefully examined the alleged peculiarities of this passage, to see whether they be real; the statements having been either hooted at as trifling, or accepted as correct. Such an examination is here proposed. It will, however, be confined to the *diction* of the passage. The question of its conformity to Mark's *general style of narration* is one of which every well-qualified reader will judge for himself, without requiring any special research. It is easy to see how, in concluding his very brief treatise, Mark should have thought proper to touch various points, without entering into much of the minute and vivid detail which is often seen in his writing. This gospel begins in much the same way, as will be manifest upon comparing i. 1-22 with the corresponding passages in Matthew and Luke. It would be quite as proper to call this opening passage the work of a "compiler." And Ellicott has noticed (see below), that there are not wanting in the closing verses several specimens of descriptive detail.

But restricting ourselves to the diction, about which so much has been asserted, let us put together, from the various sources above named, all the words and phrases in which it has been claimed that the passage differs from the remainder of this gospel—numbering them for convenience: (1.) *No εὐθὺς*, *no πάλιν*, &c. (2.) *Προεύομαι* is used here three times, (vs. 10, 12, 15), and nowhere else in Mark. (3.) *Θεάομαι* used twice (vs. 11, 14), and in no other place of Mark. (4.) *Ἐξείνους* used twice (vs. 10, 11), *without emphasis*, whereas elsewhere in Mark, (iv. 11; vii. 15, 20; xii. 4-7; xiv. 21), it *has* emphasis; thus it is emphatic in v. 13 (twice), 20 of this passage. (5.) *Τοῖς μετ' αὐτοῦ γενομένοις* (v. 10) is foreign to this gospel, while *τοῖς μαθηταῖς αὐτοῦ*, Mark's common expression, does not occur in this passage. (6.) *Ἀπιστέω* used twice (vs. 11, 16,) and nowhere else in Mark. (7.) *Ὁ κύριος* applied to Christ, twice (vs. 19, 20), and nowhere else in Mark. (8.) *Μετὰ ταῦτα* (vs. 12,) not found in Mark, "though many

opportunities occurred for using it." (9.) *Παρακολουθέω* (vs. 17), and *ἐπακολουθέω* (v. 20,) are both foreign to the diction of Mark, often as he uses the simple verb. (10.) "*Ἐτερος, ὅσπερον, συνεργέω, βεβαιόω* used here, and nowhere else in Mark. So with the phrase, *πρώτη σαββάτου* (v. 9). This list is believed to include all that have been mentioned by any of the critics named; except, perhaps, one or two words quite unworthy of notice. It certainly seems to present a formidable array of peculiarities.

Now let us examine them.

(1.) *Εὐθέως* is well known to be a favorite expression with Mark, occurring (if we include the other form *εὐθύς*,) more than forty times, and one may think strange that it is not found in these twelve verses. But looking back from this passage, we pass over fifty-four verses before we find it (xv. 1). Moreover, between xi. 8, and xiv. 43, being one hundred and fifty-three verses, and nearly one-fourth of the gospel, this favorite word does not occur. It is evident that the argument from *εὐθέως* disappears, and leaves only the conviction that, on this point at least, Meyer made no careful examination. The other word, *πάλιν*, is used by Mark twenty-nine times, and not used here. But we go back forty-three verses (to xv. 13,) before finding it; nor does it occur in ch. i., ch. vi., or between ch. xii. 5 and xiv. 39.

(2.) The case of *πορεύομαι* is the most striking in the collection, and mentioned by all the critics. Let one turn to his Bruder, and he will, at a glance, be greatly impressed. Here is a long list of passages containing the word in each of the other gospels (Matthew twenty-nine times, Luke fifty, John sixteen, Acts thirty-eight), and in Mark not one reference, except to vs. 10, 12, 15 of this suspected passage. It is hardly possible that any argument of the kind should be more striking and satisfactory than this appears to be. But we ought to do a little more, in such cases, than glance at a concordance, What has Mark said in passages parallel to those in which Matthew or Luke uses this word? The reader may be willing to examine a list. (Text of Tregelles.)

Matthew xii. 1, Mark ii. 23, *διαπορεύεσθαι*, Luke vi. 1, *διαπορεύεσθαι*.

Matthew xxi. 2, Mark xi. 2, *ὁπάγετε* . . . *εἰσπορεύμενοι*, Luke xix. 30, same as Mark.

Matthew xxi. 6, Mark xi. 4, *ἀπῆλθον*, Luke xix. 32, *ἀπελθόντες*.

Matthew xxiv. 1, *ἐξέλθων* . . . *ἐπορεύετο*, Mark xiii. 1, *ἐκπορευομένου*.

Matthew xxvi. 14, Mark xiv. 10, *ἀπῆλθεν*, Luke xxii. 4, *ἀπελθών*.

Matthew xxviii. 19, Mark xvi. 15, same as Matthew; the two forms of the Commission.

Luke iv. 42, *ἐξελθὼν ἐπορεύθη*, Mark i. 35 (see connection), *ἀναστὰς ἐξῆλθεν καὶ ἀπῆλθεν*.

Luke v. 24, Mark ii. 11, *ὕπαγε*, Matthew ix. 6, *ὕπαγε*.

Luke viii. 14, Mark iv. 19, *εἰσπορευόμεναι*, connection different, making the compound appropriate.

Luke viii. 48, Mark v. 34, *ὕπαγε*.

Luke ix. 12, Mark vi. 36, *ἀπελθόντες*, Matthew xiv. 15 *ἀπελθόντες*.

Luke ix. 13, Mark vi. 37, *ἀπελθόντες*.

Luke xxii. 8, Mark xiv. 12, *ἀπελθόντες*.

Luke xxii. 22, Mark xiv. 21 *πάγει*, Matthew xxvi. 24 *πάγει*.

Luke xxii. 39, *ἐξελθὼν ἐπορεύθη*, Mark xiv. 26, *ἐξῆλθον*, Matthew xxvi. 30, *ἐξῆλθον*.

Luke xxiv. 13, Mark xvi. 12, same as Luke.

Mark v. 40, *εἰσπορεύεται*, Matthew ix. 25 *εἰσελθὼν*.

Mark x. 1, *συμπορεύονται πρὸς αὐτόν*, Matthew xix. 2, *ἡκολούθησαν*.

Mark x. 35, *προσπορεύονται*, Matthew xx. 20, *προσῆλθεν*.

This statement shows that Mark is not averse to the word *πορεύομαι*. Where he departs from Matthew or Luke, and uses some other equivalent word, we frequently find the other of the two agreeing with him. Nor does he fail to employ this verb itself in numerous instances, though in a compound form, using it even in several cases where the *parallels* do not. He is particularly fond of compounds, not only of this, but of other verbs. Thus we find *εἰσπορεύομαι* in Matthew once, Mark eight times, Luke four; *ἐκπορεύομαι* in Matthew six, Mark eleven, Luke three, John two times. Similarly the simple *ἐρωτάω* occurs, Matthew four, Mark three, Luke fourteen, John twenty-nine; but *ἐπερωτάω*, Matthew eight, Mark twenty-five, Luke nineteen, John three; and it must be remembered that the gospel of Mark is but little more than half as long as that of Luke. This fondness for compound verbs, for saying not simply "go," but "go in," "go out," "go by," etc., accords precisely with Mark's well-known habit of giving minute details; and Luke, who resembles Mark in this respect, approaches nearest to him, it will be observed, in the frequent use of the compounds named. There would seem to remain, on this point, then, only the inquiry why Mark should have three times in this passage used the simple verb, while elsewhere he has always some compound of it. We need not lay any great stress on the fact that in Mark ix. 30, Lachmann and Tregelles give the simple *ἐπορεύοντο*, for the evidence is so divided as to leave the reading uncertain. But observe. In xvi. 10, it is *πορευθεῖσα ἀπήγγειλεν*, and a preposition with the participle must have been either *ἐκ* or *ἀπὸ*. The former would be manifestly unsuitable to the connection; the latter would suit very well (comp. v. 13 *ἀπελθόντες ἀπήγγειλαν*), but *ἀποπορεύομαι* is a very rare word, not found in the New Testament or the Sept. In v. 12 *πορευομένοις εἰς ἀγρόν*, the point is that he appeared to them while *going* into the country; if the participle were compounded with *ἐκ* or *εἰς*, stress would be laid on the fact that they were *going out* of the city, or *going into* the country, and neither would be appropriate. Similarly in v. 15, "*Go into* all the world," with stress on the "into," would be quite out of place; "go forth into all the world," would fit, but is less terse and vigorous than the simple "go." If these reasons for preferring the uncompounded verb in the three verses before us appear to any person over-refined or uncertain, let him take the three cases in which Mark employs the simple *ἐρωτάω*, viz., iv. 10; vii. 26; viii. 5 (correct Bruder), and find any better reasons there.

Is it too much to say that in their concordance work over this word *πορεύομαι*, eminent scholars have been hasty, and that patient examination deprives the argument of all available force?

(3.) The peculiar sense of *θεάομαι* is quite appropriate in v. 11, and in

v. 14 the same word as before would be purposely employed. *θεάομαι* is used but four times by Matthew, three times by Luke, seven times by John. And yet Meyer can say, that "when we consider the frequent occurrence of the word elsewhere," its failure to occur in Mark outside of this passage, belongs to the signs of a foreign hand. It occurs in Mark oftener (in proportion to length), than in Luke, and about as often as in Matthew.

(4.) Here as also does *ἐκείνος* have something of emphasis, expressing a certain contrast. Our Lord appeared to Mary; *she* (for her part,) went and told the disciples (v. 10), *they*, when they heard, disbelieved, (v. 14). Nothing more than such a contrast is expressed by the word in some of the other passages, nothing more in v. 13, where Fritzsche says there is not emphasis, while Meyer says there is. The amount of the matter is, that *ἐκείνος*, which in Mark has usually some emphasis, is three times in this passage emphatic, and twice not so much so.

(5.) Mark frequently says "his disciples;" here, he has 'to those who had been with him,' an expression "foreign to this gospel." We may add, I believe, "and to the other gospels." But which part of it is foreign? Not the phrase *οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ*, applied to the disciples, for that is found in v. 40 (comp. i. 36; ii. 25), as also in a few passages of Matthew and Luke. The only thing is the conjunction of *γενομένοι*, with this phrase. Now that is a thing not at all remarkable in itself, and is here necessary. It would not have been appropriate to speak of them on that morning as "those with him," but as "those who had been with him," while this last expression would not have been appropriate with reference to any period preceding his death. As to the complaint that the phrase "his disciples," "Mark's common expression," does not occur in these twelve verses, it suffices to notice that it is not found in the fifty-nine verses from iii. 9 to iv. 34, nor in several other quite long portions of this gospel.

(6.) *Ἀνιστάω* (v. 11, 16), is not elsewhere used in Mark, and Fritzsche himself says "Mark had not before had any occasion to use it." The verb is rare; occurring nowhere else in the gospels except in Luke xxiv. 11, 41, (likewise after the resurrection), and the corresponding noun (see below) is used oftener by Mark than by the other gospels.

(7.) It is precisely after the resurrection of Christ that it would be most natural to apply to him this high name, "the Lord." In John also we find the word in this sense only two or three times before the resurrection, and seven or eight times after the resurrection, in two chapters. Matthew also uses it only after the resurrection (Matthew xxviii. 6), yet the reading is there uncertain. Luke has the expression some fourteen times. It is, however, difficult to determine in a good many cases (as Mark xi. 3), in what precise sense *κύριος* is used. These facts reduce the argument from this word to almost nothing.

(8.) Alford and Meyer do not specify any of the "many opportunities" in Mark's gospel for using *μετὰ ταῦτα* (v. 12). Matthew does not use it. Luke has it five times, only one of them parallel to Mark (ii. 13), and here Mark has a reason for saying *πάλιν*, as is seen by comparing ii. 1. John has the phrase eight times. There is thus no evidence that Mark

was averse to this expression; he simply had no need for it elsewhere. The phrase is simple and not at all remarkable in itself, but is not often used. Luke, who has it five times in his gospel, has it only twice in Acts; and Mark, in a writing little more than half as long as Luke or Acts, uses it only once. Would any one argue that Luke was not the author of Acts, because the writer of Acts has employed this phrase only twice, "often as he *could* have used it" (Meyer's phrase here)?

(9.) Tregelles reads in v. 17 the simple verb, ἀκολουθήσει, but on grounds that seem hardly sufficient. Of the two compounds, παρακ. and επακ., the latter is found nowhere else in the gospels, the former only in Luke i. 8, with a different meaning. Fritzsche, though he regards the passage we are examining as spurious, will not admit that any argument against it can be drawn from the use of these two words, for, he says, Mark "has employed many peculiar words." We have seen that Mark is fond of compounds, and it was natural that he should here wish to express strongly the fact that "signs" were to follow, and did follow, those who believed and proclaimed the gospel.

(10.) It is complained that we have here (v. 9), πρώτη σαββάτου, while just above (v. 2), is μὴ τῶν σαββάτων, which last is also the phrase employed by the other evangelists. Fritzsche already has remarked that πρώτη is in itself quite as natural an expression as μὴ. The latter alone is found elsewhere in the gospels, but so rarely (Matthew xxviii. 1; Mark xvi. 2; Luke xxiv. 1; John xx. 1, 19; and Acts xx. 7), as certainly to establish no rule. Thus the argument from this phrase becomes exceedingly frail. The remaining words are not adduced by Fritzsche, Meyer or Alford, the first of them being mentioned by Fritzsche only to deny that any argument can be derived from it. Wordsworth includes them in his list, but it is hardly worth while to spend time on them. Ἐτερος, we are told, is used in v. 12, and nowhere else in Mark. Well, it is used in John xix. 37, and nowhere else in John. Ἰστέρον, in v. 14, and nowhere else in Mark, occurs only once in Luke, and only once in John. The other two words are not found elsewhere in any of the gospels. They are words not likely to be often wanted, but are in no wise characteristic or remarkable.

Now it will not do to say that while no one of these peculiarities would itself prove the style to be foreign to Mark, the whole of them combined will do so. It is very true that the multiplication of littles may amount to much; but not so the multiplication of nothings. And how many of the expressions which are cited, appear, in the light of our examination, to retain the slightest real force as proving difference of authorship? Is it not true that most of them, and those the most important, are reduced to absolutely nothing, while the remainder possess scarcely any appreciable significance?

Still, it may be said, leaving out of view all these pains-taking comparisons and refined distinctions, the mere fact that we have here so large a number of words and phrases nowhere else used by Mark, seems hard to set aside. Dean Alford, in his concluding remarks, dwells on the consideration. He says, "Internal evidence is, I think, very weighty

against Mark's being the author. No less than seventeen words and expressions occur in it, (and some of them several times,) which are never elsewhere used by Mark, whose adherence to his own peculiar phrases is remarkable." This can hardly fail to make its impression—seventeen such cases within twelve verses. It occurred to me to examine the twelve just preceding verses, (xv. 44 to xvi. 8,) and by a curious coincidence, the words and expressions not elsewhere employed by Mark, footed up precisely the same number, seventeen. Those noticed are the following (text of Tregelles):

Verse 44, *τέθνηκεν* (elsewhere *ἀποθνήσκει*.)

Verse 45, *γινὼς ἀπὸ*, a construction found nowhere else in the New Testament.

Also, *ἐδωρήσατο* and *πτόμα*.

Verse 46, *ἐνείλησεν, λελατομημένον, πέτρας, προσεκύλισεν*.

Verse 1, *διαγενομένου, and ἀρώματα*.

Verse 2, *μὴ τῶν σαββατων*.

Verse 3, *ἀποκυλίσαι*.

Verse 4, *ἀνακυλίσται*. Also, *σφόδρα*, (Mark's word is *λίαν*).

Verse 5, *ἐν τοῖς δεξιotois* is a construction not found in Mark, or the other gospels, though the word *δεξιός* occurs frequently.

Verse 8, *εἶχεν*, in this peculiar sense, not elsewhere in New Testament, *τρόμος*.

This list is perhaps not complete, for it was prepared in a few hours—about as much time, it may be said, without disrespect, as Fritzsche and Meyer appear to have given to their collections of examples from the other passage. It is not proposed to discuss the list, though some of the instances are curious. It is not claimed that they are all important, but that they are all real. And as regards the single question of the number of peculiarities, they certainly form quite an offset to the number upon which Dean Alford has laid stress.

There is still another direction in which the discussion might be carried. Are there not in the disputed passage (xvi. 9-20,) noteworthy instances of *resemblance* to Mark's style elsewhere? Bishop Ellicott alludes to this point, remarking, that "we may certainly plead the circumstantial tone of v. 10, (*πενθῦσιν καὶ κλαίουσιν*), of v. 12 (*ἐν ἑτέρα μορφῇ, πρηνενομένοις εἰς ἀγρόν*), the specifications of v. 17 *seq.*, and the conclusion of v. 19." These refer to style of narration. The following examples pertain to diction. They are not presented as possessing any great importance, but as quite equal to most of those which have been urged *against* the passage.

Verse 9, *πρωτῖ*. Favorite word with Mark. (Matthew two, Mark five, Luke none, John two.)

Verse 12, 14, *ἐφανερώθη*, a word not used by Matthew or Luke, though frequently by John, and it would have been much insisted on as a peculiarity of this passage, had it not happened that Mark uses it in iv. 22, also.

Verse 14, *ἀπιστία* is used in two other passages of Mark, once in Matthew, not in the other gospels.

Verse 15, *κρίσει* is used twice besides by Mark, and in no other gospel.

Verse 16, *κατακρίνω*, instead of *κρίνω* is Mark's word (comp. x. 33; xvi. 64). The simple verb is found Matthew four, Mark none, Luke five, John nineteen; the compound, Matthew four, Mark three, Luke two, John two.

Verse 17, *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου* has a parallel in ix. 38, and Luke x. 17 while Matthew employs a different construction (vii. 22.).

Verse 18, *ἀρρώστους* is found in two other passages of Mark, once in Matthew, once in I Corinthians.

This list might, no doubt, be enlarged.

The reader will now judge whether I have shown that the favorite argument against the genuineness of this passage, drawn from its style, is a failure. To me there is no doubt of it.

Much may be learned, in many ways, from observing and comparing the style of the sacred writers. It is a department of study which must not be sneered at, which ought not to be overlooked. But the present discussion will have shown how easily scholars may deceive themselves in such investigations. Judgments of style, when formed in a general way, can, of course, be accepted as only a moderately probable evidence; and to make them very convincing, we must have more of an author's writing than a little tract of thirty or forty pages. If the judgment is to descend to particulars, these particulars must be examined with the sharpest scrutiny, and estimated with the utmost caution. Even then, the result will be only more or less probable; and without such scrutiny and caution, it may be utterly misleading. Style is like physiognomy and phrenology; from each of the three we almost instinctively draw conclusions, which will often be correct, but are always uncertain, and when we attempt to be very minute and precise, are in the highest degree unsafe.

JOHN A. BROADUS.

GREENVILLE, S. C.

"I will have mercy, and not sacrifice." Matthew ix. 13; xii. 7.

On two occasions our Lord quoted from Hosea vi. 6, this declaration of God to Israel. The first is when condemned by the Pharisees for eating with publicans and sinners. He vindicates himself by the general principle, that the sick, not the whole, need a physician, and adds, "But go ye and learn what that meaneth! 'I will have mercy and not sacrifice;' for I am not come to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance." Afterwards when his disciples are charged with breaking the Sabbath, by plucking and eating grain as they pass through the cornfields, he justifies them by various arguments, and, in conclusion, declares that if their accusers had understood the meaning of "I will have mercy, and not sacrifice," they would not have condemned the guiltless.

Commentators, with great unanimity, consider mercy here to mean kindness shown by man to his fellow. Cowles says: "Mercy here rep-

resents the whole circle of moral duties towards man." Alexander: "The superior importance of benevolent affections to mere ritual observances, however binding." Barnes: "I am more pleased with acts of benevolence and kindness, than with a mere external compliance with the duties of religion." Webster and Wilkinson: "ἔλεος and θυσία are adduced as the highest of their class; the former among moral, the latter among positive precepts." Calvin: "Under mercy, the prophet embraces all the kindness which we owe to our brother." Lange: "God desires much more particularly the mercy of pious love to men, than the sacredness of pious worship."

Notwithstanding these high authorities, it may be questioned whether this exposition meets the necessities of the case. In Matthew ix. our Lord's defence seems to be not the general duty of kindness, but somehow to hinge upon his character as a physician, and upon the purpose of his coming. In Matthew xii. he begs no indulgent construction of the actions of erring disciples; he boldly accuses the Pharisees of condemning the *guiltless*. Not charity, but justice he asks, and arraigns the objectors themselves as the criminals.

The ground which our Lord takes is far higher than that furnished by the current interpretation. If we carefully examine the Hebrew words quoted, the connection in which they originally occur, and the argument of Christ, we shall see where God declares, "I desire mercy, and not sacrifice," he means to say, the end which I have in view in the ceremonial law is not the oblations which are laid on the altar, but the salvation of sinners; not what you bring, but what I can bestow; not what man can do for God, but what God will do for man; and that our Savior's rebuke of the Jews, is, that they entirely missed the purpose and meaning of the Levitical ritual, and that only by such a great, grievous misconception, could they have condemned him for doing exactly what God desired.

The chapter in Hosea from which our sentence is taken, opens with a call to repentance founded on the character of God. The most loving assurances of mercy are given. The people had been torn by lion-like judgments. With exquisite beauty and tenderness, God puts into their mouths these words: "Come and let us return unto the Lord; for he hath torn and he will heal us; he hath smitten and he will bind us up. After two days will he revive us; in the third day he will raise us up, and we shall live in his sight. Then shall we know if we follow on to know the Lord, (or rather, let us know, let us follow on to know the Lord), and he shall come unto us as the rain, as the latter and former rain on the earth. Oh, Ephraim, what shall I do unto thee? Oh, Judah, what shall I do unto thee? for your goodness is as a morning cloud, and as the early dew it goeth away. Therefore have I hewed them by the prophets; I have slain them by the words of my mouth; and thy judgments are as the light that goeth forth. For I desired mercy, and not sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings." The end of all of his dealings, the object aimed at in his messages and his judgments, were to show them mercy, and teach them his true character.

They misjudged his nature and mistook his motive, their thoughts went no farther than the offering, his heart was set on forgiving them.

The Hebrew words *אֶתְּחַנּוּן* here translated "I desired mercy," are found in Micah vii. 18, *בִּיחָנֵּן אֶתְּחַנּוּן הוּא*, where they are rendered "He delighteth in mercy." To show *whose* mercy is here meant, that it is not man's kindness to man, but God's pardoning grace, it is only necessary to quote the whole verse: "Who is a God like unto thee, that pardoneth iniquity, and passeth by the transgression of the remnant of his heritage? He retaineth not his anger forever, because *he delighteth in mercy.*"

It is God's mercy to man, then, which is put in contrast with sacrifice; and this is declared to be the great object of all Jehovah's appointments. And this misunderstanding of God's end and aim, of God's "desire," of which so great complaint is made in both the Old and New Testaments, this grievous misjudgment of God, the fertile source of so much evil, is the great sin of man in all ages. He looks only at what God requires, and supposes that this is the one object of value in God's eyes; he does not see that God's heart is fixed on the bestowment of great blessings on man, and finds its highest delight, not in receiving, but in imparting.

"Jesus saith unto him, If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee? Follow thou me. Then went this saying abroad among the brethren, that that disciple should not die: yet Jesus said not unto him, He shall not die; but, If I will that he tarry till I come what is that to thee?"—JOHN xxi. 22, 23.

The words in which our Lord rebukes Peter's untimely inquisitiveness, in regard to the time and manner of the death of his fellow disciple John, and the comments of that disciple upon these words, present several interesting points for our consideration. We pass by, as too obvious to need anything more than this allusion, the important practical lesson which they teach, that our business is, not to tell the fortunes, or pry into the affairs, of others, but to mind our own path, and see that we follow Christ ourselves. How natural it was that the expression, "if I will that he tarry till I come," should have given rise to the common reports, among the brethren, that that disciple should not die, but should survive till the Lord came to judgment. With the expectations which many of them evidently cherished, and which some of the Lord's own words seemed to them to justify, that his coming would not be delayed many years, such an interpretation of this expression would be the first which would be likely to occur to their minds. It is very interesting and instructive to notice how John himself treats this declaration of the Lord. It seems most probable, that he did not himself fully understand its import. If he did, he did not feel called upon,—we may rather say, he did not feel at liberty,—to explain the dark saying. But he knew as much as this: that the popular inference was unauthorized; and he was unwilling that it should have even the seeming sanction of his silent acquiescence. What does he do in these circumstances? He reminds those who had drawn too hasty an inference from the obscure expression, that Jesus did not say that the disciple referred to should not *die*, and

tells them again exactly what Jesus *did* say. He appeals from the uninspired commentary to the inspired text, a very good example for all biblical scholars. He repeats, without note or comment, the saying of Jesus, word for word, and syllable for syllable. What a beautiful combination of sound logic, cautious prudence, punctilious exactness, and profound reverence for the words of the Faithful and True Witness! What an admirable lesson to us, in all these respects.¹

But may we not hope to understand the meaning of this declaration of Jesus, even though John himself probably did not? A prediction that is very dark when uttered, may be very plain after its fulfilment. With the light which is shed upon this saying by subsequent events, compared with other expressions of the Lord, in regard to his coming, we may reach a satisfactory understanding of what was at first so generally misunderstood. It is *possible*, indeed, that Jesus did not intend to give any intimation as to the *actual* destiny of John; but only to rebuke Peter's impertinent curiosity, in strong terms; as if he had said, "I have a perfect right, if I choose, not only to preserve him from that martyrdom which I have just foretold as appointed for thee, but also to exempt him altogether from the common fate of death, and keep him alive until my final advent." If that was his meaning, the common report was correct in interpreting the expression, "tarry till I come," and erred only in leaving out the "if," in disregarding the hypothetical character of the expression. But it seems more probable, that his words do contain some reference to the actual destiny of the beloved disciple. If so, to what event does he refer in the phrase, "till I come"? It cannot be any *very near* event; for the form of expression, "if I will that he tarry till I come," implies a longer continuance on earth than fell to the lot of Peter, at least, if not of most of the other apostles. Nor need we suppose it to be an event beyond the extreme natural limit of human life. We are not justified in supposing any *miraculous* extension of the life of John. Within these limits, we know of but one important event, to which the Lord's words can be reasonably referred; and that event is, the destruction of Jerusalem. It occurred about thirty-seven years after these words were spoken; and after the martyrdom of Peter, though probably not more than three years after. We give no credit to the current tradition, which did not originate, probably, till about the time of the Emperor Constantine, that all the apostles, except John, died by martyrdom. That Judas died by his own hand, and James by the sword of Herod, we know from inspired testimony. That Peter and Paul suffered martyrdom, before the destruction of Jerusalem, there is good reason to believe. That some of the other apostles died before that event, either by martyrdom or by a natural death, is not improbable. But we need not embarrass the case by bringing in the whole apostolical company. The comparison is simply between the destinies of Peter and

¹ The Bible Union version is unfortunate in this passage. Instead of adhering to John's scrupulously exact citation of Jesus' words, it changes the most important word in the sentence, using the word "remain" in the first instance, and the word "tarry" in the repetition, where the Greek does not vary a letter.

John. No matter how many other apostles may have lived till the destruction of Jerusalem, if it be only admitted that John did, and Peter, did not.

But is the destruction of Jerusalem ever spoken of as the coming of the Lord? We think it is, in more than one place, by our Lord himself. We mention, as the least doubtful instances, only Matthew x. 23, and xvi. 28. We know not to what other event the last clause in each of these verses, "till the Son of man be come;" "till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom," can be reasonably referred.¹ But to rest in this negative view of the case would be to treat the subject very superficially. This interpretation is not adopted merely as one to which we are driven by the difficulty of finding any other near event worthy to be spoken of in such terms; but there was a grand *propriety* in speaking of the destruction of Jerusalem as the "coming of the Son of man," or the coming of the Lord. The common statement, that the extreme, perhaps unparalleled, calamities and sufferings attending the siege and capture of Jerusalem, made this great national judgment a fit type of the final and universal catastrophe, when the Lord shall come to judge the world, is by no means an adequate statement of the case. It overlooks, in fact, the *main* reason why that event is called the "coming of the Lord." The overthrow of Jerusalem signalized the actual termination of a divine dispensation. It was the actual removal of what God had long ago come, in wonderful manifestations of power and majesty, to establish on earth. No man, no combination of human forces, had either the right or the power to overthrow what God had so directly and formally established. It was not like the destruction of Babylon, or of Nineveh, or of any other of the great capitals or kingdoms of this world. God had made a formal covenant with the Jewish people, as he had with no other. He had adopted and set apart Jerusalem as his special abode, the capital of his own kingdom on earth; and that theocratic kingdom could not be overthrown or superseded, until he himself came to overthrow and supersede it. Its overthrow was his manifest coming. The rejection must be as manifest as the adoption. It fell, not because Titus and his legions were irresistible; but because the Lord had no longer any use for it; nay, rather because he could no longer suffer it to remain, without seeming to deny the great truth, that his kingdom on earth had ceased to be a national institution, and become world-wide and universal. The final destruction of the city and temple was the last act in the setting up of the new, spiritual, all-comprehending dispensation; the removal of the last hindrance that stood in the way; the last relic of the local, national, and provisional economy. It was the *actual* abrogation of those divinely appointed types and sacrifices, which had already been fulfilled and *virtually* abrogated, by the sacrificial death of Jesus on the cross,—the providential proclamation upon the house-tops of what had before been spoken in the ear in the closets.

It is worthy of note, that the phrase, "there be *some* standing here,

¹ See the parallel places to the last named passage, in Mark ix. 1; Luke ix. 27.

who shall not taste of death, till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom," agrees well with the idea already suggested, that John was not the *only one* of the Apostles who remained alive when Jerusalem was destroyed. It is just such an expression as our Lord would naturally use, on the supposition that only a *minority* of the twelve survived that event; a supposition in itself not at all improbable.


Nor is the fact, for which we have the evidence of an early and uncontradicted tradition, that John lived thirty years, or more, after Jerusalem was destroyed, a valid objection to our interpretation of Jesus' words to Peter. For the great event referred to, marked an era of sufficient importance to suggest and justify the division of the twelve into the two classes of those who died before, and those who outlived that great catastrophe.

"Then *cometh* the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority, and power. For he must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy *that* shall be destroyed is death." I. Corinthians xv. 24-26.

This rendering is almost universally condemned by scholars. Besides other objections, the words inserted in 26 v. give a meaning to Paul's assertion which the Greek does not warrant, and which is not in harmony with the context. The following translation is submitted.

"Then, finally when he delivered up the kingdom to God the Father, when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority, and power, (for he must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet,) death, the last enemy, shall be destroyed."

This suits the connection, avoids the necessity of supplying the words which our common version inserts, gives to *τὸ τέλος* just the force which it certainly has in I. Peter iii. 8, and probably in Romans vi. 22, and makes the passage, with its parenthesis, Pauline.



NOTICES OF BOOKS.

An Introduction to the Old Testament. By JOHANNES BLEEK. Edited by Adolf Kamphausen. Translated from the second edition, (Berlin, 1865), by G. H. Venables, Esq. London: Bell & Daldy. 1869. Two vols., 8vo.

This work is famous in Germany. The bibliographical notices, and survey of opinions, have been brought up, by Kamphausen, to 1865, and it is now, for the first time, translated. Bleek is well known to have been one of the ablest of the great German scholars belonging to the generation which is now passing away. The work before us is very complete, well arranged, and well written. It is marked by great thoroughness and ample learning, and by genuine reverence and devoutness of spirit. He insists that critics should "keep before them the stand-point of Divine Revelation, and should regard the Old Testament in its relation to Christian faith, *i. e.*, as prophesying of, and leading up to, the New Testament." And he avowedly attempts "a mode of viewing and treating the Old Testament, holding a middle course between the two extremes." These extremes, in his estimation, are represented, on the one hand, by De Wette and Ewald, with their respective schools, and, on the other, by such writers as Hengstenberg, Hävernick, and Keil. De Wette's Introduction to the Old Testament, regarded by himself as the ablest of his critical works, (translated by Theodore Parker,) was mainly destructive in its tendencies, and its day is past. Ewald, whose

celebrated works are just beginning to be translated into English, aims at very positive views, but constructs with the most arbitrary subjectiveness, and, as Bleek justly says, "frequently pronounces judgment, with the greatest confidence, in cases where the existing data warrant it least." His immense learning, magnificent historical imagination, and a self-confidence, which is too sublime to be ridiculous, together with the uncouth splendor of his style, give Ewald an authority, with many, to which he is not entitled. On the other hand, Hengstenberg is ferociously orthodox, and Hävernicks and Keil, though we sympathize with their general views, do, we must admit, write, sometimes, rather as advocates than as investigators, and it is very possible that the commonly received opinions which they defend, do require to be modified as to various minor points.

A work such as Bleek proposes would seem, therefore, to be called for; and a translation of it to be desirable, when we have nothing recent from English writers but Davidson's offensive, though feeble, rationalism, and Stanley's hints at all manner of destructive notions. But it must not be taken for granted that Bleek holds what *we* should call a middle course. All men think themselves moderate, and can point you to an extreme position beyond their own. The following results will give an idea of what he means:

He holds that much of the Pentateuch, especially of the laws, was written down by Moses, or in his times, but that the books were composed at a much later period; that "the author of Genesis made use of various early writings, and, sometimes, appropriated their statements, but that the ancient Elohist writing formed his chief groundwork," and he cannot agree that Genesis was written later than the early part of the reign of David, while the date of Deuteronomy is placed between Hezekiah and Josiah. The latter part of Isaiah is attributed to a different author, writing shortly before and after the return from the captivity. (Comp. a good discussion in the Appendix to Leathes' Boyle Lectures, "The Witness of the O. T. to Christ.") He refers the book of Daniel to the age of Antiochus Epiphanes, and much doubts whether Daniel was a historical personage. This last is worse than De Wette, whom he so strenuously opposed as to the Pentateuch. As regards the Psalms, Bleek is really more conservative, rejecting the whole figment of Maccabean Psalms, and holding that none of them should be placed later than Nehemiah's age.

His arguments, on all these questions, are carefully and ably wrought, and yet they consist almost entirely of assumptions, supposed probabilities, and large inferences from slight and doubtful matters of internal evidence. He attaches no great importance, we are glad to notice, to the argument from style.

We think that one who wishes to study the subjects involved, cannot do better than to take this work, with the Introduction of Hävernicks, and compare the articles in Smith's Dictionary, and the discussions in such commentaries as Perowne on the Psalms.

The New Testament: translated from the Greek text of Tischendorf. By GEORGE R. NOYES, D. D., Hancock Professor of Hebrew, and other Oriental languages, and Dexter Lecturer on Biblical Literature, in Harvard University. Boston: American Unitarian Association. 1869.

In the death of Dr. Noyes, which occurred in June, 1868, Biblical learning lost one of its most diligent and successful cultivators. It was his purpose, we believe, had his life been spared, to translate the entire Old and New Testaments. His translation of the Prophets was published, in two volumes, in 1866. Two more volumes were published in the following year, containing his translation of the poetical books of the Old Testament. Since his death, his translation of the New Testament has been published, under the editorial care of Mr. Ezra Abbott.

Our attention must now be confined to this last volume. In a brief preface, Dr. Noyes has clearly stated the principles by which he was guided in his work. The text adopted is that of Tischendorf's eighth edition, as far as published, namely, to Luke xviii. 9; then, to the end of the Gospel of John, that of the second edition of his *Synopsis Evangelica*, published in 1864; and in the remainder of the New Testament, that of his seventh edition, published in 1859. The first two portions of Tischendorf's text were published after he had collated the Sinaitic manuscript. And Mr. Abbott has added, in an appendix to the volume, the readings contained in the fifth part of Tischendorf's eighth edition, extending to John vi. 23. Though differing in some cases from Prof. Tischendorf, in regard to the true reading, Dr. Noyes has strictly adhered to his plan of translating the unaltered text of the German professor. Thus, he has followed the reading, "only begotten *God*," in John i. 18, a reading which Tischendorf himself has since abandoned.

Dr. Noyes thus states the ruling aim which has guided him as a translator: "It has been my aim to make a version, more free from wholly or nearly obsolete words and phrases, more intelligible, more critically accurate, and, on the whole, even closer to the original, than that of King James' translators, though less encumbered with mere Greek and Hebrew idioms. I have endeavored, with what success it is not for me to say, to retain what may be called the savor and spirit of our old and familiar version, so far as is consistent with the paramount duties of a translator; and, in doing this, I have simply acted in conformity with my own judgment and taste." He adds, in allusion to the fact that his book is published by the American Unitarian Association: "My translation has not been supervised or corrected by any association, or by any authority whatever. Every word of it is the result of my own judgment, guided by universally acknowledged principles of scientific interpretation, without regard to creed or church." We take sincere pleasure in saying, that so far as we have examined this translation, we have found no occasion to accuse Dr. Noyes of unfaithfulness to this principle. He has done his work in the spirit of a scholar, and not of a sectary. We think Dr. Noyes has succeeded, also, beyond most recent translators, in preserving what he calls "the savor and spirit" of the received version.

Thus, for instance, he has adhered to the graver forms of the verb, in the third person singular: "Every one that loveth hath been born of God, and knoweth God; he that loveth not hath not known God." In this respect, his version is more to our taste than that of the Bible Union, which substitutes the more familiar and less dignified termination in *s*. A change like this, though very slight in itself, is so pervasive that it modifies very appreciably the whole tone of the translation, and, in our opinion, takes away not a little of its appropriate solemnity of style. In the treatment of the Greek tenses, too, we think he has been more judicious than the Bible Union revisers. While, in common with them, he has made more frequent use of the indefinite past, to represent the Greek aorist, than King James' translators did,—a modification which, we think, all Greek scholars of the present day will agree in approving,—he has not carried this change so far as it is carried in the Bible Union revision. On a nice question of this sort, a difference of judgment and taste is to be expected. We have noted a few instances, even in Dr. Noyes' translation, in which he has made this change, where we should prefer to retain the perfect tense, which our earlier translators give. In common with the Bible Union revisers, he translates the word "Hades," "the under world." We should prefer, in this case, a simple transfer of the Greek word. In carrying out his principle, of having his version "less incumbered with mere Greek and Hebrew idioms," than our common translation, he seems to us, sometimes, to transform his version into a paraphrase. Thus, instead of the simple "unto," by which both the common version, and that of the Bible Union, literally render the Greek preposition in Romans vi. 16, he has, "whether of sin whose fruit is death, or of obedience whose fruit is righteousness." In Romans i. 26, he renders the common Greek expression *κατὰ σάρκα*, "after the fashion of the world." In like manner, the adjective *σάρκινός* (or *σάρκινος*, according to some Greek Mss.), is several times translated "unspiritual," or "not spiritual." Usually, however, both the noun and the verb are translated literally, as in our common version. Instead of "to justify," and "to be justified," as the English equivalents of the active and passive forms of the Greek verb, he uses, "to accept as righteous," and "to be accepted as righteous," or similar periphrastic expressions. Instead of "the hope of your calling," in Ephesians i. 18, he substitutes, "the hope belonging to his call of you," which is both periphrastic and awkward. In I Peter i. 13, where the common version has, "hope to the end," and the Bible Union version, "hope perfectly," Dr. Noyes has, "hope undoubtingly." In this instance, we prefer the more literal rendering of the Bible Union revision to either of the others. II Thessalonians ii. 7, the translation, "only there is one who now restraineth, until he be taken out of the way," is thus justified, in a note: "If this is not a strict rendering, it conveys the meaning of the Apostle better than a verbal one." And, again, in I Timothy iii. 16, which is translated, "and confessedly great is the mystery of godliness, in him who was manifested in the flesh," &c., the following foot-note is added: "The words 'in him' are not in the Greek, but seem to be implied in the context." There was less excuse for

making this addition, as the Greek text, which the author adopts from Tischendorf, is here by no means certain. In all these cases, we should prefer a more strict adherence to the original, even at some risk of transferring a Greek or Hebrew idiom. It is in this direction, we think, that the translation, as a whole, is most open to objection. Indeed, most of the cases where we find any cause to object to the English style, are just those where the translator seems to have been influenced by the fear of allowing some Greek or Hebrew idiom to corrupt or obscure his English. *Most* of the cases, we say; not quite all. For we must always protest against such expressions as "are being saved," (I Corinthians i. 18; II Corinthians ii. 15), however they may claim to be the only strictly literal rendering of the passive participle. In Acts ii. 47, Dr. Noyes avoids this objectionable rendering of the same participle, by saying, "those who were in the way of salvation." Here the revised version has, "those who *are* saved," better, in one respect, than, "those who should be saved," of the common version, yet savoring of anachronism. If the verb in the aorist passive, in v. 40, may properly be translated, "save yourselves," (as it is in all the three versions), why may not the present participle, which belongs to the *middle* voice, no less than to the passive, be fitly translated, "those who were saving themselves"? Is there not reason for supposing a *designed* reference, in this participle, to the verb which has been used just above?

In John i. 9, Dr. Noyes has, "the true light, which enlighteneth every man, was coming into the world." The objection to this is, that it transposes the verb "was," from the beginning to the end of the verse. The Bible Union revision has here, "*there* was the true light, which lights every man that comes into the world." The ambiguity of the first word is a serious objection to this. We do not think that either of these have improved upon the common version. If any improvement can be made, we think it is in the direction indicated by Tischendorf's punctuation of the text,—"*he* was the true light, which lighteth every man, coming into the world." Thus the word coming is referred to the true light, and the meaning is, he was the true light, which, coming into the world, (or by its coming into the world), "lighteth every man." The expression, "coming into the world," does not seem a natural one to be applied to every man; but it is just in accordance with the habitual language of Scripture, when applied to Christ, the true light of the world. At least, it is much more common and natural, in the latter application, than in the former.

We have noted one more passage, in which there must have been some oversight of the translator, or blunder of the printer. In John iii. 5, we have, in the last clause, "he cannot enter the kingdom of *heaven*." This expression is used only by Matthew. Plainly, it should be, "the kingdom of God."

In conclusion, we can heartily recommend this translation of the New Testament, by Dr. Noyes, as a useful help to critical students, and as a valuable contribution to the work of revising our English Scriptures.

Congregationalism: What it is; Whence it is; How it works; Why it is better than any other form of Church Government; and its Consequent Demands. By HENRY M. DEXTER, Editor of the *Congregationalist* and *Boston Recorder*, and lately Pastor of the Berkeley Street Congregational Church, Boston. Second edition, revised and enlarged. Boston: Nichols & Noyes. 1868. pp. 394. \$3.00.

This work, in its first edition, has already become very generally and favorable known. This second edition is a considerable improvement upon the first. The author is an enthusiast on the subject, and has given much time and attention to it; his investigations have been extensive and thorough, and their results are given with fulness. His defence of Congregationalism, as opposed to all other forms of Church Government, is earnest, but fair. If he had discussed the subject with less exclusive reference to his own denomination, it would have been more satisfactory to many; yet the book is commendably free from unchristian flings, and invaluable to every man who wishes to understand the Congregational Polity. The title page, as above, indicates the general course of thought. The book contains, for reference, a very minute Analysis, and exhaustive Index of subjects, and an Index of names. This greatly facilitates consultation, and increases the value of the work. The Rules of order, pp. 174-183, are the best we have ever seen—"Christian common sense applied to Church matters." The presiding officer who will thoroughly master these rules, will be well furnished for his work. We have examined many modern treatises on parliamentary law, in vain, for any allusion to the twofold nature of the motion to adjourn; this motion being sometimes privileged and sometimes not, and hence sometimes susceptible of amendment and debate, and sometimes undebateable. Dr. Dexter, we are glad to see, recognises and states this distinction. We should as decidedly differ with him as to the proper course of the Church, in matters of public scandal. The New Testament precepts and examples seem decisive, that in cases "of open and notorious offence on the part of a Church member, (as when he should have committed murder, or eloped with the wife of another, etc.) there is no need of any preliminary and private steps, but the Church ought to purify itself by the instant expulsion of the criminal."

Though the Congregationalists are not quite as congregational as the Baptists, and their practices, in respect to order, differ from ours in a few particulars, there is probably no work in existence which will give to the Baptist student a more comprehensive, exact, and practical knowledge of our own polity. We rejoice in the appearance of this second edition, and heartily recommend its careful study.

Pre-Historic Nations; or Inquiries concerning some of the Great Peoples and Civilizations of Antiquity, and their Probable Relation to a still older Civilization of the Ethiopians or Cushites of Arabia. By JOHN D. BALDWIN, A. M. New York: Harper & Brothers, Franklin Square. 1869. 12mo., pp. 414. \$1.75.

Primeval Man. An Examination of some Recent Speculations. By the DUKE OF ARGYLE. New York. George Routledge & Sons, 416 Broome St. 1869. 16mo., pp. 200. \$1.50.

These works accord in only two particulars, in all else they are antipodal. The noble Duke and Mr. Baldwin both speak of the hoary past, and both believe the race to be far more ancient than the current chronology admits. Here ends agreement. Henceforth there is only contrast. The Duke of Argyle calls attention to three totally distinct questions: The Origin of Man; the Antiquity of Man; and Man's Primitive Condition. To each of these he gives a single brief essay. In a clear, discriminating, and judicial manner, he opens these questions, and indicates the principle on which they are to be examined, and the lines of argument by which they are to be settled. There is no claim of exhaustive discussion. The essays are merely introductory. Eminently suggestive, they are models in candor and courtesy, no less than in purity of diction, and felicity of argument.

But what shall be said of the writer of the other volume? He has certainly gathered together, in his 400 pages, a great amount and variety of valuable information. If it is not thoroughly digested and methodically arranged, it must be remembered that the author is crazy. He is a duomaniac. Frantically and furiously he raves, through all his book, against the "biblical chronology" and its "rabbinical" defenders, hurling at them, in pitiable frenzy, a huge heap of harmless epithets. In charming relief he every where vents his passionate love and admiration of the most ancient Cushites. Thus he "bounds, rebounds, and tetrabounds" to and fro between denunciations of the "Chronologists" and laudations of the "Cushites." While his work contains much information that is important, and much opinion that is just, it is cause of profound regret that a subject of such universal interest has not been discussed in entire freedom from that spirit which is alien to true scholarship, an insult to the reader, and a disgrace to the author.

Sketches of the Rites and Customs of the Greco-Russian Church. By H. C. ROMANOFF. With an introduction by the author of "The Heir of Redclyffe." Rivingtons. London. 1868. 12mo., pp. 429.

This book will not meet the expectations of those who think to find in it an orderly and scientific statement of the views and practices of the Russian branch of the Greek Church. It is not a scientific treatise, but a series of popular sketches, attached to a loose frame-work of personal narratives. The separate sketches are ten in number, the first, and longest, having more the character of a simple romance of common life, than the rest. Indeed, the story of "Roman, the Reader," almost makes us wish that the writer had given her work more artistic unity, and let the ill-fated "Roman" live to accompany us through the whole volume. This first story embodies a description of the ceremonies of baptism, baptismal unction, or confirmation, and the consecration of a church. The remaining chapters, or sketches, are shorter, and less romantic. They

treat, successively, of confession and communion; of ordination; of marriage; of extreme unction, funeral services, and requiems; of church bells; of the fourth of April, (the anniversary of the Emperor's merciful deliverance from assassination, in 1866, for which a special thanksgiving service has been instituted); of adult unction, or the reception of proselytes from other churches; of adoption; and of a bishop's visitation.

The author of these sketches is an English lady, the wife of a Russian officer. Following the fortunes of her husband, who was stationed in one of the remote provinces of the empire, she had peculiarly favorable opportunities for becoming acquainted with the religious and domestic life of the humbler classes, and she has given the result of her observations with a charming simplicity. Some of the episodes are exceedingly interesting. The narrative of the attempt to assassinate the Emperor, and of the honors heaped upon the young artisan who had the good fortune to save the life of his sovereign, is admirably told.

In the baptismal service, the church prays that the child to be baptized may have "the remission of his *voluntary* and involuntary sins." The author remarks, in a note: "This prayer was, of course, composed at a time when adult baptism was more frequent than that of infants." (p. 71). In another note she says, that "in cases of extreme sickness, sprinkling, or pouring of water, is considered sufficient." (p. 72). We believe the writer is in error here, as her testimony is at variance with all other trustworthy testimony known to us. It seems, moreover, to be contradicted by what she, herself, says, on a subsequent page: "In the event of a child's being born in a hopeless state, or of its becoming ill so suddenly as to have no time for sending for the priest, the nurse, or any one else, may legally baptize it. A pure vessel of water is procured, and the infant is *immersed*, with the same words as those used by the priest." (p. 79).

Manual Latin Grammar. Prepared by WILLIAM F. ALLEN, A. M., Professor of Ancient Languages and History in the University of Wisconsin, and JOSEPH H. ALLEN, Cambridge, Mass. Boston: Published by Edwin Ginn. 12mo., pp. 127.

The authors of this little book have endeavored to meet a want, of late years very generally felt, of a Latin Grammar, which, in brief compass, shall furnish the pupil with such and only such knowledge of the language as is requisite for the understanding and appreciation of the master-pieces of Roman Literature. For so worthy an endeavor as this, we think they deserve the thanks of all who wish well to the cause of classical education.

It has seemed to us, in examining this book, that it might be of use to private students of some maturity of mind, or to pupils in some schools where a full and thorough course of Latin study is not pursued. Even such persons, however, would need the guidance of very able and experienced instructors to supply what has been omitted in a work of such extremely small compass. For students who are preparing for college in our classical schools and academies, we think it must be inadequate.

To illustrate by a single item :—how could a young pupil get a sufficient knowledge of adjectives of the third declension from a treatment of them which covers only half a page? Three adjectives partially declined and seven lines of remark contain the entire doctrine of the grammar on this subject. After the three examples which are given for adjectives of one termination and of two terminations, the pupil is told that "a few adjectives of this declension have the nom. sing. masc. in *er*, as *acer*." Why not give the adjectives? How is the pupil to know how many there are, or what ones are so declined? Then in the remaining four lines of remark, it is stated with like indefiniteness, that "adjectives of one termination include those in *us*, with a few others, as *vetus*, *par*, *felix*." What can be more unsatisfactory than such an expression as "a few others?" Suppose the pupil comes across the word *memor* or *teres*, where is he to locate them, or how decline them? Indeed, with absolutely no information on the peculiarities of inflection in this declension, how could he decline *vetus* or *felix*? Nor is it enough to say that of course they are declined like nouns of the third declension, for the treatment of the nouns is also so very limited, that it is just as inadequate as a practical guide as the treatment of the adjective. If we may use an expression which we constantly find in this grammar, we may say that "so it is" with many other parts of the etymology. The truth is the language cannot be fully and thoroughly taught by this grammar in any school where the pupils are preparing for entrance to college: the best teacher cannot be expected to furnish so much with every lesson to supply the deficiencies of the text-book, and only the very best would be capable of such task. We think that the authors must revise their work, and make very considerable additions if they will render it a sufficient text-book.

But we are constrained to believe that there are more serious faults in this book than those of omission. We have noticed many instances of obscurity of expression, and also not a few inaccuracies of statement, which must needs hinder very much the usefulness of the work, especially with beginners in Latin, for whom it is especially designed. To give one example of obscurity, we find, on p. 32, the following information about the verb *prodesse*. "*Prodesse*, to help (*pro esse*), is conjugated like *sum*, inserting *d* where followed by *e*:" now the pupil might well ask what it is that inserts *d*, and what it is that is followed by *e*? Any one who is versed in Latin may see what the author intended to say; but how is the remark of any service to the beginner? We regret to say that this is a very favorable example of the vagueness of statement which we have noticed in various parts of the book.

We are not yet prepared to agree with the authors in their doctrine of the vocative case, which they state in their preface to be a special merit of their book. We question the wisdom of introducing even an allusion to the vocative in a grammar of this kind intended for beginners. Even in the most extended treatises on Latin grammar it would legitimately find a place only in hypothetical suggestions derived from comparative philology, and designed to explain the anomalous use of the genitive singular of the first and the second declension to denote the

place where. But if it is prematurely brought into Latin grammar, is it not a very "arbitrary" proceeding to lay down the doctrine that "this case ended in *i*, and is generally the same in form with the dative;" and then, in order to obviate the difficulties incident to such a view, to say that "in the second declension the old form in *i* is retained;" and again, that "in the third declension this case sometimes ends in *e*, like the ablative"? We think that all this is a very questionable improvement on what the authors style "the old, arbitrary, and unintelligible rule."

We find a very singular statement about the comparative on p. 17, viz.: that "it is used instead of the superlative where only two are spoken of." What can this mean? And the example is given, "*melior imperatorum*, the best of the (*two*) commanders."

If we may judge from some parts of the Prosody which we have examined, we must infer that that portion of the book is sadly incorrect. The subject of final syllables is an illustration of this remark. It is so very wrong throughout that it needs an entire revision.

But it is a disagreeable task to find fault, especially with a book which has been constructed upon so excellent a plan and for such good purposes. We must be allowed to think that a small grammar is not necessarily a good one; but we can say, too, in all frankness, that we are glad that this one is no larger. The outward appointments of this volume are of the first order. The paper, and fair type, and broad margin, and the handsome binding, combine to make it a most attractive book.

The Apostolical and Primitive Church Popular in its Government, Informal in its Worship. A Manual on Prelacy and Ritualism carefully Revised and Adapted to these Discussions. By LYMAN COLEMAN, D. D., Professor in Lafayette College. Author of "Ancient Christianity Exemplified," "Historical Text-book and Atlas of Biblical Geography," &c. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1869. 12mo. pp. 413. \$2.00.

Dr. Coleman does not profess to develop the exact form of church polity taught in the New Testament, but merely to show that the hierarchy and ceremonial of our days has no warrant in Scripture, or in primitive usage. This he demonstrates. The work is one of great and permanent value, and deserves to be thoroughly studied. The mechanical execution of the book is admirable.

The Dutch Reformation: A History of the Struggle in the Netherlands for Civil and Religious Liberty in the Sixteenth Century. Am. Tract Soc., New York. 12mo., pp. 823. Cl. \$1.50.

The history of the Dutch Reformation is yet to be written in English. He who will use the abundant materials stored in Brandt, the martyrologies, the histories of the Netherland cities, Ypeij and Dermout, Kist and Royaards, Gerdes, Glasius, and many others, and relate in simple English the wondrous tale, will confer an abundant blessing on the churches of Christ.

Either Mr. Martyn is ignorant of the religious struggle and the actors in it, or he esteems the political struggle of more importance. His best pages are those where he most closely copies Motley and Prescott, and these occur frequently. It is no dispraise to him to say that he does not excel them, though he does advance some new views. The poor Waldenses have borne many opprobrious epithets, but it was reserved for Mr. Martyn to sketch in one word their mortifying occupation: "they were the resurrectionists of Christianity," p. 84. We are sorry for them and for Christianity if this is true. Egmont, the friend and companion of Orange, "was an idiot," p. 468.

Travel and Adventure in the Territory of Alaska, formerly Russian America, now ceded to the United States, and in various other parts of the North Pacific. By FREDERICK WHYMPER. Cr. 8vo. pp. 353. \$2.50.

A cleverly written work, giving us much useful information in regard to our new territory.

China and the Chinese: A General Description of the Country and its Inhabitants; its Civilization and Form of Government; its Religion and Social Institutions; its Intercourse with other Nations; and its Present Condition and Prospects. By the Rev. JOHN L. NEVIUS, ten years a Missionary in China. 12mo. pp. 456. \$1.75.

The promise of this long title page is amply redeemed: the author's warm and generous interest in the people among whom he has labored, is evinced on every page, and he is successful in showing that the misunderstanding of the two nations so suddenly brought together, has not been all on one side. If the Chinese are ignorant of the character of the people of the United States, we cannot lay any special claim to a knowledge of the Chinese. Mr. Nevius believes that the present of China is emphatically a period of transition, and he is very hopeful of the future.

The Day Dawn and the Rain, and other Sermons by the Rev. JOHN KER, Glasgow, Scotland. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1869. 12mo. pp. 460. \$2.00.

The Scotch title of this book,—Sermons by the Rev. John Ker,—is a far more appropriate one for these vigorous and suggestive discourses, than the fanciful appellation chosen for the American edition. A volume of better discourses has not been published for many a day. We give a sample to induce our readers to enjoy the whole:

For there is this difference further between mere brightness of the face and the beauty of the soul which beams through it, that the one is seen entire at first, and grows no more. It tends constantly to fade, and must fade to us, even though it remains in itself the same. But the soul's expression grows evermore as we gaze into it; and it is in reminiscence, above all, that it rises to its perfect ideal. It was this angelic beauty which shone in the face of Stephen,

and it was there because of the object which he looked upon. 'His eyes were beautiful,' if we may adapt to the case the expression of a poet, because 'you saw that they saw Christ.' There was a look passing beyond this world into another, so forgetful of all around, so absorbed in what he beheld, so full of reverence and love for the Saviour, who met his gaze of pity and forgiveness for his persecutors, that Christ himself can be read in that look,—the very Christ who suffered so meekly and magnanimously, and whose visible image is now reflected from the soul of his martyred servant, as he kneels down and cries, Lord, lay not this sin to their charge! and, having said this, falls asleep.

Now these two forms of transfiguration belong each to its own period, as does the view of God from which they spring. The one is bright, but formless; the shadow of the Shekinah on him who sees it; and inspiring even its friends with awe, till they can look no longer. The other is the beauty of the soul that has beheld Christ, distinct and expressive, reflecting his divine purity and tenderness, so mild that even those who hate it cannot choose but look and wonder; and when they would thrust it from the world, must stop their ears upon the voice of Stephen, and summon blind passion to do its work. * * * * *

In Stephen it was no passing glimmer of a setting sun, but that lustre in the morning clouds which shows him before he is above the horizon, and which is lost only in perfect day. Moses was descending the hill of God, with a brightness which was continually dying: Stephen was ascending the higher mount, with a glory growing to all eternity. The death of Stephen is the New Testament translation, and he is to be set as the third with Enoch and Elijah, only higher, inasmuch as each manifestation of God rises while time moves on. It is a greater thing to overcome death than to be carried past it, and here it is no fire-chariot which lifts to heaven, but the outstretched hand of Christ, according to his own word, 'I will come and receive you unto myself, that where I am there ye may be also.'

Church Communion, as Practiced by the Baptists, Explained and Defended. By W. W. GARDNER, Professor of Theology in Bethel College, Russellville, Ky. Cincinnati: Geo. S. Blanchard & Co., 1869. 12mo. pp. 294. \$1.00.

The Lord's Supper; its Institution, Nature, Prerequisites, and Laws Regulating its Observance. By A. P. WILLIAMS, D. D., with a Biographical Sketch of the author, by A. H. Burlingham, D. D. St. Louis: St. Louis Printing Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 165.

These are able treatises on Communion, defending the practices of the Baptized churches. Dr. Burlingham has paid a merited tribute to the memory of a most excellent Christian minister.

Our New Way Round the World. By CHARLES CARLETON COFFIN. Boston: Fields, Osgood & Co. 1869. Cr. oct. pp. 542. \$3.00.

In this handsomely illustrated volume, the popular author and lecturer gives his notes of observation along the route in Egypt, India, Malacca, China, Japan, and California. It is full of timely information.

The Living Questions of the Age. By an American Citizen. Author of "The Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation," "God Revealed in Creation and in Christ," etc. Chicago: Clarke & Co. 12mo. pp. 297.

An examination, in popular form, of some of the prevailing moral fallacies of our time, in which the self-styled liberal Christians are met on the philosophical basis which they claim as their own ground.

The Dance of Modern Society. By W. C. WILKINSON. New York: Oakley, Mason & Co. 1869. 16mo. pp. 77. \$1.00.

Mr. Wilkinson's racy and readable book needs no commendation in the pages of this Quarterly. If there is in our language any better discussion of the subject we would be glad to have it pointed out.

The North British Review, March. 1. The Royal Engineers. 2. Russian Literature. 3. Revolutions in the Queen's English. 4. Dean Milman. 5. The Increase of Lunacy. 6. The Hudson's Bay Company. 7. What is Man's Chief End? 8. Public Works in India. 9. The Reconstruction of Germany.


The Edinburgh Review, April. 1. Confucius. 2. Edible Fungi. 3. The Competitive Industry of Nations. 4. Memoir of Madame de La Fayette. 5. The Settlement of Ulster. 6. Dilke's Greater Britain. 7. Matthew Arnold's Critical Works. 8. American Finance, 1865-69. 9. Life and Times of Edward III. 10. Campbell's Lives of Lyndhurst and Brougham.

The North American, for April, has a notable article on Cotton Mather and Salem Witchcraft. Enjoyable anywhere, it has a peculiar zest in the *North American*. Read it by all means, and read it there if you can.—Many persons, who have been dumb before the amazing knowledge of half-fledged scientists, will find a grim satisfaction in the perusal of what the Rev. Dr. Patterson, of Chicago, has to say in the *American Presbyterian*, for April, on Recent Discoveries in Geology.—*The New Englander*, for the same month, contains a timely discussion of the False Definitions of Faith and the True Definition, by the Rev. Leonard W. Bacon, of Williamsburg, N. Y., who, in a manner characteristic and masterly, points out the erroneousness of the prevalent conceptions and statements, and shows that gospel faith is trust in a person. Many erudite theologians might study this satisfactory little treatise with benefit to themselves, and profit to their hearers.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS.

Life and Death, the Christian's Portion; a discourse occasioned by the funeral services of the Rev. Basil Manly, D. D., at Greenville, S. C., Dec. 22, 1868, by the Rev. James P. Boyce, D. D., Professor in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary; presents a spirited sketch of the life and labors of a truly noble Christian man.—In an address, delivered at the annual meeting of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Feb. 9th, 1869, that indefatigable antiquary, Horatio Gates Jones, Esq., performs a labor of love in behalf of Andrew Bradford, the founder of the Newspaper Press in the Middle States.—Those of our readers who take any interest in the Romanistic controversy in the Episcopal Church, should not fail to procure *A Letter to the Most Rev. Archbishop Manning*, by Edmund S. Foulkes, B. D., author of *Christendom's Divisions*, published by Pott & Amery, Cooper Union.—*The Malady and the Remedy* is the appropriate title of a sermon preached May, 1868, by the Rev. Geo. W. Eaton, D. D., LL. D., late President of Madison University, and now President of the Hamilton Theological Seminary, on the text, "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world." The veteran educator and eloquent preacher has given a succinct statement of that evangelical theology which he has done so much, from the pulpit and in the lecture-room, to perpetuate.—The American edition of *Smith's Dictionary of the Bible*, continues to

justify all the encomiums it has received.—*Pedobaptist Sophistry Exposed*, is the title of a tract of 20 pages, by the Rev. G. J. Johnson, a thorough refutation of the mis-statements, mis-interpretations, and mis-quotations of a tract issued by the Methodist Book Concern of New York — *The Lord's Supper and Unbaptized Communicants*, is a clear and cogent argument in favor of strict communion, by the Rev. William Cathcart, of Philadelphia: the position of Baptists is justified by short and pertinent citations from writers of all denominations, and the too common fault of long and tedious extracts is wholly avoided. It would be well for other writers to copy Mr. Cathcart's sensible example in this regard.—*Woman as God Made Her: the True Woman*. In his well known and forceful style, the pastor of the Tremont Temple presents the soundest views on the subjects of: Woman as God made her, Woman a Helpmeet, Woman as a Tempter, The Glory of Motherhood, Mariolatry not of Christ, Woman's Work and Woman's Mission, Woman vs. Ballot.



INTELLIGENCE.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

It was our purpose to notice the commentary of *Hengstenberg*, on the Gospel of John, in the next number of the *QUARTERLY*, and perhaps we shall do this; but the recent intelligence of his death, makes it proper for us to refer briefly to the labors of this eminent scholar, in the department of biblical interpretation. For although his tendencies to absolutism in church and state have weakened, in some degree, his hold upon the sympathy of Protestant Christians, since 1848, he must nevertheless be regarded as one of the ablest and most useful of modern biblical scholars in Germany. His writings are well-known to students of the Bible everywhere, especially his work on the Christology of the Old Testament, and his commentary on the Psalms. Next to these in general interest, and possibly superior to them in value, are his two volumes on the authenticity of the Pentateuch, and his defence of the genuineness of the book of Daniel. Less satisfactory are his commentaries on the Apocalypse and the Song of Solomon; while, if we may judge from a very cursory examination, his last work, on the Gospel of John, will prove to be very instructive. Dr. Hengstenberg was by nature, bold, positive, dogmatic, yet a thorough scholar, and, we doubt not, a sincere Christian. He withstood, with great firmness, the assaults of the "destructive critics" upon the old Testament, when they were everywhere in the ascendant, and the Christian world will not soon forget such service. Ullmann, Krummacher, Nitzsch, Hengstenberg! how rapidly the leaders of religious thought, during the last forty years, are passing away!

The Theology of the New Testament. A Manual for Academic Lectures, and for Private Study; by Van Oosterzee.¹ This work is a biblical theology, according to the present use of this expression by scholars. It was first published in the Dutch language, two years ago; but a German translation, by Fritz Körper, has now come to hand, proving that the original fully sustains the reputation of Professor Van Oosterzee for ability and scholarship. The plan of the book is simple and satisfactory. In Part First, the writer exhibits the Old Testament foundations for New Testament theology. In Part Second, he presents the theology of Christ, as drawn, first, from the Synoptical Gospels, and, secondly, from the Gospel of John, closing with an exhibition of the Higher Unity in doctrine which pervades these two sources. In Part Third, he presents the theology of the Apostles; first, that of Peter, secondly, that of Paul, and thirdly, that of John. In Part Fourth, he treats of the agreement of the Apostles with one another, of the agreement of the Apostles with the Lord, and of the agreement of the Lord and his Apostles with the Scriptures of the old Testament. At the close of every section, he suggests a number of "points for consideration," which are not discussed in the Manual. We have been particularly interested in those portions of the work which relate to the substantial agreement of the writers of the Bible in their doctrinal views; for it has been a tendency of modern German scholarship to multiply and magnify the formal differences, while overlooking essential unity of belief in these writers. Prof. J. J. Van Oosterzee, of Utrecht, the author of this Manual, is one of the ablest biblical scholars of Holland, and the present work will be one of the most useful which he has given to his countrymen. Is not the time approaching when our own scholars will turn their attention to this method of exhibiting the truths of Christianity? Ought not Baptists to take the lead, if possible, in this work, thus illustrating their profound regard for Apostolic doctrine? These questions we commend to all who feel an impulse to biblical study, and especially to our brother professors. Who will gird himself for the task, and furnish to ministers and people such a treatise?

The Descent into Hell, shown to be a Myth without Biblical Support, by an Interpretation of I Peter iii. 17-22; by A. Schweitzer. Zurich, 1868,² is but a pamphlet of forty-nine pages, yet we think it deserves notice in this Quarterly and will repay faithful study. For it is well known that the passage in question, has long been a veritable *crux interpretum*. A monograph upon it was, therefore, much needed; and Prof. Schweitzer has furnished one, which, though brief, will be likely to arrest attention, and lead expositors who differ from him to reconsider their interpretations of the Apostolic language. For this language has

¹ Die Theologie des Neuen Testaments. Ein Handbuch für Academische Vorlesungen und zum Selbststudium. Von J. J. Van Oosterzee. Einzige Autorisirte deutsche Übersetzung. Von Fritz Körper. Barmen. 1869.

² Hinabgefahren zur Hölle als Mythos ohne biblische Begründung durch Auslegung der. Stelle. I Pet. iii. 17-22, nachgewiesen. Von A. Schweitzer, Dr. und Prof. Theol. Zürich. 1868

been understood by a large majority of interpreters, to teach the descent of Christ into Hades, after crucifixion, for the purpose of making known to the dead, the completion of his work on earth. But this view of the text is opposed by Prof. Schweitzer, as untenable, and the reasons which he brings for pronouncing it so, appear to us convincing. According to his own explanation, Peter refers to preaching, which was addressed to "the Spirits in prison," in the days of Noah, while they were yet in the flesh; and this preaching consisted, to a great extent, in the building of the ark. By this work, undertaken at the command of the Spirit of Christ and prosecuted, through many years, to completion, in the sight of the people, they were graciously warned to repent; but the warning was disbelieved, the people persisted in disobedience, and at last the flood swept them away. We cannot attempt any discussion of the questions suggested by this monograph, but will merely say, that for several years we have been convinced that the interpretation defended by our author, is, in its principal features, correct, and at some future time we hope to submit an examination of the passage to the readers of this Quarterly.

The Epistle to the Hebrews Explained, by J. H. Kurtz. Milan., 1869.¹ The author of this commentary is best known to American scholars by his works in church history. But he has also given to the public two very instructive volumes upon the "Mosaic Sacrifices," and the "Old Testament Sacrificial Worship." The preparation of these volumes led him, of course, to a very careful study of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and we are not, therefore, surprised at the appearance of this commentary. And so great is our confidence in the writer, that, deviating from our usual course, we direct attention to his work without having read it.

The Gospel of John. Four Lectures. By J. J. Van Oosterzee, 1867.² In the first of these lectures the author defends the genuineness of the fourth Gospel; in the second, he treats of the mutual relations of the Synoptical Gospels and that of John; in the third, he examines the narratives of miracles in John's Gospel; and in the fourth he considers the person of Christ, as portrayed by John. These lectures are worthy of being translated into our own language, as well as the German.

ALVAN HOVEY.

¹ Der Brief an die Hebräer Erklärt. Von J. H. Kurtz. Milan.

² Das Johannesevangelium. Vier Vorträge. Lüttersloh, 1867.



THE BAPTIST QUARTERLY.

UNIVERSITY CORPORATIONS.

1. *Geschichte des Römischen Rechts im Mittelalter.* Von F. C. VON SAVIGNY, Zweite Ausgabe. Heidelberg: 1834.
2. *Geschichte der Pädagogik vom Wiederaufblühen klassischer Studien bis auf unsere Zeit.* Von KARL VON RAUMER, Zweite Auflage. Stuttgart: 1854.
3. *The English Universities.* From the German of V. A. HUBER. London: 1843.
4. *The Reorganisation of the University of Oxford,* by GOLDWIN SMITH. London and Oxford: 1868.
5. *Schools and Universities on the Continent,* by MATTHEW ARNOLD, M. A. London: 1868.

THE question of University Reform, so long confined to a discussion of the comparative advantage of certain studies, has, of late, extended over a much wider range, and the general administration of our higher academic institutions is attracting more and more attention. The efficiency of these institutions must depend so largely upon the direction given by those entrusted with the supreme control, that it cannot but be a matter of surprise that the constitution of college corporations, instead of being the last, should not have been the first subject of inquiry. As a contribution to a more correct understanding of the whole matter, we propose to review the historical development of these venerable bodies, which, once a year, as the season of our annual commencements comes round, arouse from sleep, and taste, for a single day, the bliss of resurrection. For they are not less the legacy of a former age than the mysterious parchments which express, in unknown terms, their periodic functions.

An inquiry into the origin of universities, directly opens one of the most brilliant chapters in modern civilization. Mr. Merivale allows himself to speak, in his *History of the Empire*, of the two great universities of Alexandria and Athens, but the term cannot be accurately applied to any of the ancient schools. Universities sprang out of wants which ancient society never felt, and were quickened with a motion and a spirit of which it never dreamed. The Theodosian code abounds in regulations respecting education, yet affords no trace of the existence of any such great corporate centres of intellectual life as we encounter at a later period. After the dissolution of the Western Empire, instruction gradually ceased to be a concern of lay society, and sought the fostering shelter of the Church. From the fourth to the twelfth centuries, the only schools in Europe that deserved the name were connected with the monasteries. At that of Saint Médard, four hundred students were gathered in the sixth century. The vast schemes of social reconstruction that engaged the capacious intellect of Charlemagne assigned to education a conspicuous place; but the Austrasian Cæsar was before his time, and his famous palace-school proved a premature experiment.

Not till the Feudal System had taken effectual possession of western Europe, did that remarkable intellectual tendency develope, which, under various forms, has been perpetuated to the present day. It is in the twelfth century that we must place the proper beginning of universities; a movement in which all Catholic and Feudal Europe shared. For it is now well understood that the true initial point in the intellectual regeneration of the European mind must be sought, not in the glittering Italian Renaissance of the fifteenth century, when Grecian art and letters were revived, under the benignant auspices of the Medici, but in an earlier movement, within the limits of the proper Middle Age. Of this great awakening, the rise of Modern Languages, the rise of Gothic Architecture, and the rise of Universities, are the three illustrious monuments. While, therefore, the secondary schools of Europe have a long history, joining on, as they do, to the traditions of Roman culture, the universities, like the free towns, must be regarded as the product of the mediæval period. And that singularly sympathetic social state which, during this period, sprang from the mixed influence of Latin Christianity and the feudal spirit, and which made western Europe, in effect, one community, explains their rapid increase and their striking internal correspondence. From the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries they exercised a continuous and controlling influence on the intellectual, the religious, the political development of the leading European

States. For they were not simply schools of instruction for the young; they were far more teeming centres of thought and study, where leading minds from every nation were drawn into eager and stimulating conflict. It is not too much to affirm that they led the way in all the great movements by which Western Europe emerged from the Middle Age. Whether we consider the momentous revolution in modes of apprehending truth, betokened by the scholastic philosophy, that system so aptly named by Frederic Schlegel, the Rationalism of the Mediæval Church, or the change in ecclesiastical theories represented by Gerson in the successive councils of Pisa and Constance, or, what was not less far reaching in its results, the essential modification of feudal monarchy, effected by the maxims of Roman jurisprudence, we are equally confronted with the everywhere-operative influence of the great mediæval universities. They furnished Philip the Fair the cruel weapons with which he carried through his relentless persecution of the Templars; they undermined, with subtle dialectics, the mighty structure which Hildebrand and Innocent had built; they wrested the mind of Europe from its perilous subjection to tradition, and kindled the torch destined one day to be seized by Bacon and Descartes.

The influence of universities, however various the direction which from time to time it followed, was everywhere essentially the same. For they everywhere presupposed the same spirit of intellectual independence which they everywhere most powerfully aided to develop. They were arenas for the unrestricted interchange for the foremost scientific and philosophic thought which the age afforded. At a time when the art of printing was unknown, and when the oral communication of ideas was the most effectual, they rendered a service to society, which finds its most perfect analogy in the free press of modern times. This prime characteristic of unhampered intellectual freedom was the secret of their living power. They were fields on which the master spirits of the age were matched against each other, not so much like modern schools as like modern reviews and essays. They were frequented by men of more mature development than those to whom the designation, student, is now restricted; a circumstance which helps to explain some of their most striking internal features, and renders credible the statements respecting the great numbers who frequented them. Thus it is stated that, in the fourteenth century, the university, and those depending on it, made a third part of the population of the French capital. When, on one occasion, the whole body went in procession to St. Denis, one end had reached the door of the cathedral before the other had passed the

city gate. The crowds at Oxford and Bologna were hardly less. And making every allowance for exaggeration, we can well understand how such great multitudes should have been drawn together, when we bear in mind that life at the university was not, as with us, the brief prelude to a wholly different career, but afforded the very widest circle of aspiration and achievement.

The oldest universities were not foundations, in our sense; that is, they were not originally established by any formal act, but arose gradually from the voluntary impulse of students to gather about some inspiring teacher. He received neither appointment nor support from any authority above him. His sole claim on the attention of his hearers rested on his eminence over them. Such were Irnerius and Gratian at Bologna, and William of Champeaux and Abelard at Paris. All these had taught before any legal incorporation of universities had taken place.

At nearly the same time, that is, during the first half of the twelfth century, three schools, in three different cities, became illustrious in three different departments: Salerno for medicine, Bologna for civil law, and Paris for theology. The first of these, although the most ancient of the three, may be dismissed from any further mention, not only for the reason that very little has been preserved respecting its early history, but also because its influence upon the growth of later schools is imperceptible. But Bologna and Paris require particular examination, for they were the most illustrious and influential universities of the Middle Age, and furnished the models after which all subsequent institutions were arranged. In the organization of these two, there existed, from the outset, a striking difference. At Bologna, the whole body of students formed the corporation, choosing from their own number the governing body, to which the instructors were subjected. At Paris, on the contrary, the professors formed the corporation, the students having no share in university administration. Bologna became the pattern for all the universities that sprang up in Italy, and Spain, and France; while Paris furnished the model to Germany and England. That the French universities should have looked, not to Paris, but to Bologna, was due to the fact that they were designed chiefly for the study of Roman law. The difference between Paris and Bologna was the result, in part, of the republican spirit of the Italian city and, in part, of the different nature of the studies. For the study of theology disposed the mind to a spirit of subjection to authority, more especially as so many of the students had received their early training in the cathedral schools.

We may take, therefore, these two universities as models of the whole system which prevailed throughout western Europe, although it should be borne in mind that they were not exactly copied, but, both in Germany and in England, received essential modifications. In Germany, especially, was this the case after the Reformation, when the universities adapted themselves with great freedom to the new wants of the time. The Reformation marks, in fact, the dividing line between the mediæval and the modern systems.

The enthusiasm of Italian antiquaries has traced the University of Bologna to the reign of Theodosius the Second. But, leaving the domain of fable, it is sufficient reason for not fixing the origin of the institution with chronological exactness, that it dates from no formal authorization. The fame of a great teacher, and the eagerness of students, established at Bologna a school of civil law, long before any corporation had been created. The university was recognized, rather than established, by successive imperial edicts. The first of these was the "Privilege" of Frederic Barbarossa, published at the Diet of Roncaglia, November, 1158. Although there is no mention in it of Bologna, yet there was no other city to which it could apply. It had a two-fold operation. In the first place, foreign students were put under special protection of the laws. They could travel without restraint; any injury done them was punished with unusual severity; none of them could be called to account for the misdemeanors or debts of their countrymen. In the second place, if accused of crime, they had the choice of being tried by their teachers or the bishop. Thus, the foreign students were rendered, in great measure, independent of the municipal authorities. It is perfectly clear, therefore, that while this "Privilege" of Frederic conferred great immunities, it was not, in any proper sense, a charter. There is no mention of rector or university, for the reason that none as yet existed. Nor was the act limited to Bologna only; it included any university and any students that might afterwards exist in Lombardy. The whole transaction strikingly illustrates the manner in which the oldest European universities gradually grew up. It is impossible to study it without being reminded of the similar manner in which the most vigorous of the free cities came into being, not by any formal charters of incorporation, but winning their liberties through successive concessions of feudal lords. The universities were products of a movement like that from which the communes sprang; only in the one case it had its origin chiefly in intellectual, in the other, in social and material causes. In the case, however, of the Bologna University, these intellectual, and social, and material causes were very curiously blended.

To comprehend the causes of this intermixture, we must bear in mind that the extraordinary development of the study of Roman jurisprudence, which was seen in the Italian cities during the twelfth century, and which gave Bologna its eminence as a place of study, was not the result of accident. The story, so long repeated, of the discovery of the Pandects at Amalfi, has been long exploded. Both the authorities relied upon to prove it, are at least two centuries later than the occurrence they attest, and both come to us in a shape exposing them to great suspicion. The older and more trust-worthy chronicles make no mention of the incident. According to another, though somewhat later statement, the famous manuscript had been in Pisa since the time of the Emperor Justinian. Either account must be ranked with the innumerable fables with which local patriotism labored to adorn the annals of each petty Italian State. The great revival of the civil law was due, not to any accident, but to a social and political necessity. Leaving aside the disputed question, on which Savigny and Carl Hegel are so much at variance, whether the old Roman municipalities were preserved in Italy from the fifth to the twelfth centuries, there is no ground whatever for supposing that a knowledge of the codes had ever perished. And when, during the contests between the Popes and the Hohenstauffen princes, the Italian cities suddenly sprang into new importance, experiencing, from their peculiar character as great commercial centres, a variety of novel wants for which the feudal legislation made no provision, the Justinian code supplied precisely what was needed. The study of Roman law was not a mere literary or antiquarian diversion; it met a great public want. The peculiar situation of the Lombard cities, their invigorated civic spirit, the unaccustomed and manifold relations created by their commercial enterprise, the enhanced value imparted to personal, in distinction from real property, the endless and intricate questions connected with commercial law, were the true reasons why the refined system of the Roman code was substituted for the rude process of the feudal tribunals. This circumstance has an important bearing, as showing how universities, instead of holding themselves aloof from the tendencies of society about them, were, in reality, created by these very tendencies. Never was there a more striking instance of an attempt to apply science to the practical concerns of life, than was seen in the lectures of Irnerius at Bologna; and never was an institution in more hearty sympathy with the leading movements of the time.

The internal constitution of the university, with which we are now especially concerned, was of gradual formation, having for its basis a

series of statutes finally confirmed by Innocent the Fourth, in 1253. In accordance with a somewhat singular provision, these statutes were revised and corrected every twenty years, by eight scholars appointed for that purpose. The slow development of the system is seen in the fact that it is not till near the close of the twelfth century that we find any mention of the Rector, the official head of the university. The jurisdiction of this officer was very extensive, and entailed endless disputes with the municipal authorities, who sought in vain to establish a control over him. His powers were finally confirmed by a papal edict of the year 1224. After this time, the students, singularly enough, were amenable to four jurisdictions. The first was the ordinary local; the second, special, resting on the Roman theory of a corporation; the remaining two were based on the "Privilege," granted by Frederic Barbarossa. These four jurisdictions were exercised respectively by the city, the rector, the bishop, and the professors. The inevitable confusion arising from this conflict of authority, was, more than once, the means of bringing the university to the verge of ruin. For the most part, however, these disputes confirmed and extended its immunities.

It should be carefully borne in mind that, at the outset, Bologna was simply a law school; for the term "*Universitas*," did not, by any means, as is commonly supposed, imply a seat of learning in which the four faculties of arts, theology, law, and medicine, existed. Still less was it used in the English acceptation of a federal union of many separate colleges. Bologna bore the name of university for two centuries before any provision had been made for the study of theology, and at Paris, the Roman law was not introduced until the year 1679. In the same way, Salerno and Montpellier, for a long time, contained only the faculty of medicine. In the technical language of the codes, the word "*Universitas*" included both things and persons. In the latter sense, it denoted a plurality of persons associated, by law, for a common purpose; in other words, a corporation. Thus, at Rome, any trade association was termed a university; and, in ecclesiastical phrase, the canons of a cathedral were sometimes designated by the same title. When applied to those associated in learned studies, it was originally qualified by the words "*magistrorum et scholarium*;" but in the fourteenth century these were dropped, and the designation "*Universitas*," by common consent, applied only to the higher schools of learning.

Owing to the enormous throng of students, amounting, in the early part of the thirteenth century, to ten thousand, the law school of Bologna was divided into two sections, according as the students

were from Italy, or from beyond the Alps, and to both these bodies, the *citramontanes* and the *ultramontanes*, the term university was equally applied. In 1316, after a long struggle, medicine and philosophy were created into a distinct faculty; and finally, in the latter part of the fourteenth century, a theological school was established by Innocent VI. This latter was copied from the Parisian model, and was, therefore, a *Universitas magistrorum*, not *scholarium*. From this time, Bologna really included four universities; two of civil law, one of medicine and philosophy, and one of theology. Ultimately, the two schools of law were combined in one.

If now we examine this university of law as a corporation, we find that it was composed of three distinct classes, enjoying three distinct kinds of academic rights. Full academic rights were accorded only to the foreign students, and these, when convened by the Rector, constituted the proper corporation. The students who were natives of Bologna, could neither vote in this assembly, nor be elected to any academic office. This distinction had its origin, partly in the special immunities accorded to foreign students by the "Privilege" of Frederick, and partly in the legal relation of the native students to the municipality. The university feared that its independence might be compromised by entrusting any jurisdiction to these students. The professors held a wholly subordinate position. Not only at their first appointment, but every succeeding year, they were required to swear obedience to the Rector and the students. For any disobedience they were liable to punishment by fine, or to be deprived of the right to teach. They could not go on a journey without permission of the rector, nor be absent more than a week, except by consent of the whole university. They had no part in the university convocation, unless called to fill the office of Rector. In all other respects, their rights and duties were those of ordinary students.

The two great bodies of law students were further divided, in accordance with a custom that became universal, into nations; of which, at first, there were no less than thirty-five. The number, however, as well as the name of these nations, were subject to constant changes. The German nation possessed special privileges, the students being allowed to take an oath, not to the Rector of the university, but to their own procurators. In addition to these nations, there were associations of poor students, deriving support from a common fund, which were termed Collegia. These charitable foundations, the germs of the great collegiate establishments of Oxford and Cambridge, never, at Bologna, exercised any important influence.

The Rector was required, by statute, to be twenty-five years old, to

be unmarried, and to possess sufficient pecuniary means to enable him to meet the expenses of his dignity. It is a striking evidence of the lay influence prevailing at Bologna, that no member of any religious order could be chosen to the office. The Rector, whose term of office was limited to a single year, was chosen by his immediate predecessor, by the counsellors, or representatives of the nations, each nation having one, and by certain electors appointed by the university at large, and selected from the nations in a certain order. The Rector took precedence, not only over bishops and archbishops, but over any cardinals who might be enrolled as students; a provision which affords another striking illustration of the difference between a great mediæval university, where men of all ages were collected, and a modern seat of learning. The ordinary jurisdiction of the Rector included all members of the university, but was generally limited to academic discipline. In more serious cases, the municipal authorities acted with him. He was also assisted by the counsellors of the nations, who formed an academic senate. The German nation was represented in this body by two members, termed procurators. The rights of the university were defended in all outside tribunals by its Syndic.

Nothing connected with the history of university corporations is more curious and intricate than the subject of academical degrees. When these were first conferred cannot be ascertained, but they seem to have been in use at least from the middle of the twelfth century. The title "Doctor," literally teacher, implied no more than that the person bearing it had a right to instruct. It seems a most reasonable conjecture of Savigny, that the degree was a device for preventing unauthorized persons from claiming the immunities granted by the Emperor Frederic. The rank of doctor was conferred by cooptation, and by the sole authority of the respective faculties, until frequent abuse caused the Archdeacon of Bologna to be joined with them. Degrees were first granted only in civil law, but canon law and medicine soon followed. Candidates were examined, both in public and in private, and for each examination a distinct rank was given. For the canon law, six years' study was demanded; for the civil, eight. The public examination was held in the cathedral, where the candidate delivered an oration, and received his ring, book and cap. The students and professors entered and left the cathedral in a procession, a custom which most of our American colleges retain to the present day. It is a notable feature of the Bologna university that women were sometimes admitted, both to its honors and to its offices.

The degree of doctor conferred the right to teach, not only in Bologna, but in all schools of law, wherever established. Only such as had received it could vote on the promotion of a new candidate. Connected with the exercise of this right, there was a peculiar condition. There were five distinct faculties, or associations, which regulated all promotions to the academical degrees. Although these faculties were termed colleges, they had no connection, of any kind, with the eleemosynary foundations before mentioned. They were five in number, corresponding to the faculties of civil and canon law, medicine, philosophy, and theology. Admission to the College of Jurists was limited to natives of Bologna, who must also be of Bolognese descent. At the head of each college stood a Prior. They had a common place of meeting near the cathedral.

At the beginning, there were no foundations for the support of teachers, but very early we find them receiving compensation. Thus, in the year 1279, the students agreed to pay a certain lecturer three hundred and twenty dollars, in gold, for reading a year on the Digest. In the year 1289, two professorships were founded, apparently with the design of attaching the professors more closely to the university. The salary was paid by the city, but the professors were chosen by the students. The election was only for a year. A beginning having once been made, the number of endowed chairs constantly increased. The schools, or lecture-rooms, during the whole of the thirteenth century, were in private houses. In the following century, public lecture-rooms were first provided by the university. The relation of teacher and pupil was more exclusive than in modern times; students, for the most part, attaching themselves to some single master. Lectures were divided into ordinary and extraordinary, a distinction which has given rise to much debate, but which Savigny has proved beyond doubt to have had its origin, not in the circumstance that some were given in public, and others in private halls; still less in the fact that some were free, and others restricted to those students paying a fee, but in the nature of the subject treated. Ordinary books, in the phraseology of the civil law, were the Digest and the Code; all others were extraordinary. The lectures on the former were given in the morning; on the latter, in the afternoon. Ordinary professors might lecture in the extraordinary courses, but the converse was not permitted. Besides, lectures, repetitions, and disputations, formed part of the courses of instruction.

The other universities of Italy differed from that of Bologna in no essential particular, with the single exception of the University of

Naples, which, both in the circumstances of its founding, and in its internal administration, formed a marked exception to all the rest. For, instead of springing from a great social necessity, and receiving its shape from the free development of the relation between pupil and instructor, it owed its origin, and its distinctive characteristics, to the will of a single man. The Emperor Frederic the Second, perhaps the most extraordinary character in the whole range of the Middle Age, who cultivated all liberal arts with the same ardor with which he wooed the dark-eyed daughters of the East, decided in the year 1224, to found, in Naples, a school of all the sciences, and on a far more comprehensive plan than had been, as yet, anywhere attempted. Since, in his contests with the Lombard cities, Frederic had conceived a prejudice against all kinds of corporate immunities, Naples was allowed neither rector, nor university of students. The supreme oversight was entrusted to the chancellor of the kingdom; all appointments and promotions, as well as the direction of the lectures, being in his hands. Degrees obtained at other universities received no recognition; for admission "*ad eundem*," new examinations were in every case required. Yet, with all this pretension to superiority, and with the most strenuous support that the government could give, Naples accomplished far less than any of her rivals. Although the claim has been put forth, in her behalf, that, in the thirteenth century, she was the only proper university in Europe, her influence was always insignificant. The genius of an enlightened but arbitrary ruler, could not supply the place of the free intellectual impulse which found such full scope in the republics of northern Italy.

If now, from Bologna, we turn to Paris, the type of another class of universities, the model which Germany and England copied, we are struck with essential differences; differences which may be explained in the circumstances in which each had its origin. Bologna grew up in a republic; her leading function was to expound those legal principles which the wants of a free commercial State had clothed with new significance; Paris, on the contrary, owed all her greatness to theology; and, naturally, assimilated the temper of the church. She was the great Middle Age university; where Abelard and Peter Lombard taught; where Roger Bacon, and Aquinas and Dante studied; to which Henry II, of England, was willing to refer his memorable dispute with Becket; to which Christendom itself was ready to defer in the great schism of the West. "*Nos fuimus simul in Galandia*," was a password among scholars throughout Europe, and its was deemed sufficient ground for any academic regulation to add the words "*quemadmodum in Parisiensi studio*."

While there seems no reason for doubting that, for two centuries after the death of Charlemagne, Paris was frequented for purposes of study, a regular succession of instructors can be deduced only from the time of William of Champeaux, who opened a school of logic, in the year 1109. The oldest documents relating to Paris, as a seat of study, are two decretals of Pope Alexander III, the earliest of which, dated 1180, was directed against the practice of exacting fees for licenses to teach. An ordinance of Philip Augustus, of the year 1200, makes the first mention of a Rector. The division into four nations existed as early as 1206. And, lastly, in a decretal of Innocent III, in the early part of the thirteenth century, the title "Universitas" is first applied. The papal sanction was indispensable for an institution in which theology was the leading study. By a decretal of Nicholas IV, near the close of the same century, it was ordained that degrees at the University of Paris should confer similar privileges in every country of Christendom.

In the constitution of the University of Paris, the first thing to be remarked is that, from the beginning, there was only a single body; so that we find nothing of the distinction between independent corporations existing in Bologna. A second point of difference was that the administration was wholly in the hands of the instructors, the students enjoying no participation. To the general governing assembly belonged, originally, all who had received the degree of doctor, or of master; and these, for a long time, were identical with the actual teachers. When, however, it gradually became the custom for many to take a degree, who did not intend to teach, the right to sit in the university assembly was restricted, as a rule, to those performing the duty of instruction. In this peculiarity of her constitution lay the chief ground of the great influence which Paris exercised. For, while the Italian universities made it their chief aim to secure the freedom of the students, and to call eminent professors, the University of Paris took part in great theological controversies, pronouncing her opinion as one organic body. This thorough academic unity which could never have existed had the whole body of her students taken part in her deliberations, enabled her, at times, to fling a tremendous weight into the scale of European authority. Her influence was direct and undivided.

From a very early period, the students were divided into four nations: the French, the English, the Picard, and the Norman; and these, in turn, were subdivided into a multitude of provinces. Thus, the English nation embraced, besides England and Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the northern kingdoms. In these nations the pro-

fessors and students were alike reckoned, without any distinction of special faculties. But, in the middle of the thirteenth century, the university became involved in a bitter strife with the new mendicant orders, and, as a result, the doctors of theology were erected into a distinct body. The doctors of canon law and medicine soon followed the example. From this time, the university was made up of seven distinct bodies: the four nations, and the three faculties. The faculties were governed by their deans; the nations by their procurators. The four nations were, in fact, the university, and with them the choice of rector rested. So, also, the students and bachelors of all the faculties were considered as belonging to the nations; the faculties being made up of doctors only. In the course of time, this relation was much modified, and the four nations came to be reckoned together as a fourth faculty, that of arts. But they still retained the original control over the election of the rector.

In the internal organization of the Paris University, the colleges deserve particular attention. These were, at the outset, as in Italy, mere foundations for the support of the poorer class of students; but, by degrees, they were greatly multiplied, becoming not simply foundations for the poor, but boarding houses for the rich; so that, at last, it was the exception to live out of college, such students being known as martinets. As these were less amenable to discipline than college students, the legislation of the university was turned especially against them. The oldest and most famous of these colleges, the Sorbonne, was founded in 1250. These differed wholly from the English colleges in being appropriated, for the most part, to single faculties. Thus the theological faculty was collected at the Sorbonne. Regent masters were nominated, by the several faculties, to lecture in the colleges; and, in the course of the fifteenth century, instruction in the colleges came almost wholly to supersede the university lectures given in the public schools.

The head of the university, as in the Italian universities, was the Rector, who must be single, and held his office, at first, for four weeks; but after the year 1279, for three months. He was chosen by electors named for that purpose by the four nations. The Rector, with the four procurators, constituted the ordinary government of the university. He was only eligible from the faculty of arts.

The fact that the university was situated partly within the diocese of Paris, and partly within the abbey jurisdiction of St. Genevieve, was the occasion of an important modification in the manner of conferring degrees. For it had always been the prerogative of a bishop to grant licenses to teach within his diocese, and the same

power was claimed by abbots within their territories. The exercise of this power was usually delegated by the bishop, or abbot, to his chancellor. Hence it followed, at Paris, that promotions to all degrees must be made with the concurrence of these officers; the chancellor of the church of St. Genevieve, being the chancellor of the faculty of arts, and the chancellor of the diocese of Paris, of the remaining three faculties; and, therefore, considered, in general, chancellor of the university. But while the chancellors regulated the conferring of degrees, they had no power whatever to interfere in other departments of administration.

In the middle of the twelfth century, there arose among universities a violent prejudice against the study of the civil law. In councils held during that century, the study was repeatedly interdicted to monks, a prohibition extended, in the next century, to the whole body of the clergy. From this prejudice arose the remarkable decretal of Honorius III, in 1220, by which all lectures on Roman law were forbidden in Paris and its immediate neighborhood. Theology and arts were the glory of the university.

The time when academical degrees were first conferred at Paris is uncertain. According to some, they were coeval with the university, while others hold that they were borrowed from Bologna. The earliest degrees were those in arts. In the middle of the fifteenth century, the course of study requisite for obtaining the degree of bachelor of arts covered three years and a half. The candidate was next required to devote an equal period to the study of philosophy, and, if he passed his examination, received a license to teach the seven liberal arts. The seven arts were the *Trivium*, including grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic; and the *Quadrivium*, including arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. "This," says Matthew Arnold, "was the liberal education of the Middle Age, and it came direct from the schools of ancient Rome." To obtain the degree of doctor of divinity the candidate must have studied philosophy for seven, or if he belonged to a religious body, for six years. An additional probation of nine years was then required, so that the student must have been, at least, sixteen years connected with the university. Salaried professors were not known at Paris until the eighteenth century. The university, as a corporation, was always poor, never possessing any public buildings of its own; but schools were provided for the several faculties; and the endowments of some of the colleges were very large.

With the sole exception of the restriction relative to the study of the civil law, the University of Paris was a centre of the freest in-

tellectual activity. Like her sister of Bologna, she owed her vast influence to her vital sympathy with the movements of the age. Her glory culminated in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. When, in the fifteenth century, she became false to her own traditions, and refused to assimilate the new studies of the Renaissance, she rapidly fell from her proud position at the head of European culture. The splendid foundation of Francis the First, the only institution that kept pace with the progress of the sciences, was not connected with the university.

In the first half of the sixteenth century, the focus of free thought in Europe was the newly-founded University of Wittenberg. Since, however, the German universities, so far as their organization was concerned, were copies of that of Paris, they require no special explanation. The only important difference consisted in the fact that, in Germany the college system never attained any development. In all the older universities there existed Bursæ; but these were simply funds for the support of poorer students. There was no provision made for common residence.

The two great universities of England, whatever may have been their origin, unquestionably derived from Paris the model of their corporate organization. During all their early history, this similarity continued very striking. Thus, at Oxford, the students were lodged in private houses, as at Paris and Bologna; and the business of instruction, instead of being confided to an exclusive body, was shared by the graduates at large. The division into nations also continued for a time, but fell into disuse on account of the small proportion of foreign students. A reminder of this original division is still preserved in the two Proctors. The degrees, and the conditions of bestowing them, were also similar to those of Paris. The earliest application of the term "*Universitas*" to Oxford was in 1201, earlier than any instance where it is known to have been applied to Paris. The first formal charter of privileges was granted to Oxford in 1224, and to Cambridge in 1291, although legal instruments, recognizing the existence of the universities, are found of an earlier date. Both Oxford and Cambridge obtained a confirmation of their privileges from the Holy See.

Since Oxford stood, originally, within the diocese of Lincoln, the bishop, as in the case of Paris, claimed the right to interfere in university affairs; but, in the reign of Edward First, a violent dispute arose, which resulted in the entire emancipation of the university from episcopal jurisdiction. A similar dispute between Cambridge and the Bishop of Ely, led, although at a somewhat later period, to the same result.

The more pronounced ecclesiastical character of the English universities is shown in the absence of a Rector, an officer who, on the continent, was the embodiment of the civil, or lay influence. The head, both of Oxford and of Cambridge, was the Chancellor, a dignitary elected by the general body of graduates, but requiring the confirmation of the bishop. The office was held for a short period, and was always conferred on a resident ecclesiastic. The universities were accustomed, at the beginning of each new reign, to solicit a confirmation of their privileges. By the act of the thirteenth Elizabeth, all charters, liberties, and privileges, granted to both universities, were expressly confirmed, and their legal constitution settled. The two institutions were known to law as "The Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge."

Meantime, an internal revolution had been gradually accomplished, which was destined not only to subvert the constitution of the universities, but to change entirely the methods of instruction. This was the extraordinary development of the collegiate system, to which the continental universities present nothing parallel. The colleges of Paris were, it is true, richly endowed corporations; but they never supplanted, and never aimed to supplant, the university. In England, on the contrary, the universities came, by degrees, to be mere associations of colleges. This remarkable transformation can be most clearly traced at Oxford.

At Oxford, as in the case of Paris, the colleges had been originally founded for the support, and better discipline, of the poorer class of students. In the absence of the control supplied by the far more efficient organization of the nations at Paris and Bologna, the need of some such arrangement was more keenly felt. At first, the number of these charitable foundations was very small, in comparison with the halls where students were simply furnished with cheap lodgings. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, while there were about three hundred halls, there were only three colleges. All that was needed to establish a hall was that a few students should agree to live together, with some respectable graduate as their master. Simply the sanction of the Chancellor was needed to make the arrangement binding. The distinction between colleges and halls, consisted in the possession, by the former, of endowments. On this account, from the beginning of the fifteenth century, the colleges increased, while the halls rapidly diminished; so that, at the beginning of the sixteenth, while the number of halls had fallen to fifty-five, the number of colleges had increased to twelve. It had now become an established rule that all students should be connected with some

hall or college. The colleges, which originally had admitted only on the foundation, now began to receive other students. To comprehend the cause of the rapid increase of the wealth and influence of the colleges, it must be remembered that each college was a distinct corporation, governed by its own laws, and controlling its own funds. The college consisted of a head, variously styled provost, master, rector, president, principal, or warden; a body of fellows, who usually elected the head from their own number; and a certain number of scholars, or students, on the foundation. In nearly all the colleges, there were also exhibitioners, who received annual stipends, either from the college funds, or from the endowed schools where they had been prepared. Thus, it was inevitable that a corporate spirit should be developed. The fellows and students, naturally, came to look upon the interests of the particular colleges to which they were attached as more important than the interests of the university. The common and intimate academic life could result in nothing else. So that, in the course of time, what had been simply a contingent and accessory element, came to absorb all the rest.

The gradual subversion of the university was effected in two ways. While, in the beginning, the general academic administration had been in the hands of the regents, under which designation were included all who had acquired the right to teach, the colleges were now gradually entrusted with exclusive functions. The university retained the examinations, and the degrees; but the real work of instruction passed to the colleges, partly, no doubt, in consequence, as Professor Goldwin Smith remarks, of the decline of the scholastic philosophy, and the rise of the classical studies, which the colleges took up. By the statutes of Leicester, the heads of houses, with the doctors of the three higher faculties, and the two proctors, were constituted a body, to which was conceded the prior discussion of all measures proposed in convocation; and, by the subsequent statutes of Laud, an absolute initiation was given to the heads and proctors, thus making the heads of the colleges, in fact, the masters of the university. Thus it happened that a form of government, originally elastic, and allowing a free development, was exchanged for a system in which local and collegiate interests stood always in the way of any comprehensive changes. To make the dominion of the new powers more complete, the two proctors, who, from the beginning, had been chosen by the whole body of the graduates, were now elected, in rotation, by the colleges. This final step in the administrative revolution, converted what had been a great university into a mere aggregation of private corporations. It sufficiently explains

the intellectual torpor which prevailed, at Oxford, for the two centuries following; a torpor in such shameful contrast with her early history.

For, by these changes, the university instruction, although not formally abolished, was yet completely paralyzed. The whole influence of the heads of houses was thrown in favor of the college tutors, to the exclusion of the university professors. Attendance on the university lectures, except as a mere form, was not required, even for university degrees. The stimulating influence of great minds, in eager contact with new truth, was thus wholly lost. The right of teaching, once belonging to all graduates, was restricted to a single class. The public universities became private schools. And since, in consequence of the mediæval statutes with which most of the colleges were saddled, all graduates, save those of one profession, were excluded from position, it followed that all studies, not connected with that profession, were neglected. The once famous faculties of law and medicine found a refuge at the inns of court and the London hospitals. Even theology, under the depressing influence that prevailed, lost all genuine scientific impulse. The two great English universities became universities only in name.

It is a most significant circumstance, in the history of higher education in this country, that, just at the crisis when the great revolution in the English universities was completed, the earliest American colleges came into being. Harvard College, with its corporation of seven persons, a president, treasurer, and five fellows, was simply a copy of the model with which all the leading clergy of the colony of Massachusetts Bay were well acquainted. At a time when the college had supplanted the university, it was, naturally, a college that they essayed to plant. Notwithstanding the arguments which the late President Quincy advances, in his "History," there seems no good reason for supposing that the term "fellows," as used in the charter of 1650, is to be understood in any other sense than that familiar to those who used it. By usage, however, the title, in the course of time, ceased to be limited to resident instructors; and a distinction came to be established between resident and non-resident fellows, the former being known as fellows of the house; the latter, as fellows of the corporation. This distinction was recognized in the year 1712, when Joseph Stevens was elected fellow of the house. When, however, nine years later, Sever and Welstead claimed seats in the corporation, on the ground of being engaged in actual instruction, the claim was denied. As soon as the distinction between fellows of the house and fellows of the corporation had become thus

fixed, the general direction of the college passed into the hands of a body of non-residents, a change which led to the most important results in the constitutional form of all American colleges. In consequence of this change, the original significance of the term "Fellow" has been wholly lost; for the power of conferring degrees, the sole distinctive prerogative retained by the fellows of an American college, was never possessed by the fellows of an English college. In the charter of Brown University, granted by the General Assembly of Rhode Island, in 1764, the original quality of the fellows is, in some measure, preserved. They are not only constituted a "learned faculty," but are charged with "the instruction and immediate government of the college." With a singular disregard of the plain intent of the charter, this duty of immediate supervision has been wholly renounced by the board of fellows; and is understood to be committed to an anomalous body, the executive board, made up, indifferently, of fellows and trustees.

The origin of this latter body, which, in many of our more recently founded colleges, has entirely absorbed the functions of the fellows, was as follows: Before the corporation of Harvard College had been created, there existed a board of overseers, consisting of the governor, deputy-governor, and magistrates, together with the teaching elders of the six next adjoining towns. These were entrusted with the general duty of supervision, which, in England, was exercised by Parliament. But their duties were simply of supervision, not of direct administration. They could only approve or reject the propositions of the board of fellows. This, too, is the theory of the functions of the trustees in the charter of Brown University. The fellows have the exclusive right to make and publish all laws and statutes for the instruction and government of the college; but these laws are not valid, unless approved by the trustees. While, however, at Harvard, the rights of the "corporation," or, in other words, the fellows, have been carefully preserved amid all changes of the overseers, at Brown, the fellows have lost their character, as a body charged with the instruction and immediate government of the college, and become, with the single exception of granting degrees, merged with the trustees. In many colleges no board of fellows exists.

As a result of this extended examination, it appears that academic governments have undergone a complete transformation. Beginning in Italy, with entrusting to students and graduates the whole charge of administration, it ends, in America, with excluding graduates from all share in academic government; committing the entire authority

to a more or less numerous body of non-residents, who not only need not be graduates of the institution which they control, but, in many cases, lack the qualification of a liberal education. Taking for our model the English colleges, just at the time when the English colleges were at their worst, we have preserved, even then, but the shell of the system, carefully eschewing all its valuable features. For the fellows of an English college were, at least, men of culture, and were directly concerned in promoting the interests of the body with which they were connected. The history of higher education in Europe begins with universities. The colleges were a later and subordinate growth. In this country, it has been precisely the reverse. We began with colleges; and are now, at least in the case of Yale and Harvard, endeavoring to engraft universities upon them. But, whether it be our object to have a good college, or a good university, it is clear that our present corporate system stands in need of thorough revision. No substantial progress can be hoped for until this is done.

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F. W. ROBERTSON ON BAPTISMAL REGENERATION.

IT was a favorite theory of Mr. Robertson's, that truth is a union of two contradictories.

Rejecting that method in theology which seeks to go between two opposite views, and to find the truth in a kind of middle region, or temperate zone, removed alike from either extreme, he regarded all great truths as having a latitude so wide that they could embrace within themselves every zone and every temperature of belief. He would tell the Calvinist and the Arminian, the Romanist and the Protestant, that, however widely they might be separated from each other, after all their separation is only geographical; and that the belief of each is, in a certain sense, necessary for the equipoise and completeness of Christian doctrine.

The application of this principle in the sermons on "The glory of the virgin mother," on the Sabbath, on Absolution; and on Baptism, tests its soundness quite sufficiently to satisfy us. For, in our view, it not only destroys all unity and homogeneity of thought, but presents an insuperable hindrance to any full assent to his conclusions. By the charm of his rhetoric, we are allured on through page after page, our attention easily enchained to the end of the discourse. But, if we analyze our mental processes meantime, we shall usually find that, instead of having been carried on in a straight line from

premise to conclusion, thus making the shortest distance between two points, as we ought, by a law of logic as well as by a law of mathematics, our mind has been in a state of perpetual oscillation, now strongly attracted in one direction, and now equally strongly repelled in another; but brought to no full persuasion of the justness of the author's views. One is constantly discerning the influence of this pernicious maxim, in his strange aversion to sharp discriminations and radical separations between the true and the false; his fondness for seeking the soul of goodness in things evil; his tendency to locate error on the extreme confines of truth, rather than within another and totally different kingdom; and to look upon human depravity as rather a misconception, by the soul, of its true position than its actual perversion from the right.

Paganism, in his view, is only the antipode of Christianity; Mariolatry, a truth german to Christ worship; and the world the reverse side of the church. In those discussions which are guided by this favorite axiom, his argument is found invariably to carry double, being apologetic on the side of error, as well as defensive on the side of truth; and thus his doctrine, by advancing upon us in a bifrontal attack, keeps both our assent and our dissent alike alert and busy.

To the doctrine of Baptism he gave more attention, perhaps, than to any other single subject of which he treats. In his works we have *two* sermons on the subject; *four* or *five* letters, in which the views of these sermons are very fully and elaborately drawn out; and the *catechism*, written by him for instructing his candidates for confirmation, which relates almost exclusively to the same subject. After a diligent study of these discussions, we confess that we have no difficulty in discerning a great and admirably stated truth running through them all; but then it is always seen writhing, Laocoon-like, in the folds of the two "*contradictories*," and hence is so disfigured and contorted, that it presents no very engaging aspect, unless we can extricate it from its agony.

If, in this argument, our author could only have been released from his bondage to the dogma of baptismal regeneration, we believe he would have presented one of the most scriptural and consistent theories of Baptism that has ever been drawn out. We say "if he only could have been released,"—for, at almost every turn of his reasoning, it seems as though he must be, so strongly does his argument gravitate in that direction. But a legitimate carrying out of his axiom, "Baptism does not make the fact, but declares it," would have landed him among the "miserable dissenters;" and since, to use his own words, he "would far rather hold the Romanist than the dis-

senting evangelical vulgarisms upon the subject," he still subscribed with all his heart to both expressions of the formulary,—“a child of wrath before baptism, made a child of God by baptism.”

For the sake of convenience, we shall speak first of the views of *regeneration* brought out in this discussion, and then of the views of *baptism*, though, of course, the two doctrines are closely bound together and really inseparable.

His view of regeneration is given, *in nuce*, in the few following sentences, from one of his letters :

Christ revealed the fact that all men are God's children. . . . Baptism is that message to the individual. You, personally, especially by name A or B, are hereby informed of that truth. You are God's child. You are henceforth to live as such, not according to the old falsehood as a child of the devil, denying God your Father, living with no resemblance to him ; but henceforth redeemed from that into privilege. There is a difference, however, between being God's child by right and God's child in fact. All who are born into the world are God's children by right. They are not so, in fact, till they recognize it and believe it, and live as such. To believe it and live it, is to be regenerate. . . . A heathen is God's child, if he only know it. You send a missionary to him to tell him what he is, and to bid him realize his royal character ; but, being God's child, *de jure*, avails him nothing, unless he becomes so in fact, i. e., changes his life and character, and becomes, like his Father, pure and holy. Then he is regenerate. God's child before, unconsciously ; God's child now by a second birth, consciously. Nay, in fact, till now he was a child of wrath, in which I again take entirely the church words, “by nature a child of wrath.” . . . Baptism is, therefore, an authoritative symbol of an eternal fact, a truth of eternity realized in time, and brought down to the limits “then and there ;” then and there made a child of God ; but it is only the realization of a fact true before baptism and without baptism ; the personal realization of a fact which belongs to all humanity, and was revealed by Christ. In other words, it is redemption applied.¹

This, it will be seen, reduces regeneration to an exceedingly small matter. It is simply the giving of full credence to a piece of information. Baptism is the bearer of that information. It comes to a man who is stupidly sleeping in sin, and before he has ever asked for the portion of goods that falleth to him, or ever thought whether he has any portion, it puts its hand upon his head, and says, You are hereby informed that you are a child of God, and have a right to all the privileges and emoluments of sonship. If, perchance, the person thus addressed is incredulous, and refuses to believe, the message im-

¹ Letters, vol. ii, pp. 67-8.

mediately becomes practically reversed, and announces to him that he is a child of wrath, i. e., the "eternal fact" which was to be transmitted in the "baptismal dew," by coming in contact with the chilling unbelief of the candidate, is precipitated into a practical fiction.

"*Baptism does not create the fact; it reveals it.*" It is the divine philosopher's stone, whose touch transmutes a "*de jure*" condition into a "*de facto*" one. The pure gold of grace was present, however, just as really before as after the subtle process of spiritual alchemy, but undiscerned by its fortunate possessor, and unrecognized by God. But now it is discovered, assayed, and stamped with God's image and superscription, and put into circulation.

All this is beautiful and satisfactory enough till some person brings back one of these rare coins to this ecclesiastical mint, and, displaying it all rusted and corroded with the pomps and vanities of this world, protests that it is spurious. In such a case, it would seem that our author would be driven to the admission that some of his "*de jure*" material was not genuine, and that the stamp upon it was the symbol of an unreal value. Not at all. The whole difficulty lies in a want of confidence in it, and in a failure to recognize God's mark upon it by the owner. Let him believe that it is genuine, and it is genuine; or, in his own language, "to believe (the fact declared in baptism) and to live it is to be regenerate."

Here is the same confusion of ideas introduced into the doctrine of baptism which the Transubstantiator has introduced into the Lord's supper. The thing demanded by the church, in each case, is the bringing in of the real presence into that which was designed simply for a sign and symbol. But, in this instance, both priest and people revolt from the materialism which an open, literal introduction of it involves; and so it is attempted to be done by a process of metaphysical sleight of hand, the belief in a practical falsehood being the *sine qua non* condition to the realization of a truth.

"Believe that you eat the body of Christ in the Eucharist," said Sir Thomas More, in his discussion with Erasmus; "and you eat it."

"Believe that you are regenerated in your baptism," says Mr. Robertson, "and you are regenerated." The divergence here from Scripture may be stated very briefly. The Bible represents men as "believing a lie that they might be damned." Mr. Robertson would have them believe a lie that they might be saved.

The secret of this strange paltering in regard to the most solemn question of the gospel is clear to any one at all familiar with Mr. Robertson's writings. It lies in his intense abhorrence of that doctrine of Calvinism which demands that a sharp distinction be recog-

nized between the regenerate and the unregenerate, coupled with his constrained assent to the doctrine of original sin.

Newman has told us how he learned, from the teachings of the Catholic Church, "to shade and soften the awful antagonism between good and evil . . . by holding that there are different degrees of justification . . . and that there is no certain knowledge given to any one that he is surely in a state of grace, and much less, that he is to persevere to the end."¹

Robertson seems to have studied in the same school. For he not only softens down these distinctions, but sweeps them quite away. "Take care," he says, "do not say of others that they are unregenerate—of the world. All who are born into the world are God's children by right." If there was any belief for which he cherished a dislike, amounting to positive aversion, it was the belief in the possibility of discerning the marks of regeneration in the individual consciousness, and by the inward witness of the spirit. And if there was any belief for which he cherished an aversion, amounting to absolute contempt, it was, that there is a distinct boundary line between the church and the world. That line he regarded as simply an optical illusion of narrow-minded bigots, to be swept from their disordered vision as speedily as possible.

And as for evidence of one's renewal, that was to be found in exact ratio to the credence given to the doctrine of baptismal regeneration; that evidence being greater or less on a sort of "graduated scale of assent," or according as the probabilities of this professed fact can be appropriated and translated into a practical belief.

It will be seen that, according to this theory, regeneration is anything but a positive, absolute fact. It is simply a purpose of God that presents itself to every man for his confirmation or rejection, an idea that hangs on the verge of reality, ready to become a fact or a non-fact, according as it is accepted or denied. The Romish theory of the mystic seed infused into the soul by baptism, is rejected as too grossly materialistic, and this fine etherialism is substituted in its stead, which we should describe as a divine decree of "let there be light" impinging on every human soul, and producing regeneration or unregeneration, according to the disposition which that soul presents. Thus the attribute of sovereignty is transferred from the Creator to the creature himself, and with him it rests to decide whether the birth of the soul shall be consummated. If the baptism does not miscarry, and regeneration becomes a practical fact, it is after all only a change of attitude, not a change of being that has

¹ *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, p. 57.

taken place, and the divine life in which it issues is something overlying the mind rather than something incorporating itself with it, and radically changing its organic qualities. Contrary to one of his own principles, that "Christianity works from the inward to the outward," we should say that his view of regeneration makes it something taken on to the soul at once, or by slow accretions, according to the affinity which it presents.

He certainly does not conceive of regeneration as a new creation, the bringing into being in the soul of that which did not before exist either within or without itself. He regards it simply as the embracing and appropriating of that which was already prepared and waiting to be received; or, to use his own words, it is "a truth of eternity realized in time, and brought down to the limits *then* and *there*." Thus any man's regeneration may be fairly said to precede his generation. It not only antedates conscious choice, but existence itself. As an experience, it may lie within certain fixed limits of time; but as a fact, it is dateless, at least by any human chronology, lying along the entire line of God's redemptive purposes, and coeval with the atonement itself. In the soul's renewal, the only really new fact that takes place is the baptism. That is precisely what Hartley Coleridge declares faith to be,—

"An affirmation and an act,
That bids *eternal* truth be present fact."

There is a saying of an old divine, that "a ceremony duly instituted is a chain of gold around the neck of faith; but if, in the wish to make it co-essential and co-substantial, you draw it closer and closer, it may strangle the faith it was meant to deck and designate." This, we believe, is exactly what Mr. Robertson's argument does. He did not wish to make baptism co-essential and co-substantial with regeneration; but his creed required it. And so, while attempting to take off the coarse and cumbersome chain which Rome has forged upon the neck of regeneration, he has substituted another, wrought of finer substance, and forged into an almost invisible tenuity; but whose delicate links of sophistry and error, while they bind in a less oppressive bondage, suffocate with no less certain death.

The doctrine of a radical renewal by the Holy Ghost, of a thorough revolution and reconstruction of the moral nature by the sovereign agency of the spirit of God, a change wrought in time and made cognizable to the consciousness, has no place in this theology.

But, while convinced that Mr. Robertson's view of regeneration is

thoroughly unsound, we believe that his theory of baptism, apart from its relations to this doctrine, has many admirable points; and, what is not a little remarkable, fits very closely to the true scriptural pattern.

We wish to notice some of these points, which will serve alike as points of agreement and points of divergence into views of our own.

In the first place, his statement of its design and import.

This is one which, we dare say, few pedobaptists would venture to accept; and one than which no Baptist could ask a better.

For, instead of defining it as a consecration, and thus making it the foreshadowing of a not yet existing fact; or linking it with the church theory of "prevenient grace," and thus making it the symbol of a hypothetical fact; or accepting the *bald dogma* of baptismal regeneration, and thus making it the immediate cause of a fact, he rejects all these views as equally absurd, and takes, without qualification, the Baptist view, and defines it as the public recognition and symbol of an already accomplished fact. Of course, he was assailed, as those always have been who have held this view, with the charge of voiding the rite of all substance and reality, and making it a mere empty form. He answered the charge well; but it is to be regretted that, by denying the possibility of recognizing regeneration by a credible evidence, he surrendered the only ground on which it can be strongly answered. For we believe that when these views are tested by their own definitions, Robertson's is the only one that makes baptism stand for a substantial fact.

The strict Episcopal view makes Baptism, when it has been performed, stand ever after for regeneration, as the currency represents the coin in the vault; but, at the same time, the church is so strongly convinced that her issue vastly exceeds the piety which she can show for it, that she asks the "judgment of charity," and so virtually goes into ecclesiastic insolvency, while she, meanwhile, still continues to send forth her bonds.

The Pedobaptist, who denies baptismal regeneration, usually puts the rite for a hoped-for renewal, thus making it simply promissory, with no security but the unmortgageable piety of others. Those who carry out Robertson's definition to its legitimate results, make baptism stand for regeneration, vouched for by the best possible evidence in an inward experience and in the external life, at the same time standing ready to recall the act, when they are convinced that, through a mistake of judgment, it has been wrongly applied. So that while, according to each view, the ordinance professes to represent the same thing, we believe that the last has every advantage for

representing it most fairly, and hence is least open to the stigma of being a hollow form.

And, moreover, this theory alone allows a simple and rational explanation of those exceptional cases which occur under every system. Few churches can deny the appearance of a reprobation, as well as an election among its baptized. How, now, shall the rite be explained in its application to the former class?

The English church, and those who hold the various modified forms of her doctrine, regard the baptismal act as proceeding from God. Hence they cannot consistently admit that the act is invalid in any case. For they certainly cannot suppose that God would make it a true presentation in one case, and a false presentation in another. There is no reason why he should equivocate in the language of symbols any more than in the language of literal statement. And if the act is his act, it must be, in each instance, a genuine expression, having its counterpart in the soul to which it comes. Hence there is no consistent course for the believer in baptismal regeneration but to maintain, inflexibly, that every baptized person, however bad in his outward life, has somewhere wrapped up in the folds of his ungodliness the true principle of divine life. The moment the church allows, as in the "Gorham judgment," referred to by Mr. Robertson, that a baptized person may or may not be regenerated, that moment she entirely destroys the consistency of her doctrine; and, what is worse, admits that the same solemn act of God may in one case be a literal act of new creation, and in another a hollow and utterly useless form. Hence the endless complications in which those who are compelled to meet this difficulty become involved.

Robertson (for it must be remembered that, in regard to the source of the act, he separates from those who carry out logically his definition, and takes the view of his church,) resorts to the expedient of regarding the baptized impenitent as simply acting a false part, living as a child of wrath, when his real character is that of a child of God. And so the "walking" of such an one, "according to the course of this world," is only sleep-walking,—the movement of a religious somnambulist, whom the call of baptism has failed to awake, but who, nevertheless, is likely to come to himself if he is faithfully reminded of his true character. Melville, in his sermon, "The Spirit upon the Waters," has no hesitation in believing that baptism is the fiat of new creation spoken over the formless chaos of the soul, but allows an indefinite time for the decree to be accomplished; and by distinguishing between regeneration and renewal, as the geologist distinguishes between the first great act of creation and the successive stages of

formation, he has the convenient resort of considering all such as exhibit no fruits of regeneration as in a kind of *azoic period* of the soul's new development.

Edward Irving, in his elaborate treatise on the subject, while maintaining most strenuously that the baptismal fact proceeds from God, and is his expression to the subject, and not *vice versa*, gets over the difficulty in regard to those whose lives prove them unregenerate, by a still more ingenious device. He says that baptism is necessary to constitute a person reprobate, just as it is to constitute one regenerate, as the spurious coin must have the stamp of the real in order to be counterfeit.

The view which we believe to be the scriptural one, demands no such novel expedient to render it consistent. We regard the act as proceeding not from God, but from the candidate himself. It is not God's call or annunciation to him, but his *sacramentum*, or oath of allegiance to Christ. If, through hypocrisy or self-deception, it is unworthily assumed, it is simply a false oath, and hence a totally invalid act; and that is all that need be said concerning it. No elaborate device of logic is demanded for releasing God from a seeming breach of his covenant; nor, on the other hand, any subtle mystification of words for endowing a baptized man with a character which is out of harmony with both his life and his consciousness. Those who hold this theory have nothing to prevent them from being perfectly honest, and, if a life gives no evidence of renewal, saying so frankly, instead of calling all the appliances of logic and sophistry into use for forcing that life into conformity to the prescribed standard.

Baptism being, in our view, simply a divine symbolic language, given us for expressing certain spiritual ideas, we believe it can be truthful only as it is *idiomatic*, the *vernacular*, so to speak, of the new life. If strangers and foreigners use it, their expression is to be taken as the expression of those who know not what they say. If deceivers employ it, it is simply wrested to the uses of perjury. In neither case is it necessary to vindicate the language from the charge of untruthfulness, that charge belonging entirely to those who falsely use it.

Of course, as we have already intimated, this view would involve the repetition of the act by those who, having unworthily received it, might afterwards become fit subjects of it. And this, we believe, is as it should be. We ought to become not only *Anabaptists*, but *Polybaptists*, rather than lay ourselves so fairly open to the charge of Dr. Bushnell, that we put ourselves in precisely the same position with the Pedobaptists by the fact that "in cases of open apostacy,

where there is a recovery, and the disciple openly testifies that he was not before a truly converted person, he is not rebaptized." If this be the fact, it is certainly most grossly inconsistent. As it is impossible to project the baptismal act forward upon a prospective conversion, so we believe it is equally impossible to go back and take the act of an effete profession, and make it the sign and seal of a real conversion. Baptism, assumed by proxy, and antedating its correspondent reality, is what the Baptist complains of in the doctrine and practice of the Pedobaptist. But if we could suppose that God would accept the act at all, from the hands of another, it is quite as supposable that he would receive it as the act of our pious parents, as the act of our former selves,—our old unrenewed man; and if the rite may antedate the reality at all, possibly it makes but little difference whether its date run back a few years, or fully into the period of unconscious childhood.

Again, we believe, there is a deep truth in the view of Mr. Robertson, that baptism, while it only realizes that which was virtually true before, yet really creates a new condition,—a condition which were impossible without it.

His illustration is this:

In Baptism I was made a child of God. Yes; coronation makes a sovereign; but, paradoxical as it may seem, it can only make a sovereign of one who is sovereign already. Crown a pretender; that coronation will not create the king. Coronation is the authoritative act of the nation, declaring a fact which was a fact before. And ever after, coronation is the event to which all dates back, and the crown is the expression used for all royal acts; the crown pardons, the prerogatives of the crown, &c.

Similarly with baptism. Baptism makes a child of God in the sense in which coronation makes a king. And baptism stands, naturally, in scripture for the title of regeneration and the moment of it.¹

If we might make child of God, as here used, synonymous with *Christian*, we would accept this statement, and thank Mr. Robertson for the admirable manner in which it is put.

For we have no hesitation in avowing our belief that baptism makes a man a Christian. Of course, it could only make him so, as he was so *de jure* before. But we would insist on a rigid distinction being made between a *regenerated* man and a *Christian*. The latter condition, as the greater, necessarily includes the former as the less; but it ought, by no means, to be considered as identical with it. Taking Mr. Robertson's illustration, we should say that the difference is precisely that between a prince and a king. A prince is heir

¹ Sermons, vol. II, p. 88.

to the throne by virtue of his blood relationship to the ruling monarch. A regenerated man is an heir of God by virtue of his spiritual relationship to Christ. A prince becomes a king by the act of coronation, the putting upon his head of the royal crown. A regenerated man becomes a Christian by his baptism, the putting upon his head of the coronet of the Holy Trinity. In other words, baptism is the formal initiation of a regenerated person into the kingdom of Christ, and that which alone can invest him with the rights and prerogatives of Christian citizenship. Hence that word *Christen*,¹ repudiated generally by the advocates of believer's baptism, is etymologically the most exactly expressive of the fact. It is the *Christening*, or putting of Christ's name and livery upon a man. It is the ceremony which declares his divine rehabilitation and introduction into Christendom; that which says to him, Call yourself no longer a *man* as descended from Adam by a natural lineage; but call yourself, henceforth, a *Christian*, because descended from Christ by a spiritual lineage. We may appear, in these statements, to magnify baptism unduly. But, we think, there is little to choose between the error of making baptism and regeneration identical, as the ritualist does, and making them simply parallel and coördinate, as the spiritualist often does. Unless the one be considered as the complement of the other, and the two as the necessary and correlated parts of one fact, we cannot well suppose that the administration of the former would effect any change in the status of the disciple. It does not answer our conceptions to regard baptism as simply a form, made to hand, for fitting on to the great fact of spiritual renewal, to signalize and illustrate it. It is a symbol; and a symbol not merely implies a corresponding reality, but is necessarily included in that reality. Call it a sign, if you choose, which simply shadows forth a fact; but a shadow must not only be the shadow of something, but every something must necessarily cast a shadow, if it be in the sun. So we believe that the state of being a Christian involves two facts,—a spiritual and a physical, a visible and an invisible, or a belief and a profession. That the first, if it be real, will express itself in the second; and that the second cannot be possible, in any genuine sense, without the first. Lange says, commenting on the words: "He that believeth, and is baptized, &c.," that baptism is here mentioned as "a natural, certainly also a *necessary*, consequence of faith;" with which we entirely agree, and add that, unless this consequence issues from it, an evidence of its genuineness is wanting.

¹ In Wiclif's translation, Rom. vi, 4, is rendered,—"*Sothli we ben togédere buried with him in Christendom into death.*"

The almost invariable linking together of these two commandments, in the conditions of salvation, surely points to a relation between them of something more than mere juxtaposition, or a relation of correspondence merely without any common root or vital connection. We are persuaded that instead of being parallel lines of duty, which run side by side without ever meeting, they both start from one point in the gospel, and converge to one point in the life of the believer; the baptism standing, henceforth, as the representative of regeneration,—no longer to be looked upon as a thin shadow and reflection of the spiritual fact, but its incarnation, its human form divine.

In the statement of Mr. Robertson, in the passage above quoted, that all the rights, and privileges, and prerogatives of the Christian life date back to baptism, as those of the king to coronation, he in no wise differs, we take it, from the majority of theologians. The statement is simply a reiteration of the view that baptism is the initiatory rite of the Christian church.

This view, however, though held nominally by all churches, seems to be reduced, practically, to the veriest ecclesiastical fiction in many of them.

Mr. Robertson's practice, as a minister of the Church of England, shows that he did not, or rather could not, regard the baptized as invested with a single immediate right of Christian citizenship, except the right to be undertutors and governors, sponsors and godfathers. *Confirmation*, supplementing baptism after a greater or less interval of time, is virtually the initiatory right of the Episcopal church. For it is through that alone that the candidate enters upon the full enjoyment of its privileges and blessings. If one does not choose to submit to that form, he remains, practically, an outlaw from the church. Baptism has said to him, "You are hereby initiated into the full rights and privileges of the visible church;" but ecclesiastical law says to him, You cannot have your franchise, as a citizen, till you have had the bishop's hands laid on your head in confirmation. In the English church, therefore, baptism simply initiates a person into the initiatory steps towards Christian citizenship; or, in other words, renders him *eligible* to membership in the church.

A similar fact is true in the practice of all Pedobaptists; baptism ushering only a part of its subjects into membership with the Christian community, and leaving subsequent events to determine whether the others shall become "fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household of God."

In the usage of some Baptists, it strikes us that there is an equal,

though quite opposite, inconsistency. For while they lay stress on the initiatory character of baptism, and demand it, with faith, as an indispensable prerequisite to the Lord's supper, they yet, by recognizing the validity of pedobaptist ordinations, practically admit that into the pulpit and into the exercise of the highest function of the Christian church,—the ministry of the word,—a man may climb up some other way without being a thief or a robber.

If, now, we are to take the assertion that baptism is the initiatory rite of the church, in any strict sense, it seems to us that it must be considered as not only antecedent to all properly Christian acts, but as conferring plenary privilege in the church. It is not an usher that merely conducts one to the porch of the church, and leaves him there, shivering and naked, with not a single shred of privilege to cover him. Nor is it a porter that demands its fee of obedience of those seeking the use of certain prerogatives and rights, but allows others to go unchallenged. It is that which instates him in full membership in the body of Christ, and opens to him every immunity of discipleship, "that to which all dates back."

Admirable service has been done by Mr. Robertson in exposing the grossness and absurdity of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, as generally interpreted in the Anglican church. He has no hesitation in branding it as jugglery and incantation, as debasing to the minds of those who hold it as degrading to the character of God.

The following is a fair specimen of his handling of the subject:

A child is to be baptized on a given day; but when that day arrives the child is unwell, and the ceremony must be postponed another week or month. Again a delay takes place,—the day is damp or cold. At last the time arrives; the service is read. It may require, if read slowly, five minutes more than ordinarily. Then and there, when that reading is slowly accomplished, the mystery is achieved. And all this time, while the child is ill, while the weather is bad, while the reader procrastinates,—I say solemnly,—the Eternal Spirit, who rules the universe, must wait patiently, and come down, obedient to a mortal's spell, at the very second that suits his convenience. God must wait attendance on the caprice of a careless parent, ten thousand accidents; nay, the leisure of an indolent or an immoral priest. Will you dare insult the Majesty on high with such a mockery as this result?¹

But we are inclined to think that Mr. Robertson's contempt for this doctrine grew out of his disposition to exclude all supernatural agency from the immediate event of regeneration, and his hostility to what Coleridge calls "the mischievous fanaticism of moments of con-

¹ *Sermons*, vol. II, p. 81.

version," quite as much as from his conviction of its coarseness and materialism.

If some dissenter had told him that, at a certain time and in a certain place, while bowing before God, in deep conviction and agony of spirit, pleading for pardon, he had suddenly felt his burden lifted, and the clear evidence of his acceptance revealed to him in his soul, he would have ridiculed the statement as a worse delusion, in the direction of airy sentimentalism and fanatical nonsense, than the other was in that of materialism.


The difficulty was that he could not conceive of the operations of the Spirit as referable to time and space; that he could not believe in the possibility of his touching a soul by a palpable impression and influence; that he could not conceive of conversion as a new creation, an "*opus operans et in presenti*;" and hence his dislike of every theory that gave to it the semblance of a definite reality, or recognized in its accomplishment an actual contact of the natural and the supernatural.

The general impression which we have received from a view of this subject is that this theory of baptism is an outgrowth of a theology shaped largely, as men's systems invariably are, by personal experience.

Robertson seems not to have known conversion, in his own experience, as an abrupt, definite, clearly-marked event,—a change like that of Wesley and Luther, made known and forever memorable to the soul by the awful pain and travail through which it was accomplished. With him, however real it may have been, it was much more vague and undefined. His theory of baptism strikes us as being the scripture theory, bent and accommodated so as to fit into all the peculiarities of such an ideal of regeneration. Evidently making little account of what is commonly termed "*experimental religion*," his theory of regeneration became experimental in an extraordinary sense,—a "*to be or not to be*," depending on the efficacy of the baptismal call.

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GROWTH AND HISTORY OF LANGUAGE.

Language and the Study of Language: Twelve Lectures on the Principles of Linguistic Science. WILLIAM DWIGHT WHITNEY, Prof. of Sanskrit, and Instructor in Modern Languages in Yale College. London: N. Trübner & Co., 1867. Charles Scribner & Co., New York.

Lectures on the Science of Language. First and Second Series. MAX MÜLLER. 1862 and 1865.

Histoire Générale et Système Comparé des Langues Sémitiques. 1re partie. Histoire générale des langues sémitiques. ERNEST RENAN. Paris: 1855. Seconde édition, revue et augmentée. 1858.

Compendium der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen. Kurzer Abriss einer Laut- und Formenlehre der indog. Ursprache, des altindischen, u. s. w. AUGUST SCHLICKER. Zweite Auflage. Weimar: 1866.

Zur Chronologie der indogermanischen Sprachforschung. GROSS CURTIUS; Mitglied der K. S. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften. Leipzig: 1867.

De la Forme et de la Fonction des Mots. Leçon faite au Collège de France. MICHEL BREAL. Paris: 1866.

A HUNDRED years ago, Father Coeurdeux, a French missionary in India, struck with the resemblance he had observed between many words in the sacred language of the Brahmins, and those of European origin, put the following question to the French Academy: How are we to explain the fact that a large number of Sanscrit words are also found in Greek and Latin, especially in Latin? The answer was not then to be had. It came nearly a half century later, in 1816, when Francis Bopp, then twenty-five years of age, issued in Frankfort-on-the-Main, his essay entitled "Conjugation-system of the Sanscrit language, as compared with Greek, Latin, Persian, and German." Others before him had contributed facts and advanced theories, tending to a solution of the problem. Frederic Schlegel, indeed, with the intuition of genius, had divined the answer. But it was reserved for Bopp to establish, by indisputable evidence, the

similar grammatical structure of languages spoken in India and Western Europe. His discovery flashed order into the linguistic chaos of the civilized world, and made a science of language possible.

"There is a science of language," says Max Müller, "as there is a science of the earth, its flowers, and its stars." The material it deals with is found in the words of human speech. It seeks to account for the existing forms in all languages, deducing the laws of development in each tongue and dialect, as well as the universal laws of articulate expression. It is the design of this article, as far as so limited a space will allow, to notice some of its main facts and results, and to illustrate its method. Its history, and the results of its investigations, are engaging more and more the attention of thinking men. They confront us in almost every field of philosophic and religious inquiry. To quote a recent English reviewer, "language is becoming the battle-ground on which the fiercest modern controversies must be fought out."

The science of language, (it still lacks any better distinctive name), was, up to the present century, scarcely more of a science than geology, when the Noachian deluge was held sufficient to account for fossiliferous strata, miles in thickness; or, than chemistry, when acids and crucibles were chiefly employed in the search for the philosopher's stone. Not but that classification had been attempted, and endeavors made to arrive at the principles and origin of human speech. The wisdom of the ancients wrought upon its profoundest problems. Plato, with sharp discrimination and subtle irony, set himself to attack various erroneous theories and etymologies. At a later era, Leibnitz, in this, as in other provinces of thought, was far in advance of his age, and almost anticipated, with his oracular utterances, the dicta of inductive science. Nor has there ever been any lack of etymologizing. Inquiries after the derivation of words, have employed the profoundest scholars. But they were conducted as a diversion, rather than a business, and in obedience to few or no acknowledged laws. Etymologists had a facility with letters equal to that of some apocalyptic expounders with figures. There was no transposition which they had not some process of reaching, there was no opinion which might not have etymological arguments in its favor. The burlesque derivations of Dean Swift, in his "Discourse to prove the Antiquity of the English Tongue," such as *A-kill-ease* (Achilles), *a straw-lodger*, or lodger in a garret, (astrologer), and Archbishop Whately's interpretation of Napoleon as akin to the Hebrew Noel-opan, "Godless revolution," are hardly more ludicrous than numberless attempts made in sober earnest. The oft-quoted

sarcasm of Voltaire was amply justified by the facts, when he called etymology a science which made little account of the consonants, and none at all of the vowels. If a science at all, it was a science without a method, and almost without an aim. It was satisfied to collect museums of verbal curiosities,—a philosophy of verbal excrescences, as it were, studying the *lusus naturæ* of speech. But a new era began, when out of the great multitude of languages, a group was identified with the same laws of growth, and demonstrably the offspring of the same ancestral tongue. This group is called the Indo-European, or Indo-Germanic,¹ and includes seven distinct families, to which belong respectively, the Hindu, Persian, Greek, Latin, Germanic, Slavonic, and Celtic. On the characteristic features of these families, and the further classification of them into numerous languages and dialects, we have not space here to dwell. Suffice it to say, it is within this group that the science under discussion has established its main principles, tested its methods, and laid its base lines for wider operations.

Nor is it by accident that the science of language has found its first and chief field among the Indo-Germanic tongues; that among these, indeed, it sprang into life. Linguistic comparison was practiced by Semitic scholars, long before Bopp and Grimm. But no conception of an independent science ever dawned upon their minds. In spite of the long historic career of the Semitic languages, the phenomena were too limited in their range to develop the scientific method, to encourage comprehensive inductions. The Semitic mind, in its slow and solemn march, was little adapted to produce those rapid transitions, luxuriant forms, and skillfully adapted vocal expedients, which were suited to call forth the extended classification of a new science. It is well remarked by M. Renan, that these tongues were no better adapted to produce comparative linguists, than Chinese history the philosophical historian.

The student of the science of language, pursues a different path from either the practical linguist, or the philologist. The former acquires a language to make it an instrument. A certain practical readiness of this sort may be acquired without methodical study, and without conferring, or being much aided by mental discipline.¹ A vigorous memory, a mind plastic to receive the peculiar idioms of a foreign tongue, may often succeed in this the soonest.

¹Aryan is the term employed by Prof. Max Müller to designate this group. It belongs, however, more appropriately, to the two Eastern families, of which the Hindu and the Persian are the modern representatives. The word itself is derived, by the best authorities, from *aryas*, "genuine," "noble," found in the Vedic Sanscrit.

Philology applies itself to study the literature of any historic race. It is often restricted to classical studies, but is used just as properly in those which relate to the language and literature of the Semitic, Romance, or English speaking races. It is occupied with the structure, as well as the contents, of a nation's written language. Through these it seeks to arrive at a comprehension of its historical career, its social, political and religious systems; in a word, the forces and phenomena of its culture and civilization. It includes, as auxiliary, the closest analysis of verbal forms, and syntactical structure, for the genius of a nation displays itself in the history of its words; with the grammar and lexicon we can look into its very soul. Philology, then, is philosophic history, at work with a national literature deciphering its contents, and interpreting its deliverances.

The science of language, on the other hand, analyzes the phenomena of human speech. A language without a literature, could possess only a secondary value to the philologist, while to the votary of our science, it might be the richest of mines. He will explore the Masso-gothic as eagerly as the Latin; the philologist would regard it as a literary relic, for most of his purposes awakening only something of the same curiosity as the pipe and wampum of an extinct tribe of Indians. Not so with the science of language. The "winged words" of the most ignorant savage, with no written characters, and a dialect that loses its identity almost in a generation, are with like earnestness put to the question. In all the discordant Babel of human speech, there is not a dialect heard, which it does not expect to reduce under its sway of law.

The ultimate elements of language, are articulate sounds, which, however, exist only in the combined form of words. A word, considered in itself, is the union of two or more articulate sounds. It is, moreover, representative of some notion, or idea; this idea being the animating principle, as it were, and determining its value. Our inquiries concern the form, not the idea represented, not the signification, except so far as the signification affects the form. On what principles is the word constructed? How has it come to be what it is? What original design, or what causes, have made it the symbol of the idea which it now conveys? How account for the revolutions in its pronunciation, that is, in its form? We say *sweet*, the Germans *süss*, our Anglo-saxon fore-fathers said *svête*, their Gothic great-uncles *sutis*, our relations in Italy *suavis*, in Greece *hêdus*, while the Indo-Germanic ancestors of us all expressed the same notion by *svad*. Why? The science which has learned to put these questions, is gradually eliciting the answers.

Every word in the Indo-European languages, is, or has been composed of two portions, root and flexional suffix. Letting the letter *B* represent the root, *S* the suffix, and *x* a variable co-efficient, we would have as the mathematical formula of the Indo-European word $R\bar{x}Sx$. Thus, *voc-abatur*, "he was called," $\delta\omicron\theta\eta\sigma\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma$ (*do-thēsomenos*) "about to be given." The slender form of the primitive word is hardly recognizable in the aldermanic proportions of its later age. The monosyllable, which at first expressed a single simple notion, received, in the course of centuries, successive additions fitted to express various relations. Thus, the latter example, in a manner altogether without parallel in English, defines, by its form, its respective relations to other words, as denoted by voice, tense, gender, number, and case. The suffix indicates relations, the root the fundamental notion. Each word has its root; that root was, at first, a monosyllable. *Vak*, "speaking" or "to speak," (being either noun or verb), *dā*, "giving," *i* and *ga*, expressive of motion, *ad* of eating, are examples of these primitive monosyllabic roots.

Most of the languages of this group, as spoken at the present day, would not furnish very clear evidence of the existence of these two elements in every word. In our own, we are scarcely conscious of the presence of determining suffixes. We add a *ly* to adverbs; a *d* or *ed* to our preterite, indicate a participial notion by *ing*, and a possessive genitive by *s*. But a flexional system has almost disappeared. Words have been mutilated and worn away, or have shrunk together, so as apparently to belie their origin. Familiar examples are *alms* from $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\eta\mu\omicron\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ (*eleēmōsunē*), *palsy*, equivalent to *paralysis*, *priest* to *presbyter*, etc. In *debt*, as pronounced, we have an illustration of how a root may disappear from the middle of a word. *Debet*, "he owes," has already, as far back as we can trace it in Latin literature, taken the place of *dehibet*, in which we recognize the preposition *de* "from" and *habet* "he holds." Thus, the root *hab* has entirely disappeared, and there remain only *de-t*, the preposition and personal suffix. The English depends so little on a system of suffixes, as a means of expression, that one would be at first inclined to deny its grammatical relationship with the highly flexional sister languages. It contains within itself, a language of monosyllables, reduced from previous polysyllables. In its independence of grammatical suffixes it reminds us of the primitive Indo-European language, when its words were uninflected roots. The number is very large of words used both as nouns and verbs, such as *love*, *cry*, *leak*, *endeavor*, etc. *Free*, *perfect*, and others, are at once nouns and adjectives. *Fit* does duty equally well as noun, adjective and verb. In *better* we have an illustration

of the same word being used as adjective, adverb, verb and noun,—the latter a plural in the sentence, “he should pay respect to his betters.”

Between the early age of uninflected forms, and the present, marked by such remains as these just noticed, of fuller forms which preceded them, lies a long, linguistic history. Words have had their rise and fall, their growth and decay, or to apply terms perhaps still more fitting, their accretion and attrition. Let us, at this point, turn aside to take the historic bearings of the group of languages we are considering. In a sense, they are one, and that one is the tongue of modern civilization. It contains most of the history of our civilization. Christendom speaks one language. It is the science of language which, in detecting this unity, has furnished a key to extant history and ethnology, and recovered many a page supposed to be irrecoverably lost. Incontestible evidences of original identity in their languages leave no doubt that the races already referred to had a common ancestry and a common home. Thousands of years ago, this primitive Indo-European tribe was in quiet possession of some fertile district of the highlands of Central Asia,—probably on the northern slope of the Hindu-Kush mountains. It wrote no history, it had no literature, that we know of. Its great achievement was the creation of the language, which was to become the common tongue of civilization and Christendom. This tongue is the temple enshrining the best thought of all the Christian centuries. Its structure reveals the genius and manifold endowment of this primitive people. The race that then began to found and outline a linguistic structure, so complex, and yet so perfect, to satisfy the requirements of its variously active intellect,—this race must, in the nature of things, push its conquests over the realms of nature and thought. At this early period, however, they had only the rudiments of civilization. Our only knowledge of their condition, is obtained from their vocabulary, drawn from the languages which have descended to us, but this trustworthy. This people used, perhaps had originated, the decimal system of numbers, but devised no numerical term beyond a hundred. The moon was their time-measurer, their months were moons. Beside the art of war,—the art which is preëminently cosmopolitan,—they had learned systematic tillage of the ground; to build and row boats; were in possession of flocks and herds; and these the bear and wolf ravaged, and the dog assisted to defend. They had houses, and these were infested by flies and mice. Gold and silver were known; barley was the grain chiefly cultivated, and they had learned to weave into garments, the wool and flax which

were among their products. The social state was patriarchal; the family life of a higher order than in some succeeding periods. The father was the "protector," the mother the "divider," she who apportioned the household bounty; and brother meant the "maintainer," the stay of the younger household, the staff of the parents' declining years.

History is silent respecting the breaking up and dispersion of this people. The period is so remote, that even tradition has faded out, till undecipherable. We have linguistic proof, however, that the first separation was between the Eastern and Western branches. The former struck southward, and then the Sanscrit speaking family, separating from the Persian, shut itself up in the Indian peninsula, to "muse and brood," as if dwellers in

"A land where all things always seemed the same,"

losing their place in the advancing column of political history, content to push their conquests far into the realms of abstract thought and speculation.

Westward came the remaining kindred, over paths long since obliterated, and apparently undiscoverable. The families of Northern Europe seem to have remained a certain time together, (that is, the Germanic, Slavonic, and Celtic races), and the Greek and Italic families were long together, at a date anterior to their earliest traditions. The mobile Celt was the first to reach the bounds of Western Europe. The metamorphoses experienced by the Celtic dialects, seem to accord with the frequent removals of the people who spoke them, as well as with the feebler tenacity of the Celtic character, along side of the more persistent Germanic and Italic races.

We have, then, in these Indo-European languages, an historical product, to a certain extent homogeneous. Different lines have met different fortunes, have been modified by different influences, but they retain distinct indications of their common lineage. Chief among the modifying influences, that to which are referable the larger portion of the phenomena which engage the attention of the investigator, is the process known as phonetic decay. This law, describing the gradual loss, in words, of their constituent elements, has been the prevailing influence in the linguistic history of this group, from a period long anterior to its written records. Illustrations of the operation of this law, have already been given in the case of *priest*, *alms*, etc., but they are not confined to such examples of unusual contraction. They abound on every page. *Count*, a title of nobility (stem *comit*), is a descendent of the Latin *comes*, and the verb *count* from *computare*, "to reckon together." *Goodbye* is a contracted

sentence, "God be with you." In Modern Greek, *mati* (μάτι), "eye," is the ancient diminutive *ommation* (ὀμματίων). Secondary languages, such as the French, for instance, abound in the most striking changes of this sort; *oiseau*, "bird," is from *avicellus*, diminutive of *avis*; *coucher*, "to lie down," from *collocare*; *même* "same," "self," from *met ipseissimum*; in *jour*, "day," we should not at first discover the Latin adjective *diurnum*; still less in *aujourd'hui*, "to-day," should we recognize the queer combination it contains, "*ad illum diurnum de hodie*."

In the above examples, the change has been wrought in the root. But it is upon the suffixes that the operations of phonetic decay have been especially manifest. In our western languages there remain only the faintest traces of the elaborate verbal structures which arose during the period of organization. From forms such as *bhar-ami*, "I bear," and *bhar-amami*, "I bear myself," the flexional endings have disappeared, we using the root *bear* with scarcely any grammatical termination. In the old-English *wiss* (compare *to wit*) there is nothing to indicate the existence of a future *vét-syāmi* "I shall know," such as the Sanscrit gives us from the root *véd*, still earlier, *vaid*. The *d*, which distinguishes the preterite of the English verb from the present, is all which is left of a whole system of flexional terminations corresponding to those in the Gothic. The Gothic *haban*, "to have," for instance, was thus inflected:

PRETERITE.

Sing.	1. <i>habai-da</i>	<i>I had.</i>
	2. <i>habai-des</i>	<i>Thou hadst.</i>
	3. <i>habai-da</i>	<i>He had.</i>
Dual.	1. <i>habai-dedu</i>	<i>We two had.</i>
	2. <i>habai-deduts</i>	<i>You two had.</i>
Plur.	1. <i>habai-dedum</i>	<i>We had.</i>
	2. <i>habai-deduth</i>	<i>You had.</i>
	3. <i>habai-dedun</i>	<i>They had.</i>

These examples, which might be multiplied indefinitely, show that the movements of language have been in one general direction. Elision of vowels and consonants, mutilation, corruption, weakened and shortened forms,—these are expressions which indicate the general character of the phenomena falling under the law referred to. Ages ago, the strata of language cropped out in bold, jagged forms; the waves of centuries have beat over them with a powerful denuding force. Weightier, more resonant, and elaborate forms have suffered compression and diminution. The explanation is as simple as the law is univereal. Language has been trying to get itself uttered as easily as possible. What was hard to pronounce has steadily given

way to that which was easier. The universal striving for euphony, which different languages show in different fashions, has been less to propitiate the taste, or to avoid discordant sounds, than to economize the energies of the vocal muscles. The exceptions to the law are only of a character to establish it, as the ascent of a balloon confirms the doctrine of gravitation. Even the apparently irreconcilable consonantal changes which fall under one series of permutations, expressed by Grimm's law, seem, on the theory of Prof. Curtius, more fully elaborated by Prof. Müller, to be but an inevitable result of the same principle.

The tendency of language, then, has been down the great inclined plane of phonetic decay. Full, open vowels, have given place to closer,—hard consonants, to soft,—rough, aspirated sounds to unaspirated. Other laws of phonetic change, subordinate to this, and more restricted in their application, have been discovered. Accumulating facts will disclose many others. Grimm's law of permutation, or displacement of consonants in the Germanic languages, was a discovery marking an epoch in linguistic science. It not only inflicted a summary execution on a host of false etymologies, but afforded proof sufficient to convince the most skeptical, of the correctness of the methods hitherto employed. There are special laws which belong to single languages. Such are preferences for certain vowels, certain single or collocated consonants, and a systematic rejection of others. Greek, for instance, abounds in certain diphthongs, in doubled letters within a word, in strong initial forms. A valuable collection of such specific differences and similarities in Latin, Greek, and Sanscrit, is contained in Dwight's *Modern Philology*, second series, in the chapter on Comparative Phonology. Some of these peculiarities of individual languages, or dialects, are among the most difficult of explanation; many of them must doubtless remain as ultimate ethnological facts. The impulse towards uniformity has often obliterated phonetic distinctions, and brought together forms widely different. Many words show traces of an incorrect analogy, or a popular but erroneous etymology. *Lantern*, for example, from the French *lanterne*, was long spelled *lanthorn*, as if it had meant lamp-horn, with which compare *inkhorn*; an interesting illustration is found, also, in the German *Sündfluth*, "sinflood" instead of *Sinfluth*, meaning the "great flood." The principle of differentiation, again, has operated in multiplying both articulate sounds and grammatical forms in the endeavor to give scope to the widening range of human thought.

Let us not be deceived, however, by such terms as decay, loss, attrition, when applied to the group of languages which we have

been considering. The loss of vocal weight and energy has not by any means rendered them less valuable as the instruments of thought. They have rather thus gained in potency for the accomplishment of their ultimate end. The common tongue of the Indo-European race has lost the ponderous resonance of its heroic age; in the later ages of its career it has become ampler in resources, infinitely more flexible and varied. The earliest words rooted like polypes in the bed of a primeval sea, struck out long branches, spread in every direction their Briarean arms. Uprooted and shattered by historic forces, they have, with viviparous energy, multiplied their life a thousand fold. Its alphabetic resources were compressed in three vowels and sixteen or seventeen consonants; its vocabulary, a few hundred monosyllabic roots. There are now not less than fifty-eight or sixty consonant and vowel sounds employed, and the vocabulary has been developed beyond computation. What would modern thought and science be without this multiplied variety? Civilization would be stifled, if thrust back into the swaddling clothes of its infant speech. Phonetic decay, conditioned by other mental and physical laws, has, in a variety of ways, promoted the availability of language, both by reducing the more unwieldy of its forms, and by multiplying the number of forms. There has been, however, a mutual action and reaction between mind and speech. It is thought which has evoked the hidden resources of language, applying phonetic analysis, and seizing on all articulate differences in order to retain as well as body forth its infinitude of forms; while on the other hand, this very linguistic fertility has promoted the tendency to distinguish things that differ, and furnished the indispensable requisite for the advance of science.

Back of the long, but relatively late period, to which belong the phenomena of obliteration and decay we have been considering, lies another, with treasures less accessible, but of the highest value to the student of language. It is named, by Humboldt, the Period of Organization; a long period of phonetic accretion, when the formative principle was the dominant one. Prof. Müller remarks upon these distant regions, far back in the past of linguistic history, as being the most interesting of all. His lectures, however, present little that is satisfactory concerning them, and the proposed plan and limits of Prof. Whitney's volume, exclude anything more than a mere mention. In setting up "dialectic regeneration" as the counterbalancing principle to phonetic decay, Müller's lectures seem likely to confuse most readers who come to them for information, apart from the fact that this view seems to involve the essential error of making dialects antecedent to language. We shall not here enter into a discussion of the

chronology of human speech, whether the processes of growth hitherto traced required thousands, or tens of thousands of years, as some are ready to assume. We cannot certainly locate the period of structural organization, since even its close is anterior to recorded history. The dates within our reach consist of phonetic facts, and the order in which they occur, is that which is of chief importance in their chronology. It is back into this period that the science of language is led in the attempt to resolve existing forms into their original elements, "following in thought the unconscious endeavors of the creative intellect." The time embraced begins with the stage of uninflected monosyllables, and reaches to that in which the language came forth, equipped with an elaborate system of terminations and grammatical forms. It starts, for instance, with such a root as *mat*, "stirring," and leaves it after modifying variously its root and vowel, or having added complex suffixes, as in *math-ishyamahé*, "we shall shake," in middle sense, with a power of expressing things and relations multiplied a hundred-fold. When we remember that each constituent element of the flexional terminations in these languages was originally a separate word, that it was used only separately till long habit had accustomed the ear to the union, and obscured the consciousness of its individual existence, we perceive that the process must have been very gradual. The suffix must have retained its form and strength unimpaired, till its original force was in some measure forgotten; then welded with, and absorbed into, the radical word, it formed a new root, to which other additions were successively made, with the same result. The notion that the affixes which denote nominal or verbal relations, were at first only arbitrary or conventional syllables, science has long since done away with. Once they were words with definite meanings, largely no doubt with a pronominal signification, and used with a distinct consciousness of their meaning. Among the earliest advances out of the primitive root-period was doubtless the uniting of the personal pronouns to a verb stem, as *dā-ma* "give-I," *dā-ta* "give-he." Much later probably, but affording a more difficult problem to the analyst, came the additions to denote the casual relations of nouns. The aggressive, but cautious and discriminating scholarship of Prof. Curtius has been brought to bear upon the Period of Organization, with results which already suggest the fruitfulness of this field of inquiry. We have room only to name the successive stages of formation which he is able to trace, the subordinate periods of word-growth.

1. The Root Period.
2. The Determinative Period.

3. Period of Primary Verb-forms.
4. Period of Formation of Themes; i. e. secondary roots.
5. Period of Compound Verb-forms.
6. Period of Case-endings.
7. Adverbial Period.

An example or two will best illustrate what is meant by the period of determinatives or modificatory letters. Among the original monosyllabic roots, we find *ga*, denoting motion, "go" or "going;" also belonging to the more remote roots is *gan*, "grow," "become." It is inferred that the added element *n*, served the purpose of limiting the signification of the earlier and shorter root to the single species of motion or advancement which it denotes. This *n* is called a determinative, a term equally applicable, whether it was in all cases a significant word, which has been disputed, or simply a phonetic addition appropriate by reason of some lost analogy. So from the root *yu* "join" are formed by affixing different determinatives *yuj* and *yudh* the former meaning "to yoke" or "harness," the latter "to fight," or "join battle."

We are not to understand that phonetic decay reserved its operation till the completion of word structure. On the contrary, it must have been in force even early in this period, and have assisted in welding together the combinations. But the dominant impulse was that which tended to extend and multiply word-forms. A pleasure seems to have been felt, during the earlier ages, in long and sonorous combinations. Economy of vocal energy was less a motive. The mind, in seeking full expression, had at its command not only fewer articulate sounds, but also a vastly inferior stock of words, upon which to ring all the changes of its thought. It is easy to conceive that the impulse would be developed, and would long continue to employ one set of roots, in manifold methods, as suffixes, in order to enlarge the resources of expression. Some of the Sanscrit verbal forms, comparatively unimpaired in structure, partially show to what extent this formative or combining impulse was carried.

Investigation into this period is destined to engage still further the efforts of linguists, as the materials increase upon which to employ a reconstructive comparison. With cautious, but assured step, science is pressing on in this remote field of inquiry. A causeway of convincing fact is being pushed far back into a past that hitherto afforded no solid footing. We are, at least, brought nearer those beginnings of things toward which all science strives. The history of the mind of man, as revealed in language, its own work, must awaken increasing interest the more perfectly its deliverances can be

interpreted. Strange, how plainly the impalpable sounds, moulded in the viewless air, have retained imprints from the creative fingers of the mind,—how those things, which seem of all least enduring, have defied

“the tooth of Time,
And rasure of Oblivion!”

Is the science of language a physical science? Is its votary but the geologist of speech, finding, in its worn and denuded strata, only the operation of physical laws? The affirmative position, with the advocacy of such scholars as Müller and Schleicher, is widely maintained; but we do not see how it can be considered tenable. This theory has had one beneficial result, at least, in giving currency and popularity to these studies among a large class, in England, which would otherwise have been tempted to ignore them, but seems insufficiently sustained by the facts. Even the operations of phonetic decay are not wholly explicable in accordance with it, though Max Müller maintains “that the laws which regulate these changes are entirely based on physiological grounds, and admit of no other explanation whatever.” The illustrations drawn by M. Breal, from the history of the Latin language, sufficiently refute this. Words have a life, an animating principle; and that is the thought which they convey. The word has no lifeless appendages,—its thought inhabits every part. But life repels decay. The limbs do not shrink or wither where the life-force penetrates. It is in the thought, then, in the function of the word as the bearer of thought, that we are to find the controlling principle of its destiny. Phonetic transformations follow the channels of physical and physiological laws, but the period and the extent of these transformations lie back of them. Historical and psychological causes determine when decay begins, when and where it must stop. The word, as such, has nothing to preserve it. It perishes out of use as soon as the necessity for it ceases. So with the flexional portions. They originated in a felt necessity; they were endowed with a clearly-perceived meaning, and this meaning was consciously held even long after they had been linked, as independent words, to the root. So long as the distinctive signification of each formative element remained unobscured, such an element had a guarantee of being preserved inviolate. In Sanscrit, we have for the Greek *ἔδειξε*, “he showed,” *a-dik-sha-t*, “then-showing-was-he.” A verb like this could not be worn away into forms, such as prevail in English and German, until various influences had rendered its termination merely conventional. When ossification had set in, decay and attrition could act.

Etymology, it is moreover to be remembered, deals with three factors, sound, signification, and origin; commonly, the first two being given, the last is required. But what is the signification; whence did it spring? Whence its quick transitions, its changing hues, its mysterious analogies? Physiology has no answer. Causes here strike as deep as the springs of volition. Not always can you "pluck out the heart of its mystery," for the scheme of the politician, the dream of the enthusiast, the whim of caprice, the quick-flashing fancy of the wit, are wrought into its invisible texture. The reason for a name may often be as far from relevant as Bottom's: "It shall be called Bottom's dream because it hath no bottom." Again, it may lie close to profound mental and moral problems. What phenomenon has a sadder interest than the influence of sin in dragging down words, the pure messengers of noble thought, to the vilest uses of the powers of darkness? We cannot admit the premises required for this theory. If words have no representative value, if syllables are but the combined resonant vibrations of certain vocal muscles, and this is their be-all and their end-all; or, if mind obeys the behests of matter, and the soul's lowest chords are swept by elemental forces only as the strings of an *Æolian* harp in the breeze, then words may, perhaps, be handled as fossils, and we may find in physiology principles sufficient to account for all linguistic phenomena.

As already indicated, the achievements of the science of language have been chiefly within the domain of the Indo-European family. The extent of its literature, its ancient literature especially, the varied history and wide diffusion of its races, have afforded peculiar facilities for extended comparison of phenomena, and the application of severer tests to its methods. Comparatively little has been done in tracing the growth of other languages or groups of languages, or in establishing a genealogical classification. There are a number of families, however, recognized by, perhaps, a majority of investigators. Among these are the Semitic; the Finno-Tataric, or Ural-Altaic; the Dravidian, embracing dialects spoken by some thirty-three millions in southeastern India; the Polynesian; the Hamitic, or those African languages of which the Egyptian stands at the head; and some others. The whole number of languages now spoken is variously estimated from eight hundred and sixty to a thousand. The impossibility of distinguishing precisely a language from a dialect, increases, of course, the difficulty in agreeing upon the exact number, even if they were all known.

There is another principle of classification, which admits of universal application. It is the morphological, and concerns the structure

of a language, without regard to its history or its genealogical affinities. It is determined by the presence or absence of a formative element in the word, or by the manner in which this formative element is united with the radical portion. Thus we have the—

1. Isolating languages, in which words are simple roots.
2. Agglutinative, which attach the formative element to an unvarying root.
3. Flexional, in which radical and formative elements lose their individuality, and combine to form a new theme.

The Chinese affords an example of the first; the Scythian, or Ural-Altaic family, of the second; both the Semitic and the Indo-European are classed in the third. Though it is, perhaps, true that the line of demarcation cannot, with certainty, be laid down between these classes, the distinction is, nevertheless, a scientific one, and represents three well-defined stages of linguistic development. But it is yet too early for a final and satisfactory classification of languages. Vast collections of facts must first be made from fields as yet almost untraversed; these must be patiently assorted, compared, and subjected to approved scientific tests. Thus progress must necessarily be slow, though investigations in this department are rapidly multiplying.¹ In our own country, Professor Whitney occupies a position of acknowledged prominence. Nowhere better than in his work, named at the head of this article, are the main facts and bearings of the science stated; a familiar method of presentation is united with a scholarly accuracy that is never forced to resort to generalized obscurities.

Far from being a department of classical philology, the science of language is rather, it may readily be seen, the main trunk, of which classical philology is but a branch. The classical languages are deeply in its debt for a flood of light thrown upon their origin and development, their structure and mutual relations. Much has been contributed, too, to facilitate the acquisition of these, as well as modern languages. Learner and teacher alike are indebted for an emancipation, already begun, from manifold arbitrary classifications and exceptions,—from the Procrustean frames of metaphysical category, antecedently plausible enough, but only projected into grammar. Many a traditional form, rule, and theory has already been banished to the dread "*paedagogorum defunctorum sedes*," seen by Mr. D'Arcy W. Thompson. In place of these, the genetic method, founded on a

¹ As an indication of the increasing attention paid to these studies in Germany, it may be mentioned that the lectures of Prof. Brockhaus, on Sanscrit Grammar, held in Leipsic, last summer, were attended by not less than sixty (60) students,—a thing unheard of before.

rigorously scientific comparison with ascertained kindred, will render grammar less and less an unreasoning *memoriter* exercise, infusing into it something of the "divine order," and promoting its effectiveness as an intellectual discipline.

Scarcely any department of knowledge is more indebted to the discoveries of linguistic science than ethnology. Its theories have had to be cast anew, its foundations relaid. Cuvier's classification of races was threefold: Caucasian, Mongolian, and Ethiopian, or the Fair, Yellow, and Black varieties. The more generally received division was that of Blumenbach: Caucasian, Mongolian, American, Ethiopian, Malay; five varieties, or races. The classification founded on language is, as yet, incomplete; but it is established that the most trustworthy data must be drawn from its sources. The remains of language cast more light upon the affinities of races than any mere physical peculiarities. No decision, founded on the comparison of physical race-characteristics, can be considered as final till ratified by linguistic science. A few long-disputed questions it seems to have finally settled; others await a more accurate investigation of unknown dialects.

Perhaps, however, it has gained no single triumph more splendid than in Oriental history, lifting into light the long-buried empires of western Asia. We have already alluded to its reconstructive additions to our historic knowledge, which have been gathered from the materials of language itself, extending the domain of secular history where written records, or even national myth and tradition fail, and bridging broad chasms between the present and a remote past, in the progress of our civilization. But, besides this, it has deciphered monuments, for ages unintelligible, which held the annals of the Assyrian and Medo-Persian empires. Christian scholars remember, with interest, the discoveries which at once added a new bulwark to the external evidence for the authenticity of the Old Testament narratives. The accounts of Rawlinson and Layard reveal, in part, what has been accomplished. A destructive criticism had already attempted to consign the Ninevite monarchy to the realm of fable. Doubts were even expressed in regard to the existence of Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes. Then came the explorations, which exhumed remains and inscriptions, antedating the Christian era by at least six or seven centuries. Among the ruins of more than a hundred cities, and strewn over thousands of square miles in ancient Persia and Assyria, were the pages of a vast historic library,—glazed tiles, bricks, and monuments, covered with cuneiform, or arrow-headed characters. An actual library, indeed, was discovered by Layard, in

1850, in the excavations at Kouyunjik, among the ruins of Nineveh, deposited there during the reign of Sardanapalus. Now the cuneiform characters had been a hopeless puzzle to scholars for several hundred years. But a key was at length furnished by Comparative Grammar. Scientific comparison of Sanscrit and its kindred tongues introduced new factors, and applied a new method for the solution of the problem. Enough has been done to guarantee final success; and thus will be made known to the world this providentially-preserved history, ages ago graven, as it were, with a pen of iron, in the rock forever. The value of the whole fund is confirmed by the facts already elicited. Tending, as they do, to establish the general trustworthiness of the much-abused Herodotus, and still more the accuracy of the later Jewish histories, as given in the Old Testament, they take rank among the most interesting results of recent investigation and discovery.

WILLIAM A. STEVENS.

GRANVILLE, O.



MR. LOWELL'S POETRY.

IT is hard to say how much it is virtue and how much felicity that runs in the blood of some families, to distinguish them with an honorable fame, through various branches and during successive generations. The Lowell, of Massachusetts, enjoy a good civic, and social, and literary renown, which is coeval with the date of the republic, and which constitutes one of the truest, and one of the least alienable, of the treasures of its history. The commonwealth of Massachusetts is rich in the heraldry of such illustrious names; but the commonwealth of Massachusetts has no gentler blood than that which has descended, without taint, from John Lowell, of the days of Washington, to James Russell Lowell, the laureate of Abraham Lincoln. As long as the archives of the Supreme Court of the United States continue to be consulted; as long as cotton is woven in the looms of Lowell, on the banks of the Merrimac; as long as the Lowell Institute of Boston, instructs the American community in religion, science, literature, and the arts, the fame of the Lowells is secure. If these anchors should hereafter drag in the urgent drift of time, then there is that in the volumes now under review, which will still hold against the stress of whatever storm does not overwhelm the language itself in which they are written.

The issue of a new collection of poems by Mr. Lowell, after the lapse of twenty years since the appearance of his previous volumes, is too important an event in the annals of American books not to be signalized by a notice, of respectful dimensions, in every periodical

claiming to be, in any degree, an organ of American literature. It is not without a sense of pain that we welcome this addition to the world's slowly-increasing store of genuine poetry. It is too small an addition to stand for the whole poetical fruitage of such genius as Mr. Lowell's, during twenty such years of his life. Apollo avert the omen, but Mr. Lowell's prime, though vigorous yet, will hardly endure to furnish him a like term of productiveness again. When we consider the "prosperous labor" which Tennyson's thrifty genius has accomplished within the same period, and consider, too, that perhaps the chief difference between Lowell and Tennyson lies, not in their gifts, but in their use of their gifts,—alas, we involuntarily fall to forgetting what Mr. Lowell has done, in vainly guessing and missing the more that he might have done. Sixteen years ago, the editor of *Putnam's Monthly*, with a natural preference, which possibly the "Fable for Critics," with its dedication, and its genial notice of *Harry Franco*, may help one understand, expressed to us the opinion that Lowell was a greater poet than Tennyson. We are much inclined ourselves to believe that Tennyson's genius excels chiefly in that which, after all, constitutes the chief excellence of genius,—the faculty of work,—industry. We may do Mr. Lowell wrong in saying this. We must not forget that poetry is the vocation of a lifetime with Tennyson. It is scarcely more than the avocation of a stolen leisure, now and then, with Mr. Lowell. During the greater part of twenty years past, Mr. Lowell has been the incumbent of a laborious professorship at Harvard. More recently, he has been an editor, too. And, especially about the time of the rebellion, his incisive prose invigorated many a page of *The Atlantic Monthly* with articles, each one of which was as a battle gained for the republic at her utmost need. So, then, with nothing further said that might seem to abate the grace of our greeting, we loyally thank Mr. Lowell for his volume, small as it is. It is precious, nevertheless,—*ὄλγον τε φθονόν τε*. We have been querulous like Achilles. It is but fit that we should now be at least as appreciative as he.

This new volume will naturally attract the public attention afresh to its two predecessors of so many years ago. It will be more satisfactory, therefore, to consider the three volumes together, and to review Mr. Lowell's poetry as a whole.

We need not give much space to an examination of that part of his poetry which belongs to the feminine stage of the poet's development. Feminine, we say; and we do not mean effeminate. The earliest poem, in the first collection, is no more effeminate than the latest, in the last. The quality of the strength exhibited does not

seem to be much changed from the one to the other; but the volume of the strength is bravely expanded from the "Threnodia" of the author's youth, to the "Commemoration Ode" of his full maturity. Virility, not perhaps in its most athletic, but certainly in a fine and true meaning of the word, is present in every line that has ever come from Mr. Lowell's pen. A considerable number, however, of the pieces in the first volume are the offspring of a genius manifestly impregnated from the ascendant influence particularly of Tennyson, whose star had already arisen on some foreseeing minds about the time at which Mr. Lowell was an undergraduate at Harvard. These pieces are full of poetry; they even read more smoothly than do many of the later works of the same hand; but they are imitations, and not creations. The "Prometheus," for example, is a monologue, in blank verse, after the manner of Tennyson's "Ulysses." It is a noble poem, but it quite fails of the statuesque perfection of Tennyson's matchless modern antique. The "Prometheus" is Greek in color, although the tone of the color is mixed with a dash of spirit that is not Greek, nor yet Eastern, nor ancient, nor pagan. But this is intentional, and it harmonizes well with the allegorizing use which is made of the myth. The great lack of the poem is in that which should have constituted its chief praise. It lacks in severity and in density. If the idea had been treated with the measure of success of which it was worthy, the literature of this famous personage would have been illustrated with one more poem, not unfit to rank with the few masterpieces, on the same subject, that are destined to be immortal. "St. Simeon Stylites" is suggested by the "Prometheus." The old saint seems, indeed, to be a kind of grotesque ecclesiastic travesty of the mythic pagan hero. It is a coincidence worthy of note, that Tennyson's volumes, containing the "Ulysses" and "St. Simeon Stylites," were published in England the year before the composition of the "Prometheus," according to the date which Mr. Lowell has himself modestly affixed to his poem. It would be ungracious not to be warned off from very serious criticism of Mr. Lowell's brilliant experiment by a caveat so delicate and indicative of a consciousness so just.

It is curious, by the way, and provocative of exceedingly varied and, as it were, anachronistic reflections, to remember that the "Prometheus" first saw the light in the old *Democratic Review* of the antediluvian political world. A *Democratic Review* of now-a-days would hardly be Mr. Lowell's preference, as his medium of communication with the literary public.

Among the other pieces dated by the poet, are various exquisitely

modulated echoes of Tennyson, especially in the Englishman's earlier and more purely sensuous style. But there is one piece among them, echoed, it seems to us, from nowhere, unless from some valley of "rich foreshadowings," secluded within the musing poet's own heart. It is the delicious poem, entitled "My Love." The woman of this piece is so charmingly idealized, in the most modern Christian, or perhaps we should say civilized, spirit, and the stanzas are so inter-fused with a certain quaint and liquid sweetness of diction and rhythm, flowing around them and between, and floating them, like so many fair islands of Delos, ready to be moored in the reader's memory,—that only with a great effort of self-denial do we refrain from quoting them in full. Happy the lover who has found a love like that which Mr. Lowell first guessed, we suppose, and then put forth, not in vain we believe, to discover!

I love her with a love as still
As a broad river's peaceful might,
Which, by high tower and lowly mill,
Goes wandering at its own will,
And yet doth ever flow aright.

And, on its full, deep breast serene,
Like quiet isles my duties lie;
It flows around them and between,
And makes them fresh, and fair, and green,
Sweet homes wherein to live and die.

Happier still,—the sweet seriousness of these exquisite stanzas, amounting to something that is almost more than the natural piety of a poet, does not forbid the suggestion,—happier still, and far more securely happy, the soul whose love of what is at once Human and Divine exercises the wholesome and helpful influence here described.

None but a nature fortunate in a singular manly sweetness, as certainly none but a nature doomed and sealed to poetry, could possibly have conceived, at twenty-one, an ideal so Selene-like of "perfect wifehood and pure lowlihead." "Isabel" is like it, but lacks the warmth and color which, we respectfully venture to guess, something in the poet's heart, yet more ideal than his fancy, imparted to the idyll of Lowell. No wonder that a moral constitution so happily balanced, especially if the balance of it were afterward still further confirmed by the finding of the reality of his beautiful dream,—no wonder that such a moral constitution has preserved Mr. Lowell from soiling his verse with even a dash of that unchaste suggestion, which many recent poets, not pagan by birth, however pagan by sympathy,

require us to forget in their character before we can suffer ourselves to admire their genius. Once only, so far as we remember, has a humorous-malicious conceit of verisimilitude (in the "Fable for Critics") conspired with stress of rhyme to force the national half-oath of Great Britain from the pen of the apparently protesting poet. He was speaking of Theodore Parker,—and the word was, we confess, strictly hypo-sulphurous, considering the circumstances.

The "Legend of Brittany" appeared in the same collection (1844) with the "Prometheus;" but the date of its composition is not subjoined in the present reissue, as is the case with the latter poem. The "Legend of Brittany," indeed, needs deprecate nothing, at the hands of the critic, on the score of the author's youth. It has faults, but they are not juvenile faults. It is a marvel of infinite delicacy, in treatment of a subject intrinsically too disagreeable to have been worthy of being treated at all. We think, likewise, that, the choice supposed, the artist should have exercised greater freedom in moulding the legend to poetical uses. Mr. Lowell inartistically betrays his consciousness of having been entangled in an unhappy theme, by two or three stanzas of downright didactics, at the commencement of the second part of his poem, wherein we are taught the principles of art on which we ought to relish disagreeable subjects. The intractable prosaicisms in expression, which necessarily occur here, divide the career of the poet's Pegasus into two separate flights, more effectually than any device of typography could do.

The poem is what it is in plot. The reader is as helpless about it as probably Mr. Lowell was when he wrote it. It is to be appreciated, not as a whole, but as made up of passages. It is not valuable, as the best works of art are valuable,—for what it is,—but for what it contains. It contains a larger amount of essential mere poetry than any other poem, long or short,—always excepting the one perfect mood of his heart and his hand, "The Vision of Sir Launfal,"—that Mr. Lowell has written. A larger amount,—but of a merit many, many degrees more humble than the lofty strain of the "Commemoration Ode." The poetry of the "Legend" is ethereal in quality. The soul of song soars in it as if language had become, for her behoof, a buoyant ether that took away all sense of weight, and with it all need of wings. There is no more airy-footed versification, out of Shelley, in the English language. Shelley himself is hardly more musical,—hardly more purely and merely poetical. And yet there is a hovering human interest in the "Legend," which has fled, shuddering, out of Shelley's pages everywhere, and left them blank and cold.

Mr. Lowell likens his Margaret to

A summer cloud, thrilled through with rosy light.

Shelley would have had his cloud blanched to the pure "white radiance of eternity." Mr. Swinburne displays much the same absolute mastery of language to the musical uses of verse with Shelley, and with Mr. Lowell in the "Legend." Shelley is the white Aurora Borealis; Swinburne, where fit to be talked about at all, the Aurora Borealis, waving banners of color; Lowell here, the warm sunshine, flushed with a thousand shimmering hues.

We string together a few pearls from the "Legend," as specimens of its riches.

Of Margaret's moral nature, Mr. Lowell says that it was

Of white and gracious thoughts the chosen home.

Margaret used to indulge her maiden dreams in woodland dells,

And in the nunneries of silent nooks.

How otherwise, to the happy souls that have explored Love's blessed abyss themselves, could the "rapine sweet" of that delirious fall be more satisfactorily described than in the following line?

From mistily golden deep to deep he fell.

In the couplet given below, which felicity is more consummate, the fitness of the simile itself, or the fitness of phrase with which the simile is expressed? And what if "Locksley Hall" had wedded the Aurora Borealis to a woman's blush before? It was no more the same likeness between them with Lowell's than Tennyson saw, than is the rainbow the same which you and I simultaneously see, standing side by side together. We are not sure that Lowell did not look with even a finer eye than Tennyson here. Margaret's color came and went

As snow, o'er which a blush of northern light
Suddenly reddens, and as soon grows white.

"A sunlit fall of rain" has flashed in verse elsewhere, with an exceeding beauty of showery evanescence, as much like a sudden largess of diamonds from a prince of the "gorgeous East," as is the brilliant phenomenon in nature. But when will it ever again illumine a stanza with a liquid April sparkle of moral "sweetness and light," altogether so magically tender as what follows?

Her summer nature felt a need to bless,
And a like longing to be blest again;

So, from her sky-like spirit, gentleness
 Dropt ever like a sunlit fall of rain,
 And his beneath drank in the bright caress
 As thirstily as would a parched plain,
 That long hath watched the showers of sloping gray,
 Forever, ever, falling far away.

"Sky-like spirit" is a wedding of words which Mr. Lowell repeats somewhere else in his poetry,—perhaps in one of his sonnets. As for the vanishing, echo-like music of the last line, it is to us inexhaustible of beauty. It sings itself, like one exquisite song that we remember of Chopin's, in which the words, when rightly given, go rocking off from the hearkening sense into silence more musical than sound, as a lark might soar, swaying away from the sight, into the drowning blue of the sky. And that one verse, too, is a perfect sound-picture of the scene. You seem in it to see with your ear the hoary showers far off sheet down aslant in silent, visionary rain.

How much nice observation, and how much pictorial power, combined with what a transferred effect of lavish self-bestowment in love, do the following lines, descriptive of Margaret's devotion, contain:

Like golden ripples hasting to the land
 To wreck their freight of sunshine on the strand.

The "fine frenzy" of love, making those intense electric motions in the happy lunatic's head which bewilder him with a sense of blissful pain and scintillating light, is thus described:

Flooded he seemed with bright, delicious pain,
 As if a star had burst within his brain.

This is a couplet to form a touchstone for the indefinable poetic sense in a reader. Many intelligent readers imagine that they love poetry, when it is only the story, or the moral, of the poetry, that pleases them. But here is poetry, about as unadulterated as you ever get it in words of human speech. The grandfathers of the old *North American Review* were scandalized by it. Professor Felton, we think it was, that conceived a joke about it. He italicized a paraphrase of the poet's figure, which made it more intelligible, and then, if we remember right, invited laughter with an exclamation point. *As if a bomb-shell had burst within his brain!* No doubt the learned professor was honestly unable to construe the fine poetry of the somewhat daring expression which he criticised. He had often set Mr. Lowell right on a Greek rendering, in the class-room at Harvard, and it was with a sort of magisterial pleasantry, we

suppose, that he now sought to recall his old pupil to safe common sense, in reviewing his poetry. But the two minds were native to different elements, and Professor Felton's admonition was like the hen's motherly note of alarm to a duck, amongst her brood, taking to the water.

But we have given space enough to this experiment of the poet in legendary romance. The anonymous author of the "Fable for Critics" accuses Lowell of being a preaching poet. Certainly, Lowell seldom works "without a conscience or an aim;" and his moral earnestness and instinctive partisanship with virtue are quite apparent in the "Legend of Brittany." But, on the whole, the didactic spirit is less obtrusive here, and the sensuous delight in mere beauty is more freely indulged, than perhaps anywhere else in the entire compass of the volumes.

"The Present Crisis" bears a date which is probably designed by the author to note an historic, rather than an autobiographic epoch. The date is "December, 1845." This, it will be remembered, was the winter in which the annexation of Texas was formally and finally accomplished. Presaging minds then discerned, in this measure of territorial aggrandizement, a long forward reach of slavery toward continued preponderance in the Senate of the United States. Lowell wrote his poem, as a kind of political pamphlet on the side of anti-slavery, while the question was yet pending. It bears the marks of its inspiration. It is vehement, fervid, intense,—moral didactics at white heat. The poetry of it is almost magnificent,—in passages quite magnificent,—and yet Lowell, we should say, was "God-conquered" in it by the inspiring divinity of moral prophecy, rather than of song. He is more a seer in it than a bard. We re-open the volume to read again, and we feel half remorseful for stinting our praise of the poetry, which, in truth, only falls short, as perhaps also it should, of mastering the turbulent madness of the ascendant moral mood. The metre is the ringing one of Locksley Hall. It is not arranged in couplets, however, but in stanzas, each composed of a couplet and a triplet of rhymes. The stanza is a powerful one, and discharges its gathering momentum in a tremendous blow at the close.

What the immediate effect of the poem was, we are unable to say. We should suppose, however, that its obscurity, or, not to say obscurity, its hiding sense must have unfitted it to be a very popular Roland-stroke of alarm for freedom. The *North American Review* of the time affected not to understand its aim; but assured its author that age would gradually reconcile him to the world as it was. We have seen an assemblage of more than ordinarily astute wits fairly at fault

to divine the meaning of some one or two of the passages. And yet Lowell certainly had a meaning in each one of them that was definite to his own mind. He is not in poetry what Fichte was in metaphysics, to make the confession: "Probably God and I knew what I meant by that when I wrote it. God may know now; but, most assuredly, I do not."

The intensity of the following passage, descriptive of the diffusive disastrous effect of a successful political crime, is certainly an intensity of heat rather than of light:

So the Evil's triumph sendeth, with a terror and a chill,
Under continent to continent, the sense of coming ill,
And the slave, where'er he cowers, feels his sympathies with God,
In hot tear-drops, ebbing earthward, to be drunk up by the sod,
Till a corpse crawls round, unburied, delving in the nobler clod.

The imbruting influence of slavery on the slave has here its ultimate expression. The mathematical limits of intensity are reached, when it is said that the slave becomes an unburied corpse, crawling about the ground, and breaking-clods that are higher in the scale of existence than himself. Perhaps intensity just overleaps itself a little, and lands on the edge of extravagance.

The finest stanza in the poem is this:

For Humanity sweeps onward: where to-day the martyr stands,
On the morrow crouches Judas, with the silver in his hands;
Far in front the cross stands ready, and the crackling faggots burn,
While the hooting mob of yesterday in silent awe return
To glean up the scattered ashes into History's golden urn.

It was quoted by Mr. Sumner in that celebrated speech of his in the Senate, on "The Barbarism of Slavery," which provoked the assault of Preston Brooks of South Carolina. Mr. Sumner, as a wise rhetorician, omitted the third line, no doubt thinking that it obscured and obstructed the force of the whole for the purpose of impassioned recitation. The omission of the line, however, exposed the passage to the charge of a want of keeping, against which Mr. Lowell had striven, by the insertion of the line, though without entire success, to protect it. "Judas," as representing the traitor, seems almost inevitably to suggest Jesus as representing the martyr. But Jesus was not burned; and so the poet, hard bestead, introduces the cross, coördinating it, however, with the stake, which last instrument of death was necessary to furnish the imagery of the splendid concluding lines. Altogether, it is not a "faultily faultless" passage, but it is, notwithstanding, nothing less than magnificent.

A considerable number of brief poems fill up the interval, in the first volume, between "The Present Crisis" and "The Vision of Sir Launfal," with which the volume closes. These are all of them excellent, but only a few of them seem to us to have that distilled excellence which makes the life-time of a poem an immortality. The first stanza of the little piece entitled "She Came and Went," contains a drop of this costly elixir:

As a twig trembles, which a bird
Lights on to sing, then leaves unbent,
So is my memory thrilled and stirred;—
I only know she came and went.

"The First Snow-fall" is an old favorite of the public. It is of a mintage clearly inscribed with Mr. Lowell's personality, but stamped for universal currency.

"The Changeling" is one of several poems in the collection belonging to the domestic affections,—an idyll of the hearth and heart. It is probably always doubtful how far one succeeds in reading such pieces in the dry light of literary judgment. We are apt to accuse them of too much art, if their art appears at all. The highest art accordingly consists in a "careless-ordered" appearance of neglecting art. Tennyson's lines "To J. S." are an admirable specimen of art submitting to nature in this way. "The Changeling" is extremely beautiful, though its beauty is not of a very precious order. This comparison, however, is striking; and, to the rightly susceptible soul, even of an aweing and silencing power. It is almost sublime. The father speaks, waking in the morning to see the changeling child of his fancy left in the place of the little one that had gone:

And I feel as weak as a violet
Alone 'neath the awful sky.

"The Vision of Sir Launfal" is not the greatest poem in these volumes; but we consider it, upon the whole, to be the most perfect felicity of Mr. Lowell's genius. The plot of it is pleasing, if not wholly novel, but the execution is beyond all praise. Sir Launfal, about to set forth on the quest of the Holy Grail, has a vision; and this vision told is the theme. The poem has a moral. Indeed, the moral is the poem. Sir Launfal dreams of sallying out of his castle gate in June, himself a part of June. His undinted mail gathers the sunshine into a sheaf of beams, as he rides out, encountering at once a loathly leper, who asks an alms. Sir Launfal shudders with recoil from the contrast to his own youth, and health, and wealth, and beauty;

but flings him down a piece of gold, which the beggar refuses, as not heart-meant for the heart. The knight pricks on, and rides his manly prime away in fruitless search of the prize. It is winter when the old man comes back, to find himself dispossessed of his castle and lands. He is wiser, however, and, with wisdom, has won also its meekness. He shares his crust with a beggar by the ice-roofed brook, and gives him drink from it out of his own wooden bowl. The beggar is the leper, and the leper is the Lord. The Lord teaches Sir Launfal that any crust, heartsomely shared with another, is His body; and any cup from which drink is given to a thirsty soul is the Holy Grail.

The tale is told with wonderful beauty. If the metre, and rhythm, and wayward musical flow of the verse, suggest any comparison, it is with Coleridge's rhyme of "Christabel." It is hardly so much a deduction from the merit of Mr. Lowell's genius for high originality, as it is an addition to the merit of it, for that exquisite elective appreciation and susceptibility of external influence, which, in his case, indeed, goes far to overlie his native quality—it is hardly, we say, so much abatement as enhancement of praise to observe that nearly every marked piece of his poetical composition suggests a counterpart earlier than himself in English literature. This comes of the wide commerce which Mr. Lowell's generous genius holds with whatever, anywhere, is beautiful, or capable of beautiful use. The dedication of his first volume to William Page, renewed in this latest edition, testifies his intense sympathy with one art that is sister to the art of poesy. His recurring allusions to music are proof of equal love for a third sister art. Such affinities of his genius are like in spirit with those resemblances in his poems to originals elsewhere, of which we have spoken. His early studies in the antique classics of English verse, and his subsequent professional familiarity with literature, acquired, as we may guess, in conscientious fulfilment of the duties of his chair at Harvard University, rather than in obedience to the law of his own uninfluenced individual choice, have alike tended to impart a quaint exotic flavor to his diction, and to embarrass the natural play of genius with learning,—learning worn "lightly like a flower," indeed, but less graceful and less precious than would have been the spontaneous bloom which we jealously feel that it has sometimes displaced. The result has been, in some degree, to obscure, though in no degree to extinguish, Mr. Lowell's originality.

Mr. Lowell's delight in music appeared in a voluptuous description of an organ overture, pierced at last, and vocalized with a thrill of clear boy-treble from the cathedral choir, which occurs in "The

Legend of Brittany." But the first stanza of his "Sir Launfal" is, at the same time, beautiful and brief enough to quote:

Over his keys the musing organist,
Beginning doubtfully and far away,
First lets his fingers wander as they list,
And builds a bridge from Dreamland for his lay:
Then, as the touch of his loved instrument
Gives hope and fervor, nearer draws his theme,
First guessed by faint auroral flushes sent
Along the wavering vista of his dream.

What could be more beautiful by itself as a sympathetic appreciation of the musician's mood, and what more beautiful in this place as a simile prelude to the prelude with which the poet introduces his theme? And yet,—and yet,—shall we say it? the beauty is of a sort which produces its highest effect at the first reading. You do not exactly take revenge upon your judgment by any after shame at your first ready pleasure in the passage. It still remains to you what it was, really beautiful and very beautiful; but it does not keep yielding you further beauty, to your demand, like a flowing breast of nourishment, fed from a secret vital fountain. And, notwithstanding the tokens of thought and emotion everywhere abounding innumera- bly in Mr. Lowell's verse that could belong only to genius, still we are bound to admit that the quality of his work is, for the most part, fugitive. When his gracious personal presence shall have finally vanished out of our world of letters, and,—none remaining behind him in the "impoverished land," to tell us what he could, he shall be estimated only for what he did,—then it will appear, we think, that immortality will winnow very wastefully from his work, and transmit but an exceedingly small portion of the bulk that makes these volumes. For we experience ever a disappointment, reluctantly acknowledged even to ourselves, in repeated perusals of almost any one of Mr. Lowell's poems. They never seem less beautiful than they did at first, but they seldom seem more beautiful. There are notable exceptions to this remark, of which we shall make due mention in subsequent pages. One of these exceptions is the "Commemoration Ode," in the volume entitled "Under the Willows." This poem we rank as in the peerage of the few,—the very few,—greatest odes in the English language. To this high peerage we assign Wordsworth's "Ode on the Intimations of Immortality," Tennyson's "Ode on the Death of the Duke of Wellington,"—but we shall not try to be exhaustive,—only we must be permitted to say that we do *not* assign hither Dryden's much-bepraised "Alexander's Feast."

Wherein lies the defect, on account of which we pronounce the sentence "fugitive" on so much surpassing beauty? We have asked ourselves the question a hundred times. We think we have the answer. Mr. Lowell's fancy is too prolific, and his faculty of expression is too facile and too versatile. He fails by too abundant resources of success. If his fancy were more barren, or if he found greater difficulty in giving language to its teeming progeny, in either case, perhaps, he might have been thrown back upon that patient travail of the imagination,—that careful, fastidious, exclusive choice, inclined to Spartan rejection, of the thoughts and images which he will, upon the whole, take the trouble to find words for,—that humble waiting for crystallizing physical, and mental, and moral moods, to shape his sentiments into ultimate verbal forms, never again to be dissolved by the satisfied mind of the race,—in short, with a less lavish endowment in either of the two kinds that we have mentioned, Mr. Lowell might have been remitted to that long labor of the poet which alone can bestow upon its servant the freedom of all mankind and the lease of immortality.

And after all, there is, it may be, a reason, more controlling still than any one that is personal to Mr. Lowell, for the fugacious quality of his verse. There is no poet in this country that is nothing but a poet. All our men of genius work in the harness of some useful practical profession. They are college instructors, or physicians, or ministers, or editors, and then they may be also poets. But poetry is the by-play of a life elsewhere earnestly bestowed. Mr. Longfellow comes nearest, among our American literary men, to being exclusively a poet. But Mr. Longfellow devoted two decades of his prime to the duties of an arduous college professorship, and we have good testimony that he did not shirk those duties as in the privilege of genius and of fame. The fact remains, that in the United States division of labor has not yet reached the point of allowing our poets to devote themselves exclusively to poetry. The newness of our civilization continues to exact of us all a roundabout *savoir-faire*, hostile to the highest perfection of those seclusive and meditative habits which alone enable the poet to secrete, in fruitful tranquillity, the precious substance of his verse, and silently and slowly crystallize it into supreme and ideal forms. We remember, some years ago, meeting a solid English tradesman, as he looked, driving his solid English horse, before a two-wheeled wagon, at a ringing trot around and down a sloping curve of the solid English road, on the Isle of Wight, in the neighborhood of Mr. Tennyson's residence. The ruddy roast beef of the man's complexion, his brown-stout corpulence, and

the perfect worldliness of his whole appearance, whimsically suggested Mr. Tennyson's poetry to us under the circumstances. We could not resist the temptation to stop him, and enjoy the sensation of inquiring the way to Mr. Tennyson's house of such a man. "If now you could tell me his business?" responded he. Tennyson's business! We were well nigh dumbfounded. We came near being in the case of Mr. John Smith, that absent-minded man who could not recall his own name on challenge at the post-office window. We recovered our presence of mind, however, and told our friend he "made verses," we believed. "Ah, yes; the Queen's poet,—Tennyson,—that's the name. Yes; he makes verses,—you're right,—that's his business; and very clever at it he is, too, they say." This was the old world. It could hardly have been the new.

And yet poetry, certainly as much as any other vocation of genius, is jealous of a divided devotion. Nothing short of the whole man, for his whole life, will satisfy her extortionate claim. It will not even do, generally, for the poet to indulge himself in coquetting with prose. The "poet's garland and singing robes" are not an investiture to be lightly donned and doffed at will. To wear them most gracefully one must wear them habitually.

The difference between poetry and prose is an essential difference. It can hardly be defined, but it may be illustrated. Poetry differs from prose, in part, as running differs from walking. There is motion in both running and walking; but in running the motion is continuous, while in walking the motion is a series of advances, separated by intervals, less or more appreciable, of rest. Poetry runs,—prose walks. Again, poetry differs from prose, as singing differs from talking. The difference between singing and talking is not that singing is musical and talking not musical. The difference is that singing is musical in one way, and talking musical, if musical, in another. Poetry sings,—prose talks. Each has a rhythm; but the rhythm of each is its own.

But there is a yet finer distinction between poetry and prose than has thus been illustrated,—a finer one, we mean, this side of the finest one of all, which is far too fine to be expressed in any "matter-moulded forms of speech." There is a certain curiously subtle idiom of expression belonging to poetry, and another equally subtle idiom of expression belonging to prose. These two idioms of expression are as palpably distinct from each other as are the several idioms of different languages. They defy definition,—they elude analysis. They do not depend on choice of words, and they do not depend on collocation of words, although they depend partly on both these things. A man, whose talent was that of a prose writer, might make

faultless verse from a vocabulary chosen out of the purest poetry of the language, and there should not be one poetical line in his work from beginning to end. On the other hand, there is hardly an intractable word in the language that a true poet could not weave into his verse without harm to the poetic effect. In the main, the diction of a true poet and the diction of a good prose writer will be identical. The order of the poet will not vary violently from the order of the prose writer. Their subject may be the same, and even the mode of conception, and the figures of speech. All these points of coincidence between poetry and prose may exist; they generally do exist, and notwithstanding them all, the inviolate idiom of poetic expression, and the inviolate idiom of prose expression, remain uninterchangeably distinct. If poetry borrows the idiom of prose for a single instant even, the effect is immediately appreciable to the cultivated sense. It is like the effect that would be produced by the introduction of a few words of talking in the stately recitative of the opera. If prose borrows the idiom of poetry the effect is equally appreciable. It is like the effect that would be produced by the introduction of a bar of singing in the course of common conversation. The full broadness of this contrast would, of course, exist only in extreme cases.

But Mr. Lowell's volumes furnish some illustrations,—not many,—on one side, of what we mean. When, for example, Mr. Lowell says, in the "Legend,"

Mordred, for such was the young Templar's name,

he speaks in the idiom of prose. It is prose when he notes a transition about to be made with the phrase, "Here let us pause." It is prose again when he says,—

And though the horror of it well may move
An impulse of repugnance in the heart,
Yet let us think, etc.

An illustration of our meaning, on the other side, is supplied in the picturesque phrase, which we quoted a little way back, from Milton's prose,—*"the poet's garland and singing robes."* This is not metrical, but it is expressed in the unmistakable idiom of poetry. It is, perhaps, a garnish, rather than a disfigurement of the general texture of the composition in which it occurs. On the other hand, citations have frequently been made from Dickens of long passages written in an unbroken series of iambs,—perfectly metrical. Yet no line could by any possibility happen into a production of Dickens that would be other than prose. Milton's prose, however, is inces-

santly "pawing to get free" from prose limitations. In general, it may, we think, be said that practice in verse tends to improve one's prose style, and that practice in prose tends to deprave one's faculty of verse. To the former of these two generalizations there are exceptions,—to the latter none, we believe.

Coleridge made as close an approach to a statement of the difference between poetry and prose as perhaps language admits of our making. He said good prose was proper words in proper places,—poetry the best words in the best places. All but the most triumphant prose passages allow the change of words here and there, and even the reconstruction of sentences, without any serious injury to the whole effect. Change a word, however, in any perfect line of poetry, and the spell of its power is broken. How often, if you have the talisman sense of poetry in you,—how often have you hovered in memory over a verse that had lost its charm, for a wrong word in it somewhere; and felt a poet's pains almost over again till the right word came back into it, like a keystone to its arch, and made its strength and beauty perfect? Such being the difference between poetry and prose, what wonder that it is the poetry of the world that survives with its own uneffaced image and superscription immortally perfect, while almost all the prose goes surely back into the bullion of the general thought and knowledge of mankind? It is form that embalms a production of the mind. What do we care now for the question of Demosthenes' title to his civic wreath? But every age and every race of men have an unflagging interest in Demosthenes' manner of vindicating his title to it.

We hold it to be of the very first importance, in view of the radical difference thus shown to exist between poetry and prose as instruments of expression, that the poet, who would rank among the greater gods of his Olympus, should nurse his genius in the uninterrupted use of its own proper and peculiar language. He must lisp in numbers, and then speak in numbers, if he would have the numbers come. If he addicts himself to prose writing, one of two things, or both, will assuredly happen. Either he will affect the sensitive idiom of poetic expression with some alloy of its delicate purity, or else he will suffer some loss from perfect lubricity in the metrical flow of his language. Most probably both of these consequences will follow. Herein, we think, lies a part, at least, of Mr. Lowell's mistake, or of his misfortune, as a candidate for the poet's highest apotheosis. He has written too little poetry, and he has written too much prose. For his own fame, and for our wealth in letters, he might better have thrown away half the verse he has printed, as the mere exercises of his genius

trying and training its powers, and then have used the time and the strength that he has devoted to prose production in maturing the master poems which would fairly have represented his poetic capacity.

We doubt if there is a single great name in English literature that positively or negatively will not confirm these positions. Milton, for example, is reckoned, and justly, one of the chief masters of our English prose. How could that great mind be otherwise than great in whatever mode of utterance it might choose to speak? But then it is the significant fact both that his verse is often prosaic, and that his prose often breaks its mighty and numerous march with little fits of a movement which may be very fine indeed, but which, nevertheless, is not prose. Thus that extraordinarily nervous and that magnificent declamation of his, which is like Burke's, as far as the utterance of an essential poet can be like the utterance of an essential prose writer, but which is really like nothing else in the world,—constituting a variety of literature by itself,—Milton's prose recalls, with its reckless and resourceful headway, his own description of the progress of the fiend, who

O'er bog, or steep, through strait, rough, dense, or rare,
With head, hands, wings, or feet, pursues his way,
And swims, or sinks, or wades, or creeps, or flies.

Of course, no sensible person will think that we are undervaluing such composition. We are only describing it for the purpose of showing how even such a genius as Milton could not master perfectly two instruments of expression so different as poetry and prose. Dryden is another of the traditionary names of renown in English letters. He might, perhaps, occur to the reader as one who united the two faculties of verse and of prose. He did write a noble prose, under the dominant influence of those masters of form in every kind, the French,—but then he was born to be a prose writer; and, in strictness, he never was anything else, although he produced quantities of vigorous verse, which, in his day, was readily accepted for poetry. Pope wrote elegant verse and elegant prose. The faculty of numbers was so natural to him that nothing could spoil it. His prose practice, never very considerable, probably had no material effect on his facility in versification. And facility in versification was the only attribute of the poet that Pope possessed. The same might be said of Addison, a less facile versifier, and a less trim prose writer, though more various and more voluminous in prose than Pope. Burke was a genius of a very high order, essentially a prose writer. He is, perhaps, the most extreme instance that could be named of a prose

writer whose temperament and whose imagination continually buoy him as if above the level of prose expression, yet without once making you afraid that he is going to leave it. His tread is as if he spurned the ground. But he never uses wings to fly, and the truth is he has no wings that he could use. Macaulay is another example of the essential prose writer. His prose marches like a numerous host. His verse is the same host marching to music, and hurried into a double quick. There is no exchanged influence of idiom between the two, simply because the idiom is always the same,—that of prose expression,—on the whole, the most curiously perfect prose expression, considered purely as expression, to be found in our language. Campbell was a true poet, and he wrote melodious and spirited prose. Probably Campbell's prose gained from his use of verse. But not without proportionate loss to his verse. In the first place, his poetry flats a note here and there, and very often in some of his pieces. In the second place, his facility of poetical composition was so imperfect as to give occasion to one of Sidney Smith's most characteristic sallies. Campbell's poet-pains often obliged him to take to his bed after a successful stanza. Sidney Smith applied the formula, "Campbell and his couplet were doing as well as could be expected under the circumstances." Tennyson is almost alone among the poets in *never* flattening a note. Now that we think of it, we would not like to undertake the job of finding a flattened note in Shelley; or in Keats, perhaps. And these men are examples of nearly exclusive addiction to poetry. Of course, we do not mean that they are necessarily greatest among poets. But their poetry, whatever the degree of its merit, is at least unmixed poetry. Nothing occurs in it that is spoken in the idiom of prose. This much may suffice for illustration of our meaning. We are examining, be it remembered, the poetical recreations of a man who, probably, might have been a great poet.

The "Vision of Sir Launfal" contains that happy form of words which has gone into the current commonplace of poetical quotation,—

And what is so rare as a day in June?
Then, if ever, come perfect days.

Mr. Lowell's quality is not such as to have enriched the commonplace books with many passages of similar popularity. The description of the ice-roof, built by the brook to shield him from the winter cold, is an exquisite specimen of Moreesque architectural fancy,—fairly beautiful. The moral of the whole piece may be taken in either one of two contrasted ways,—as wholesomely humane, or as polemically "humanitarian." We take it in the former of the two ways.

That would be a very incomplete review of Mr. Lowell's poetry which should omit to take account of his witty and humorous verse. The "Biglow Papers" have enjoyed the unique fortune to attract trans-Atlantic attention, as illustrating what foreign critics have been pleased to consider the American variety of literary drollery. They have accordingly been read and studied abroad with a sort of patronizing curiosity, which might not unfitly be reckoned to exemplify that "certain condescension in foreigners" of which Mr. Lowell has himself treated, in a vein of badinage a shade too serious and too much aggrieved perhaps, in the *Atlantic Monthly*. The "Biglow Papers," on the whole, have weighted their wit with such excess of pedantic learning, itself ceaselessly witty to be sure, and saturated with Attic salt, and with such excess of Yankee provincialism pronounced, we think, beyond a just effect by phonetic cacography, as hardly to keep permanently afloat on the ever-shifting current of popular appreciation. The work is now, we judge, virtually unknown, except by name, to the new generation of readers that has arisen since it originally appeared. It would not be surprising if it should, however, continue to retain a certain antiquarian interest and value, as the best monument of an archaic provincial dialect which the present literary mood of curious self-consciousness concerning it, on the part of the New England mind, proves to be already in process of passing away. Its wit, consummate as it is, does not possess the quality of appeal to universal human nature, irrespective of local and temporary condition, which has given to the "Hudibras" its singular tenacity of life.

The "Fable for Critics" at once foreclosed itself from a long date of currency by including so many names of authors whose chief hold on remembrance consists in being thus included. Its main interest lies in its continuous series of triumphs in versification, and its perpetual Aurora Borealis play of harmless wit. It is a feat rather than a work. It reads as if it might have been achieved under the genial stimulation of an admiring coterie of friends, with a wager laid that the poet should never change a rhyming word once written. Preternaturally witty as these works show Mr. Lowell capable of being in verse, they yet, we believe, will survive in a merely traditionary fame. The world is fond of laughing; but it likes to laugh at little cost of thought, and it does not want to laugh deep enough to disturb the comfortable sleeps of conscience.

We cross a wide gulf of contrast and come to a series of poems in the volume recently published,—that entitled "Under the Willows." This name is taken from the leading poem in the collection, the

"June Idyll" of the *Atlantic Monthly*, under an *alias*. Before passing to the contrasted series of poems to which we allude, a cursory remark or two may be made on the poems that intervene. "Under the Willows" itself is full of insight, and instinct with beauty; but it is too rambling, and incoherent, and aimless in plan, to rank as a work of art. "Pictures from Appledore" are remarkable for resourceful versification, and have, probably, some claim to be admired as powerful; but they contain so many Hudibrastic rhymes, or at least rhymes that are mere *tour de force*, and so many neologisms, and so many intense expressions, occasionally trending toward the disagreeable, that, upon the whole, we do not derive much pleasure from the series. Mr. Lowell's diction is, we think, apt to be disfigured by uses that either a surer taste or more painstaking attention would have excluded from his poetry. It is needless to give instances,—they are too numerous and too palpable not to strike every reader. We have no doubt Mr. Lowell himself schooled his ear to accept them all, and we have no doubt Mr. Lowell's readers might succeed in doing the same. It is always a question how much ought to be trusted to the first instinct with respect to such points, and how much is justly to be deferred to the feeling that comes after familiarity with a word, or a phrase, or a construction. Certain it is, that the poem which offers no point at which you stick on the first reading, and assent to only after challenge and demur, is not apt to be of a very high order of merit. It cannot possibly contain any beauty, except that which lies upon the surface. And, on the other hand, a poem which has been thought out several strata down below the surface of obvious suggestion must necessarily present salient points of form not immediately acceptable to the cursory reader. Whether Mr. Lowell has justly hit the mean here must remain a matter of individual opinion. Our own opinion we have already expressed.

The series of related pieces, to which we now come, have a personal interest that is a part, and a large part, of their literary interest. They must be autobiographic in their reference, and if this is so they must refer to the death of Mrs. Lowell. It complements the sad satisfaction which these melodious cries of anguish inspire to know that it was not the idealizing of the husband or of the poet alone that made the lost one worthy of being thus commemorated in song. Mrs. Lowell was to others also, we believe, what she seemed to Mr. Lowell. "The Windharp" sounds a note prelude to the four following poems, which, together, compose a tetralogy of musical sorrow, in which the sorrow is almost too much and too sharp for the music. "*Auf Wiedersehen*" is unspeakably tender with the "tender

grace of a day that is dead." It is reminiscent of a parting scene between the two, at which, as Mr. Lowell says exquisitely, they "played at pain" in that sad-sweet transfigured past before they were married. Her half-doubtfully repeated *Auf Wiedersehen*, on that occasion, magnetic with meaning unexpressed, seems afterward to have become a talisman of memory between them, and it is the motive of the poem.

The second poem of the series has this occasion: The husband, left lonely by the loss of his wife, revisits the little gate where the heartsome German farewell was first spoken memorably by her, and there recalls the more recent parting

When the weak
And fading lips essayed to speak,
Vainly, "We meet again!"

This second poem is beautifully entitled "Palinode." The vivid words just quoted occur in it. It deals with the forward distance, too, having prospect as well as retrospect.

The third poem follows, like a shriek of anguish that refuses to be sung. The very title has the hopeless wail of Electra in it. It is "After the Burial." The desolate man sits down with despair, and almost angrily repels consolation:

Communion in spirit! Forgive me,
But I, who am earthy and weak,
Would give all my incomes from dreamland
For a touch of her hand on my cheek.

That little shoe in the corner,
So worn and wrinkled, and brown,
With its emptiness confutes you,
And argues your wisdom down.

"The Dead House" takes its occasion from a visit to the dwelling where they had lived together.

* * * * *

But, I think, the house is unaltered,
I will go and beg to look
At the rooms that were once familiar
To my life as its bed to a brook.

Unaltered! Alas for the sameness
That makes the change but more!
'Tis a dead man I see in the mirrors,
'Tis his tread that chills the floor.

To learn such a simple lesson,
Need I go to Paris, or Rome,
That the many make the household,
But only one the home?

'Twas just a womanly presence,
An influence unexpressed,
But a rose she had worn, on my grave-sod,
Were more than long life with the rest!

* * * * *

"A Winter Evening Hymn to my Fire" is a piece of capricious fancy, prevailingly cheerful, as seemed to befit the theme, which, nevertheless, sinks at the close into this exquisitely pathetic cadence of memory and regret:

Thou sinkest, and my fancy sinks with thee:
For thee I took the idle shell,
And struck the unused chords again,
But they are gone who listened well;
Some are in heaven, and all are far from me:
Even as I sing it turns to pain,
And with vain tears my eyelids throb and swell.

* * * * *

Earth stops the ears I best had loved to please;
Then break, ye untuned chords, or rust in peace!
As if a white-haired actor should come back
Some midnight to the theatre, void and black,
And there rehearse his youth's great part
'Mid thin applauses of the ghosts:
So seems it now: ye crowd upon my heart,
And I bow down in silence, shadowy hosts!

This poem and the "Al Fresco," in the same volume, are kindred in motive and manner with some of Mr. Emerson's verse, which, however, seems to us to surpass Mr. Lowell's experiments in "lithe perpetual" elusive changefulness of fancy, and in successful expression. Mr. Emerson is a more natural pantheist than Mr. Lowell, and makes a better Magian.

Last in the volume, if the "L'Envoi" be excepted, comes the "Commemoration Ode," a poem recited on occasion of the exercises held at Harvard, in honor of the patriot dead who fell from among the alumni of the University during the war. This poem is to be held responsible for Mr. Bayard Taylor's recent "Dedication Ode" for the Gettysburg National Cemetery,—a not ungraceful echo of the

original. Mr. Lowell's "Commemoration Ode" is the most elevated in aspiration of all his poems, and the attainment, if not absolutely equal to the aspiration, is by no means unworthy of it. The ode scarcely escapes anywhere a certain localizing color, appropriate when you consider the occasion for which it was written; but a little embarrassing when you are wishing to put the poem in the company of the greatest works of its class. The genius of the poet seems throughout to be striving in vain to expand a limited subject to heroic proportions. At least, the success is at no point positive success until we reach the episode of allusion to Abraham Lincoln. The prolonged strophe that constitutes this episode seems, indeed, the Kohinoor, to which all that precedes and all that follows is magnificent setting. There are almost no blemishes in the perfection of this noble passage. We quote it entire:

Such was he, our Martyr Chief,
Whom late the nation he had led,
With ashes on her head,
Wept with the passion of an angry grief:
Forgive me, if from present things I turn,
To speak what in my heart will beat and burn,
And hang my wreath on his world-honored urn.
Nature, they say, doth dote,
And cannot make a man
Save on some worn-out plan,
Repeating us by rote:
For him her Old World moulds aside she threw,
And, choosing sweet clay from the breast
Of the unexhausted West,
With stuff untainted shaped a hero new,
Wise, steadfast in the strength of God, and true.
How beautiful to see
Once more a shepherd of mankind indeed,
Who loved his charge, but never loved to lead;
One whose meek flock the people joyed to be,
Not lured by any cheat of birth,
But by his clear-grained human worth,
And brave old wisdom of sincerity!
They knew that outward grace is dust;
They could not choose but trust
In that sure-footed mind's unfaltering skill,
And supple-tempered will,
That bent like perfect steel, to spring again and thrust.
His was no lonely mountain-peak of mind,
Thrusting to thin air o'er our cloudy bars,
A sea-mark now, now lost in vapors blind;

Broad prairie rather, genial, level-lined;
 Fruitful and friendly for all human kind,
 Yet also nigh to heaven, and loved of loftiest stars.
 Nothing of Europe here,
 Or, then, of Europe fronting mornward still,
 Ere any names of serf and peer
 Could Nature's equal scheme deface;
 Here was a type of the true elder race,
And one of Phylarch's men talked with us face to face.
 I praise him not; it were too late;
 And some innate weakness there must be
 In him who condescends to victory
 Such as the Present gives, and cannot wait,
 Safe in himself as in a fate.
 So always firmly he:
 He knew to bide his time,
 And can his fame abide,
 Still patient in his simple faith sublime,
 Till the wise years decide.
 Great captains, with their guns and drums,
 Disturb our judgment for the hour,
 But at last silence comes;
 These all are gone, and, standing like a tower,
 Our children shall behold his fame,
 The kindly-earnest, brave, foreseeing man,
 Sagacious, patient, dreading praise, not blame,
 New birth of our new soil, the first American.

Such poetry as this makes one wish that somehow the customs of the republic could have devolved the task of building a national monument in verse, to the memory of Abraham Lincoln, upon a laureate poet like Mr. Lowell. An entire ode, of suitable length, inspired to the "higher mood" of this one strophe, would have been accepted by every race and every generation of men as a fit immortality for Lincoln's name, and as an adequate expression of the transformed heroic temper of the times that set him forth to the view of history. As it is, this brief passage will probably survive everything else that has been written on the subject, and form, and nobly form, the destined traditional estimate of Lincoln's character.

We know of nothing else concerning Lincoln at once so genial and so just, so deep in penetration and so carefully happy in expression, so compact and so comprehensive, unless it be a little speech of Mr. Emerson's to his fellow-citizens at Concord, on the occasion of the assassination. We hope some biographer of Lincoln will take the pains to rescue this precious bit of prose from the oblivion that is

always likely,—almost certain, indeed,—to overwhelm such chance-dropped words.

If we descend to verbal criticism,—we are half-ashamed of ourselves not to be above it in the presence of workmanship so splendid,—we are conscious of some slight disturbance of perfect satisfaction at coming upon coinages like “innative,” “disvoiced,”—coinages not so felicitous as to be their own sufficient vindication. “Brood” and “breed” are linked, by usage, with associations too ignoble to make them wholly agreeable in application to men. We can easily understand how Mr. Lowell may even have meant to flout a taste, judged effeminately finical, by using these very words. But it affects us as if it were a trick of language, rather than the natural utterance of a genuine quasi-scornful masculinity. It is to us a little flaw in the finish of the work to have “in’t” made conspicuous by being matched for rhyme with “stint.” Mr. Lowell has a weakness for compounding words, and this ode has not escaped. In the strophe quoted, it seems a false antithesis to say of an Homeric shepherd of the people that he

loved his flock, but never loved to lead,—

a modesty characteristic enough of Lincoln, but hardly so of an ideal shepherd. Was it in the highest key of “noble anger” to write the strophe beginning, “Who now shall sneer?” It strikes us as too much a condescension in a strain of passion so august and transcendent.

The strophe numbered “IX” attempted a very difficult achievement. The thought in it is sublime; and if the expression of the thought had been perfectly successful, the passage would be as noble as anything that we know in the whole range of poetry. Perhaps there is a certain prolixity of expression, in the course of which the thought almost gets sublimated sheer away from us. What was it that embarrassed those strong wings, and hindered that aspiring flight from quite gaining its high goal? We believe that it was nothing but the lack of that hardness of vigor which only exercise gives. Original strength needs to have been trained long, by arduous use, in order to bring such soaring adventures fairly to their aim. The humored caprice of the close of the ode, the self-checking spirit of humility taking fresh headway again and bursting forth in a peal of joyful pride unrestrained, is quite like Tennyson’s “Ode on the Death of the Duke of Wellington.”

No other college in the country had the choice among its alumni of so many prominent names in poetry and in eloquence, to illustrate its patriotic memorial services, as had the University at Cambridge.

The alumni of Harvard number a very large share of the chief reputations in our American republic of letters. This noteworthy disparity in favor of Hartford is to be accounted for, in part, by the antiquity of its foundation, and, in part, by its numerous list of graduates. But not wholly. Yale is nearly as old, and the number of its alumni is nearly as great. But the contrast between these two colleges, in respect to their proportion of literary celebrities, is striking. We have been at the pains to run carefully over the catalogues of both from the year eighteen hundred down. We should say that Harvard outnumbers Yale, at least three to one, in names of eminent literary men. There must be reasons for this. One reason, perhaps, is found in the fact (it is a fact, we believe,) that Yale drew its patronage, for many years, in greater proportion from the South; while Harvard recruited its classes more from New England, and especially from Massachusetts. Scholarship and literature were never the leading ambition of the ingenuous South; and, besides, New England, and by eminence Massachusetts, boys enjoyed the inestimable advantage of a far better preparatory training.

Another reason, however, we are compelled to believe, must lie in the different manner in which Yale and Harvard have manned their departments of belles-lettres instruction. Second-rate abilities and second-rate culture cannot occupy the chair of rhetoric for a long series of years, at a seat of high education, without registering an appropriate effect in the intellectual character and development of the students. On the other hand, genius and accomplishments, like those of a Ticknor, a Longfellow, a Lowell (the illustrious triumvirate of recent succession in the chair of elegant literature at Harvard), cannot preside over the literary studies of a series of classes without impressing a corresponding character upon their intellectual development. It is a capital mistake for boards of college oversight to suppose that they have done the best for the literary education of young men, when they have provided them with an instructor who is willing to go through unlimited drudgery, in the way of minute rudimentary criticism of their essays with the pencil or the pen. Infinitely better, in our judgment, it would be for college classes, if their rhetorical teacher should even, save in exceptional cases, never once *see* the essays of their pupils. This is no place for discussing a point of education, and we cannot pause to vindicate our opinion. We scarcely state it, indeed. We baldly suggest it. Stimulus, more than criticism, is what the forming literary mind requires. Vigorous growth can better be trusted, than the most laborious pruning-knife, to give symmetry of form. Besides, only vigorous growth responds

to the pruning-knife with desirable results. The criticism that is applied should be living criticism,—by which we mean oral criticism, in which the criticised writer himself should share as respondent, while the writer's classmates, under stimulating and regulating direction from the head of the department, should take a principal part in it. It is in some such way that the voluntary societies of a college manipulate their members; and many a student will testify that he is more indebted to their influence than to the influence of the regular instruction for the forming of his literary habits. This collectant play of mental faculties in generous social exercise, is worth, for literary discipline, all the dead pen-strokes that could be strewn on a manuscript essay by the most industrious grammarian in the world. A teacher who can do, has done, is doing literary work of acknowledged value himself, provided always that it be with art, and not wholly by instinct, is the man to teach literary workmanship to college students. Such a man will not be a drudge. And such a man need not be. An ounce of stimulus here outweighs a ton of drill.


But while we thus attribute a deserved preëminence to Harvard University, for its share in the nurture of those minds which have hitherto represented American letters, a just deduction from its praise remains to be made. The circle of culture which centres at Harvard has done little in the way of such production as is fitted both to endure itself and to produce its like again. Its work has been mainly epideictic work. Its history is likely to turn out more valuable as writing than as history. Its eloquence tends to be rhetoric rather than eloquence. Its poetry seems to be the echo of singing rather than song. As for its theology, that is the empty shell of negation, out of which the positive kernel of gospel has gone. Reverence, as a matter of religion, has mostly disappeared; the decorous affectation of it that remains is a matter of aesthetics. Self-complacency is the broadest trait that characterizes this school of culture. It is a very well-bred self-complacency, and it rallies itself with admirable pleasantry. But it is an evident token of shallowness. The end is easy to predict. The literary sceptre will surely depart from Boston. Puritanism gave the Boston mind a great launch. But the force of that launch will not last forever. New Boston will have to borrow vigor from an earnestness rooted in religion deeper than aesthetics, or the days of its literary dominion are numbered.

"An age too late" is, perhaps, Mr. Lowell's misfortune. The bracing moral atmosphere that blew down on an earlier generation, from the heroic heights of a more religious time, would have suited better with something in the man that allies him to an order of

greatness, toward which the current Boston aspiration is no longer hospitable. Dr. Holmes is the perfectly-contented child of present Boston,—furnished with a complete assortment of easy solutions for the problems that perplex nobler minds, and quite incapable of their unworldly sorrow. But when Mr. Lowell speaks in the dialect of this shallow complacency, he always seems, somehow, to be using a language that is not his mother tongue. He is haunted by doubts, and fears, and guesses, that are not dreamed of in the popular Boston philosophy. Puritanism would very likely have oppressed Dr. Holmes, and quite silenced his chirrup. But Puritanism might almost have made Mr. Lowell a lesser Milton. It is creditable to Mr. Lowell that his moral and his intellectual sympathies are in the noblest sense conservative. That heady radicalism in religion and in politics, which Boston calls progress, has long ago, we believe, left Mr. Lowell in the rear. His present aspect, if we do not mistake, is rather toward a past prematurely forsaken, than toward a future plucked at by rash hands before its "season due." Whatever mutations impend in literary judgment, Mr. Lowell, if one may venture without offence to anticipate the criticism of the future, will always be remembered as one of the greatest and best of that school of brilliant wits who contented themselves with making a transient eddy in the main current of intellectual human activity, the direction of which they might, perhaps, have influenced, and the volume of which they might have contributed, in some degree, to swell.

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BALAAM, THE PROPHET OF SYRIA.

ONE of the most interesting and striking episodes belonging to the early history of the nation of Israel, is the story and prophecies of Balaam, contained in the Book of Numbers, chapters xxii-xxiv. The purpose of the present paper is to inquire what can be ascertained of his life, character, and prophecies. There is a deep fascination in this story, exceedingly provocative of further investigation, though, it must be confessed, that the data for such investigation, looking also to satisfactory conclusions, are few, being limited to the narrative in these chapters, and a few pregnant allusions elsewhere in the Scriptures.

§ 1. His Name, Descent, Nation, and Place.

In pursuing this inquiry, we naturally begin with his name, which, in its Hebrew orthography, is *Bileam* (בִּלְעָם). The spelling of our English Bible is taken from that of the Septuagint, *Baladμ*; that of Josephus is *Balamos*. As to its derivation, Gesenius and Fürst compound it of בָּל and עַם, "not a people; perhaps, same as foreigner;" Vitringa of בָּלָם and עַם, "lord of the people;" while the two principal American writers who have discussed it, Bush and R. D. C. Robins (in *Bib. Sac.*), derive it, after Simonis, from בָּלָם and עַם, "destroyer of the people;" as if with reference to his pretended and supposed malign power. We will say no more than that, whether we consider the form or the signification, the last seems to us the most probable derivation.

Touching the descent of Balaam, we have nothing certain beyond the name of his father, Beor, and what may be inferred from his nationality. The Scriptures afford no place for either father or son in any preserved genealogical register of the times. In the sketch of Idumean genealogy, in Gen. xxxvi, *Bela*, the son of *Beor*, is mentioned among the kings that reigned in the land of Edom. The similarity of name of son, and identity of name of father, might lead one to look for identity of person here, as it has some Jewish writers; but not long. It is not probable that they were even contemporaries; and it is certain that the Syrian prophet could not have been an Idumean king or chief at the time of his appearance in this history, while identity of person would require that he was reigning king, in Edom, at the time of his death.

It is certain that Balaam's place was Pethor, in Syria Mesopotamia, *i. e.*, Syria, between the rivers Tigris and Euphrates.¹ It is fair to presume that this was the residence of his ancestors. If so, he was a Syrian by nation, descended from the same ancestry with Abraham and his descendants, the Israelites, Idumeans, Midianites, and Ishmaelites; and the descendants of Lot, the Moabites, and Ammonites.²

§ 2. Character and Profession of Balaam.

The Apostle Peter gives Balaam the title of "the Prophet," and speaks as if it were appropriate to him before he had uttered the prophecies contained in this history. Undoubtedly, he had assumed this title and vocation, and had a wide and exalted reputation as such in all western Asia. Several expressions in the history clearly indicate that he was a user of the arts of divination and enchantment. In one place,³ he is expressly called a *soothsayer*; a word always taken in a bad sense in the Scriptures, designating those who used arts of divination and magic. The probability is that his pre-

¹ "Pethor, which is by the river of the land of the children of his people." Numbers xxii. 5. This shows that Balaam's home was among his own nation and people. For proof that this was Aram Naharaim, or Mesopotamia, see Deuteronomy xxiii. 4.

² "Balaam belonged to the Midianites, and perhaps, as the prophet of his people [the Midianites], possessed the same authority that Moses did among the Israelites."—*S. L.*, in *Smith's Bib. Dic.* It is not easy to see how such a sentence as this could be deliberately written down, and published in a standard biblical work. The only reason given for the statement is that he is named in conjunction with the five kings of Midian, apparently as a person of the same rank. A slender support of an opinion which runs counter to all the light the Scriptures afford us. Balaam himself says, that he was "brought from Aram, out of the mountains of the East." Pethor, his home, was separated from the land of Midian by the whole breadth of the vast Syrian Desert. He was not the prophet of the Midianites, but was sent for, by them, to do a prophetic service, because they had no prophet competent for it

Joshua xiii, 22.

tensions, as a prophet, were based on his pretended skill and power in the use of these arts. What these arts were, perhaps, we need not attempt to particularly describe. They were never used by the true prophets of God. They are always associated, in the Scriptures, with the worship of false gods; and were forbidden to the Israelites as capital crimes. Those who practiced them used the name of any deity thought most efficacious to accomplish their designs, whether the name of some false god or gods, or the name of the true God. Thus we see Simon, the Samaritan sorcerer, looking on, with wonder, at the miracles wrought by the Apostles, through the name of Jesus, undoubtedly making profession of Christianity that he might employ, in his arts of divination, that same potent Name;¹ and, as another illustration, the vagabond Jewish exorcists at Ephesus, when they saw the miracles of Paul, "took upon them to call over them that had evil spirits the name of the Lord Jesus, saying, We adjure you by Jesus, whom Paul preacheth."²

As idolatry, in some form, had begun to corrupt the patriarchal religion, which seemed to linger longer in Mesopotamia, as early as the call of Abram to leave that country, as it appears still more clearly in the time of Jacob, we may conclude that it was generally prevalent in the time of Balaam. At the same time, we have reason to conclude that the knowledge and worship of God, under the patriarchal forms, which had a clear existence, though corrupted, in the time of Laban, was not wholly extinct in the time of Balaam. It seems probable that, when he set out on his career as a prophet, he acted under this mongrel religion, "swearing by the Lord, and by Malcham," acknowledging the idol gods when that would best serve him, and professing the name of the true God when that would better suit his designs.

§ 3. Balaam's wide reputation as a Prophet, and the grounds of it.

Balaam's reputation as a prophet must have extended from his home, beyond the Euphrates, westerly to the borders of Egypt; and how far east, we cannot tell. The principal scene of his exploits, in this line, must have been in his mountain home, in Aram Naharaim. The greatness and extent of his reputation may, with certainty, be inferred from the fact of his being sent for by the Moabites and Midianites in their then existing terror. Had any prophet or magician, supposed to possess greater power or skill to cope with Moses, been known of in all the Orient, we may be certain he would have

¹ Acts viii.

² Acts xix. 13.

been applied to, and, if possible, obtained, in preference to him. That no other one is mentioned, is pretty conclusive proof that no other one existed, aside from Moses, approaching Balaam in reputation as a prophet. In their pressing emergency, it is plain, no other man was thought of. Balaam must be sent for, and must be obtained, at whatever trouble or expense. And that could not have been inconsiderable, were it limited to the bare sending for him. The distance from the plains of Moab to the mountains of Aram could not have been less than six hundred miles, in an air line, across the Syrian Desert; the actual travelled way was, doubtless, much farther.

It is an interesting and important branch of our inquiry, the consideration of the grounds of that reputation. That extraordinary reputation could never have been gained without some rare native gifts and acquired endowments.

1. He must have been possessed of a large share of native shrewdness and sagacity. This would be an essential prerequisite for any success in the course of life upon which Balaam had entered; and his large success is a sufficient proof of his distinction in that respect. The whole history is a confirmation of this inference. Balaam's ends, as they appear in this history, were base; the means by which he sought to attain them were a sufficient attestation of his sagacious skill. The profundity, at once, of his intellect and of his wickedness, was brought out in clear relief, in the infernal counsel he gave to the Midianitish princes after the signal failure of his attempt to attain the end for which he was sent, by the use of his prophetic gifts.

2. There is no reason to doubt that Balaam had made unusual attainments in the scientific knowledge which was attainable in that age of the world. The science of that day, we know, was comparatively small; and what there was, was kept carefully concealed from the vulgar, within the circle of the initiated, and was known only to those who, as prophets and magicians, used it for the production of supposed magical effects. No doubt, many of the wonders, whereby they secured their power over the multitude, were due to their superior knowledge of nature and her laws. Balaam's residence was nearer Chaldea than Egypt, and those were the two heads and centres of all the scientific knowledge then extant. Moses was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, and there is no reason to doubt that Balaam also was. The elders of Moab and Midian conceived that Balaam alone could match the mighty Moses; they could not have presumed upon that ability in him had he not had opportunity and reputation for skill in Egyptian lore, equal to that of Moses. If

we suppose Balaam, in addition to this, to have drunk into the mystic depths of the wisdom of the Chaldean Magi,¹ this might afford a basis for the hope in the minds of the elders of Moab and Midian that he might prove more than a match for Moses. That the Chaldean learning had an antiquity sufficient to give it this high rank throughout western Asia, as early as the exodus from Egypt, is so far a conceded fact as to need no special investigation in this connection.

3. All ancient prophets were poets; sometimes, also orators. They owed their influence over the multitude largely to their poetic gifts. Moses did not lack the poetic gift, as his song at the Red Sea and the XCth Psalm sufficiently attest; but his oratorical deficiency was so great that he was unwilling to go as the Lord's prophet to Pharaoh and to Israel, until Aaron was associated with him to supply his deficiency in that respect. And Balaam was a poet of no inferior rank. Judging him by the four oracles of his, spoken to Balak and the princes of Midian, we may compare him favorably with Moses, or any poet of the early time. There is not only an admirable poetic genius manifest in them; there is mingled with it a touch of the orator sufficient to suggest the possibility, if not the probability, that oratory may have been one of the gifts whereby he impressed himself on his contemporaries, and in which, if he had any excellence at all, he was probably superior to Moses.

4. To these sources of personal influence among men, which were in themselves legitimate and honorable to him as they would be to any possessor of such means of influence in any period of the world, Balaam added a supposed skill in divination and the myticism of magic arts. If it be said that the history rather intimates than gives any distinct declaration on this point, still the intimations are so clear as to leave no reason for doubt. What the nature of these arts was we need not, as we cannot, precisely state. Probably he practiced divination in connection with sacrifices,² as seems to be intimated in his direction to build seven altars, and prepare seven bullocks and seven rams to be offered; where some account seems to be made of the number *seven* as a mystic number; and mention is also made, in connection with it, of *seeking for enchantments*. No doubt, when it could further his designs, he could use magic arts,—in some

¹ "The Chaldeans were the learned class among the Babylonians, who, by their acquaintance with science, had become its depositaries. They were priests, magicians, or astronomers, as their preference inclined them."—*Rawlinson*. Daniel was skillful in all wisdom, cunning, in knowledge, understanding science, and was taught the learning and tongue of the Chaldeans, and was promoted by Nebuchadnezzar to the rank of "Master of the Chaldeans" Dan. i. 4: v. 11.

² Of this matter of divination, as practiced by Chaldean magicians, the prophet Ezekiel gives a graphic picture in Esek. xxi. 18-23.

instances taking advantage of common ignorance by means of his own superior scientific knowledge, and in others employing the deceptions of jugglers, such arts as are referred to when the magicians of Egypt are described as imitating the miracles of Moses. And without doubt, the sorcerers and soothsayers of that day practiced the arts of necromancy, so often alluded to in the Scriptures,—pretended intercourse with the spirits of the dead,—analogous to that which has become so notorious under the civilization of the nineteenth Christian century; and we can see no reason why Balaam should not, as well as other diviners and sorcerers. These various arts were claimed by the practitioner of them, perhaps, also, believed by him, certainly believed and received by the universal public in all the nations where Balaam was known as a prophet, as veritable and supernatural revelations from above, or modes of intercourse with the spirit world, elevating to an influence almost unbounded, the man who could, by these means, win the public confidence. And no doubt the reputation of Balaam was as high in this element of his prophetic profession as in any other.

5. The history gives us undoubted proof of one important ground of Balaam's great influence, perhaps the most effectual of all,—his professed knowledge of Jehovah, the God of Israel, and his pretended communion with him.

That Balaam had some knowledge of God, by his name Jehovah, is certain from the history. When first visited by the elders of Midian, he asks time to consult "Jehovah;" and then, as the result, "Jehovah refuseth to give me leave to go with you." At their second visit, he refers again to "Jehovah," and "the word of Jehovah, my God;" and so invariably in all his explanations to Balak and the elders he uses that name "Jehovah," and sometimes "Jehovah, my God," with a single exception, in which he uses the name "Elohim,"—God.

How Balaam came by this knowledge cannot so easily be known. If, according to a theory accepted by some (in regard to which we must not be understood as expressing an opinion), there were extant among the early worshippers of God original "Jehovistic" and "Elohistic" documents, from which the earlier portions of Genesis were compiled, then the name Jehovah must have been known to the patriarchs, and no reason can be assigned why the knowledge might not have been handed down by tradition in Mesopotamia (which seems to have been the principal seat of the patriarchal religion), though more or less corrupted by the increasing prevalence of idolatry, and so have come to Balaam.

This, however, is insufficient to account for the frequency and persistency with which Balaam uses the name Jehovah in his communications with Balak and the elders. The evidence that that name was known at all beyond the chosen family of Abraham is, perhaps, the minimum quantity. It occurs in Job, in the preliminary and closing history; and is there once put into the mouth of Job,—“Jehovah gave, and Jehovah hath taken away; blessed be the name of Jehovah.” It is never used in the conference, either by Job or his interlocutors; the names of Deity used by them being “El,” or “Elohim,” and “Shaddai,”—“God” and “The Almighty.” Melchizedek, a distinguished example of the patriarchal worship, was priest of “El Eliôn,”—“God Most High.” In that name, not in the name Jehovah, he blesses Abram. On the other hand, Abram takes his oath, in the presence of Melchizedek, to the impious king of Sodom, in the name of “Jehovah El Eliôn,”—“Jehovah, God Most High;” as if to testify that his God, Jehovah, is the God Most High of Melchizedek.

When Abraham’s servant went to Mesopotamia to obtain Rebekah for Issac, he was welcomed by her brother Laban, then a young man, as “blessed of Jehovah;” and again, when an old man, disappearing from history, he appeals, at his parting with Jacob, to Jehovah as witness between them. These two examples will, perhaps, justify the inference that the name Jehovah was not entirely unknown in Mesopotamia, in the time of Laban, while the history would lead to the conclusion that it was not much known, and was seldom used in the patriarchal worship even then. In that very connection, we find him accusing Jacob of stealing his “gods,”—teraphim or images. It is a just inference, from all these references to the patriarchal worship outside the chosen race, that, by the time of Balaam, tradition could scarcely have retained the name Jehovah in Mesopotamia.

It is barely possible that, by a dim, uncertain tradition, almost died out, that name may have come down to Balaam. But were it certain, it would not account for the great importance attached to it by him, nor for his high and emphatic pretensions of a knowledge of and communion with God, as revealed under it. We must seek, from other sources, for the impression of that name upon him; for his attempt to use it to increase his power as a prophet; and for the evident increase of his influence and power over the minds of his contemporaries from its use by him.

God told Moses that he revealed himself to the fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, by his name “El Shaddai,”—God Almighty; but

by his name Jehovah he was not known to them.¹ That is, as we must understand this language, not that they had never heard of or used that name as a designation of God, but that they had known it only as a name; they had not known it in a real, practical, efficacious sense; they had no knowledge of the might, the efficiency, the glory inhering in that sacred name. This Israel was yet to learn; and the same wonders that would teach it to them would impress it upon Egypt and upon all the neighboring nations. And, accordingly, with every announcement of a new prodigy upon Egypt, it was also announced, "The Egyptians shall know that I am Jehovah." Those prodigies in Egypt, culminating in the destruction of Pharaoh and the deliverance of Israel at the Red Sea, produced a mighty effect upon all the tribes from Egypt, to and beyond the Euphrates; an effect ever growing, up to the time of Balaam's appearance in the history. Through all those idolatrous nations, Jehovah was a proud and preëminent name, among all names that were worshipped. Moses, in his song at the Red Sea, predicts the amazement and terror it would inspire among all those tribes. Jethro, Moses' father-in-law, expresses the general conviction among all the nations when he says, "Now I know that Jehovah is greater than all gods: for in the thing wherein they dealt proudly he was above them." Very strong and emphatic is the expression of Rahab, the harlot, to the same point, "We have heard" what Jehovah has done for you, and "your terror is fallen upon us; for Jehovah, your God, he is God in heaven above and in earth beneath." All the wonders in Egypt were a manifest war between Jehovah and the gods of Egypt; in all of which he was, with the greatest apparent ease, and with the most complete and triumphant success, conqueror. And so, on from that time till the appearance of Balaam upon the scene, all the wonders connected with Israel, and all their national exploits, were in the name of Jehovah. In that name they had fought with Amalek and prevailed; with Arad, the Canaanite of the South, utterly destroying them and their cities; with Sihon, the Amonite, and with Og, the giant of Bashan, and with the same results.

All this Balaam, who was seeking and intermeddling with all the wisdom within his reach, must have been familiar with. Not merely by the fame of it, which must have reached Pethor, in the mountains of Aram, but, as he must have done if our estimate of him is correct, as the result of particular inquiry and investigation, so as to obtain the authentic facts. And now, looking at all this from his own standpoint, what effect would it be likely to have upon him? The

¹ Ex. vi. 3.

earlier and most amazing of this astounding series of events, we suppose, found him in the pursuit of his purpose of setting up himself in the vocation of a prophet and a magician, intent upon everything which would further his plan. He had mastered the Chaldean wisdom. He had penetrated the mysteries of Egyptian science. But here was a name greater than Bel or Nebo; greater than Baal, Chemosh, or Moloch; greater than Apis, Isis, or Osiris. Greater, not only in his own conviction, but in the estimation of all the peoples he wished to influence. A meagre and insufficient knowledge of God Most High had come to him in the dim traditions of the land of his birth. But these events had more clearly defined, intensified, and fixed it, with firm conviction in his mind, as could never have otherwise been. It had been a revelation to him of God by his name Jehovah. And now, what course would such a man as Balaam, with such a purpose in view, be likely to take? In what way would he be most likely to further his plans of life? In what way would he be likely to secure the widest and strongest influence as a prophet and magician? Above all, how would he be most likely to make his theosophic schemes most effective for the acquisition of pelf, which seems to have been the ruling aim of his life? In no way but to do just what he most clearly did do,—set up the pretension of an intimate knowledge of Jehovah, a worship of, and communion with him. It is not necessary to suppose that he did this in an exclusive sense, renouncing, like Jethro, the worship of the false gods of the nations. From his point of view, and that of all the nations among whom he proposed to exercise his powers, there was nothing inconsistent in the claim of ability to conjure with them, too, when circumstances made it expedient, as well as with the name of Jehovah.

On such a basis as this, we conceive, Balaam may have gained that wide reputation as a prophet and a magician which he very clearly had when he appears in the Israelitish history. That he had an exalted reputation in that line, exceeding any contemporary of his in all western Asia, unless Moses were an exception (which was a point yet to be proved to those nations), is clear from the history. Unquestionably, he was deemed a true prophet of Jehovah, not in an exclusive sense, as *we* know Moses was,—such an exclusive sense was not, in their view, necessary,—but in a sense which, in the estimation of those heathen tribes, would secure for him all the power such a relation could in any sense imply. We have no reason to doubt that Balak expressed the general confidence when he sent to him his request, “Come, curse me this people: for I wot that he whom thou blessest is blessed, and he whom thou cursest is cursed.”

§ 4. How far could Balaam be considered a true prophet of Jehovah?

Balaam, as we have already noted, is once designated by the title of "the prophet."¹ So Hananiah, contemporary with Jeremiah, is called "Hananiah, the prophet," in the same chapter, in several of the same verses, and in the same form of expression that Jeremiah is called "Jeremiah, the prophet;"² but what kind of a prophet he was, the connection clearly enough shows. He had the profession and reputation of a prophet as truly as Jeremiah had. He may have been in higher acceptance and repute as a prophet among his contemporaries than Jeremiah. Just so, Balaam had the profession and reputation of a prophet as truly as Moses had, which was sufficient to justify the application of that term to him, without such application, even by an inspired apostle, furnishing any proof that he was a true prophet of God.

Balaam was also called "the soothsayer,"³ a name never used of true prophets. It is evident that Balak did not expect or desire Balaam to act counter to the will of Jehovah, his professed God. What was desired of him was that he should bring the will of God into conformity with their will; and this he was expected to do by means of enchantments and arts of divination. The power to do this was believed to belong to the class of men among which Balaam must evidently be reckoned. And this very thing he manifestly hoped and attempted to do, and by these very means. After repeated vain efforts, as if abandoning those attempts in despair, he exclaims, "Surely, there is no enchantment against Jacob, neither is there any divination against Israel!" And when Balak, unwilling to abandon his scheme, leads him to another place, expressing the hope, "Peradventure, it may please God that thou mayest curse me them from thence," Balaam, willingly complying, his wish perfectly agreeing with Balak's, still cannot but see that "it pleased the Lord to bless Israel;" and then, it is said, "he went not *as at other times* (as he had before done) to seek for enchantments,"⁴ but resigns himself a mere passive instrument to utter the words which God put in his mouth.

All this shows what sort of prophet he was. His own words prove that he was, by profession, a true prophet of Jehovah. And this was precisely the point which recommended him to Balak as a fit instrument for accomplishing his designs. But his practice shows

¹ II Pet. ii. 16.

² Jer. xxviii.

³ Josh. xiii. 22.

⁴ The phrase undoubtedly implies the meeting or seeking an interview with the Lord, for the purpose of making him propitious to his designs, by certain ceremonies of a cryptic or mysterious nature, known as *divinations*, or *auguries*,—practicing, in private, those cabalistic arts which were common to sorcerers.—*Bush on Num.* xxiv. 1.

that the means whereby he claimed to obtain revelations from God, and power to influence his will, was the use of enchantments, incantations, and divination,—arts which formed a grand line of distinction between false or heathen prophets, and the true prophet of Jehovah.

There is no difficulty in believing that Balaam deluded himself into the belief that he was a true prophet of God. No clearer example can be found in all history of the most complete hypocrisy, the grandest self-delusion. But there is an immense difficulty in any sound mind's believing that the Holy Ghost, as a spirit of inspiration and prophecy, could dwell in such a man as Balaam was. In his outward life, he may have been moral and irreproachable, according to then existing standards; but the perfect rottenness of his heart is plainly enough revealed in his history here, and in other allusions to him in the Bible. Three times he is presented to us in the New Testament, in all of which we see the same unmistakeable features, photographed by three different inspired artists. Peter gives him as the type of men who, "as natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed, shall utterly perish in their own corruption; spots and blemishes, sporting themselves with their own deceivings; having eyes full of adultery, and that cannot cease from sin; beguiling unstable souls; having a heart exercised with covetous practices; cursed children."¹ Jude classes him with Cain and Korah, and describes those of whom he is given as the type as "clouds without water, carried about of winds; trees whose fruit withereth, without fruit, twice dead, plucked up by the roots; raging waves of the sea foaming out their own shame; wandering stars, to whom is reserved the blackness of darkness forever."² Of the same character, though with less fulness of description, is the reference in the letter to the church in Pergamos.³

That God did, in particular instances, make revelations, through men not known to have been regenerate, in dreams, or some other involuntary way, must be admitted, and the fact is not without difficulties. But that a holy heart and life was an essential prerequisite of true prophetic inspiration, and a divine, as well as human, recognition of one in the prophetic office, not only our moral instincts, but the word of God plainly teaches. When Isaiah was called to the prophetic office, by a vision of the Lord with the seraphim in his presence, his first impression, as an insuperable obstacle, is his own unholiness. His objection was removed by one of the seraphim taking a live coal from off the altar, and laying upon his mouth, saying, "So this hath touched thy lips, and thine iniquity is taken away, and thy sin purged." And then to the call, "Whom shall I

¹ II Pet. ii. 12-22.

² Jude 8-13.

³ Rev. ii. 14.

send, and who will go for us?" he readily responds, "Here am I; send me."¹ The declaration of Jeremiah's sanctification from his birth precedes that of his ordination to the prophetic office.²

Balaam then was a professed prophet of the Lord, and a professed magician, soothsayer, diviner. The latter profession, *we* know, was inconsistent with the former, though his heathen contemporaries did not. The latter profession was his real character, in addition to an amazing corruption and wickedness of heart. But though no true prophet of God, did he not utter words of true and elevated prophetic inspiration? He certainly did; and in a sense and form which, in some respects, has no parallel in the Scriptures. In these four recorded oracles, we must say with Chalmers, "He is made the involuntary instrument of further revelations (in addition to those communications connected with his going with Balak's messengers), and what he now utters when the Spirit of God came upon him is in the very highest style and strain of lofty inspiration. We cannot fix on any portion of Scripture that bears a nobler or more sustained elevation than those effusions poured forth by Balaam."³ But that God ever spoke by Balaam before the messengers of Balak visited him, that he ever did after the delivery of the last of those four recorded oracles, there is no evidence whatever; and the presumption that he did, in the face of the immense difficulties involved in it, is utterly inadmissible.

§ 5. Balaam's knowledge of Hebrew Literature.

We have expressed the belief that Balaam sought and obtained, by his own personal attention, definite and authentic knowledge of the nation of Israel, both in their relation to Egypt and in their preceding history. We think we find traces of this in his prophecies,—evidences of an acquaintance with the earlier Hebrew literature. It is not necessary to the support of this theory that there should have been any written Hebrew literature previous to the exodus. Undoubtedly, before any written history of their race existed, the main facts were perfectly familiar among them by current tradition. And especially those matters of so much importance to them, the blessings spoken to their leading ancestors by their respective immediate progenitors, in the lofty strains of prophetic poetry, must have been carefully preserved in memory, passed from mouth to mouth, essentially as originally spoken, and as now extant in the Book of Genesis. That Balaam had a knowledge of these poems, we think we find very probably indicated in his own prophetic poems, recorded in Numbers;

¹ Isa. vi. 5-8.

² Jer. i. 5.

³ In Bush.

and if this is certain, we regard it as also morally certain that he had such a definite knowledge of the condition of the Hebrew race in Egypt, and their preceding history, as a philosophical observer would be likely to gain.

We shall best exhibit this evidence by setting down, in parallel columns, the passages which suggest each other in the earlier Hebrew literature, and in Balaam's prophetic odes. Those of his which seem most nearly a verbal repetition of the earlier, we will give from the Hebrew, as well as the common version:

I will make thy seed as the dust of the earth: so that if a man can number the dust of the earth, then shall thy seed also be numbered.

Gen. xiii. 16.

The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between his feet, till Shiloh come.

Gen. xlix. 10.

Judah is a lion's whelp; from the prey, my son, thou art gone up.

Gen. xlix. 9.

He stooped down, he couched as a lion, and as an old lion; who shall rouse him up?

גָּרַץ רָבַע גְּאוֹנוֹ
יִקְלֹא מִי יִקְמוֹ

Gen. xlix. 9.

Cursed be every one that curseth thee, and blessed be he that blesseth thee.

אֲרִיךְ אֲרִיךְ
יִקְבְּרֶךָ אֲרִיךְ

Gen. xxvii. 29.

Who can count the dust of Jacob, and the number of the fourth part of Israel?

Num. xxiii. 10.

There shall come a star out of Jacob, and a sceptre shall rise out of Israel.

Num. xxiv. 17.

Behold the people shall rise up as a great lion, and lift up himself as a young lion: he shall not lie down till he eat of the prey, and drink of the blood of the slain.

Num. xxiii. 24.

He couched, he lay down as a lion, and as a great lion: who shall stir him up?

כָּרַע שָׁכַב כְּאֵרִי
יִקְלֹא מִי יִקְמוֹ

Num. xxiv. 9.

Blessed is he that blesseth thee, and cursed is he that curseth thee.

קִבְּרֶךָ כִּרְךָ
אֲרִיךְ אֲרִיךְ

Num. xxiv. 9.

Perhaps some of these quotations may be regarded by some readers as mere casual coincidences, furnishing little or no evidence of a probable knowledge by Balaam of those earlier prophecies. It seems to us that this cannot be said of those of which we have quoted the

originals. It will be seen that the difference is less in the original than in the translation; in the last example, the verbal agreement being complete, except the transposition of the clauses; and in the other, there being no farther variation than might be expected on the supposition that Balaam's only knowledge of the earlier prophecies was derived from oral communication, and the quotations were from memory,—the glowing words, long latent, leaping from his lips in the ecstasy of inspiration. And if these be admitted as proofs of such knowledge, we may easily admit that that knowledge suggested the similarity of expression in the examples in which it is only similar, and not a quotation.

§ 6. Balaam's Appearance in the Israelitish History.

About forty years before the time of Balaam's appearance as an actor in the history of the Israelites, they had come out of Egypt, after a series of wonders that almost literally destroyed Egypt and amazed the entire oriental world. Under the protection of Jehovah and the leadership of their prophet Moses, they had passed through the Red Sea, which opened to make them a way, while its reflux waves rolled over the pursuing host of Pharaoh; they had gone into the desolate wilderness of Sinai, where, from the lips of Jehovah and through the mediation of Moses, they received a system of legislation such as had been hitherto and elsewhere utterly unknown; they had wandered and sojourned in that black, uninhabitable desert for eight and thirty years, where, according to all human calculation, a few weeks should have witnessed the utter extinction of the whole race, with their immense flocks and herds, and in which every day of their preservation involved a miracle almost as astounding as the wonders that attended and secured their deliverance from Egypt; they had passed on to the Ælanitic gulf of the Red Sea, around the territory of the descendants of Esau and Lot, still skirting the uninhabitable desert, until they came to the territory of the Amorite chieftains, Sihon and Og, upon which they fell with a resistless fury and force, destroying all before them, and taking possession for themselves of their cities and lands; and had finally encamped upon the borders of Moab, apparently considering whether to advance across the Jordan, or turn to their left upon Moab and Midian.

It is not difficult to imagine how all this would affect the princes and people of Moab and Midian. We can easily credit the statement in the history: "And Balak, the son of Zippor, saw all that Israel had done unto the Amorites. And Moab was sore afraid of the people, because they were many: and Moab was distressed because of

the children of Israel. And Moab said unto the elders of Midian, Now shall this company lick up all that are round about us, as the ox licketh up the grass of the field."

This terror which was upon the Moabites and Midianites was a terror of Jehovah, the God of Israel, and of Moses, the prophet of Jehovah and leader of Israel. Jehovah was with them by the visible signs of his presence and glory; while Moses had appeared as the visible prophet of all the wonders which had characterized their exodus from Egypt and their wanderings in the desert, the oracle of all the destruction which had befallen all the nations they had so far encountered, and of all that was threatened to the nations they were yet to encounter. In this situation there seemed but one hope for Moab. It was vain for them to think of contending with Jehovah. So long as he was upon Israel's side the case was hopeless. But could another prophet be found greater than Moses, who was also a prophet of Jehovah, and hence might be presumed to have power with Jehovah, who would take their side against Moses and against Israel, and curse Israel for them, then, Moses being overmatched, Jehovah would cease to be the exclusive protector of Israel, and they might hope to prevail against them. This was manifestly the Moabite scheme. Its utter futility is plain enough to us, but its feasibility was equally plain to them and to all the heathen nations of antiquity, as abundant illustrations from the history of Greece and Rome would show.

Was there any prophet known in the world in whom these conditions could be supposed to meet? None, unless it were Balaam, the son of Beor, of Pethor, in Aram Naharaim. That Balak and his senators had this hope of Balaam, seems evident from the message he sent, from his persistence in seeking his prophetic services, and from the large inducements which he offered him. "Behold," he said, "there is a people come out of Egypt: behold, they cover the face of the earth, and they abide over against me: come now therefore, I pray thee, curse me this people; for they are too mighty for me: peradventure I shall prevail, that we may smite them, and that I may drive them out of the land: for I wot that he whom thou blessest is blessed, and he whom thou cursest is cursed."

Honored and dignified senators—"elders of Moab and elders of Midian"—carried to Balaam, a distance of many scores of miles, this message of the King of Moab; carried also presents worthy of a king in a negotiation with a great prophet and magician,—"*the rewards of divination*." They were received by Balaam in a manner entirely consistent with the character in which the application

was made to him,—that of a prophet of Jehovah. So admirably did Balaam act out this character that we need not doubt he believed himself to be what he professed. "Lodge here this night," was his response, "and I will bring you word again, as Jehovah shall speak unto me." The apparent fact that Balaam, seemingly as a matter of course and wholly without surprise, received, for the first time in his professional career, a real communication from God, may, perhaps, be accounted for on this consideration. He had, no doubt, as a diviner and a magician, passed through so many experiences that to common persons would be strange and unaccountable on any known laws of nature, that he had learned to be surprised at nothing he might meet. Moreover, if he believed himself truly a prophet of God, as it seems probable he did, he must have experienced at different times what he supposed to be divine communications. If so, a communication from God would be no more than he would expect, and consequently not at all surprising to him. And then, as to this great and transcendent fact that God did make real prophetic communications to him, while we cannot admit that he was a true prophet of God, but, on the contrary, was such a man as God could not dwell with and own as a prophet of his, a covetous man, a miserably deluded hypocrite, at heart an atrociously wicked man; still, since he was received as a prophet of God, and as such was applied to to curse those whom God had blessed, we may well consider whether it was not an exigency worthy the divine interposition, in which God should, in a way wholly miraculous, out of the sphere of merely natural psychological laws, make Balaam the involuntary medium of communicating to the enemies of Israel his unalterable purpose of blessing Israel; thus at once glorifying himself by making the wrath of man to praise him, bringing honor to his servant Moses, and protecting his own chosen people.

God came to Balaam at night (in a dream, probably), and asked him what men were with him. Balaam replied, repeating the message sent to him by the King of Moab. God gave him a direct prohibition: "Thou shalt not go with them; thou shalt not curse the people; for they are blessed." In the morning, he sent the ambassadors home to their sovereign who sent them, not, we may observe, with a refusal to go with them, but with the answer that "Jehovah refuseth to give me leave to go with you."

But Balak was unwilling to abandon his favorite project. He sent yet again princes, a larger retinue, and higher in rank, with a still more pressing request. "Let nothing, I pray thee, hinder thee from coming unto me: for I will promote thee unto very great honor, and

I will do whatsoever thou sayest unto me: come therefore, I pray thee, curse me this people." Of Balaam's answer to this we must say, as before, nothing could be more in keeping with the rôle he had undertaken, a prophet of Jehovah. "If Balak would give me his house full of silver and gold,"—here he revealed the passion of his soul,—“I cannot go beyond the word of *Jehovah, my God*, to do less or more." God now permits him to go, with the express announcement to him that he shall speak only the word which God will speak to him. Balaam's heart being after his covetousness, he needs only a hint of permission; and the morning's dawn witnesses the prophet astride of his beast, on his journey to the King of Moab.

On his way, probably early in it, occurred what is commonly treated as the wonder of this narrative. Balaam met by the Angel Jehovah, i. e., Jehovah in his character of Leader and Protector of Israel, as an adversary to him; he, the professed prophet, who afterwards boasted that he had his eyes open, blind to the great sight, while spiritual discernment to behold the theophany was vouchsafed to the proverbially stupid brute on which he rode. This incident demands a brief passing consideration.

We have all known that it is past calculation what freak of exegesis the German mind will develop,—it surely could be no other devised the scheme of explaining this plain narrative of a fact, which, if a fact, must necessarily be wholly supernatural and miraculous, as a vision.¹ Here is a narrative, as simple and direct as can be found between the lids of the Bible, of an event which occurred while Balaam was riding on his way from the mountains of Aram to the plains of Moab. There is no intimation here of any visionary character predicable of it; and St. Peter mentions it as a veritable fact of history. And why should it be called a vision? The history, as a whole, needs this as an essential part of it, and as the key to a right understanding of the main fact in it. Shall we say this is incredible in itself as a fact, and therefore we are forced to devise some explanation which will enable us to escape the conclusion that it is a fact? As a fact, it is not half so incredible that a dumb ass should speak with the voice of a rational man, as it is that a wicked magician should speak with the voice and utter the word of a true and holy prophet of God. This particular narrative is not the great wonder in this history, the point which makes the main draft upon faith. The really incredible thing in this history is that God should

¹ This theory is accepted and defended by two American commentators, Bush and Robbins (in Bib. Sac., and in Smith's Bib. Dict.) A concession to the spirit of rationalizing which seems to us utterly gratuitous and unwise. It is not the only seeming concession which may be found in an article learned and otherwise very able.

should reveal important and wonderful truth through such a character as Balaam. It has no clear parallel anywhere in the Scriptures. It seems contrary to what we learn elsewhere of prophetic inspiration. If any facile interpreter can contrive plausibly to convert this entire history of Balaam into a vision, a parable, a fable, a myth, that might seem something worth while. But since no one attempts this, let us not be guilty of the folly of taking away from the history the one fact which furnishes the key to the one mystery contained in it. Did God give the stupid ass such spiritual discernment as to behold him, when human eyes could not; and did God speak in articulate rational speech through the organs of a brute whose natural voice was a discordant bray? This plainly could have been an exercise of the simple power alone of God, altogether miraculous, altogether out of the sphere of natural law. Then, perhaps, we may think it possible that he might give the hypocritical magician and diviner the broad, the profound, the far-reaching insight, and the lofty utterance of a true and holy prophet of God.

It is granted that the representation of this occurrence as causing no apparent surprise to Balaam, while perfectly in keeping with a dream, is strange in a fact of wide-awake occurrence. Balaam seems to have no surprise at his beast's speaking out in remonstrance at his harsh treatment of her; on the contrary, he carries on conversation with her as if it were quite a thing of course. But we must bear in mind that Balaam was a magician, and as such had passed through strange experiences, we know not what, or how far analagous to this. As before remarked, he may have passed through experiences of such a character as would prevent his surprise at any thing. Besides, this whole history is incapable of understanding or explanation, except on the theory that it all lies within the sphere of the supernatural and the miraculous. Balaam is not to be judged as another man would be; not even as himself. It is doubtful if he was in a normal mental state from the time he set out from his home till this real prophetic episode in his life was over.

§ 7. The final issue of their attempts.

Balaam, as we have seen, went with the princes of Moab. Probably they did not journey in company, as the princes did not seem to be with him when the Angel Jehovah met him. He was not surprised that his beast spoke; but when God opened his eyes and he saw what the brute had seen before, then, indeed, he was astonished. "He bowed down his head, and fell flat on his face." This is, probably, what he alludes to in the two last of his prophetic odes, when

he speaks of himself as "seeing the vision of the Almighty, falling, and having his eyes open."¹ He confessed his sin in persisting to go after the prohibition first given him, and proposed to turn back if it was displeasing to God. Again God permits him to go, and again enjoins him to speak only the word he shall bid him. He completes his journey, but meets Balak in the sole, ostensible character of a prophet of God. He says to Balak, "Lo, I am come unto thee: have I now any power at all to say anything? the word that God *putteth into my mouth*, that shall I speak." Balaam then spoke the exact truth, and expressed the precise relation of his prophecies to the divine inspiration. If ever the comparison of clay in the hands of the potter would apply, this was the precise relation of Balaam to God in these prophetic utterances. He had no power to follow his own will; yet his will was active in all these events. His will was to curse; this was his wish all the time; and it does not appear that he abandoned it until, having twice attempted it in vain, compelled to bless when seeking to curse, he submitted and spoke the words of prophetic blessing which God put into his mouth, without farther seeking to do the opposite.

The whole account of these prophecies shows that Balaam made his pretension of being a prophet of Jehovah a capital point. It shows, too, that he considered it necessary to propitiate Jehovah; that he sought to do it in hope of thereby obtaining the desired permission to curse. But notwithstanding the blindness and darkness of his mind in attempting to seek God, and influence his will by incantations and enchantments, it pleased God to meet him, and show how far he was above the reach of all these counsels of wickedness, and how able he was to make all those abominations praise him. God met Balaam even then, when he boldly urges his plea for permission to curse. He said, "I have prepared seven altars, and offered upon every altar a bullock and a ram," as if this were a sufficient reason why God should fulfil his wicked will. God put a word in his mouth, and said, "Return to Balak, and thus shalt thou speak." He went, and in beautifully flowing poetical numbers he spoke the words of blessing. Balak hears with astonishment. "What hast thou done unto me? I took thee to curse mine enemies, and behold, thou hast blessed them altogether." Balaam, in reply, expresses his utter helplessness in God's hands,—Must I not take heed to speak that Jehovah hath put in my mouth?"

Balak leads him to another point of view, and begs him to try again, with which he, nothing loth, readily complies. The same pro-

¹ Num. xxiv. 4, 16. "Into a trance" supplied after "falling" in E. V. without authority.

cess of sacrifice and divination is repeated, and again God met him and put a word in his mouth. Balak asks, "What hath Jehovah spoken?" He hears the word more decided and pronounced than before. In bitter vexation the disappointed king exclaims, "Neither curse them at all, nor bless them at all!" Again the prophet protests, "Told I not thee, saying, All that Jehovah speaketh, that must I do?"

But Balak, though so bitterly disappointed, still unwilling to yield his cherished purpose, leads him to another place, with the expressed hope, "Peradventure, it will please God that thou mayest curse me them from thence." Again Balaam directs him to build the prescribed altars and offer the sacrifices. But despairing of success, he abandons his previous attempts at enchantments and divinations, and looks abroad upon the camp spread out as a panorama before him. The Spirit of God came upon him, and he speaks even in more measured and elevated poetic strains. Balak can endure no more. His "anger was kindled," and in his rage "he smote his hands together." "I called thee," he exclaims, "to curse mine enemies, and behold, thou hast altogether blessed them these three times. Therefore, now flee to thy place: I thought to promote thee unto great honor; but lo, Jehovah hath kept thee back from honor!" Balaam reminds him of the positive word he first gave his messengers,—“If Balak would give me his house full of silver and gold, I cannot go beyond the commandment of Jehovah to do either good or bad of my own mind; but what Jehovah saith, that will I speak.” Before he departs he calls upon Balak to hear his closing oracle,—probably the last word of genuine prophecy he ever uttered; a prophecy wide and far-reaching in its application, extending, without doubt, literally down to the "latter days." Having uttered this, it is said, he "rose up, and went and returned to his place: and Balak also went his way."

Thus ended this great attempt to compass national ends by spiritual power; this attempt to overmatch a prophet of God by a prophet of Belial, and so overcome the people of God. It was a miserable failure. Ruined in his reputation as a prophet, Balaam probably returned to his home soon after his last prophetic utterance; yet probably not until he had given Balak and the elders the advice which is hinted at in several places in the Scriptures. He had failed in bringing injury to Israel by asking counsel of God; he now turns for counsel to the devil in his own corrupt heart. Though he cannot successfully curse, he knows that God's curse will be upon them if they fall into gross sensual and idolatrous sin. He judges that, with

a sufficiently attractive temptation set before them, they will do for themselves what all his and Balak's malignity combined could not do. With the foul and degrading rites of the worship of Baal-peor, under the enticing lead of the beautiful and princely daughters of Midian as that temptation, it would be sure to work with a most desirable success, as it did, to the destruction by God's avenging plague, of many thousands of the people.

Balaam's end was a fulfilment of his own prophecy. Blessing Israel by a divine, over-ruling constraint, when his heart and his will were to curse, he received the curse he himself had denounced against the curser of Israel. When Israel, by divine direction, armed and marched against Midian to avenge the destruction which the diabolical counsel of Balaam had brought upon them, the wicked contriver of it all, who, no doubt, came back to claim the reward of his wisdom, was among them to share in the execution of the just judgment of God. Probably the promotion which he sought he gained, and was recognized as one of the princes of Midian. If he shared their honor, he shared also their fate. He who, like many a stubborn sinner since, could say, with no doubt a measure of sincerity, "Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his," uncircumcised lay down with them that were slain with the sword, and bore his shame with them that go down to Sheol. With sinners he cast his lot in life, and with them his soul was gathered at death.

And here we cannot refrain from recurring to another of his prophecies,—his last; the most profound, the most far-reaching, and the most worthy of careful study, of his four prophetic odes. The oldest expositors, both Jewish and Christian, and the best, of all periods, are surely right in seeing here a prophecy of the Messiah. But it is such a vision of the Messiah as such a man as Balaam might have contrasted it with the view that Job had, "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand in the latter day upon the earth." Job's vision was clear. Balaam's vision, too, is of "the latter days." But it is not clear. He does "not now see" the Messiah; and he sees him not as "my Redeemer." Only as Conqueror, only as Judge, does he see him, in which character alone will he ever know him, in which character he certainly will see him, as he himself seemed to understand and testify. "I shall him,"—I *shall* see him, most assuredly!—"but not now,"—oh, not now, and at no time when I shall wish to see him! "I shall behold him, but not nigh," oh, never nigh! Ever afar off my Conqueror, my Judge! And as he goes on and depicts that Star which shall come out of Jacob, that Sceptre which shall rise out of Israel, it is ever a conquering King, overthrowing

obstinate and persistent foes; never a Redeemer. And as he sees the farther progress of that kingdom, he exclaims, "Alas! who shall live when God doeth this! And ships shall come from the coast of Chittim and shall afflict Ashur, and shall afflict Eber, and he also shall perish forever,"—where is a distinct prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans; which is the New Testament type of the second advent of Messiah, the final judgment and overthrow of all the enemies of Christ. With a most fit and appropriate sadness does Balaam close his prophetic utterances, "He,"—all opposers of Jacob's Star and Israel's Sceptre,—"*he also shall perish forever!*" So the prophet himself sings his own hopeless requiem.

J. T. SMITH.

WARWICK NECK, B. I.



EXEGETICAL STUDIES.

"Restore unto me the joy of thy salvation; and uphold me with thy free spirit: then will I teach transgressors thy ways; and sinners shall be converted unto thee."—PSALM li. 12, 13

THE words "thy ways" are susceptible of two interpretations. They may mean either the ways in which God would have men walk, the method of life pleasing to him, or God's own ways, his ways of dealing with transgressors when they repent and seek his mercy.

In this verse, there can be no doubt that the latter is the true meaning. The forgiven sinner goes forth, not to preach God's law, but his Gospel; not to tell how man ought to live, but how wonderfully God deals with the guilty. To do this successfully, the joy of a conscious salvation is necessary, and the indwelling of the free, unconstrained, unbought, willing spirit. Out of the fulness of his own experience the redeemed sinner speaks of that marvellous grace, as much above all man's thoughts and ways as the heavens are high above the earth which comes to one of great and acknowledged guilt (v. 3); a guilt which is not merely the result of sudden temptation, but flows from a sinful nature (v. 5); and teaches him confidently to look for forgiveness (v. 9); for a renovation which shall surpass the spotlessness of the untrodden snow (v. 7); for a happiness which shall find appropriate expression in song (vs. 12, 14, 15); for usefulness in the conversion of others (v. 13); and for the privilege of intercession for Zion at large (vs. 18, 19). Let any one consider the sin of David and its aggravation, and then what God taught him to pray for and expect, and see what a theme he had in "God's ways," and how appropriately he might look for the conversion of sinners when God's glorious, gracious character was made known.

"A bruised reed shall he not break, and smoking flax shall he not quench, till he send forth judgment unto victory."—MATT. xii. 30.

In this chapter the enmity of the Jewish nation against Christ culminates. Henceforth Christ pursues a new method of instruction, and devotes himself to gathering out of Israel those individuals to whom God would reveal the true character of the Saviour, and who would constitute the *ekklesia*. The nation rejects their Messiah, and is doomed. Accordingly, in this chapter, Christ utters those fearful words concerning the climax of guilt, the unpardonable sin, declares the condemnation of the generation who had listened to his teachings and would not believe, and in the well-known words, "Behold my mother and my brethren," severs himself from all mere earthly and national relationships, and announces a new kinship, founded on obedience to the word of God.

By the quotation from Isaiah, of which the 20th v. forms a part, the Evangelist vindicates the course of Christ in evading his enemies, instead of meeting and crushing them, and setting up a national kingdom in spite of their opposition. "Then the Pharisees went out, and held a council against him, how they might destroy him. But when Jesus knew it, he withdrew himself from thence: and great multitudes followed him, and he healed them all. And charged them that they should not make him known: That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias, the prophet, saying,

"Behold my servant, whom I have chosen;
My beloved, in whom my soul is well pleased;
I will put my spirit upon him,
And he shall show judgment to the Gentiles;
He shall not strive nor cry;
Neither shall any man hear his voice in the streets.
A bruised reed shall he not break,
And smoking flax shall he not quench,
Till he send forth judgment unto victory.
And in his name shall the Gentiles trust."

Not from any fear of his enemies did Christ retire from before them, nor from any apprehension of their rage; they were but bruised reeds and smoking flax, powerless and contemptible; but in accordance with prophecy, and to accomplish God's yet unfulfilled designs. Their judgment was certain, but it would not be executed till he should send forth judgment unto victory,—then sweeping them out of his way, in his name should the Gentiles trust. When the Lord came to destroy the Jewish polity, at the destruction of Jerusalem, he removed the one great hindrance to the free proclamation of the Gospel among all nations. The evident purpose of the quotation is not to show Christ's wonderful tenderness, which would not be evinced by his retiring into the wilderness and prohibiting the publication of his miracles, but to meet the objection which would be naturally brought against Christ's declining a contest with his foes, and to show that this was the predicted method by which the Messiah was to establish his kingdom.

In the Old Testament, the emblematic meaning of a reed is very ob-

vious. I. Kings xiv. 15, "For the Lord shall smite Israel, as a reed is shaken in the water, and he shall root up Israel out of this good land, which he gave to their fathers, and shall scatter them beyond the river, because they have made their graves, provoking the Lord to anger." II. Kings xviii. 21, "Now behold thou trustest upon the staff of this bruised reed, even upon Egypt, on which if a man lean, it will go into his hand and pierce it: so is Pharaoh king of Egypt unto all that trust on him."

The matchless grace of our Lord is everywhere declared in the Holy Oracles; there is no danger that we overestimate it, or proclaim it too earnestly; but neither the words nor the context will allow us to use this verse to illustrate Christ's infinite tenderness.

"And they went forth and preached everywhere, the Lord working with them, and confirming their words with signs following. Amen."—MARK xvi. 20.

The number of the QUARTERLY for July contains an article from the pen of Dr. Broadus, of Greenville, S. C., on the genuineness of the passage Mark xvi. 9-20. His examination has referred to the style of the disputed passage, and most persons will be content to accept it as a part of the evangelical narrative on the evidence which he adduces.

There is, however, further evidence of its genuineness to be deduced from the fitness of the mooted passage as the close of this special Gospel. If we regard the passage as spurious, the Gospel closes with the flight of the women from the empty sepulchre of Jesus, and the reason therefor, "for they were afraid." Such a termination would strike an attentive reader as very abrupt. The Gospel itself would seem to be incomplete; and this incompleteness would be almost painfully felt.

The words which we have quoted above, the last verse of the disputed passage, furnishes a fitting close to this Gospel, in which Jesus is represented as the Servant of God, the mighty Worker. In verse 19, we are told, "He was received up into heaven, and sat on the right hand of God." It might have appeared from this that he entered into rest, that his work was done. But verse 20 continues the representation. It says that the disciples "went forth and preached everywhere," a real working band, treading in the footsteps of him who had been depicted as the Servant of God, abounding in work. Then it advances yet further, and tells us that the Lord himself, though seated at the right hand of God, was still "*working with them*, and confirming their words with signs following." That character which Jesus maintained throughout the Gospel he maintains still, when the Evangelist is about to lay aside his pen. After such a statement, we can close the book with a devout "Amen," feeling that no more need be added to the portraiture which the sacred writer designed to present.

G. W. A.



NOTICES OF BOOKS.

The Four Gospels: translated from the Greek Text of Tischendorf, with the various Readings of Griesbach, Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles, Meyer, and others; and with Critical and Expository Notes.
By NATHANIEL S. FOLSOM. Boston: A. Williams & Co. 1869.
12mo. pp. 476. \$2.25.

Those who have no other test of the worth of any version of the Scriptures than the narrow criterion of its fitness to be a substitute for the one in common use, will find little to attract them in the work of Mr. Folsom. Translation, according to Dr. Newman, is "a problem how, two languages being given, the nearest approximation may be made in the second to the expression of ideas already conveyed through the medium of the first. The problem almost starts with the assumption that something must be sacrificed, and the chief question is, What is the least sacrifice?" The answer to this question will depend greatly upon the design of the version. If it is to be received and daily read by the common people, it must be good idiomatic English, at whatever cost of nice distinctions and shades of meaning. Men of higher education, whether classical scholars or not, will value versions made on a different principle, conformed more to the Greek than to the English, and will find them of great benefit in many ways.

In the translation before us, Mr. Folsom, formerly an orthodox Congregational clergyman, now a Unitarian, and for several years a pro-

fessor in the Meadville Theological School, has sought to express every Greek word by its exact equivalent in English, giving in general the proper force of the subjunctive, and always of the aorist, and preserving, when the English idiom will allow it, the many instances of broken, heterogeneous, blended, defective and redundant structure, and of construction of sentences. The work is done with care, and will repay study. Some of its renderings are more than usually happy: Be wary as serpents, and unsoiled as doves, gives very exactly the Saviour's meaning. The disciples were to be exposed to the most intense hostility, and our Lord's injunction is to take heed that there be no *personal* ground of offence; that they avoid, with the utmost care, every occasion of objection, except that which would arise from the Gospel. The distinction between *ἐν* and *γάρ* is carefully preserved; *ἐν* never being translated "for." So, also, discrimination is made between *αγαθός* and *καλός*, the latter being rendered "fine," "choice," "excellent," etc., except in Matt. v. 16, where, by an oversight, we presume, "good" is found. In common with the Bible Union, *μακάριος* is rendered "happy;" it seems desirable to retain in an English version the distinction in the original between *μακάριος*, *εὐλογητός*, and *εὐλογημένος*. We wish that the same attention had been paid to some other words which our language allows us to distinguish, and which have carefully marked meanings in the usage of the sacred writers, but which all versions confound, such as *ἔργον* and *κόπος*, *οὐκ* and *οὐ μή*, &c. *ἑταῖρος* is rendered "my good friend," which is Liddel and Scott's definition, but hardly expresses the New Testament signification. *Εἰς*, in the commission, Matt. xxviii. 19, is translated "unto;" Noyes, Alford, Green, Ainslie, "into;" Bible Union, "in," which we prefer to either of the others. In accordance with his principle, Mr. Folsom brings out, more clearly than any other translator within our knowledge, what he conceives to be implied in the Greek: Matt. ii. 12, "Having received response in a dream;" ii. 13, "When they had withdrawn;" iii. 14, "But he tried to hinder him;" iii. 17, "This is my beloved Son, with whom I became well pleased." Some of his renderings seem to us indefensible; Matt. xvi. 22, "And drawing him aside, Peter began to chide him, saying, Merciful [will he be] to thee, Master: this will not befall thee." Particularly is this the case with the Gospel of John, the translation of which is less satisfactory than that of the others; i. 9, 10, "The true Light which enlightens every man continued coming into the world. It was in the world, and the world through it arose into being, and the world knew it not." The text which is chosen as the basis compels, in some instances, quite a departure from the standard version. Luke xxiv. 17, "And he said to them, What are those words which you are exchanging with one another as you walk? And they stopped, with a sad countenance." Alford, "And he said unto them, What manner of communications are these that ye have one to another, as you walk? And they stood still and were sad." Noyes, "And he said to them, What discourse is this which ye have one with another, as ye are walking? And they stood sad." Ainslie, "And he said to them, What are these words that ye exchange one with another, as ye walk?"

and they stood with sorrowful countenances." Luke ii. 14, is given, "Glory in the highest to God, and on earth the peace of his good will among men." Noyes, "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace among men of good will." Alford, "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace among men of good pleasure." Green, "Glory in the highest realms to God, and on earth peace among men of graciousness."

The table of various readings, comprising nearly fifty closely printed pages, is very valuable to the English student. The Notes are worthless, *e. g.* :

Jonah in the sea monster's belly. Regarding the book of Jonah as poetic, it is unnecessary to take the account of his being thrown overboard and swallowed by a sea monster, as any thing more than his getting into trouble, in consequence of fleeing from duty. Every man who flees from duty gets swallowed by a whale. * * *

It is a remarkable feature that the demoniacs so readily recognized Jesus, and owned him as the Son of God. Many of them were, probably, religious men, become insane through the excitement of the times; and there is nothing more common than deep religious sensibility and acuteness of discernment among this class of persons. * * *

"My Master and My God," are two different exclamations: The one of recognition of his Master, and faith in Him; the other of deep, reverent wonder. The last exclamation, "My God," was not a mere idle word, but a sincere lifting up of his soul to God, Lord of all Power and Might, and Source of all Good.

Historical Memorials of Westminster Abbey. By ARTHUR PENRHYN STANLEY, D. D., Dean of Westminster. Second and Revised Edition. London: John Murray, Albemarle street. 1868. 8vo., pp. 632.

Annals of St. Paul's Cathedral. By HENRY HART MILMAN, D. D., late Dean of St. Paul's. London: John Murray, Albemarle street. 1868. 8vo., pp. 538.

The two great ecclesiastical buildings of London have been fortunate in being in charge of persons so admirably qualified to write their history as Deans Stanley and Milman. Dr. Stanley is well known, even beyond the guild of scholars, for his pictorial skill as an historical artist. Some years ago he did a similar service for the Cathedral at Canterbury, the cradle of English Christianity. Dr. Milman closed the copious historical labors of a long life, and the nearly twenty years' term of his Deanship, with this work, which has passed through the press since his decease. Personal friends, and in close theological sympathy, both of the liberal school, they have continued the parallel in books similar in purpose and subject, and enough alike in appearance to be companion volumes of the same work. And yet they are quite unlike in structure, and style, and treatment of their subjects.

Dean Milman follows a chronological order, and calls his work *Annals*. Dean Stanley is guided by the uses of the Abbey, and gives its *Memorials*. The first has given more prominence to persons and events, incorporating the history of the building with what we may call the ecclesiastical history of St. Paul's. The second, as is natural, has gathered the history round the building, and devoted only the last of his six chapters

to the persons who have been connected with it. Dean Milman has taken the easiest course, and his style has something of the carelessness of a writer drifting with the current. Dean Stanley has wrought up his material with more effort and art, and distributes his subject into its natural divisions. Both of them write with the love which it is natural not only for a minister to feel for the venerable house over whose worship he presides, but for the shrine of so many ancient, and stirring, and sacred memories.

For these structures touch English history at some of its memorable points, and it is the historical setting in which they have been put which gives these volumes such a charm. They are historical quite as much as they are ecclesiastical edifices. For eight hundred years, from William the Conqueror, at Christmas, 1066, to Victoria, June 28, 1838, thirty-seven times, at least, has the Abbey opened for the coronation of English royalty. Dean Stanley's second chapter is the brilliant story of these scenes. But coronations are transient events. The history of the Abbey is in its tombs. From Edward the Conqueror, who founded it, to George the Second, it was the usual receptacle of the royal dust of England, the dynasty of York being the chief exception. From being at first a royal sepulchre, which it has now ceased to be, it gradually grew to be a burial place for the great citizens of England; and its original dedication to St. Peter, we might almost say its use as a church, has been overshadowed by this secondary consecration of it as the Pantheon, the Valhalla, the Santa Croce of English rank and genius.

According to Dean Stanley (p. 365), it was not at Aboukir, but at Cape St. Vincent, that Nelson went into battle with the exclamation, "Westminster Abbey or victory." He was buried, however, under the centre of the dome in St. Paul's. For with a statue to John Howard begun the dedication of this new Valhalla for English worthies. In the old St. Paul's (three times has fire desolated or destroyed it) there were some monuments, none of any royal person, and only one of a poet, Sir Philip Sidney. The new structure of Wren needs the interior decoration of tablets and monuments to relieve its spacious bareness. But it lacks the charm which antiquity and history give to the Abbey. The great historic interest about St. Paul's, so well illustrated by the pen of her scholarly Dean, is in its connection with the varying fortunes, the exciting conflicts of English Christianity. "In St. Paul's was the first public appearance of the earliest champion of religious freedom, the rude apostle of principles which, matured, refined, harmonized, were to make a revolution in half Europe," John Wycliffe. (p. 76.) Dean Milman devotes his sixth chapter to Dean Colet, the friend of Erasmus, and a kindred spirit. In the Cathedral, in 1535, nineteen Anabaptists were tried, most of whom were condemned and burned. Twenty years after, her own Bishop Ridley, and one of her canons, "the worthy proto-martyr of the English Church, John Rogers," went to the flames. "Paul's Cross was the pulpit not only of the Cathedral; it might almost be said, as preaching became more popular, and began more and more to rule the public mind, to have become that of the Church of England."

(p. 163.) Strangely enough, it was destroyed under Cromwell, at the time when the tongue of the English Reformation was entirely unloosed, and might have been supposed to be all ready to fill such a throne of power. It will be one of the best memories of St. Paul's in the days of Dean Milman's administration that it was opened for public worship on a large scale, and that such immense congregations, under its lighted dome every Sunday evening heard the word of life. A curious account is given (pp. 283-289) of the abuses allowed in the precincts of St. Paul's, especially in the times of Elizabeth. She was obliged to prohibit fighting within its walls by special penalty. During her reign the lotteries were drawn at the west door. Though this seems tolerable, when we remember that over one-fourth of the expense of building the venerable First Baptist Meeting-house in Providence was defrayed by a lottery. The walls of the church were lined with advertisements, not always the most decent; it was the unrebuked trysting-place of profligates and ruffians; and it was made a thoroughfare not only for citizens carrying gross wares, but even for leading horses and mules. Indeed, the beautiful portico of Inigo Jones, on the old church, "was designed, not merely as an ornament and completion to the Cathedral. It was intended for an ambulatory, or Paul's walk, on the exterior, not in the interior, of the sacred building, to relieve the Cathedral itself of the profane and inveterate abuses which it seemed hopeless to suppress entirely." (p. 339.)

The Abbey, according to Dean Stanley, gave origin to the House of Commons. "As the building of the new St. Peter's at Rome, by the indulgences issued to provide for its erection, produced the Reformation, so the building of this new St. Peter's at Westminster, by the enormous sums which the King (Henry III.) exacted from his subjects, to gratify his artistic or his devotional sentiment, produced the House of Commons." (p. 421.) From 1282, even to the last day of the life of Henry VIII., the Commons sat within its walls. Here also, in the chapel of Henry VII., and in the Jerusalem chamber, for five years and a half, through eleven hundred and sixty-three sessions, sat that famous assembly of divines, taking their name from the Abbey and linking it to a work in their Catechism and Confession of Faith quite incongruous with the ritual worship and the prelatical authority with which the building has been associated through all but that brief period in its history. (pp. 485-490.) Here also the Thirty-nine Articles of the Anglican Church were signed.

As one reads the charming story of these edifices, so intertwined with the history of the English Church and crown, and finds them changed in administration, and the Abbey especially in its use, and yet standing in substantial grandeur, and appropriated to the service of the existing religion after the flight of almost a millenium, the wonder rises whether they are to survive all coming changes, and especially that disestablishment which, sooner or later, seems destined to overtake the church, which has held them so long. They would not be preserved through many ages as monuments, however sacred, after they had ceased to serve

the uses of a living religion. Their funds would be turned to other uses. And a religion unestablished and voluntary would be likely to find them unadapted to its service, and cease to sustain them. Still such institutions, and even such edifices, have very firm foundations, and as they have survived religious revolutions, feeling their influence, and exerting a reflex one, and thus harmonizing with the new age, so they may continue, linking all the centuries of Christianity in England together, and only perishing in that final convulsion which Macaulay has imagined, "when some traveller from New Zealand shall, in the midst of a vast solitude, take his stand on a broken arch of London Bridge to sketch the ruins of St. Paul's."

Studies in Philosophy and Theology. By JOSEPH HAVEN, D. D., Professor in Chicago Theological Seminary. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1869. 12mo., pp. 502. \$2.00.

In this volume are found eleven essays on Philosophy and Theology, most of which have been published in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*. The work is divided into two parts. The first part contains *Studies in Philosophy*; Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton; *Mill versus Hamilton*; The Moral Faculty; Province of Imagination in Sacred Oratory; The Ideal and the Actual. The second part contains *Studies in Theology*; Natural Theology; Doctrine of the Trinity; Theology as a Science,—Its Dignity and Value; Place and Value of Miracles in the Christian System; Sin as related to Human Nature and the Divine Mind; Arianism,—The natural development of the views held by the early Church Fathers. Professor Haven's style is perspicuous, and his statements lucid; and while there is nothing new or profound in these discussions, they are of interest as a part of the history of philosophy. We give an extract from the article on Hamilton

Whatever may be the strict philosophical meaning of the term *infinite*, it is evident that in its common theological use, as applied to Deity, we employ it in a sense different from that now mentioned. To call any being or thing infinite, in the sense of wholly unlimited, is to bring together contradictory ideas; for a being or thing is a limited object, one out of, or in distinction from, many; something definite, and therefore the opposite of the infinite. Yet we do, and must, think and speak of God as infinite. What do we understand, then, by the term as thus employed? Not, surely, the sum of all existence, the *τὸ πᾶν* or *τὸ ἅλον*, the absolute whole of things; but, on the contrary, a being who, *out of himself*, finds no limit; none save such as his own being and nature necessarily suppose; none save those implied in the very term and idea of being. We mean that his duration is unlimited, his power unlimited, his every attribute and perfection unlimited; in a word, that there is none greater, and that he himself cannot be greater by the addition of any quality or attribute which he does not already possess. This is the idea we form of God, when we think of him and speak of him as infinite; and in this, then, is involved no contradiction. Still our thought, even in the modified sense now given, is not a positive, but only a negative conception: we do not represent to ourselves as a positive object of thought, much less do we comprehend, this infinity of the Divine Being. We approach it only by negations, and we express it accordingly. We cannot positively think the infinite, but we can refuse to think the finite; and this we do when we say God is infinite.

Dr. Haven frankly confesses that his views of the nature and guilt of depravity are not those which have most widely prevailed among theologians. We gladly believe that the time will never come when such theories of righteousness and sin will meet the wants of the great body of Christians. Roots deeper than these are needed for the strong growth of Christian experience.

The Scripture Testimony to the Holy Spirit. By JAMES MORGAN, D. D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 8vo. 494 pp. \$3.60.

Lectures on the New Testament Doctrine of the Holy Spirit. By W. KELLY. London: W. H. Brown. 12mo. 351 pp. \$2.50.

The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit; or, Philosophy of the Divine Operation in the Redemption of Man. Being volume second of The Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation. By JAMES B. WALKER. Chicago: Church & Goodman. 12mo. 241 pp. \$1.50.

The work of Dr. Morgan consists of the substance of a series of sermons, running through three years, delivered by a pastor to the people of his charge. He divides them into four parts,—“The Testimony to the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament;” “The Testimony of the Gospels to the Holy Spirit;” “The Testimony to the Holy Spirit in the Acts of the Apostles,” and “The Testimony to the Holy Spirit in the Epistles and Revelation.” The history of its origin would lead one to expect in the work a degree of amplification which is out of place in a theological treatise designed only for perusal in the study. It will be found interesting and useful, both to the minister and to the general reader.

Mr. Kelly's Lectures are confined to an examination of the teachings of the New Testament. They are oral lectures, delivered in London, and printed from the short-hand writer's report, with some revision by the author. Mr. Kelly shows that he has a fair mastery of his subject; and the exegetical and logical power which he displays makes us regret that he should have been in such haste to publish. Were he to prune and condense the preparatory portion of his lectures, and to elaborate carefully his views on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, we feel confident that he would confer a great benefit on all real students of the Word of God. Even in its present form it is a contribution which such students will value. His view on the Baptism of the Holy Spirit, and his examination of the doctrine of the Friends on the Spirit, are worthy of special attention.

The volume of Mr. Walker has a specific object,—to present the philosophy of the divine operation in the redemption of man. It does not profess to grapple with the subject in all of its length and breadth. The secondary title expresses his comparatively limited purpose. The main title should have been entirely omitted. Perhaps, had the author been fully impressed with its vast scope, he would have spared us the necessity for this criticism. The work itself is, like its title, somewhat too pretentious, and rather too curt and sketchy in its style. Yet it has many acute thoughts, and embodies many eminently suggestive remarks.

A pastor may glean from its pages valuable hints to aid him in his pulpit preparations, and in his personal dealing with souls.

A thorough work on the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, in its widest comprehension, is still a desideratum. The doctrine needs to be traced throughout the whole of the Bible, from the first of Genesis to the last of the Revelation. There is no one theme in the whole range of Scriptural truth which more earnestly invites the patient, devout labor of a student of the Word. This is the dispensation of the Spirit. That Spirit is the source of all spiritual life, of all spiritual growth, the Revealer to men of the glory of Christ Jesus, the Lord. It is to be hoped that the grandeur and importance of the theme will command the labor of some one with a clear, penetrating, sprightly intellect, and an humble, devout, glowing heart, to do it more ample justice.

Lamps, Pitchers, and Trumpets. Lectures on the Vocation of the Preacher. By EDWARD PAXTON HOOD, Minister of Queen Square, Brighton, author of "Wordsworth; an Æsthetic Biography;" "Dark Sayings on a Harp," etc. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1869. 12mo., pp. 453. \$1.75.

A series of lectures delivered to the students of Mr. Spurgeon's college. Every other lecture is a pulpit monograph, and the book is full of spicy anecdotes, new and old, illustrating every order of pulpit eloquence.

The Office and Work of the Christian Ministry. By JAMES M. HOPPIN, Professor of Homiletics and Pastoral Theology in Yale College. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1869. 8vo. pp. 620. \$3.50.

This volume is designed by the author as a text-book for theological students, but seems to us better adapted to ministers than to the classroom. While it lacks the vigor and stimulus of Shedd's Homiletics, it is sensible and suggestive, and gives proof that it is the work of a thoughtful and experienced pastor.

A Letter to the Alumni of Dartmouth College, on its Hundredth Anniversary. By NATHAN LORD. New York: published by Hurd & Houghton. 1869. 8vo., pp. 89.

Of the whole number of the Alumni of Dartmouth College,—four thousand seven hundred and fifty-nine in all the departments, as by the last Triennial,—more than half were graduated during Dr. Lord's term of office as President. Having held such special relations to the great body of those interested in the recent centennial, it was fitting that he should tender them the compliments of the occasion, and recall some of those principles which had been the subject of their common investigations. With his accustomed earnestness, the earnestness of deep conviction, he discourses in this pamphlet on the peculiar responsibility which Christianity now imposes upon educated men. Our readers will

be interested in his comments on the controversy between Presidents Hopkins and McCosh upon the ground of moral obligation, and we hope will agree with him in the great fact that the throne of the moral universe can be nowhere else than in God.

Both these excellent men would doubtless subscribe to the Christian precept: "Whether ye eat or drink, or whatever ye do, do all to the glory of God." God has that claim upon us. It is our duty to glorify him. But the question arises, What is the ground of the obligation? Why should we glorify God? Dr. Hopkins, according to his critic, would say, Because my faculties are adapted to that duty, and in performing it, my faculties will be in harmony, and I shall be happy. Dr. McCosh would say, Because to glorify God is self-evidently right, and that is the beginning and end of the matter. Both have a show of truth, because, on the one part, to glorify God will certainly, as a natural consequence, produce enjoyment, on the whole; and because, on the other part, to glorify God, that being his command, is certainly right. But both are short of the mark, because enjoyment,—the great figure of the one, though personal and actual,—is unworthy; it virtually dishonors God by dividing his glory with a creature; and because right, or rightness,—the great figure of the other,—is a mere abstraction,—impersonal and—nothing. The one loses sight of God in the enjoyment, and virtually makes God nothing. The other loses sight of him in a mere intellectual image which, being nothing and put in the place of God, makes him less than nothing. As Christians they would both glorify God, and be saved, though possibly only by fire, because of the wood, hay, and stubble which they build upon their foundations. As philosophers they are lost, not merely and essentially, but in their metaphysics,—that cloud-land where so many wise men have lost their reckoning. Their speculative zeal betrays them. As Christians they keep in the sunlight. As philosophers the mist covers them, and, so shrouded, they might stumble, and cause others less Christianized to stumble fatally on the dark mountains. "This," to use Dr. McCosh's pertinent language, "is the logical consequence, and if not drawn out by themselves, it will be drawn by others; and the history of philosophy shows that what follows logically will, in fact, follow chronologically, when the system has had time to work and show its effects."

Is there not a more excellent way which, because it is not philosophical but Christian, is the only way for us if we would attain to the true end of life? Why should I glorify God? Not because it is useful or agreeable, though it be so; and not because right, though it be so; but simply because he is God. There is nothing more ultimate than the Alpha and Omega, the personal I AM. Nothing else practically is ultimate and unconditioned. My sense of God is instinctive. My sense of obligation to him is also instinctive. They are self-evident; and it would be a question for the philosophers whether, but for these self-evident and universal truths, we should have even any abstract ideas of the right, or the good, or beautiful, or true, and be other than a more accomplished variety of brutes. However that may be, these instincts are within us. They are, as it were, a part of the conscious soul, which natural and revealed religion does but educate and draw out into a clearer light, and settle in a more profound and operative conviction; and which, because it is religion and binds us to a personal God, produces practically an effect which is impossible to philosophy. It brings us into the Divine presence, into personal relations to a personal and eternal Sovereign,—an authority than which nothing could be more unconditioned, absolute, and final, and with which certainly neither happiness nor rightness, nor any other real or imaginary good, could be compared.

The Dogmatic Faith; an Inquiry into the Relation subsisting between Revelation and Dogma, in eight lectures preached before the University of Oxford, in the year 1867, on the foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton, M. A., Canon of Salisbury. By EDWARD GARBETT, M. A., Incumbent of Christ Church, Surbiton. Rivingtons, London, Oxford, and Cambridge. 1869. 12mo., pp. 307.

By "dogma" is meant a positive truth in contrast to an opinion, a conjecture, or speculation. Scripture asserts the existence of an organ-

ized and formal body of truth, which is complete in itself, and admits neither of change nor of addition; the authority due to this faith is the authority of God; and the Church is entrusted with the maintenance and defence of the truth. In the history of the Church are two great conflicts: the first and preparative is the trial of outward persecution; the second is the warfare against internal error. The latter is incomparably the more difficult and crucial. "The elements entering into the acceptance and maintenance of truth are very complicated. They lie in the intellectual as well as the moral sphere of human action. They afford room, as the other conflict does not, for honest question and sincere hesitation. The man challenged either to curse the Saviour or to endure for his sake, could not possibly doubt the nature of the issue submitted to him. But the man called to discriminate between the true teaching of dead Apostles and the false glosses of living heresiarchs has a much more difficult problem to solve. The conflict no longer appeals to the obvious claims of duty, but reaching into the inner sphere of conviction, shakes faith on its first and lowest foundations. The struggle is not less really a struggle, and does not appeal the less urgently to manly fortitude and courage; but rather it tasks them to a nobler exercise and carries them into a higher sphere. To stand firm to principle amid reproach; steadily to separate truth from its temporary counterfeits; to resist ridicule and the strength of language, often substituted for strength of argument; to throw on one side accusations of narrowness and ignorance, irritating as they are to a just self-respect; to rise superior to periodic fluctuations of opinion as ceaseless as the ebb and flow of the sea; and amid these various influences to maintain, with singleness of heart and undistracted accuracy of eye, the truth of God, is the most difficult of all conflicts and the most glorious of all victories."

In the discussion of his subject, Mr. Garbett shows that there is a historical faith identical in all ages, that its origin can only be accounted for on the supposition that it was revealed; that the amount of the religious influence is exactly apportioned to the definiteness of the religious belief; that the dogmatic faith is far superior to speculation in its objects, methods, and instruments; that it is indispensable to all true civilization, indispensable to conscience; and that the believer is under the highest obligation to defend and maintain it. The work is well and thoroughly done.

In a discussion of the comparative claims of the Faith and of the intuitions, the author remarks:

From the time of Christianity down to the present moment not one solitary shred of religious truth has been added to the dogmatic faith. Yet during this period human reason has labored at the problem with every conceivable advantage. It took the question up at the point already reached by the wonderful philosophy of the pre-Christian era. All the stores of ancient thought and learning were there to assist it. It has pursued the inquiry amid a blaze of light reflected from the whole body of dogmatic truth contained in the Christian Scriptures. Should the Divine authority of these books be rejected, yet so large a mass of dogma must contain some germs of truth, some sparks of heavenly light, some suggestions to assist the mind in its own inquiries. Moreover, these twenty centuries have culminated in an increase of human knowledge beyond all other periods of the world. The discoveries in physical science, the triumphs of an audacious genius and a fearless adventure,

the achievements of skill and industry, have been so wonderful as almost to excuse the intoxication of success, and to remove all surprise that science should occasionally forget herself. Yet amid it all, at a time when almost every day brings a discovery in the sphere of the Seen, not one solitary shred of a discovery has been made in the sphere of the Unseen.

The New Affinities of Faith: a Plea for Free Christian Union. By JAMES MARTINEAU. Boston: William V. Spencer. 1869.

This little brochure sets forth a scheme of Christian association, interesting to the careful observer of the times both from its intrinsic character and from its source. For it seems to have originated with Mr. Martineau, whom we look upon as one of the most significant authors of the age. He is a leading minister among the Unitarians of England, and Principal of their Institution for the training of candidates for the ministry, called Manchester New College, in London.

As a preacher, we are not aware that he has attained to great celebrity, though very highly esteemed by those who, without much regard for orthodoxy, particularly appreciate freedom and profundity of thought. His writings consist principally of contributions to the *Westminster*, the *Prospective*, and *National Reviews*, and are distinguished by great breadth and thoroughness of learning, by originality and vigor, by vivid interest in the great life questions of recent speculation, and by a free and teeming imagination; all evolving itself through a style of uncommon power and splendor. His splendor, indeed, is rather in excess, and one cannot help wishing, now and then, that something of this had been sacrificed for the sake of a trifle more of clearness and simplicity. Such faults are quite exceptional, but frequent enough to make the want of perfect mastery over the matter in hand, or at least of a corresponding serenity of thought, felt as a serious deficiency in what is otherwise a most commanding and admirable style. Some allowance must doubtless be made for the abstruse nature of the subjects which he loves to handle, but the example of Sir William Hamilton, and other well-known metaphysicians, shows that it is quite possible to discuss even such themes plainly, if one be not ambitious to teach what cannot be communicated to finite creatures, nor by such be distinctly known.

The theological position of Martineau is decidedly rationalistic. A few years ago it seemed conspicuously so, but such has been latterly the "progress" of the "liberal" theologians among his brethren and elsewhere, as to give him a kind of conservative character in comparison. Without wantonly assailing the plenary authority of the Scriptures, he exhibits more than a careless indifference touching the trustworthiness of much of their miraculous narrative; and while ranking them as a chief power in the moral and religious education of the race, while indicating a lofty admiration of their pure and elevating spirit, and while apparently receiving the account of our Lord Jesus Christ manifested in the flesh, as given by the four evangelists, he still leaves us in painful doubt whether he acknowledges as real the great culminating and representative miracle of his resurrection from the dead. Such is our

impression after reading such of his essays as have fallen under our eye, these being, for the most part, comprised in the two volumes reprinted in this country by the publisher named above.

At the same time this author stands firmly on the ground truths of natural religion, and boldly wages effective contest with the advanced champions of scepticism who, by their Pantheism, or their Positivism (the two poles of Atheism), threaten the elementary truths of all theology. And in the present posture of the battle, between Christian faith on the one hand, with godless science and superstitious ritualism on the other, we may well rejoice in the aid of such a defender in our inmost citadel. To persons intimidated, or dazzled, or perplexed by the vaunting assaults of Comte, the specious insinuations of Emerson, or the supercilious assumptions of Huxley, or Herbert Spencer, we know few writings more likely to serve as a helpful tonic than some of the essays of Martineau. There, also, the teachings of J. S. Mill are very ably criticised, and the influence of Coleridge, Carlyle, Kingsley, and Maurice, as leaders respectively of religious thought, is carefully estimated, and approved or condemned as the author judges each to deserve.

"The Free Christian Union," treated of in the pamphlet named at the head of this article, is a proposed association of religious people on the ground of a common desire to realize the great command of love to God and to fellow-men. In the preamble, which serves as a constitution for the society, its aim is thus set forth: "This society, desiring a spiritual fellowship coextensive with these terms [the terms of communion with God], invites to common action all who deem men responsible, not for the attainment of divine truth, but only for the serious search of it; and who rely, for the religious improvement of human life, on filial piety and brotherly charity, with or without more particular agreement in matters of doctrinal theology. Its object is, by relieving the Christian life from reliance on theological articles or external rites, to save it from conflict with the knowledge and conscience of mankind, and bring it back to the essential conditions of harmony between God and man." The plea contains, first, an interesting statement of the facts in the present state of Protestant Christianity which are supposed to furnish occasion for a society, additional to the existing churches, in which the members of any of these, without ceasing to be such, may find exercise and culture for their more catholic spiritual affections, so preparing themselves ultimately for a freer ecclesiastical organization, the much-desiderated "church of the future." The pamphlet next defends this scheme from the charge of proposing a new sect with an additional creed, and then answers the opposite objections likely to arise from those, on the one hand, who, with some regard for the real limits of Christianity, complain that the Union, "in making religious fellowship among men co-extensive with the communion of God, ceases to be Christian altogether," and from those, on the other, who, rejoicing in the unscriptural latitude of its embrace, demand that it drop the title of Christian, and honestly declare itself what it is, a theistic association for religious fellowship and the worship of God.

By what rites or practices it is proposed to accomplish the ends of this Union is not stated in the treatise before us; but it would seem to contemplate merely free religious meetings,—congregational church exercises, in short, without the ordinances.

At first blush, one wonders why any thing better than a Unitarian church should be desired for such a purpose. It is evident, however, that many such men as Martineau, disgusted with the scarcely-disguised atheism that runs riot among Unitarians, long for social sympathy and support within the sphere of a distinctly-bounded, though very wide, *Christianity*; and that they hope, by proposing this fellowship outside of existing churches, to draw together, from all the rest the uneasy and more independent spirits on substantially Unitarian ground. The movement curiously ignores that our Lord made provision in the establishment of his church for just those spiritual necessities which are now deplored; a church meant to be wide enough, surely, to embrace all properly called Christian, and efficient enough to cultivate real Christianity to a fitness for heaven. How much better humbly and earnestly to seek for that, and, if necessary, try to restore it from the disorder and decay into which it may have sunk? Yet amid the sad confusion into which that church has plainly fallen in the world, we cannot withhold sympathy from any who may be even blindly, or even inimically, seeking after it, and will pray that some good will come of their effort.

It is said that at the first public meeting of this Free Christian Union, in London, some time last summer, the exercises were shared by a Baptist minister, an Independent, a Churchman, and Martineau himself. The representative men of the Broad Church, however, such as Stanley, Jewett, Colenso, whose coöperation appears to have been specially aimed at, were noticeably absent.

The First Six Books of Homer's Iliad; with Explanatory Notes.

Edited by JAMES R. BOISE, LL. D., Professor in the University of Chicago. S. C. Griggs & Co., Chicago, Illinois. 12mo. \$1.75.

This latest and ripest fruit of the critical scholarship of Dr. Boise, who is well known through his excellent edition of the *Anabasis*, meets a recognized want in the field of classical study.

The aim of the author is to give the learner so thorough an acquaintance with the peculiarities of the Epic dialect as to enable him, after studying this edition of the first six books of the *Iliad*, to read the remainder of the Homeric poetry with comparative ease.

This aim is fully met in the judicious, full, and accurate grammatical notes and references, which are based upon Hadley's and Kühner's grammars, and Goodwin's "*Greek Moods and Tenses*." A careful study of these notes cannot fail to give the student considerable facility in recognizing Homeric forms.

Unlike the editions of Owen and Anthon, which contain numerous

notes on mythology, geography, and ethnology, this edition leaves this part of the study chiefly to the taste and scholarship of the teacher and pupil. The author has availed himself of the latest results of the most critical scholarship of Germany, and, in the explanation of obscure passages and ambiguous phrases, cites the interpretations of the best authorities, leaving, at the same time, the ultimate decision to the learner himself. The entire freedom from a dogmatic spirit is one of the most interesting features of this work. The text is that of Dindorf, and is remarkably free from typographical errors. The entire work is characterized by that accuracy of scholarship and good taste which have given the author's text-books a national reputation.

The depreciation of the study of the classics which is so prevalent in this country, we believe is destined to a speedy reaction; and we may hope that our western professors and publishers will bear a large part in promoting the more general study of the great authors of ancient literature, by furnishing the public with text-books that shall have the directness and simplicity of a genuine practical spirit.

Elements of Latin Grammar for Schools. By ALBERT HARKNESS, Ph. D., Professor in Brown University. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869. 12mo., pp. 156. \$1.25.

Professor Harkness's larger Latin Grammar, published four years since, has been received with a degree of enthusiasm unsurpassed in the history of American text books. The great facts and laws of the Latin language are presented in a form at once simple and philosophical, the rules and principles are stated in a remarkably clear, concise, and comprehensive manner, and all difficult subjects are treated with fulness. It is, without doubt, the best grammar in use. The present work is on precisely the same plan, and "is intended especially for those who do not contemplate a collegiate course of study, but it may be successfully used in any school when, for special reasons, a small grammar is deemed desirable."

A New Practical Hebrew Grammar, with Hebrew-English and English-Hebrew Exercises, and a Hebrew Chrestomathy. By SOLOMON DEUTSCH, A. M., Ph. D. New York: Leypold & Holt. 1869. 8vo., pp. 268. \$2.50.

This grammar is the best yet published in our country, or in our language, for the use of beginners. Composed on the principle of Harkness' first Latin book, it leads the beginner, by easy stages, through the usually bewildering wilderness of Hebrew verbs to a comprehension of the main facts of the language. To those who find themselves rusty in Hebrew, and wish to pursue the study without a teacher; to those who desire to commence the acquisition of Hebrew and cannot procure an instructor, this grammar will be found invaluable.

The rules are generally simple and clear, and the exercises chosen from the Bible present the forms of words most necessary for the beginner to learn. We trust the author will soon issue a new and revised edition, correcting the false references to be found in the exercises, expurgating some of the exercises where forms are presented for which no explanation has been given, and adding a complete Hebrew and English and an English and Hebrew vocabulary of all the words given in the exercises.

M. W. Dodd publishes *Uncle John's Flower Gatherers. A Companion for the Woods and Fields*. By JANE JAY FULLER. pp. 316. A charming volume in which is imparted a great deal of useful information with regard to flowers. *Philip Brantley's Life Work, and How he found it*, by M. E. M., pp. 262. An interesting narrative of the struggles and triumphs of a Christian boy called to the work of the ministry.

The Christian Review for January, 1852, notices a work, "the first, we believe, bearing the imprint of a young publisher whose success will be gratifying to many friends." Nearly twenty years have passed, and the "many friends" of the young publisher, Anson D. F. Randolph, have become a great multitude of the choicest spirits in all Christian denominations, whose attachment any man might value as his noblest possession. We are glad to know that he has achieved success in the most desirable sense of the word, and that, with the increase of his business, his name has become familiar and welcome to the best class of Christian readers. Dr. McIlvaine, of Princeton, pays him a well-deserved compliment in an introductory note to a little volume, recently published by Randolph, entitled *God's Furnace*, pp. 165: "I leave for your inspection a manuscript of spiritual experience, which has lately fallen into my hands. . . . It records the experience of a Christian woman of superior natural talents with respect to the nature and efficacy of prayer, which I know to be genuine, and which I think to be remarkable. I know of no publisher as likely to appreciate its true character as yourself. I have, therefore, submitted it to no other, and shall make no further attempt to get it published, if your judgment should be unfavorable." Mr. Randolph also publishes *The Marriage of the King's Son, and the Guilt of Unbelief: two sermons by the Rev. William James, with some Memorials of his Life*, pp. 142. We have here just enough of Mr. James' writings to excite the desire for fuller specimens of his exegesis and philosophy. His letters are almost perfect in style, and full of attractive spiritual truth. The productions of such a man ought not to be kept from the public.

The American Baptist Publication Society is continually adding to its catalogue of valuable books for the Sunday School Library. Among the latest are *Coster Grew*, pp. 220, by the Rev. Geo. B. Taylor; *Teddy's Dream*, pp. 180; *Maude Maynard*, pp. 287, by Mary E. Koontz. The

recent regretted death of the author of the last named volume extinguished many hopes which had been cherished of her future success and usefulness in the field of religious literature. The daughter of a Presbyterian clergyman, a Baptist from conviction, the child of long and severe affliction, she evinced rare power in the portraiture of character and the enforcement of truth. We recommend *Maude Maynard* to every family where there are children. Our denominational views are clearly presented.

The London Quarterly Review, July: 1. Eastern Christians; 2. Scientific *versus* Amateur Administration; 3. The Malay Archipelago; 4. Keble's Biography; 5. The Argument of Design; 6. The House of Condé; 7. The Royal Engineers and Permanent Fortifications; 8. Lucan; 9. The Truth about Ireland.

The Edinburgh Review, July: 1. The Unpublished Works of Guicciardini; 2. Lecky's History of European Morals; 3. Victor Jacquemont's Letters; 4. Shakspearian Glossaries; 5. John Bull's Alpine Guide; 6. Mrs. Somerville on Molecular Science; 7. The Ring and the Book; 8. Freeman's History of the Norman Conquest; 9. Forster's Life of Landor; 10. The Marriage Law of the Empire.

The North British Review, July: 1. Dr. Hanna's Life of Christ; 2. Henry Crabb Robinson's Diary; 3. History of European Morals; 4. Geological Time; 5. Danish Literature,—Ludvig Holberg; 6. Memoir of Sir William Hamilton; 7. The Early History of Man; 8. Walter Savage Landor; 9. The Irish Church Measure.

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